JUDGMENT Mulla and Yorke, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a proceedings under the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. An application u/s 4 of that Act was made by the principal respondent. Thakur Parmatma Nand Singh, on the 21st of October, 1936. He showed various debts in his written statement u/s 8 of the Act and one of those debts was under a decree in favour of the Maharaja of Dumraon who is the appellant in this Court. Later on, the appellant filed a claim u/s 10 of the Act and he sought so recover a sum of Rs. 14,000 and odd on the basis of two decrees, one No. 4/274 of 1913/1911, dated the 30th of January, 1925, and the other No. 193 of 1911 dated the 30th of September, 1924. The first decree, which was for Ks. 11,470-1-11, was passed by the Privy Council, while the other for Rs. 2,634-1-0 was passed by the Subordinate Judge of Arrah. The applicant, Parmatma Nand Singh, was a judgment-debtor in both decrees along with more than 200 other persons. The second decree namely, No. 193 of 1916, dated the 30th of Sept. 1924, was appealed from but the appeal was dismissed by the Patna High Court on the 13th of January, 1926, for failure on the part of the appellants to deposit printing charges. The appellant, Maharaja of Dumraon, claimed the total amount of both these decrees from the applicant, Parmatma Nand Singh, on the ground that the decrees had been passed jointly and severally against at the judgment-debtors and hence the applicant was responsible for the whole amount of each decree. The applicant pleaded that both the decrees were barred by time. We also pleaded that under the provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act he was entitled to have his liability under the decrees separately apportioned and he then claimed that he was not liable to pay anything under the first decree No. 4/274 of 1913/1911, dated the 30th of January, 1925' inasmuch as the decree had been put into execution against him and the decree-holder had realised a sum of about Rs. 2,000 which was more than the applicant's share. 2. 2,000 which was more than the applicant's share. 2. The learned Special Judge found that the applicant's contention relating to decree No. 4/274 of 1913/1911 that it was barred by time could not be sustained, inasmuch as the application under the Encumbered Estates Act had been made on the 21st of October, 1936, that is, within twelve years from the date of the decree which was passed on the 30th of January, 1925. He found, however, that the decree had been put into execution and a sum of about Rs. 20,000 had been realised from the applicant which represented more than his share of the decretal amount on appointment of liability under the Encumbered Estates Act. The learned/Special Judge further found that the second decree No. 193 of 1916, dated the 30th of September, 1924, was barred by time. Upon these findings, the claim of the appellant, Maharaja of Dumraon has been totally dismissed, hence the present appeal. 3. It was urged in the memorandum of appeal that the Special Judge was not entitled in law to apportion the separate liability of the applicant, Thakur Parmatma Nand Singh, with reference to decree No. 4/274 of 1913/1911. It appears that there were some cases in support of that view but the matter came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Court in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Vishwa Nath Khanna and Others, AIR 1941 All 363 In that case it was clearly held that under the provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act it was open to the Special Judge to apportion the liability of an applicant even under a decree which stands jointly and severally against the applicant and other persons. Learned counsel for the appellant had to concede that in view of the Full Bench case it was not possible for him to contend that the learned Special Judge had no power to apportion the separate liability of the applicant. The learned Special Judge's finding with regard to that decree must, therefore, stand. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant had to concede that in view of the Full Bench case it was not possible for him to contend that the learned Special Judge had no power to apportion the separate liability of the applicant. The learned Special Judge's finding with regard to that decree must, therefore, stand. 4. It has, however, been contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Special Judge erred in law in holding that the second decree No. 193 of 1916 was barred by limitation, inasmuch as an appeal had been filed from that decree to the Patna High Court and that appeal was dismissed on the 13th of January, 1926, so that the starting point of limitation for the execution of that decree was the date of the judgment of the Patna High Court dismissing the appeal. In our judgment this contention is definitely repelled by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (1914) 36 All. 350. In that case their Lordships held that "an order of His Majesty in Council dismissing an appeal for want of prosecution does not deal judicially with the matter of the suit, and can in no sense be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. It merely recognises authoritatively that the appellant has not complied with the conditions under which the appeal was open to him, and that therefore he is in the same position as if he had not appealed at all." We are clearly of the opinion that these pronouncements of their Lordships of the Privy Council apply fully to the facts of the case before us. In this case we are concerned with an order of the Patna High Court dismissing an appeal for failure on the part of the appellant to deposit printing charges. The question is: whether that order can be any stretch of reasoning be said to amount to a decree? In this case we are concerned with an order of the Patna High Court dismissing an appeal for failure on the part of the appellant to deposit printing charges. The question is: whether that order can be any stretch of reasoning be said to amount to a decree? "Decree", as defined in S. 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, means "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit......" Now, in the case before us we find that the appellant in the Patna High Court never invited the Court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties with reference to any matter in dispute between them. The appeal never came up for hearing at all. The appellant failed to take the necessary steps for having the appeal put up for hearing. The order of the Patna High Court dismissing the appeal in those circumstances cannot in our judgment amount to a decree, as contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code. We must also notice here that S. 2, sub-Sec. (2) (b) clearly excludes any order of dismissal for default from the ambit of a decree, as contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code. In our judgment the order of the Patna High Court dismissing the appeal was nothing more than an order of dismissal for default. This view is supported by a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of In Re: N. Kayambu Pillai, AIR 1941 Mad 836 Having regard to the clear pronouncements of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case cited above, it is clear that there was no decree of the Patna High Court in which the decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Arrah on the 30th of September, 1931, could possibly merge. The only decree capable of execution was the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Arrah, dated the 30th of September, 1924, and that there was no decree of any superior Court in which it could be said to have become merged. We were referred by learned counsel for the appellant to the case of Ram Ranbijaya Prasad Singh Vs. The only decree capable of execution was the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Arrah, dated the 30th of September, 1924, and that there was no decree of any superior Court in which it could be said to have become merged. We were referred by learned counsel for the appellant to the case of Ram Ranbijaya Prasad Singh Vs. Kesho Prasad Singh, AIR 1938 Patna 401 In that case the observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council, in the case of Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (1914) 36 All 350 were referred to but were sought to be distinguished on grounds which, we must say with respect, we fail to appreciate. We find further that the authority of that case was doubted in the latter case of the same Court :-- Mt. Dulhin and Others Vs. Harihar Gir and Others, AIR 1939 Patna 607 In our judgment the Privy Council case, to which we have referred, is conclusive on the point. It must, therefore, be held that the second decree No. 193 of 1916, upon which the appellant relied, was barred by time, inasmuch as it was passed on the 30th of September, 1924, and the application under the Encumbered Estates Act was made on the 21st of October, 1986. The result, therefore, is that we find no reason to interfere with the findings arrived at by the learned Special Judge and we accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.