JUDGMENT Bennett and Madeley, JJ. - This is a reference by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal u/s 66 (1) of the Indian Income Tax Act. The assessee is His Highness the Maharaja of Kapurthala who owns an estate in the Bthriih district. We have to decide whether income tax is leviable upon an amount received by him from the sale of forest trees in three villages, Baraipur, Somrupur and Sheopur Bankat. the amount, Rs. 93,407, was received in 1937-38, and was assessed to income tax for 1938-39. 2. The questions of law arise out of the assessment. They have been formulated by the Tribunal in the following terms (1) Whether the assessee's net receipts from the sale of forest trees were the assessee's income liable to income tax or merely capital converted , into cash and not liable to income tax; and (2) whether the income from the sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth growing on land which is assessed to land revenue is agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (a) of the Income Tax Act and exempt from income tax u/s 4(3) (viii) of the Act. 3. Section 4 (3) provides that income, profits or gain falling within certain classes shall not be included in the total income of the person receiving them, and class (viii) is agricultural income "Agricultural income" is defined in Section 2 (1) (a) which reads : (l) "Agricultural income" means (a) any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land revenue in British India or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Crown as such. 4. The assessee's contention is that the land on which these trees grew was used for agricultural purposes. 5. The assessment order of the Income Tax Officer, dated the 27th February, 1940, shows that the total receipts from the sale of timber amounted to Rs. 1,03,785 and tint he allowed a ten per cent deduction from this (Rs. 10,378) on account of "expenses relating to forests". 6. It is stated in the order that income from the sale of timber trees had never been included in the Sewai income and that the area covered by timber trees hid always been excluded from land revenue assessments. 1,03,785 and tint he allowed a ten per cent deduction from this (Rs. 10,378) on account of "expenses relating to forests". 6. It is stated in the order that income from the sale of timber trees had never been included in the Sewai income and that the area covered by timber trees hid always been excluded from land revenue assessments. It was for these reasons that the Income Tax Officer held that the income was liable to income tax. 7. In appeal the Assistant Commissioner discussed both these points in his order of the 31st March, 1941, and, agreeing with the income tax Officer, upheld the assessment. 8. The Tribunal to which the assessee went in further appeal, did not agree on either point. The Settlement to be considered was that of 1898, the current Settlement only coning into force in 1938. On the first point they observed that extracts from the report of the second Settlement, which they quoted, showed that income from the sale of timber was also taken into consideration in setting the land revenue; and on the second that "It is abundantly clear from the entries in the Mahalwar Assessment Statement and the assessment remarks that no part of the land attached to these three villages is revenue free and that the whole of it has been assessed to land revenue". These are findings of fact and not now in dispute. 9. But the Tribunal did not consider that these findings entitled the assessee to exemption. The questions before us were raised before them in appeal and they held in their order dated the 12th August, 1941, that the receipts from the sale of trees constituted income and not capital, and that the land on which the trees grew was not "used for agricultural purposes" within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (a). 10. Substantially the same arguments which were examined by the Tribunal have been placed before Us, and many of the same authorities were referred to. We may say at once that after hearing lengthy arguments for the assessee hve have come to the same conclusions. 10. Substantially the same arguments which were examined by the Tribunal have been placed before Us, and many of the same authorities were referred to. We may say at once that after hearing lengthy arguments for the assessee hve have come to the same conclusions. One important case was referred to which was not before the Tribunal because it was not decided until 1943, this being the Privy Council case of Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. Income tax Commissioner Bihar and Orissa (1943) 70 IA 180 : 1943 AWR (PC)75 : OA (PC) 75, but this pronouncement of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee supports in our view the conclusion at which the Tribunal arrived on the first question. 11. We may first stats some further facts which are relevant. The forest formed part of a grant by the British Government after the Mutiny. Doubt existed at one time as to the right of the grantee in the forest land and as to the conditions upon which it was held, but the position was clarified in 1866. Quoting from extracts of the Settlement Report of that year the President of the Tribunal observed : These extracts from the Settlement Report make it perfectly clear that the land was granted to the Raja without any condition or qualification and was intended to be enjoyed by him in any way he chose fit, there being no obligation on him to bring it under cultivation within a particular time or at any time. If the land had been granted to the Raja on the condition that within a specified time he would clear the jungle to make the land arable, the receipts from the sale of the jungle trees thus removed would perhaps not have been taxable ; but the grant not being subject to any such condition it appears to me that this case does not differ from any other case where an assessee inherits or purchases land or acquires it by gift or legacy 12. As regards the character of the forest land and its management we may quote an extract from the Settlement report of 1898 : These forests consist mainly of inferior sale trees, with miscellaneous patches on the outskirts, and extensive grass Savannahs. The estate does not at present work the forests at any great profit. As regards the character of the forest land and its management we may quote an extract from the Settlement report of 1898 : These forests consist mainly of inferior sale trees, with miscellaneous patches on the outskirts, and extensive grass Savannahs. The estate does not at present work the forests at any great profit. When it came into possession it found them in a very deteriorated condition and has now for many years past been working over them in accordance with a regular working-plan. There is not good market for fellings, the trees being of inferior quality, and firewood finds but a scanty sale, Large quantities of useful timber are supplied free to the estate tenantry who are also allowed free grazing, and thatching grass, which is abundant, in the only product which alone bring in any considerable income. 13. The net annual profit over a period of 13 years was found to be Rs. 2,131 from grass and Rs. 4,425 from trees-covered land. 14. The position appears to have remained much the same until 1928 when wholesale cutting commenced with a view to clearing the forest in order to make the land arable. During the next ten years the whole forest was cut down and as it was cut the land was let out to tenants. But it was not until the last year that the sale proceeds were assessed to income tax, the view that had previously prevailed being that they were exempt. 15. It appears from the order of the Assistant Commissioner that the question was considered in 1931-32 in connection with the assessment for that year. The position was considered doubtful hut the Settlement Officer excluded income from sale of timber from the head of "sewai" income, apparently under the impression that this would leave the way open for its assessment to income- tax. But for the purpose of this reference this is not material. We are not concerned with the effect of the present Settlement. In any case it is the land which is assessed to land revenue and the fact that it was so assessed is the important fact. We agree with the Tribunal tint the question whether income from some sources only (such as lac fioney, wax and fruit) is taken into consideration in the land revenue settlement, and income from other sources such as sales of timber, excluded, is irrelevant. 16. We agree with the Tribunal tint the question whether income from some sources only (such as lac fioney, wax and fruit) is taken into consideration in the land revenue settlement, and income from other sources such as sales of timber, excluded, is irrelevant. 16. The forest has now ceased to exist and we have to consider first of all whether the proceeds from this gradual extinction of what was undoubtedly capital can be considered income. 17. One general principle governing such cases is now well settled, being found both in English and l Indian authorities. It is that/receipts from capital I which is exhausted in the process of realization may bet none the less income. 18. It has been objected that certain authorities on which the Tribunal relied are not relevant as they relate to local enactments. Distinctions on some points may certainly be drawn, but the Tribunal has not overlooked this consideration. The objection was raised in particular with reference to the case of Kauri Timber Co. Ltd., v. Commissioner of Taxes (1913) AC 771, where the question was whether a company which carried on in New Zealand the business of cutting, milling and selling timber and had acquired rights over land for that purpose could deduct for the purpose of income tax under, the New Zealand Land and Assessment Act, 1918, from the gross proceeds of its business the value of the standing timber which it had cut. It was said by Lord Shaw in that case that "the principle to be applied is clearly a general one, that the consumption of capital cannot be treated in the ascertainment of profits as a revenue debit". Referring to the case of Coltness Iron Co. v. Black (1881) 6 AC 315 and of Alianza Co. v. Bell (1906) A C.18, he observed: The law so clearly settled with regard to the working of coal and of nitrates, and settled upon a broad general principle is in no way different when it comes to be applied to timber-bearing lands. 19. And at the end of the judgment we find the following observations: Nor is it necessary to add that this mode of treating timber or mineral for taxation purposes contains nothing noval. 19. And at the end of the judgment we find the following observations: Nor is it necessary to add that this mode of treating timber or mineral for taxation purposes contains nothing noval. For it has long been the law of the United Kingdom that the exhaustion of capital, however it might be treated on strict actuarial principles or according to certain principles of economics, may for the purposes of taxation be treated as profits. That profit may be temporary, and so when it ceases the capital may be gone, and with the going of the capital there will also go the subject and the possibility of the tax. 20. The question was briefly considered by the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Madras v. Manavedan Tirumalpad (1930) 54 Mad 21, where the purchaser of a forest which was gradually exhausted by fellings objected to being taxed on what he considered his capital. It was held that no distinction could be drawn between the case of a forest and the case of a mine or quarry. 21. We were also referred to cases in which the question of the liability of annuitants to income tax upon their annuities wa9 considered, on the view that such cases are analogous to a case where capital has been expended on the acquisition of a forest, capital having been expended on the purchase of an annuity which terminates with the death of the annuitant. The same general principle was applied in Maharj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh v. Commissioner of income tax Bihar and Orrissa (l935) 62 I A 207 : 1935 A W R 1030. For the assessee we were referred to Secretary of State in Council of India v. Sir Andrew Scoble (1903) A.C 299. In that case , the Secretary of State for India purchased the G I. P. Railway and exercised the option provided in the contract of paying for it by annual instalments instead of by a gross sum. It was held that income tax was not payable upon that part of the annual instalment which represented capital, but only upon the unpaid portion of the capital. This case is clearly distinguishable and in no wav affects the general principle. The payment of instalments was for a certain number of years : it was deferred payment of the purchase money., that is capital. This case is clearly distinguishable and in no wav affects the general principle. The payment of instalments was for a certain number of years : it was deferred payment of the purchase money., that is capital. The view that it was in substance an annuity was expressly repelled by their Lordships. 22. On the meaning of the term "income" in the Income Tax Act Commissioner of Income tax v. Shaw, Wallace and Co. (1932) 59 IA 206, was cited. It was said by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in this case that the term connotes a periodical monetary return, "coming in" with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity from definite sources; the source is not one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a windfall. The expansion into "income, profits, and gains" is more a matter of words than of sub- stance. The fundamental idea of "business" as a 1 source of taxable income u/s 6 (iv) is the continuous exercise of an activity; there must be a business "carried on" by the assessee. 23. It was contended before the Tribunal that the receipts were of casual and non-recurring nature and as such exempt u/s 4 (3) (vii) of the Ad. Under this provisions any receipts, not being receipts arising from business, which are of a casual and not-recurring nature are exempted. The tribunal repelled this contention, referring to the Settlement report of 1893 as showing that the forest had been regularly worked and to the fact tint revenue had been received from it, at least since 1885. 24. The learned Counsel for the assessee conceded that the forest was worked as a business up till 1928 and that the only reason why income tax should not have been assessed union the revenue received in the preceding years that could be put forward is that this revenue was derived from land used for agricultural purposes, but he argued that the business ceased in 1928, when it was decided to commence fellings which would exhaust the forest and clear it for growing crops. We are unable to agree. We are unable to agree. We do not understand how the business was terminated by the decision to clear the remaining stock-in-trade and for that purpose to sell every year more trees than had been sold each year before 1928. If a shopkeeper sells his whole stock of cheaply (and therefore quickly) in order to have room for a new line of goods or to start a new kind of business on the same premises the proceeds will be liable to account for income tax in the same way as the proceeds of previous sales. It would no doubt be otherwise if he sold his shop as a going concern with the good-will included. So too if the assessee had sold the whole forest in one transaction with the land; that would clearly be a sale of capital and the proceeds would constitute capital. Though it is said in Aiyar's commentary on the Indian Income Tax Act (page 121, 4th Ed.): The fact that large blocks of stock are sold does not render the profits obtained anything different in kind from the profit obtained by a series of gradual and smaller sales. This might even be the case if the whole stock was sold out in one sale, Even in the case of realization sale, if there was an item which could be traced as representing the stock, the profit obtained by that sale, though made in conjunction with a sale of the whole concern, might conceivably be treated as a taxable income. 25. u/s 4 (3) (vii) two conditions must be satisfied to obtain exemption. The receipts must not arise from the business and they must be of a casual and non-recurring nature. In the present case neither condition is satisfied. 26. Mr. Wasim argued for the assessee that the trees were not sold in the course of business, but as a matter of capital realization. He also argued alternatively that at any rate the last sale should be regarded in this light, If, he said, trees had been again planted on the land, the position would be different. A forest and a mine can for this purpose be distinguished in that while the trees of a forest can be replaced the coal in a mine cannot. A forest and a mine can for this purpose be distinguished in that while the trees of a forest can be replaced the coal in a mine cannot. At the same time he suggested that the sale of trees is equivalent to the sale of a coal mine, not merely of the right to work the mine. 27. We have given these arguments careful consideration but are unable to hold that there is any force in them. The sale of a forest, including the land, would no doubt be parallel to the sale of a coal mine, as distinguished from the right to extract coal. But what has been sold in this case is the right to cut and extract trees from the forest and though there may be some differences between the two transactions in their effect we did not consider that these affect the legal position. If the sale of trees from the forest is a business and it is not disputed that it was a business prior to 1928 the sale of the Stock-in-trade spread over a number of years does not make it any the less a business. And if use consider the object in view this was to enable a new business that of growing crop on the land to be started. The fact that receipts from the new business would not be subject to income tax is immaterial. We therefore answer the first question referred by saying that the receipts from the sale of forest trees were liable to income, tax. 28. The second question involves a consideration of the meaning of the expression "land used for agricultural purposes". Judicial authority has not been consistent in its interpretation, but Counsel are agreed that the expression may have been used in different senses in different enactments. We should not therefore be justified in wholly relying for the present purpose on constructions placed upon it where it occurs in other enactments, though such constructions may afford a guide. Could we do so the matter would be easier than it is. We should not therefore be justified in wholly relying for the present purpose on constructions placed upon it where it occurs in other enactments, though such constructions may afford a guide. Could we do so the matter would be easier than it is. For instance "land" is defined in the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 as "land which is let or held for agricultural purposes, or as grove land or for pasturage", implying that grove land or pasturage is not land let or held for agricultural purposes, and it has been held that this restricts the definition of "land" to what would ordinarily be "called arable and excludes from it forest land. 29. The question was not considered by the Income Tax Officer, who appears to have thought that the crucial issue was whether the trees had been assessed to land revenue. But to bring rent or revenue derived from land under the head of agricultural income it is necessary to show not only that the land from which it is derived is assessed to land revenue, but also that the land is used for agricultural purposes. This shows that double taxation is not legally impossible. We heard a good deal in the course of arguments about double taxation, but Mr. Wasim made it clear he did not contend that any conclusive argument could be founded on such an objection, only that this aspect should be taken into consideration if we entertained any doubt as to whether the income in question was derived from laud used for agricultural purposes. 30. The Assistant Commissioner looked at the matter from much the same point of view as the Income Tax Officer. We agree with what the President of the Tribunal has said about their orders. He has held that they were wrong in holding that the land was not assessed to land revenue, and he has explained why, on the finding that it is so assessed, the question now under consideration must be answered. He has referred to the instance given in the Income Tax Manual of income from the sale of timber being agricultural income and has ex- pressed the opinion that this relates to income derived from regular forestry or agriculture. He has referred to the instance given in the Income Tax Manual of income from the sale of timber being agricultural income and has ex- pressed the opinion that this relates to income derived from regular forestry or agriculture. We entertain some doubt about this, because if what Counsel has told us is correct the instance was expressly included on account of an assurance given in the Legislative Assembly. At the same time Mr. Wasim did not contend that we are in any way bound by the illustration given in the Manual, nor did he very strenuously contend that we should be justified in taking into account what was said on the subject in the Legislative Assembly debates to which he referred us, though he would no doubt like us to do so. 31. The President of the Tribunal was of opinion that "even where trees are grown and cut by the owner of the land according to strict botanical principles, the operation is not agricultural". But it is not necessary for us to determine in this case whether, when trees are so grown, the land is being used for agricultural purposes, because admittedly the trees under consideration were of spontaneous growth. And although the general agent of the Estate, B. Har Charan Dass, referred to the "maintenance, preservation, nurturing, improving and rearing" of the forest, and to there being a regular plan for the improvement of the quality and general condition of the forests this was regarded as an exaggeration, on the admission before the Tribunal that "the forest was of spontaneous growth and that nothing in the nature of preparing the land for the growth of the trees was done". Expenditure seems to have been mostly on watch and ward and what may be described as "conservation". 32. The learned President of the Tribunal cited three cases to support the view that the land was not used for agricultural purposes. In the first Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Prakash Ojha A I R 1924 P C 247 : 16 All. 831, the principal question in issue was one of Hindu Law but a question was raised in it whether a grove was a holding within the meaning of the Tenancy Act We agree with the learned Counsel for the assesses that the decision (in the negative) is of little or no help in the present case. 33. 831, the principal question in issue was one of Hindu Law but a question was raised in it whether a grove was a holding within the meaning of the Tenancy Act We agree with the learned Counsel for the assesses that the decision (in the negative) is of little or no help in the present case. 33. The other two cases cited are also in some measure open to the objection that they relate to local enactments, but there are general observations in them which we think relevant, and we cannot do better than reproduce the extracts quoted by the President from the judgments. 34. In Chandrasekha ra Bharathi Swamigal v. C P. Duraisami Naidu (1931) 54 Mad. 900 Reilly J. observed : If we take the strict meaning of "agriculture" according to its derivation, it means the cultivation of a field, the cultivation of an open space as opposed to horticulture, the cultivation of a comparatively small enclosed space. But the planting of timber or fire-wood trees which are to stand on the land for a considerable number of years, forming plantations, or woods or forests appears to me to be opposed to the idea of agriculture, the cultivation of an open space. It is true that for the purpose of growing trees in a plantation it may necessary first to prepare the land. Later on it may be necessary to protect and water the plants; still later it may be necessary to thin out the plantation. But when the land is covered with trees which have to stand on it for a number of years, sometimes as long as a century, during most of which period the land itself is untouched, to describe that as agriculture appears to me inappropriate To my mind it seems to be different from the cultivation of a field or of an open space. In PROVINCE OF BIHAR Vs. MAHARAJA PRATAP UDAI NATH SAHI DEO OF RATUGARH AND ANOTHER., AIR 1941 Patna 289 Hirries C. J. observed: "Binker", It appears that this head of income was derived from virgin jungles or jungle land not actually cultivated. In PROVINCE OF BIHAR Vs. MAHARAJA PRATAP UDAI NATH SAHI DEO OF RATUGARH AND ANOTHER., AIR 1941 Patna 289 Hirries C. J. observed: "Binker", It appears that this head of income was derived from virgin jungles or jungle land not actually cultivated. A few forest guards appear to have been employed to protect property but it cannot be said that the trees have grown as the result of cultivation They appear to have grown naturally in the jungle without the intervention of human agency and in my view the growth of these trees cannot be said to be the result of cultivation of the soil. In fact, it was the absence of cultivation that permitted the area to develop into a jungle. 35. We would also lay stress on the dictum of Reilly J. in the Madras case that "agriculture cannot be defined by the nitura of the products cultivated, but should be defined rather by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on. 36. Mr. Wasim has referred us to what has been said in certain commentaries and dictionaries on the meaning of the word "agriculture". At page 27 Jain's commentary (1938 edition) it is said after giving definitions from various dictionaries, that the term is used both in a general and wider sense as well as in the narrow sense of the art or science of cultivating the ground. The wider sense, according to the New Standard Dictionary, would extend to farming, "including any industry practised by a cultivator of the soil in connection with such cultivation as forestry, fruit raising, breeding and rearing of stock, dairying, market gardening" but Mr. Wasim concedes that some industries which might be included in the term such "extension" could not be deemed to be "agricultural" within the meaning of Section 2 (I) (a), and that a line must be drawn somewhere. We cannot hold that the mere fact that an industry has some connection with or is in soma way dependent on land is sufficient to bring it within the scope of the term. 37. We do not propose to refer to all the cases which were cited by Counsel. They reveal much diversity of opinion. In Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barual (1924) 51 Cal. 504, we find a difference of opinion between two learned Judges, Rankin J. and Page J. in the same case. 37. We do not propose to refer to all the cases which were cited by Counsel. They reveal much diversity of opinion. In Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barual (1924) 51 Cal. 504, we find a difference of opinion between two learned Judges, Rankin J. and Page J. in the same case. That case went to a Full Bench (I.L.R. 54 Cal. 863) and to the Privy Council (I.L.R. 58 Cal. 430).- The primary question was whether certain income from land was assessable to income tax notwithstanding the provisions of the Permanent Settlement Regulations. It was said that at the time of the Permanent Settlement of 1793 definite guarantees and assurances were given by the governing authority and were embodied in the Regulations to the effect that the income of a zamindar from his estate should not, beyond payment there out of the jama, be further touched or taxed. Rankin J. held that income derived from fisheries and from sthaljat (lanj used for stacking timber) is not income derived from land used for agricultural purposes and is liable to inc mie-tax notwithstanding the Permanent Settlement Regulations, while Page J. took the view that it was exempt on account of these Regulations. The vie v of Rankin J. upheld both by the Full Bench and by the Judicial Committee. Rankin J. observed tint some reference had been made to what had been called "a presumption against double taxation", and he said on this point that certain decisions, cited by him, only meant that a person should not pay the same tax twice, and he added : That there is any legal presumption of a general character against 'double taxation' in any wider sense is a proposition to which I respectfully demur as a principle for the construction of a modern status. 38. Reliance was placed for the assessee on certain observations in the Full Bench Madras case of Chief Commissioner of Income Tax v. Zamindar Singampatti (1922) 45 Mad 518. It was held in that case that income from forest and fisheries were exempt under the terms of a sanad and also of Regulation XXV of 1802, hut the question whether it was exem it as being agricultural income was also referred to the Full Bench observed that at first sight it using it seem difficult to include income from either soiree under this head. - They proceeded : It may, however, be pointed out that a reference to Murray's and Webster's dictionaries shows that the word "agriculture", while sometimes used in the narrow sense of the art or science of cultivating the ground, is also used in a much wider sense so as to include even forestry according to Webster. In which sense it was used by the framers of the income tax Act would be a matter for determination and to this end it would not be out of place to consider the probable reason for the exemption of agricultural income from income tax No other reason is suggested than the equity of exempting from further burden income which had already paid toll to the State in the shape of land revenue. 39. Referring to the above observations Rankin J. in the Calcutta cue cited remarked that the construction of "agricultural income" in the Madras case was "somewhat "wider" thin he could see his way to give. ; Later in the suns judgment hi said : I observe that in the Madras case already cited the Court upon reference to certain dictiomries came to the opinion that the word 'agriculture' while sometimes used in the narrow sense of the art or science of cultivating ground, is also used in a much wider sense so as to include even 'forestry' according to Webster. I am not convinced tint the Legislature, if it intended to include "even 'forestry' " would hive been content to siy "agriculture", but in the circumstances I desire to prejudice this question no further thin by an expression of this doubt. 40. Page J. refrained from expressing any view upon "that vexed question" because in his opinion "income derived from sthaljat is not "rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes," but is rent derived from land which is used for the purpose of enabling that under contractors to carry on their trade or business, he relied on the Permanent Settlement Registration for his view that such income is n )t assess label to income tax. 41. We hive mentioned certain proceedings in the Legislative Assembly. While conceding that the general rule is that the Parliamentary history of an enactment is not admissible to explain its meaning, Mr. Wasim has referred us to paragraph 1st of Vol. 41. We hive mentioned certain proceedings in the Legislative Assembly. While conceding that the general rule is that the Parliamentary history of an enactment is not admissible to explain its meaning, Mr. Wasim has referred us to paragraph 1st of Vol. 31 of Ha'sbury's Laws of England where it is said that In construing a statute regard may be had to the exact state of the law and generally to all circumstances which can be proved to have surrounded Parliament at the time it was passed. 42. He has also referred to the Federal Court case of In the Matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 A I R 1939 P. C. 1. It was there held by two learned Judges (Suldman J. debutante) that the proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform commonly known as the White Paper and the Report of the Joint Select Committee thereon, are historical facts, and their relation to the Constitution Act is a matter of common knowledge to which the Federal Court is entitled to refer. 43. At the very most we consider tint we are entitled to mention for the purpose of the present case tint there was a proposal to include ''income derived from forestry" in the definition of 'agricultural income" in the Income Tax Act and that this proposal was negatived. We are certainly not entitled to examine the debates, ascertain there- from why it was negatived, and take what was said in the course of it into consideration in construing the (definition. 44. A fiscal statute should no doubt be construed strictly and, if there be any doubt about its construction, the subject must be given the benefit. But we do not feel any doubt that the expression "land used for agricultural purposes" in the Income Tax Act does not extend to forests of spontaneous growth, where nothing is done to prepare the soil for trees to be planted therein, and where the growth of the trees is not fostered by tillage. We should not be justified in giving the tax payer the benefit of the dictionary definition when it is not disputed that the meaning of term "agricultural" cannot be extended for the put pose of the income tax Act to all the secondary implications therein suggested. We therefore construe the term in its primary sense. 45. We should not be justified in giving the tax payer the benefit of the dictionary definition when it is not disputed that the meaning of term "agricultural" cannot be extended for the put pose of the income tax Act to all the secondary implications therein suggested. We therefore construe the term in its primary sense. 45. We would accordingly that income from the sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth growing on land which is assessed to land revenue is not agricultural income within the meaning of Section 1 (1) (a) of the income tax Act. 46. The assessee will pay the cost of this reference. We fix the fee of the learned Counsel for the Income Tax department at Rs. 200.