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Allahabad High Court · body

1944 DIGILAW 186 (ALL)

Ganeshi Lal v. Emperor Through Municipal Board

1944-10-10

BENNETT

body1944
JUDGMENT Bennett, J. - This is an application in revision by a man named Ganeshi Lal, a resident of Fyzabad. He is a son of one of the proprietor of the firm Messrs. Gobreram Tulsiram. He was found guilty by the Magistrate (who refers to him as the proprietor of the firm) of offences u/s 155 of the Municipalities Act and Rule 159 of the Municipal Account Code. Under the latter provision and the Schedule to the Code he was fined Rs. 50: u/s 155 of the Act he was fined Rs. 1,000. In appeal to the Sessions Judge the convictions were upheld. As, however, it was found that only a technical offence had been committed u/s 155, the minimum penalty under that section, namely Rs. 904, was imposed. The fine of Rs. 50 under Rule 159 of the Account Code was maintained. 2. The proprietors of the firm are, I understand, the Appellant's father, Gobrey Ram and a man named K.P. Shah. In his judgment the Sessions Judge refers to K.P. Shah as the proprietor of a Calcutta firm, but Counsel before me stated that actually there is only one firm with these two proprietors and head quarters in Calcutta. The actual facts about this are, however, not material. 3. The proved and relevant facts are that a consignment of sheet iron was despatched by goods train from Calcutta to Fyzabad by K.P. Shah addressed to self. The consignment arrived at Fyzabad On or before the 2nd February. 1942. The applicant took formal delivery on the 2nd February, but left the sheet iron lying in the Railway goods-shed at Fyzabad. His case was that he had been directed by K.P. Shah to re-book the consignment to Cawnpore. K.P. Shah himself arrived, however, on the 3rd February, 1942, and re-booked the consignment to Cawnpore. Or rather signed a forwarding note asking for waggon accommodation. The actual re-booking and despatch to Cawnpore did not take place till March. 4. It was the prosecution case that the applicant Ganeshi Lal, removed the sheet iron from the railway goods-shed, and that other goods, namely scrap iron, were alterwards booked to Cawnpore. Had this been proved there would have been no doubt about the correctness of the conviction. The actual re-booking and despatch to Cawnpore did not take place till March. 4. It was the prosecution case that the applicant Ganeshi Lal, removed the sheet iron from the railway goods-shed, and that other goods, namely scrap iron, were alterwards booked to Cawnpore. Had this been proved there would have been no doubt about the correctness of the conviction. It was found, however, that the prosecution case with respect to the change in the goods was not proved and that only the sheet iron received at Fazabad was re-booked to Cawnpore. The question for consideration on these facts is whether the applicant was or was not guilty of either or both of the offences stated. 5. Learned Counsel for the applicant conceded that it was difficult to oppose the conviction under Rule 159 of the Municipal Account Code. That rule provides that before taking delivery of goods from the railway the importer must take the railway receipt and invoice to the head octroi office and obtain a municipal stamp thereon. The head octroi office shall take details of the consignment and if the goods are found to be liable to the payment of octroi the receipt and invoice are abstracted into a railway receipt and invoice register. As the applicant admittedly took delivery, though it was only formal delivery, of the goods and did not comply with the provisions of Rule 159 before so doing, he was clearly guilty of an offence under this rule. His defence was that he was informed by the local railway authorities that in the circumstances, as he did not intend to remove the goods, there was no necessity for him to comply with this procedure. That may be true, and the clerk or clerks concerned may have thought that the information they give him was correct, but this does not affect the case against him. If was incumbent upon him to comply with the Rule 6. The Schedule imposes a fine extending up to Rs. 50 for a breach of certain rules, including Rule 159. The relevant entry in the Schedule reads: "Failure to have the railway receipt and invoice or declaration stamped at the head octroi office before taking delivery of the goods, except in the case of goods declared as for immediate export and carried through the municipality under the transit pass system". 6. The relevant entry in the Schedule reads: "Failure to have the railway receipt and invoice or declaration stamped at the head octroi office before taking delivery of the goods, except in the case of goods declared as for immediate export and carried through the municipality under the transit pass system". 6. At first sight it might seem that as the goods were to be exported as soon as waggon, accommodation was available and they did not leave the railway premises, and the railway authorities were informed of the applicant's intention to re-book them, the exception is applicable. But it is clear that the applicant did not make the declaration required by the rule. The proper procedure was that indicated in Rule 199 of the Municipal Account Code, This rule and the following Rules 199-A, 200 and 201 show what has to be done under what is described as the transit pass system. Under these rules duty has to be paid by the importer at the barrier of import and he can obtain a refund afterwards on exporting the goods within a prescribed period. This procedure was not followed in the present case because it was not necessary to take the goods through any barrier at all. I feel some doubt whether the rules were intended to apply to a case of this kind, but if the goods were actually imported within octroi limits and subsequently exported therefrom, it was incumbent upon the applicant to comply with them. I agree therefore that by non-compliance the applicant made himself liable to the penalty imposed for a breach of Rule 139. 7. The next question for consideration is whether the applicant was guilty of the offence defined in Section 155 of the Act. This section reads: "A person introducing or attempting to introduce within octroi limits, or abetting the introduction within octroi limits, of any goods or animals liable to the payment of octroi for which the octroi due on introduction has neither been paid nor tendered shall be punished with a fine which may extend either to ten times the value of such octroi or to fifty rupees, whichever is greater, and which shall not be less than twice the value of such octroi." 8. The fine imposed by the Sessions Judge in present case was based on the value (or amount) of the octrol. The fine imposed by the Sessions Judge in present case was based on the value (or amount) of the octrol. It has been said that it is not proved what amount of octroi should have been paid, and that it cannot therefore be held that the calculation has been made correctly, but on the view which I take of the case this is not material. 9. I was at first doubtful whether as the goods did not have to pass through any octroi barrier the applicant introduced the goods within octroi limits, but on consideration I think it must be held that he did Learned Counsel for the Municipal Board referred to the rules, byelaws and Regulations of the Fyzabad Municipality. I find from them that octroi limits were notified in 1916. These limits are not exactly the same as the municipal limits notified in 1922. But in both the southern boundary is the East Indian Railway line, and I understand that the railway shed where the goods were left is to the north of this line. If so it must be within octroi limits. I take it therefore that the goods were brought within these limits. 10. On this finding the only question which remains is whether in the circumstances the applicant was guilty of an offence u/s 155. In the Municipal Manual published by Government there is a note below Section 155 which reads as follows: "This section prescribes a minimum penalty. The words 'with the intention to defraud the Board' which occurred in Section 69(2) of Act I of 1900 have been omitted, as the onus of proving the absence of such intention should be upon the person attempting to introduce goods etc. without payment of the octroi." 11. The marginal heading to the section is "Penalty for evasion of octroi dues". 12. It is not disputed that both the note and the marginal heading clearly contemplate that the person thus penalised for introducing goods within octroi limits without payment of octrol does so intentionally with the object of defrauding the municipality. But it is argued, and I think the argument is valid, that neither has any authoritative force. It appears to me, however, that there are indications in the section itself that it is intended to punish only deliberate evasion. But it is argued, and I think the argument is valid, that neither has any authoritative force. It appears to me, however, that there are indications in the section itself that it is intended to punish only deliberate evasion. There is first of all the amount of the minimum penalty prescribed; this might be very substantial, as in the present case, and it seems unlikely that the Legislature intended to penalize heavily an unconscious omission to comply with the rules; that is to put it on the same footing as a deliberate evasion of payment. Secondly the words which follow the word "introducing", namely "attempting to introduce within octroi limits or abetting the introduction within octroi limits" can only refer to cases of deliberate evasion. 13. Though the note may not have any legal force therefore I regard it as stating correctly the legal position. It is conceded that on the facts found in the present case the applicant can have had no intention to defraud the board. If he had paid the octroi he could also have obtained a refund. He could have gone through the formality of taking the goods through the import barrier and then through the export barrier within the time prescribed, and this is apparently what he should have done, though the procedure seems clearly unsuitable in a case of this kind. 14. I find therefore that, having no intention to defraud the board, he is not guilty of an offence u/s 155 of the Act. I allow his application so far as this offence is concerned, set aside his conviction and direct that the fine, if paid by him, be refunded. As regards his conviction under Rule 159 of the Account Code his application is dismissed.