JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This is a Plaintiff's second civil appeal against the appellate decree of the learned Civil Judge of Fyzabad setting aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissing the Plaintiff's suit for pre-emption. 2. One Ram Saran Singh was the owner of a 2 annas share in two villages Pakarpur and Kaurah. This share was undivided. On the 31st of March, 1937, Ram Saran Singh executed a deed, whereby he purported to sell his 1/3rd, that is 8 pies, share in each of the aforesaid villages to Bachcha Singh and Hausala Singh, Defendants-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for Rs. 700. These persons were co-sharers in the village. The vendor desired to get partition of his 2 annas share effected through the Revenue Court. He, therefore, took Rs. 25 of the consideration in cash and left the remaining sum with the vendees for expenses of partition proceedings. It was stipulated in the deed that neither the vendor would be entitled to get any refund, if the, actual expenditure was less than Rs. 675, nor would he be liable to pay anything more to the vendees if the expenditure exceeded that amount. Notice of the sale, as contemplated by. Section 10 of the Oudh Laws Act, was not given, and Kandhaiya Bakhsh Singh, who is a co-sharer, brought the present suit for pre-emption. Out of the two vendees Bachcha Singh did not contest the suit, and the trial proceeded against him ex parte. As between the pre emptor and the vendor, Ram Saran Singh, a compromise was effected, whereby it was agreed that the sum of Rs. 675 would be paid by the pre-emptor to Ram Saran Singh and that the possession of the property would remain with him so long as the amount was not paid to him. The suit was contested by Hausala Singh, Defendant No. 2, alone. The defence, with which we are concerned in appeal, was that Ram Saran Singh was not in possession of the property covered by the deed, and his right to ownership of it was denied by the Plaintiff. The transaction of the 31st of March, 1937, it was said, was in reality, therefore, merely the sale of a doubtful right to sue. The transaction of the 31st of March, 1937, it was said, was in reality, therefore, merely the sale of a doubtful right to sue. It did not constitute a sale within the meaning of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and was not liable to pre-emption under the Oudh Laws Act. 3. The trial Court held that the title of the vendor in respect of 2 annas share in both the villages on the date of Ex. 1 was perfect, and it further found that Ram Saran Singh enjoyed joint possession over it. There was in its opinion no dispute either with respect to title or with respect to possession. The vendor merely desired to obtain partition of his share, because he had difficulties in respect of realisation of sair income. The sale, therefore, it was held, was not a mere transfer of a doubtful claim or of future property. The trial Court was further of opinion that the deed operated to transfer 8 pies share in each of the two villages for a definite consideration of Rs. 700 which, it held, was a fair price. The other pleas in defence were overruled, and the suit for pre-emption was decreed subject to payment of Rs. 25 to the vendees. It was provided that the vendor, Defendant No. 3, would be entitled to Remain in possession of the share in suit till Rs. 675 were paid by the pre-emptor in Court for being given to him. Both the vendees appealed, and the lower appellate Court disagreed with the learned Munsif as regards the interpretation of the deed. On a consideration of its terms it came to the conclusion that the parties did not have in contemplation any exact or definite sum for which the property was being transferred, and that the price was not an ascertained amount. The transaction in its view did not give rise to a right of pre-emption. The learned Civil Judge, therefore, dismissed the suit. 4. Aggrieved by the decree of the lower appellate Court the pre-emptor has preferred this appeal, and the sole contention on his behalf is that on a proper construction of the deed of the 31st of March 1937, Ex 1, the price cannot be said to be an unascertained amount. We consider it necessary to reproduce here a major portion of this document. We consider it necessary to reproduce here a major portion of this document. The deed gives the details of the property and of the vendor's title thereto. It recites that mutation stands in the vendor's name and then it goes on to say-- "As the aforesaid mahal has not been divided between the co-sharers loss is occasioned in respect of sari etc., by the highhandedness of the other co-sharers. For this reason it is necessary to get the vendor's share separated. The executants, however, is not possessed of sufficient means to defray the expenses of partition, and he has, therefore, decided to sall a 1/3rd share out of the 2 annas in each of the two villages that is to say, 8 pies in each of them and to keep remaining 1 anna 4 pies in each for himself, so that the vendees along with the executant take proceedings and obtain partition through Court and thus prevent furture loss. Accordingly while in sound mind and in enjoyment of Senses the executants hereby sells and executes an absolute and complete sale deed in respect of 1/3rd share, that is to say, 8 pies out of the 2 annas in each of the villages Pakarpur and Kaurah mentioned above which is owned by him and is in his full proprietorship including all the rights of possession, sir, sair, khudkasht and exproprietary rights etc. without any reservation... for a sum of Rs. 700, half of which amounts to Rs. 350. The executant has received the consideration money in this way that he has today taken Rs. 25 from the vendees, for his necessary expenses and Rs. 675 are being left in deposit with the vendees so that the expenses of the partition suit be met out of it. The executant and the vendees shall together file a partition suit, and the separation of the vendor's patti would be obtained as well as of the share of the vendees so that the vendor and the vendees remain in possession as full owners of their respective shares After the payment of the Government revenue they would be fully entitled to the profits and liable for the loss. The partition suit will be fought out to its final stages and the vegdees shall incur all the necessary expenses. The partition suit will be fought out to its final stages and the vegdees shall incur all the necessary expenses. If a lesser amount is spent, then the vendor would not be entitled to the return of the amount saved, and if the expenditure is more than the amount of deposit, the vendees would not be entitled to get the excess from the vendor. The entire work in the partition suit would be carried out jointly for the executant and the vendees. The executant shall not be entitled singly to file any application for compromise or withdrawal, nor by his acts or omissions shall he do any such thing as may injure the case. If anything is to be paid to the persons who are parties to the partition proceedings, the vendees shall have to make the payment, and the executant will not be responsible for it, and if any-thing is received from the parties to the partition proceedings, the vendees would be entitled to receive it. The vendor would not be entitled to any share in it." 5. The deed then does on to say that the entire expenditure of the trial Court and of the Court of appeal would be borne by he vendees, and the executant of the deed shall not be entitled to claim any rendition of account. The property evidently was subject to a mortgage, and the deed provides that the purchasers would not be liable for the payment of the mortgage. Finally it is then said that these presents have been executed as a sale out and out coupled with an ageement. 6. It is clear from the terms of Ex. 1 that Rs. 700 were settled as the price of the share which was the subject matter of the sale. Apart from transference of the share was an agreement that the vendor will apply for partition, and Rs. 675, which were left with the transferees, were to represent the expenditure involved in obtaining partition regardless of the actual expenditure incurred. It is obvious that the application for partition was to be made for the benefit of both the parties to the transaction, and there was no question of any labour, effort or skill forming any part of the consideration. It is obvious that the application for partition was to be made for the benefit of both the parties to the transaction, and there was no question of any labour, effort or skill forming any part of the consideration. If there was any speculation, it was with regard to the expenditure that the partition proceedings may involve and not with regard to the price fixed by the deed. Reference has been made in the judgment of the Court below to three cases, namely Ram Pher Singh v. Shoo Saran Singh (1926) 3 O.W.N. 138, Rachcha Ram v. Paltan AIR 1926 Oudh 368 and Jiyaob Singh v. Jageshar Singh (1928) 5 O.W.N. 920. While the trial Court depended for its decision upon 5 O.W.N. 920 the learned lower appellate Court had leaned to-wards the interpretation which was put upon somewhat similar deeds in 3 O.W.N.138 and AIR 1926 Oud 368. These cases are no doubt authorities for the proposition that in order that a transaction may constitute a sale in present of immovable property u/s 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, there must be a price stated or ascertained at the time of the deed, and that where the price includes not only monetary consideration but also a consideration which is definitely measurable in terms of money, the transaction being not a sale it would not attract the provisions for pre-emption contained in the Oudh Laws Act. In order to determine the import and intention underlying the transaction each document must be considered with reference to its own terms and surrounding circumstances. It is dangerous to seek assistance for this purpose from precedents afforded by interpretation of other deeds executed in different circumstances and embodying terms which though analogous may have a very different significance. Here there was no cloud on vendor's title or possession. The executant was not setting out to sell a law suit. He had difficulties in proper realisation of the sair income relating to his share, and for that purpose he desired to get a partition effected. With that object the vendees also evidently agreed. If the partition proceedings where to be launched Ram Saran Singh would have had to spend a fair sum which the parties estimated to be about Rs. 675. The vendor, therefore, sold sufficient share to raise this amount. With that object the vendees also evidently agreed. If the partition proceedings where to be launched Ram Saran Singh would have had to spend a fair sum which the parties estimated to be about Rs. 675. The vendor, therefore, sold sufficient share to raise this amount. The value of the share sold was fixed, and it exceeded the aforesaid expenses by Rs. 25. This excess he took in cash and entrusted to the vendees the launching of the partition proceedings upon a contract basis, namely whether the actual partition costs were more or less, the deposit of Rs. 675 with the vendees would absolve the vendor of further responsibility in that behalf. We unable to say under the circumstances that the definite price for which the property was sold was not within the contemplation of the parties or was not settled between them, nor can we say that it was indefinite or undetermined. We are prepared to go further and to say that so far as Ram Saran Singh was concerned, expenses, of parties were also estimated, determined and definitely settled. It was not a mere contract for sale of some future property or of a property about which it can be said that a mere doubtful claim in respect of it alone vested in the vendor at the time of the deed. The transaction, therefore, was an out and out sale as mentioned in the deed. It fulfilled all the requirements of Section 54, and there is no reason to think that it could not give rise to the right of pre-emption under the Oudh Laws Act. 7. We accordingly allow this appeal with costs of all the three Courts, set aside the decree passed by the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court subject to the modification that the date by which the payment of Rs. 25 is to be made into the Court is extended from the 24th of October, 1938, to the 7th of April, 1944. If the sum of Rs. 25 is not paid on or before the date herein specified, the Plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed with costs.