JUDGMENT Bennett, J. - This is an application in revision against an order passed by the Sessions Judge of Hardoi in a case u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That case was decided by an Honorary Special Magistrate of the first class, who, holding that none of the parties had been able to show satisfactorily which of them was in possession on the crucial date attached the property u/s 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Sessions Judge upon an application in revision before him against this order refused to interfere 2. The application u/s 145 was made by a man named Kamta against six persons on the 11th September, 1942. The Magistrate called for a report from the police. The police reported on the 2nd October, 1942, that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace. The report was not apparently placed before the Magistrate until the 26th October. On that date Kamta repeated the allegations in his complaint and supported them with an affidavit. He alleged that a dispute existed and that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace. 3. The Magistrate passed an order on the 26th October, 1942, requiring the parties concerned in the alleged dispute to put in written statements explaining their claim and the facts as to actual possession of the subject matter of dispute. 4. In this order the Magistrate did not state that he was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed or mention this question at all. 5. Evidence was taken by the Magistrate on the 27th January, 1943. 6. On the 17th February, 1943, Kamta and Bisram one of the six persons complained against, filed a compromise. I may mention here that Bisram is the only applicant in the present application, Kamta asked that his complaint might be dismissed and the possession of Bisram declared. 7. The compromise was not verified. Several dates were given for this purpose but Kamta never attended to verify. 8. On the 27th February, 1943, a man named Sarin, who appears to be a second cousin of Kamta made an application to the Court that he should not be bound by the compromise. 7. The compromise was not verified. Several dates were given for this purpose but Kamta never attended to verify. 8. On the 27th February, 1943, a man named Sarin, who appears to be a second cousin of Kamta made an application to the Court that he should not be bound by the compromise. Another man named Patal, brother of Sarju, asked to be added as a party and he was added on the 16th March, and filed a written statement on the 27th March. 9. The Magistrate's final order u/s 146 was passed on the 28th December, 1943. 10. The present applicant, Bisram, filed an application in revision before the Sessions Judge. It appears that Kamta attended before the Sessions Judge on the 28th February, 1944, and asked the Court to dismiss the application u/s 145 and maintain Bisram's possession. This request was refused. 11. Three questions of law arise on this application. The first is whether in view of the police report and the nature of the order passed by him under Sub-section (1) of Section 145 the Magistrate had jurisdiction to make subsequent enquiry as to possession. The second is whether if the parties were in joint possession of the property Section 145 is applicable. The third is whether certain necessary parties were omitted from the proceedings. 12. I propose to dispose briefly of the last two questions first. I am unable to discover any finding that the parties were in joint possession It appears that they were reversioners disputing their claims to the property left by a man named Behari and his widow Mst. Bhurro There is no finding of either Court that the parties were in joint possession. There is only the statement of the patwari that the parties are related and shown in joint possession. The Sessions Judge has observed that if there is any finding of fact that there was joint possession of the parties certainly proceedings u/s 145 can in no case be justified. I take this as a correct statement of the law Reference was made by the applicant's counsel to Shanti Prasad v. King-Emperor 1937 O.W.N. 214. In that case there were allegations that the parties constituted a joint Hindu family and that the property in dispute was also joint family property in the joint possession of all the members of the family. In that case there were allegations that the parties constituted a joint Hindu family and that the property in dispute was also joint family property in the joint possession of all the members of the family. It was held on these allegations that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts in that case were thus quite different from the facts in the present case. As I have said I can find nothing to indicate that there was joint possession. The parties were disputing their individual claims to property as reversioners. It is said that two persons, a man named Rameshwar and Mst. Bhagavan Din, were interested in the property and as such they should have been made parties to the proceedings. The Sessions Judge has not explained himself very clearly with regard to this. He has remarked: "I am sure this is not a serious matter and the mere fact that certain interested persons were not made parties the present proceedings by the learned Magistrate cannot fail to operate in its full force (sic)". 13. It would seem that the learned Sessions judge has omitted something from this sentence. These two persons, Rameshwar and Mst. Bhagwan Din, may have been interested in the property, but I am not clear from the evidence that they were concerned in the dispute. I agree therefore with the Sessions Judge that the omission to implead them is not a "serious matter." 14. Coming now to the first point I do not think that the question has been very satisfactorily dealt with by the Sessions Judge. After quoting the relevant provisions of Section 145(1) he proceeded to say: "In the present case the learned Magistrate seems to have acted independently of the police report and seems to have taken his stand on the words "other information" mentioned in this section. The "other information" must be taken to have been received by the Magistrate on account of evidence produced before him, and I am inclined to hold that the said words include the evidence which is placed before the Court and those words should not be taken to mean or import the narrow sense of the words. The "other information" must be taken to have been received by the Magistrate on account of evidence produced before him, and I am inclined to hold that the said words include the evidence which is placed before the Court and those words should not be taken to mean or import the narrow sense of the words. In other words I mean to say that those words should be taken to have broad meaning as they appear to represent because after all a Magistrate has either to be informed by an application or an affidavit or on a statement on oath. In the present case evidence was placed before him and the learned Magistrate seems to have been satisfied that there existed apprehension of a breach of the peace and consequently he seems to have acted on that evidence." 15. My objection to this, apart from its reliance on conjecture as to what the Magistrate acted upon, is that the evidence which was subsequently recorded by the Magistrate after issuing notice under Sub-section (1) would not justify the preliminary order which requires a Magistrate to be satisfied that an apprehension of a breach of the peace exists before the order is issued. Moreover it does not appear that there is much, if anything, in the evidence which was subsequently recorded about the possibility of a breach of the peace, that evidence for the most part relating to the question of possession. 16. It is quite clear that the Magistrate did not comply with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 145. He is required by that Sub-section to make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. Actually he said nothing about an apprehension of a breach of the peace in his order. There are rulings to the effect that such an omission vitiates subsequent proceedings. Such cases are-- 17. AIR 1925 484 (Oudh) and AIR 1933 253 (Oudh) . 18. Learned Counsel for the opposite-parties relied on a later case of this Court, Asghari Khanam v. King-Emperor 1935 O.W.N. 454. There are rulings to the effect that such an omission vitiates subsequent proceedings. Such cases are-- 17. AIR 1925 484 (Oudh) and AIR 1933 253 (Oudh) . 18. Learned Counsel for the opposite-parties relied on a later case of this Court, Asghari Khanam v. King-Emperor 1935 O.W.N. 454. In that case there was a difference of opinion between Srivastava J. and Nanavutty J. on the point whether the mere failure of a Magistrate to state the grounds in his preliminary order of his being satisfied that there exists a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace is or is not a fatal defect. The case was referred to King C.J. who, agreeing with Srivastava J., and disagreeing with Nanavutty J., held that it is only an omission which is curable under the provisions of Section 537, if it has not occasioned a failure of justice or any prejudice to the accused persons. 19. In that case the Magistrate passed an order the deposition of the complainant recorded on the back of his application and it was held that it must be presumed that the Magistrate was satisfied by this that there was a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. 20. But in the present case there is the further fact to be taken into consideration that the Magistrate referred the complaint to the police for inquiry and that the police report showed that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace. The question for consideration is whether on these facts the Magistrate was justified in ignoring this report and accepting the complaint and affidavit of the applicant without giving any reason therefore. It seems to me that these facts are sufficient to distinguish the present case from that of Asghari Khanam v. King-Emperor. Ordinarily a police report is accepted in cases of this kind unless there is any reason to the contrary. No reason to the contrary appears in the present case, and if the Magistrate had any reason for preferring the statement of the complainant to the opinion of the police after inquiry, it was incumbent upon him, I consider, to give reasons in his subsequent order for not accepting the opinion. No reason to the contrary appears in the present case, and if the Magistrate had any reason for preferring the statement of the complainant to the opinion of the police after inquiry, it was incumbent upon him, I consider, to give reasons in his subsequent order for not accepting the opinion. There is nothing to show that the Magistrate ever applied his mind to this particular question, for he does not even state in his preliminary order that he is satisfied that there is an apprehension of a breach of the peace, and all that he says in his subsequent order is that "the fact that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace is evident". 21. I am not prepared in these circumstances to draw the inference which the Sessions Judge suggests should be drawn as to the justification for the order, nor am I prepared to hold that the case of Asghari Khanam v. King Emperor, concludes the matter in favour of the opposite-parties. 22. I accordingly hold that there was an initial defect in jurisdiction because the order passed by the Magistrate under Sub-section (1) of Section 145 was not a proper order and on the facts stated not shown to be justified. The result will be that the subsequent proceedings must be set aside and I set them aside accordingly. I direct the police, who are in possession of the property which has been attached, to vacate the property. This order of course will not preclude anyone from applying again to the Court u/s 145 if a dispute still exists and if that dispute now or at any future time causes an apprehension of breach of the peace.