JUDGMENT Misra, J. - Ganga Bux Singh, Respondent No. 1, died in the month of November 1943, and an application for substitution of his sons, Hari Har-bux Singh and Shiva Ram Singh, in place of the deceased Respondent was made by the Appellants after the expiry of limitation on 26th August, 1944. 2. Ostensibly the application purports to be one under Order 22, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, but in para 2 it is averred that the deceased was the head and karta of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his two sons, who are now the surviving members, and in para 3 it is said that the Appellants learnt about the death of Ganga Bux Singh on 10th August 1944, and for that reason they could not apply earlier. It might therefore be taken that the petition is in reality one under Order 22, Rule 9, CPC to set aside the abatement and thereafter to substitute the two sons of the deceased. In order that the abatement may be set aside, the Applicants must show that they had sufficient cause for not taking the necessary steps earlier. This Court has repeatedly held that an Appellant in the prosecution of his appeal is under an obligation to keep himself informed as to the existence of his opponent and mere ignorance of death of the opposite party occasioned by want of due diligence is not a sufficient cause within the meaning of Rule 9, Order 22, CPC vide Mirza Mohammad Askari v. Lalu (1918) 21 O.C. 68, Sarju Prasad v. Sarju Bakhsh Singh 1935 O.W.N. 371, and Bhagwan Din v. Muru 1940 O.A. 264 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 120 : O.W.N. 219. I may mention also that more than 60 days having expired since the abatement, there can be no question of substitution of names on the present application. 3. Two contentions are, however, advanced in arguments by the learned Counsel for the Applicants-- (1) that inasmuch as Ganga Bux Singh was the karta of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons, the latter are merely survivors and not "the legal representatives" of the deceased as defined by Section 2, Clause (11), Code of Civil Procedure. The decisions in Chunilal Harilal v. Bai Mani (1918) 42 Bom. 504 and Dwarka Das v. Krishan Kishore and Jai Gopal (1921) 2 Lah. The decisions in Chunilal Harilal v. Bai Mani (1918) 42 Bom. 504 and Dwarka Das v. Krishan Kishore and Jai Gopal (1921) 2 Lah. 114, are cited in support of this proposition (2) that the case is one of mere devolution of interest, and the application for substitution is governed by Order 22, Rule 10 or by Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance for this contention is placed on Rajani Kanta Roy v. Raja Jyoti Prasad Singh Deo (1923) 27 C.W.N. 710. 4. I might mention that the appeal which is pending in this Court arises out of a case under the Encumbered Estates Act. Ganga Bux Singh held a simple money decree on the basis of a promissory note and was included in the list of creditors. He was a claimant u/s 10 of the Act, and he moved an objection u/s 11 to the effect that the Applicant-debtor ought to have included certain other properties of which, it was alleged, he was the owner along with his sons. Upon his application the sons of the original debtor were in due course impleaded, and they set up a claim that the property mentioned by Ganga Bux Singh was exclusively theirs by virtue of a previous partition. The learned Special Judge disbelived the story of the partition and gave effect to the objection of Ganga Bux Singh. The sons of the debtor have come up in appeal and have impleaded Ganga Bux Singh as Respondent. 5. It is during the pendency of this appeal Ganga Bux Singh, Respondent No. 1, died. The promissory note and the decree based thereon stood in the name of Ganga Bux Singh, and there is nothing to show that he was impleaded in the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act as karta of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons, nor is there anything to indicate that this objections u/s 11 were made in that capacity. It is cleat that if the capacity in which he was impleaded and in which he moved his objections was a personal one, his sons, who represent his interest now, must be brought on the record within the limitation provided for an application under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC vide Jai Kali v. Baldeo Singh (1919) 41 All. 515. It is cleat that if the capacity in which he was impleaded and in which he moved his objections was a personal one, his sons, who represent his interest now, must be brought on the record within the limitation provided for an application under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC vide Jai Kali v. Baldeo Singh (1919) 41 All. 515. In cases of suits on promissory notes it is only the holder of them who can come to Court, and while he is alive his co-parceners have no locus stand to sue in the absence of any assignment or devolution of interest. On the other hand if Ganga Bux Singh was a party to the proceedings before the Special Judge as a karta representing his sons, the capacity which he filled has devolved now on the sons, and they would directly come within the definition of the term "legal representative" as contained in Section 2, Clause 11, Code of Civil Procedure. It was held in Gyan Datt v. Sada Nand Lal 1939 A.W.R. (H.C.) 58 : A.L.J. 56, that a legal representative need not necessarily be a legal heir of the deceased person, and in (Sic) Chandra v. Krishnachandra Gajapati Narayan Deo (1941) 20 Pat. 755, it was ruled that where no managing member was appointed after the death of the last karta of the joint Hindu family, all the surviving members of the family can be regarded as his legal representatives, because the deceased represented their interest in the suit. In ILR 2 Lah 114 cited for the Applicants the learned Judges relied on Chunilal's case for the proposition that the surviving members of a joint Hindu family are not the legal representatives. In a subsequent decision of the Bombay High Court, namely Ganesh Sakharam Saraf v. Narayan Shivram Mulaye (1931) 55 Bom. 970, however, the correctness of the broad proposition laid down in Chunilal's case was doubted, and it was held that a Hindu son succeeding his father in a joint family is the legal representative within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (11), Code of Civil Procedure. In T.S. Nagappa Nadar Vs. T.S. Karuppiah Nadar and Another, AIR 1925 Mad 456 a succeeding member of the joint Hindu family was regarded as a representative of the previous manager, and the learned Judges refused to accept as correct the law enunciated in Chunilal's case. In T.S. Nagappa Nadar Vs. T.S. Karuppiah Nadar and Another, AIR 1925 Mad 456 a succeeding member of the joint Hindu family was regarded as a representative of the previous manager, and the learned Judges refused to accept as correct the law enunciated in Chunilal's case. A somewhat cognate view was expressed by the late Court of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh in Mst. Sughar Kunwar v. Sitapat Ram and Kamakhya Dat Ram (1917) 20 O.C. 67. 6. The definition of the term "legal representative" in Section 2, Clause (11) is as follows-- "Legal representative means a person who in law represents the state of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estates of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party suing or sued." 7. In case of a joint Hindu family if the right to sue survives at all, it survives in consequence of the fact that the estate of the deceased is represented by the survivors. If it does not, the action must terminate upon the death of the deceased party. If it is claimed that the right to sue survives, it must come to the co-parceners as representatives of the deceased. For the purpose at least of substitution under Order 22, therefore, the co-parceners must be substituted as legal representatives, if they are not already on the record. 8. The next question which has to be considered is whether the substitution has to be made under Order 22, Rule 4 or Order 22, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure. Order 22 contemplates specifically three circumstances in which there will be a creation or a devolution of interest of the deceased. Rules 1 to 6 deal with the case of death of a party. Rule 7 deals with marriage and Rule 8 deals with insolvency. Thereafter the order contains a residuary rule governing cases which are not otherwise provided for earlier. It follows that in cases where devolution takes place by reason of death, and the matter falls under Rules 3 and 4, Rule 10 will have no application vide Ram Narain v. Mst. Phula 1942 O.A. 517 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 344 : O.W.N. 636. Thereafter the order contains a residuary rule governing cases which are not otherwise provided for earlier. It follows that in cases where devolution takes place by reason of death, and the matter falls under Rules 3 and 4, Rule 10 will have no application vide Ram Narain v. Mst. Phula 1942 O.A. 517 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 344 : O.W.N. 636. The rule laid down in 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes, page 710, which has been cited by the learned Counsel for the Applicants, in my opinion has no application to the facts before me. In that case there had already been a preliminary decree, and it was during the pendency of the appeal from a final decree that substitution became necessary. There is no doubt that in such a case the limitation of 90 days provided under Article 177 of the Indian Limitation Act in respect of applications under Order 22, Rule 4 does not operate. 9. I am therefore of opinion that Order 22, Rule 10 does not apply to the substitution in place of Ganga Bux Singh now prayed for. As no application has been made under Order 22, Rule 4 in time, and as no sufficient cause for setting aside the abatement has been made out by the Applicants, their application must fail, and it is accordingly dismissed.