JUDGMENT Misra, J. - This appeal arises out of a pre-emption case. The main controversy between the parties centred round two questions-- (1) Whether under the circumstances of the case Paltan Singh, Plaintiff, could be permitted to preempt the property which constituted only one of the three items of properties transferred by the sale, and (2) Whether the sale deed was a mere transfer of a share in a law suit or a sale of a doubtful right. 2. The first question was decided against the Plaintiff-appellant by both the Courts below. The second question depended upon the interpretation of the deed of sale, dated 24th August, 1937, Ex. 1, and was decided in favour of the Plaintiff. The result, therefore, was that the Plaintiff's suit for pre-emption was dismissed. Paltan Singh, Plaintiff, has appealed, and in arguments before me the parties have argued both the points at length. 3. The sale-deed by Bisheswar Singh, Defendant-respondent No. 2, dated 24th August, 1937, in favour of Prag Narain, Defendant-respondent No. 1 was in respect of three properties-- (?) half share in under-proprietary plots mentioned at the foot of the plaint in list A, (b) a residential house, and (c) a mango tree. 4. The house and the tree, it appears, were mentioned in the deed under a misapprehension. The vendor Bisheshwar Singh obtained these properties along with some others by inheritance from one Gur Bakhsh Singh after the death of his widow, Mst. Dilraj Kuar, in 1935. The house obviously belonged to another Gur Bakhsh Singh, and this was admitted by Bisheshwar Singh subsequently in a litigation, which followed the sale, between Prag Narain and Bisheshwar Singh on the one hand and Deoraj Singh, a person who claimed to be the adopted son of Gur Bakhsh Singh on the other. The learned lower Courts nevertheless considered that as the house and the tree standing therein were included in the sale, the pre-emptor ought to have claimed possession by pre-emption of these two properties also. The learned lower Courts nevertheless considered that as the house and the tree standing therein were included in the sale, the pre-emptor ought to have claimed possession by pre-emption of these two properties also. It is to be observed that pre-emption was sought on payment of the entire consideration money and under the rule laid down in recent decisions in Maha Prasad v. Dukh Haran Nath 1940 O.A. 792 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 385 : O.W.N. 828, which was upheld in appeal u/s 12(2) of the Oudh Courts Act by a Bench in Maha Prasad v. Dukh Haran Nath 1943 O.A. 260 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 128 : O.W.N. 414, Syed Ali Naqi v. Zaheer Husain 1941 O.A. 813 : A.W.R. (Rev) 862 : O.W.N. 1097, Sheo Dat Tewari v. Mahant Bhagwant Dass 1941 O.A. 972 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 385 : O.W.N. 1276, Gauri Shankar v. Hakim Mohammad Bashir Ahmad Advi 1941 O.A. 996 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 388 : O.W.N. 1306, and Abhairaj Singh v. Udairaj Lube 1943 O.A. 120 : O.W.N. 192, Paltan Singh was entitled on payment of Rs. 1,050 to pre-empt even a part of the property sold. Apart, therefore, from the question whether the house and the tree did or did not belong to Bisheshwar Singh and could or could not, therefore, be regarded as a part of the property actually sold the decisions of the Courts below on the first point of controversy must be held to be wrong. 5. The second point raises a question of interpretation of the deed. The circumstances, under which the deed was executed, were that after the death of Mst. Dilraj Kuar Deoraj claimed the properties of Gur Bakhsh on the basis of his adoption by Mst. Dilraj Kuar with the permission of her husband. A deed of adoption in favour of Deoraj was executed by the lady and was attested amongst others by Paltan Singh, the present Plaintiff pre-emptor. Mutation was effected in his favour by Revenue Courts. Bisheshwar Singh, who was a collateral of Gur Bakhsh and who considered himself to be really entitled to the inheritance as a reversioner, in order to finance the litigation for recovery of properties from Deoraj, executed the deed of the 24th August, 1937, transferring thereby a half share of the properties covered by the sale to Prag Narain. Bisheshwar Singh, who was a collateral of Gur Bakhsh and who considered himself to be really entitled to the inheritance as a reversioner, in order to finance the litigation for recovery of properties from Deoraj, executed the deed of the 24th August, 1937, transferring thereby a half share of the properties covered by the sale to Prag Narain. The deed recites the facts leading upon to the inheritance by Bisheshwar Singh and the further fact that Deoraj obtained mutation on the allegation that he was in possession as owner on the basis of adoption. It then goes on to say that it was necessary in order to obtain possession of the properties to institute a suit against Deoraj, and as the vendor did not have the wherewithal with which to finance the litigation, he was selling his half share in the properties mentioned in the deed for a sum of Rs. 1,050. The consideration was left with the vendee for the purpose of fighting out the case. In the event of the actual expenditure being more than the amount of consideration the veudee was not entitled to get the excess from Bisheshwar Singh. On the other hand, if the expenditure was less than Rs. 1,050 Bisheshwar Singh would not be entitled to claim any accounting. There were other terms embodied in the deed, which related to the manner in which litigation was to be fought out and the rights of the parties in the event of the vendor or the vendee failing to carry out their respective parts of the contract. The question to be determined is whether this deed purported to be a sale deed of immoveable property within the meaning of Section 9 of the Oudh Laws Act and Section 54 of the Transfer of Properly Act. u/s 9 of Act XVIII of 1876 if the property to be sold is a proprietary or under-proprietary tenure, the right to buy or redeem such property belongs to various persons mentioned in that section. u/s 54 of the Transfer of Property Act a sale is defined as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and Part promised. Section 5 of that Act defines transfer of property as being an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons. That Ex. Section 5 of that Act defines transfer of property as being an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons. That Ex. 1 purports to be a transfer for the price of Rs. 1,050 there is no doubt, but it is to be seen whether this was the entire price or whether anything in the shape of labour or parvi was also intended to be the price of the sale. The deed clearly recites that it was being executed for a consideration of Rs. 1,050 only. It is true that the amount was being left with the vendee for providing the expenses of the litigation, but this fact, in my opinion, does not affect the question, and the further fact that the vendee took upon himself to institute a suit in conjunction with the vendor and to carry on the necessary expenses up to the last Court is also immaterial. He had obviously acquired an interest in the property to the extent of half and entered into the agreement to fight out the litigation on behalf of the vendor and himself without charging anything in excess of the amount which was left with him. I am, therefore, convinced that Rs. 1,050 alone constituted the price of the sale. 6. The contention that the sale was merly of a share in a law suit and was, therefore, of a mere doubtful claim is based upon the ground that at the time of the sale Deoraj was in possession and was setting up his title by virtue of adoption and will. The possession of Deoraj was upheld by the mutation Court. It is argued, therefore, that the right of Bisheshwar Singh, which he purported to sell, was a mere doubtful right of suit, and in effect Ex. 1 transferred nothing more than a share in the decree which may eventually be obtained against Deoraj. It is to be observed that the sale deed does not by its terms purport to be a transfer of a doubtful claim or of a share in a law suit. In the recital Bisheshwar Singh calls himself the owner of the property, though Deoraj was in possession of it upon certain allegations of title. It is to be observed that the sale deed does not by its terms purport to be a transfer of a doubtful claim or of a share in a law suit. In the recital Bisheshwar Singh calls himself the owner of the property, though Deoraj was in possession of it upon certain allegations of title. What was conveyed by the deed was specifically stated to a half share in the under-proprietary plots, the house and the tree. The mere fact that there was a cloud on the title of the vendor or that he was out of possession could not change the nature or the import of the deed. As remarked in Manmohan Lal v. Danpal Singh 1944 O.A. 144 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 144 : O.W.N. 909, "the safest guide to the nature of the transaction is the deed itself. If it clearly purports by its own force to transfer the property from the ownership of the vendor to the ownership of the vendee, it should be regarded as a sale deed of that property." 7. The nature of the transaction or the import of it cannot be changed merely because at the time when it was executed, it was necessary to launch a litigation in order to obtain possession of the property which formed its subject matter from a trespasser or a claimant in possession, nor is the nature of the deed to be judged by the strength or weakness of the vendor's claim. I may mention that I still adhere to the view which I expressed in Manmohan Lal'e case. The terms contained in the deed and the phraseology used are the ones which are usually found in ordinary instruments of sale, and the transaction must, therefore, be regarded as a final and irrevocable of a half share in the under-proprietary tenure which came down to Bisheshwar Singh from Gur Bakhsh. 8. The learned Counsel for the parties cited a number of authorities in support on the one hand of the proposition that in similar circumstances certain sale deeds had been interpreted as mere sales of doubtful rights or of share in a law suit and on the other for the proposition that certain other sale deeds of the same character were interpreted as sales of proprietary or under-proprietary rights. In my opinion it is of doubtful utility to seek the aid of case law in order to interpret the deed in suit I am, therefore, not prepared to enter into the reasons which resulted in those decisions. I am satisfied that the sale of 1937 fulfils the requirements of Section 9 of the Oudh Laws Act and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and entitles the Plaintiff, who, it is not now questioned, has a preferential right, to pre-empt the property. 9. Upon the assumption that the sale was one which fell within the purview of Section 9 of the Oudh Laws Act and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act a further contention was advanced. This was based upon the fact that Paltan Singh was an attesting witness to the deed of adoption executed by Mst. Dilraj Kuar in favour of Deoraj and upon the further fact that when the case was in mutation Court, Paltan Singh deposed that Deoraj had, in fact, been adopted by the Musammat. On the authority principally of Abdul Wahid Khan v. Shaluka Bibi (1894) 21 Cal 496 and on the basis of the decisions in Fakhr-ud-din Ahmad v. Mst. Rasulan (1899) 2 O.C. 9, Babu Lal v. Ali Ahmad Khan (1922) 25 O.C. 258 and Ram Pher Singh v. Sheo Saran Singh AIR 1926 Oudh 196 it is said that an antecedent denial of the vendor's title by a presumptive pre-emptor disentitles him from claiming the advantages conferred by Section 9 of the Oudh Laws Act. I am unable to hold that Paltan Singh is excluded by the rule laid down in these cases for two reasons-- (1) Attestation of the deed of adoption by Paltan Singh and his statement in mutation Court regarding adoption could scarcely be regarded as a denial of Bisheshwar Singh's title, for assuming that the actual ceremony of adoption was gone through and assuming that Paltan Singh witnessed the deed of adoption, these acts could not be characterised as assertions that Bisheshwar Singh had no title to the property. The ceremonial adoption by the widow of Gur Bakhsh, though true in fact, may nevertheless be invalid in law, unless it could be established that Mst. Dilraj Kuir made the adoption with the requisite permission of her husband, (2) the denial, if any, was a denial antecedent to the sale or subsequent thereto. The ceremonial adoption by the widow of Gur Bakhsh, though true in fact, may nevertheless be invalid in law, unless it could be established that Mst. Dilraj Kuir made the adoption with the requisite permission of her husband, (2) the denial, if any, was a denial antecedent to the sale or subsequent thereto. It has neither been proved nor alleged that Paltan Singh denied the vendor's title at the time of the sale. As regards the, antecedent denial or denial at the time of mutation, assuming for the sake of argument that there was such a denial I am of opinion that the rule advocated by the learned Counsel is stated too broadly. 10. In Thepai alias Jagdeo v. Mahabir Prasad (1919) 22 O.C. 144, a Bench of the late Court of the Judicial Commissioners were of opinion that the previous denial of title did not deprive a person of the right of pre-emption under the Oudh Laws Act. This decision was followed in Saiyad Muntazim Husain v. Saiyad Ahmad Husain (1920) 7 O.L.J. 64. In Gajadhar Prasad v. Mankaran (1921) 8 O.L.J. 403, it was observed that the principle embodied in I LR 21 Cal 496 : (1894) 21 Cal 496, must be confined within very narrow limits, as the facts of that case were of an exceptional nature. The Defendant in the Privy Council case while setting up a right to pre empt was at the same time denying the title of the vendor and alleging that he himself was the true owner of the property. The sale, which he sought to pre-empt, was executed for the purpose of raising funds to recover the property from him, and the costs to be incurred in the legal proceedings were found to be a part of the price paid by the vendee. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships observed that the position taken up by the Defendant was altogether inconsistent with and foreign to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. In Fakhr-ud din Ahmad v. Mst. Rasulan (1899) 2 O.C. 9, it appears that the pre-emptor denied the title of the vendor at the time when the sale was effected and alleged that the latter was not a co-sharer at all. In Fakhr-ud din Ahmad v. Mst. Rasulan (1899) 2 O.C. 9, it appears that the pre-emptor denied the title of the vendor at the time when the sale was effected and alleged that the latter was not a co-sharer at all. A Bench of the late Court of the Judicial Commissioners without discussing the legal position to which this fact gave rise merely remarked that this could be a further reason for disallowing pre-emption. This case was considered in Thepai alias Jagdeo v. Mahabir Prasad (1919) 22 O.C. 144 to which I have already referred, and therein it was said that the observations with regard to denial of title were really obiter, as the suit stood dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. It was further held that where the denial of title occurred a considerable time previous to the sale, it was hereby material, and a denial by the pre-emptor of the vendor's title during mutation proceedings was regarded as insufficient to debar him from raising subsequently an action u/s 9 of the Oudh Laws Act. In 25 Oudh Cases 258, the decision depended upon a determination of the question whether the sale deed in that case constituted a transfer of a claim to a doubtful title. In my opinion this case has no relevancy on the point under consideration and need not be dealt with in detail. AIR 1926 Oudh 196 is similarly not in point. It merely lays down the general proposition that a pre-emptor is bound to assert the title of the vendor in order to obtain pre-emption. In Jiyaoo Singh v. Jageshar Singh (1928) 5 O.W.N. 920, the pre-emptor set up a claim to the property at the time of mutation, but that circumstance was not considered sufficient to disentitle him from getting the advantage of Section 9 of the Oudh Laws Act. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that Paltan Singh cannot be allowed to take the benefit of the law of pre-empt on. 11. I have yet another consideration which might be mentioned. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that Paltan Singh cannot be allowed to take the benefit of the law of pre-empt on. 11. I have yet another consideration which might be mentioned. In all cases where a pre-emptor is debarred from taking advantage of the pre-emption law on the ground of denial of the vendor's title, the Plaintiff was setting up a title in himself and was obviously considered by that reason to be prevented in some way by analogy of the doctrine of estoppel from subsequently or simultaneously asserting for purpose of pre-emption that the title lay in the vendor. The Plaintiff's conduct in the present case cannot bring into play that doctrine, and he cannot, therefore, upon that ground, be put out of Court. 12. The result is that there is no reason why a decree for pre-emption of the under-proprietary share in suit be not granted to the Plaintiff. I accordingly allow the appeal with costs of all the three Courts and set aside the decree of the Court below. The Plaintiff's suit for pre-emption is decreed on payment into Court of a sum of Rs. 1,050 within two months from the date of this judgment. In default the Plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed with costs.