JUDGMENT Misra, J. - This appeal arises out of an execution case. The Appellants obtained an ex-parte decree against Lallu Singh Respondent from the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Fatehpur, district Bara Banki on 6th July, 1938 for a sum of Rs. 82-14-0 as representing the arrears of under-proprietary rent due to them from 1342 Fasli to 1345 Fasli. It appears that before the institution of the suit Lallu Singh had applied u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act on 19th October, 1936, and his application was forwarded to the Special Judge sometime before 18th October, 1941. The exact date of the order is not known to the Counsel of the parties, nor is it traceable from the record. It is probable that the order was passed in 1936. The debts, to which the suit related, were for a period partly before that order and partly thereafter. The fact remains that the suit was entertained and decreed without any objection from Lallu Singh. The decree-holders applied for execution of their decree on 5th July, 1941, which in ordinary circumstances would have been the last date of limitation. The judgment-debtor then by his application, dated 18th October, 1941, Informed the Court of the pendency of the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act and sought the protection of Section 7. The S.D.O. thereupon dismissed the application and his order was upheld in appeal by the Additional Civil Judge, Bara Banki. 2. It is conceded for the decree-holder-appellants that Lallu Singh is entitled to the benefits of Section 7 of the Act. The sole contention raised in arguments is that the section does not warrant the dismissal of the execution application for it only enjoins that the attachment shall become null and void, that the execution shall be stayed and that no process in execution shall be issued. 3. The matter has to be considered from two points of view. If the order u/s 6 was passed subsequent to the decree but before the date of judgment debtor's application there is no doubt that Clause 1(a) of Section 7 applied, and though the attachment automatically became void, the execution application could not be dismissed. 3. The matter has to be considered from two points of view. If the order u/s 6 was passed subsequent to the decree but before the date of judgment debtor's application there is no doubt that Clause 1(a) of Section 7 applied, and though the attachment automatically became void, the execution application could not be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the order u/s 6 was passed in 1936, the debt, to which the suit related, being partly for a period subsequent to it, the decree so far as it related to that period could not be executed till such time as is specified in Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 7 against any of the landlord's property mentioned in the notice published u/s 11 of the Act whether such property constituted proprietary right in land or otherwise. What has however to be determined is whether by force of the statutory injunction contained in these clauses the decree in respect of a debt as defined in the Act becomes unexecutable for the time being or whether the execution is only to remain stayed. The provisions of Section 11 require the publication of a notice specifying the property mentioned by the applicant u/s 8 or by a claimant u/s 10, in other words the landlord's proprietary rights in land or such other property as is liable to attachment and sale u/s 60 CPC It has been held that the prohibition embodied in Section 7 has no application to execution of decrees by any other mode provided by law or against any property of the landlord outside the province to which the Act applies vide Lal Mohan Trivedi v. Ram Chandra Avashthi 1938 A.W.R. (C.C.) 9 : R.D. 213 and Darbar Patiala v. Narain Das 1938 A.W.R. (H.C.) 313. By force of Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3, therefore, the decree is not rendered unexecutable, nor is the presentation of an application after the order u/s 6 incompetent. The bar laid down is only to this extent that the decree shall not be executed till certain specified events occur. It is to be noticed that Section 44, Clause 3, while referring to the provisions of Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 7, regards the decree as having been merely "stayed". The bar laid down is only to this extent that the decree shall not be executed till certain specified events occur. It is to be noticed that Section 44, Clause 3, while referring to the provisions of Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 7, regards the decree as having been merely "stayed". There is, therefore, no doubt that those clauses operate to do no more than Clause (a) of Section 7, so far as the application for execution is concerned. In other words, they merely provide for stay of execution and for dismissal of the application. 4. It is obvious that the argument is more or less academic, for in practice whether the execution is stayed or dismissed by reason of Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 7, a further period of limitation is given for a fresh execution application after the declaration referred to in Section 44(1) or the orders of the Special Judge mentioned in Section 44(2). Nevertheless after an execution application has been presented, there is no reason why the decree-holder should be compelled to file a fresh execution application and to bear the additional expense and botheration. Whether, therefore, the order u/s 6 was passed, after the decree and before 18th October, 1941 or was passed in 1936, the order of the S.D.O. is wrong. 5. I accordingly modify the order to this extent that execution shall remain stayed u/s 7 of the Encumbered Estates Act. Parties will bear their own costs of this Court and of the lower Court.