JUDGMENT Bennett and Madeley, JJ. - This is a Plaintiffs' first appeal. The two Plaintiffs are owners of Iqbal Manzil in Wazirganj, Lucknow. The Defendants have built a house on the other side of the lane. They have made some doors and windows in the upper storey of their house which, according to the Plaintiffs, invade the privacy of the zenana. The Plaintiffs brought a suit to make the Defendants close these doors and windows and for a perpetual injunction restraining them from making such constructions. The defences raised by the Defendants are that the Iqbal Manzil is a public Imambara not meant for the residence of ladies; that a road intervenes between the houses so that there is no invasion of the privacy of the Plaintiffs' zanana; that the closing of the doors and windows will make the house uninhabitable; that the Plaintiffs saw these constructions being made and acquiesced by conduct; and lastly that the Plaintiffs can themselves safeguard their privacy. 2. The first issue relates to the question whether the Iqbal Manzil is a public Imambara and has been answered in the negative by the learned trial Court. The second issue relates to the question whether the right of privacy of the Plaintiffs has been invaded, and the answer is that to some extent it has as shown in the Amin's map. The third issue is whether the Defendants are entitled to have windows in their house for the purpose of giving light and air although they encroach on the privacy of the Plaintiffs. It was held that it would be easier for the Plaintiffs themselves to safeguard their privacy by raising a parapet wall to obstruct the view of persons looking out of the Defendants' windows. 3. The right of privacy is well established in this country. It is based on the law as laid down in the Easement Act, Section 18, illustration (B). It is also the subject of several judicial decisions. 3. The right of privacy is well established in this country. It is based on the law as laid down in the Easement Act, Section 18, illustration (B). It is also the subject of several judicial decisions. The decisions quoted are:--(1) Sardar Husain v. Choudhri Ahmad Husain (1928) 5 O.W.N. 538, (2) Baqridi v. Rahim Bux AIR 1926 Oudh 352, (3) Bubu Sangam Madho v. Ram Narain (1929) 6 O.W.N. 854 at 857; of these we need quote only V O.W.N. 538: "A customary right of privacy exists in the United Provinces and a substantial interference with such a right would afford a person whose right has been invaded a good cause of action. Such a customary right of privacy attaches to the property in respect of which it is claimed and is only a personal right. The fact that the houses are separated by a public road does not prevent the existence of a custom of privacy, but though the right of privacy is recognized, the Court wall take into consideration the extent and degree of privacy to which the Plaintiffs are entitled under the circumstances of the case." 4. In VI O.W.N., 854 at 857, it was held that the right of privacy is assumed to exist in all Indian towns. 5. The Appellants' learned Counsel argues that since there was an infringement of their privacy it was not right to put them to terms. They are entitled to the closing of the windows which look out upon their court-yard and roofs. There is evidence that these are used by women of the house. The road between the two houses is only just over 19 feet wide. A good view of the women can be obtained from some of the windows at the most distant place in the Iqbal Manzil which is overlooked. 6. The learned lower Court has held on the basis of decisions with which we are in agreement that there must be a substantial and material infringment the right of privacy before the Courts will interfere and that this right cannot be carried to an oppressive length. In respect of the roofs which can be seen from the window of the Defendants, Plaintiffs have no cause of action at all. In respect of the roofs which can be seen from the window of the Defendants, Plaintiffs have no cause of action at all. The only other portion of the Plaintiffs' house which is overlooked by the Defendants" windows is a very small portion of a chabutra marked 'A' in the Defendants' house. On the basis of Kashi Nath v. Ram Jiawan -`*/in which it was held that if a person opens apertures in his own wall which invade the privacy of his neighbour the neighbour's remedy is to build on his own land or otherwise obstruct the apertures, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 7. With regard to the roofs we are in entire agreement with the learned lower Court. One is the roof of a kitchen and the other the roof of a mosque. The evidence that the women-folk use the parts of the house overlooked by the Defendants' windows is of a very general nature, and we do not think it probable that the women-folk use these. Moreover, to prevent these being overlooked it would be necessary to prevent all persons in the close neighbourhood on this side of house from opening any windows in double storied houses on this side. We think that this would be carrying the right of privacy to an oppressive length. The case of the chabutra is, however, different. This is in the court-yard of Iqbal Manzil and is undoubtedly used by women. The Lahore decision seems to apply to open land. The court-yard cannot be regarded as open land. We are told, and it is not denied, that it is already surrounded by a 20 feet wall. Moreover, though the windows of the Defendants only overlook a small portion of the court-yard, other houses may go up having windows which overlook other small portions of the court yard so that the total effect will be an almost complete destruction of the privacy of the court-yard. It is true, as Respondents' learned Counsel says, that the granting of this relief under the Specific Relief Act is discretionary and that the Appellants have to show, not that a different discretion might have been exercised, but that the judgment of the lower Court is wrong. We think that the Appellants have established that the lower Court exercised a wrong discretion in respect of the chabutra. We think that the Appellants have established that the lower Court exercised a wrong discretion in respect of the chabutra. The decision relied upon does not seem to apply to this case, and the infringement is sufficiently serious to call for interference. We therefore allow this appeal so far as the windows overlooking the chabutra are concerned, but dismiss the appeal so far as the windows overlooking the roof of the mosque and the roof of the kitchen are concerned. It is not necessary to order the closing of these windows. The Defendants are ordered to make such changes in their windows that they no longer overlook any part of the court-yard of the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs are granted a perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants from opening any windows which overlook their court yard. The Defendants are given six weeks to make these changes and, if they do not do so within that time, the windows over-looking the court-yard of the Plaintiffs will be closed. The parties will pay their own costs in both Courts.