JUDGMENT Bennett and Madeley, JJ. - These are references by the Income Tax Tribunal u/s 66 (1) of the Indian Income Tax Act. The application in each case was made by the Spiral Manager, Court of Wards, Majgawan Estate, Gonda district. The assessment objected to in the earlier case was in respect of a stun of Rs. 22,347 realised by the Estate from the sale of forest trees, the assessment year being 1940-41. In the later case the year of assessment was 1941-42 and the sum in question realised from the same source was Rs. 3,791. 2. There is, we think, no material difference in the question referred. In the first reference the question is : Whether Income from the sale of forest trees growing on land naturally and without the intervention of human agency, even if the land is assessed to land revenue, is agricultural income within the meaning of Section 8 (I) (a) of the Income Tax Act and is as such exempt from income tax u/s 4 (3) (viii) of the Act. 3. In the second reference the words, "in the circumstances of the case" have been inserted after the word "whether", and the words "and spontaneously" after the word "naturally". It has not been suggested that these additions in any way affect the nature of the question. 4. It will be observed that in both cases the question assumes that the receipts in question are income; the question whether they are in fact capital has not been raised. Learned Counsel asked us to consider this question also, but we are satisfied that we should not be justified in so doing, both because the question has not been referred and also because it might involve issues of, fact which have not been considered. 5. We have examined the record to ascertain whether the question whether the receipts constituted capital was ever raised before. It is not referred to in the order of the income tax Officer who appears to ,have thought that the only question material was whether receipts from the sale of trees were assessed to land revenue. He held that -such receipts were liable to income tax because they were not assessed to land revenue. 6. The relevant ground of appeal taken before the Assistant Commissioner was that income derived from forests is not taxable, A similar ground was taken '. He held that -such receipts were liable to income tax because they were not assessed to land revenue. 6. The relevant ground of appeal taken before the Assistant Commissioner was that income derived from forests is not taxable, A similar ground was taken '. before the income tax Tribunal. And in the applications for reference we find the same language used. In the first case the question of law suggested is whether the income from sale of forest trees is assessable, and in the second whether income derived from forest is agricultural income and sis, such not taxable, and" whether it is also not taxable because the land on which the forest stands pays land revenue. No- where is there any suggestion that the receipts do not constitute income .but' capital. 7. Learned Counsel for the assessee con- tended that the word "income" was used loosely throughout. This may be so, but nevertheless it is clear that the question whether the receipts constituted .income or capital was never raised. 8. Learned Counsel referred us to the case of Shiva Prasad Gupta Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1929 All 819 . In that case a Bench of the Allahabad High Court held on the terms of Section 66 as it then read that the object of the reference (by the Income Tax Commissioner) was the decision by the High Court "of the question of law "that arises in the case". There have been several changes in the section since this decision. Sub-Section (1) now empowers an assessee "to require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising but of such order" (that is, the order of the Tribunal u/s 3j'(4). The sub- section: proceeds "and the Appellate Tribunal shall within ninety days of the receipt of such application draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court." 9. The Allahabad High Court were of opinion that in the provision then in force for a reference by the Commissioner upon his order there was some ambiguity as to what was to be referred, but they said that a' proviso to sub-Section (2) made it clear that the object of- the reference is the decision by the High Court pf the question of law that arises in the case. It has been argued that there is a similar ambiguity in sub-Section (1) as it now stands, whether the Appellate Tribunal is to refer the question or the case. We do not think that there is any ambiguity. The applicant can refer any question of law arising out of the order and as we I understand the sub-section it is that question which must be referred. The applicant does not ask for a statement of the case j to be referred, but a question of law, and there is no reason to think that the Tribunal would be required by the Act to refer r something which the applicant does not ' ask for. The Tribunal draws up a statement of the case to explain how this question of law arises. 10. It was indeed faintly suggested by the ' learned Counsel that the words "any ' question of law" imply that the applicant ! can ask the Tribunal to refer any (unspecified) question of law that may be thought to arise from their order. We have no doubt that this is not intended. The application has to be made on a prescribed form and this shows that the applicant must formulate concisely the question of law which he desires to raise. In our opinion this is dearly the intention of the section. 11. It is true that there still remain in the section references to the ; question (or questions) of law "raised thereby", referring to the statement of the case, and it has been held in some cases on a consideration that the High Court is not restricted to the question of law referred and can decide any point of law that can be raised properly upon the facts found. It was so held by the Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court in Kheimhand Ramdas v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1934 Sind. 46.. Hut we doubt whether this decision would apply to the facts of the. present case. Reference was made in that case to Attorney-General v. Avelino Aramayo and Co. It was so held by the Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court in Kheimhand Ramdas v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1934 Sind. 46.. Hut we doubt whether this decision would apply to the facts of the. present case. Reference was made in that case to Attorney-General v. Avelino Aramayo and Co. (1925) 1 K B 86 The quotation therefrom from the judgment of Atkin L. J. includes the following passage which we think very partinent : No doubt there may be a point of law in respect of which the facts have not been sufficiently found, and if that point of law was not raised below at all and cannot be raised without further facts ion either side, the Court may very well refuse to give effect to it, and either party may have precluded themselves by their conduct from raising of the Court of Appeal the point of law which they deliberately refrained from raising down below. 12. For the income tax department we were referred to the Privy Council case of AIR 1940 158 (Privy Council) . It was observed by Lord Justice Luxmoore in that case that The (unction of the High Court in cases referred to it u/s ti6 of the Act is advisory, only and is confined to considering and answering the actual question referred to it. 13. In view of this clear and definite pronouncement on the point we entertain no doubt that we should not be justified in considering any question but the question actually referred in this case. 14. The general question referred was considered by us at length in Civil Reference No. 1 of.l94i, where we held that such income was not agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Act. We give the same answer to the question in these cases. 15. The assessee will pay the costs of each reference. We fix the fee of the Counsel for the income tax department at Rs. 100 in each reference.