JUDGMENT Thomas C.J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. - This is the Plaintiffs' second appeal and arises out of the dismissal of their suit concurrently by both the Courts below. The appeal originally came up for hearing before one of us and was referred to a Bench u/s 14(2) of the Oudh Courts Act as the question involved was one of some importance. 2. The Plaintiffs sued for possession of the two-thirds share against Defendant No. 1 who was admitted to be the owner of the remaining one-third. The Plaintiffs are the nephews of Murlidhar while the Defendant No. 1 is the widow of Sheo Nandan Lal, who was the son of Jugal Kishore a brother of Murlidhar. Murlidhar died on 4th July 1936. Jugal Kishore was Defendant No. 2 in the suit and was alleged to be colluding with Defendant No. 1. The ground of the claim was that the Plaintiffs were entitled to succeed to Murlidhar under a family custom whereby the brother and nephews inherit jointly. According to this custom it was alleged that the Plaintiffs were entitled to 2/3rds being the sons of Murlidhar's two brothers, and Jugal Kishore Defendant No. 2, the third brother, was entitled to the remaining one-third. 3. This custom was denied by Defendant No. 1. 4. The only question with which we are concerned is whether the custom set up by the Plaintiffs has been proved. The decision of this question turns upon the construction of two wajib-ul-arzes of Sarwar Khurd and Charu (Exs. 4 and 6 respectively). In addition to these the Plaintiffs rely on certain judgments, instances and entries in the settlement khewat. Some oral evidence was also relied upon in the Courts below but this was rejected as not being independent and satisfactory and nothing further has been said about it. Both the Courts below have found against the Plaintiffs and hence the second appeal. 5. The parties are Kayasthas and their ancestors were pattidars in both the villages Sarwar Khurd and Charu and the wajib-ul-arzes were attested by them. The relevant portion in Ex. 4 may be reproduced as follows:-- "Jis hissedar ke koi beta no ho to uske hisse par awal bhai bhatije haqiqi aur basurat na hone bhai bhatije haqiqi ke dusra hissedar ekjaddi jo qarib tar hoga qabiz hoga" Ex. The relevant portion in Ex. 4 may be reproduced as follows:-- "Jis hissedar ke koi beta no ho to uske hisse par awal bhai bhatije haqiqi aur basurat na hone bhai bhatije haqiqi ke dusra hissedar ekjaddi jo qarib tar hoga qabiz hoga" Ex. 6 gives the custom in the following words:-- "Bad wafat bewagan mazkur ke bhai bhatije shauhar mutwaffi ka qabiz hisse mazkur honge, darsurat na hone bhai bhatije haqiqi ke jo hissedar ke khandan ekjaddi shauhar mutwaffi hain qarabatan qarib tar hoga wah pawega." 6. The Courts below have construed the statements in the wajib-ul-arzes as meaning that the uncles and the nephews do not succeed together and the nephews come in only in default of the uncles. We are of opinion that this construction is correct. The words "bhai bhatije" used in the two wajib-ul-arzes are in our opinion intended to refer to a class of persons who have been expressly named in order to show that they come in immediately after the issueless owner. There can be no doubt that among the collaterals the brothers of the deceased first and in default the nephews will succeed before other collaterals are entitled to succeed. To mention all possible collaterals whether near or distant, would have been an act of sheer superfulity. We are not prepared to hold on the language used in the wajib-ul-arzes that the intention was to confer equal rights of inheritance simultaneously on the brothers and nephews. Such a custom is undoubtedly in derogation of the ordinary Hindu Law which excludes the more remote collaterals in favour of the near ones and unless the statement of the wajib-ul-arzes is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous we shall not be justified in superseding the ordinary law in favour of the custom, No instance in which the uncles and nephews succeeded together was proved, and although a clear and unambiguous statement in a wajib-ul-arz would be sufficient by itself to prove the specific custom unsupported by any instance, we do not think that we should give effect to the custom set up in the present case unless it was either expressly recorded or was supported by reliable instances. We may refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Faqir Baksh v. Ghirraon AIR 1929 Oudh 241 where the words "brothers and nephews" used in a wajib-ul-arz were interpreted as meaning collaterals of the deceased and not as meaning that they succeeded together, and in support of this conclusion a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chandika Baksh v. Muna Kunwar (1202) 24 All. 273 was referred to. The wajib-ul-arz recited that if a brother died childless leaving a widow she would be entitled to succeed to the entire property for her lifetime without any power of alienation and on her death the brothers and nephews of her husband would succeed to the property. The learned Judges held that these words indicated only a class of persons, i e, the collaterals of the husband who were to succeed after the death of the widow. They were not intended to mean that the brothers and nephews would inherit together and no regard was to be paid to the nearness of the degree. The learned Judges added that if the intention of the framers of the wajib-ul-arz had been that the brothers and nephews should inherit together, the words should have been bhai bhatije ek sath malik honge. The case of Chandika Buksh shows that a similar interpretation was put upon these words by the late Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh. In that case the custom set up was a family custom among the Ahban Thakurs of Oudh to the effect that after the death of the widow the brothers and nephews of her deceased husband and on failure of the brothers and nephews, the nearest heir of the same stock shall get the estate. There was no conjunctive word like "and" between brothers and nephews. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner held that the meaning to be assigned to these words was not that brothers and nephews succeeded together but that brothers and in default of brothers, nephews would succeed. To say that the uncles and nephews succeeded together was to put upon the word, used in the wajib-ul-arz a forced construction. The judgment of the Privy Council, however, does not appear to expressly approve of this construction though nothing was said against it. To say that the uncles and nephews succeeded together was to put upon the word, used in the wajib-ul-arz a forced construction. The judgment of the Privy Council, however, does not appear to expressly approve of this construction though nothing was said against it. The decision proceeded on the ground that such a custom was not proved by the four instances produced in support of it. This fact, however, does not in our opinion detract from the value of the decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner with which we have no hesitation in agreeing. The view taken by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was accepted by a Bench of this Court in Faqir Baksh's case and in our opinion rightly. 7. It has been argued on behalf of the Appellants on the strength of an observation by Sir John Edge in Bishwa Nath Singh v. Jugal Kishore (1923) 50 I.A. 179, that if this interpretation were to be accepted; it would render the statement in the wajib-ul-arz wholly redundant as that would be no more than a mere reproduction of what the Hindu Law lays down. The passage to which reference is made is to be found at page 181. It runs thus:-- "It did not occur to the learned Judges of the appellate Court that if the statement that a widow could adopt meant that she could adopt if she had the authority of her husband to adopt, the statement was not a statement of a special family custom, and was unnecessary, as it would be merely a statement of a right which a Hindu widow of a sonless Hindu enjoys everywhere in India, except possibly in families governed by the law of the Mithila School" 8. We do not think that this observation affords any assistance to the Appellants. The custom involved in that case was whether a widow could adopt without her husband's authority. The wajib-ul-arz of the village in which the deceased resided stated a custom that a widow could adopt without her husband's authority but seven other wajib-ul-arzes with which the deceased was connected merely stated that the widows could adopt. The question was whether the custom that widows could adopt without authority was established by the above records. The wajib-ul-arz of the village in which the deceased resided stated a custom that a widow could adopt without her husband's authority but seven other wajib-ul-arzes with which the deceased was connected merely stated that the widows could adopt. The question was whether the custom that widows could adopt without authority was established by the above records. In this connection it was observed by Sir John Edge that there was no inconsistency between the one wajib ul arz and the seven others and each of the seven wajib-ul-arzes must be taken to state the same custom other-wise the statement would not be of a special custom but of the ordinary Hindu Law. 9. Reliance is also placed on certain judgments. Ex. A-3 is the decision of Saiyid Wajahat Husain, Munsif, dated the 11th November, 1889. The question whether the uncles and nephews succeeded together was embodied in issue No. 2 and in support of that custom the entry in the wajib-ul-arz of village Charu was relied upon. The custom was negatived. 10. Ex. 10 is the judgment of the District Judge. The District Judge took the view that as the brothers and the nephews were put together in the wajib-ul-arz, the presumption was that they were to inherit equally. In arriving at this interpretation he was influenced by two main considerations. One was that the oral evidence produced by the Plaintiff himself supported the custom and the other was that mutation of names, in accordance with that custom, had taken place six years before the suit. Finally he remanded the case for decision of an issue about jointness or separation. We do not think, therefore, that Ex. 10 has much evidentiary value. 11. Another litigation of 1920 referred to is to be found in a judgment of Mr. Bhudhar Chandra Ghosh (Ex. 8) in which he interpreted these words in the wajib-ul-arz of village Charu as meaning that the brothers and nephews succeeded together. The value of this decision is discounted by the fact that the District Judge decided the appeal on a different ground and did not consider it necessary to discuss the issue relating to custom. He definitely observed that the question of custom need not be considered. 12. Lastly it remains to notice the argument based on the khewat and the pedigree of the first settlement (Exs. 2 and 5 respectively) in the year 1871. He definitely observed that the question of custom need not be considered. 12. Lastly it remains to notice the argument based on the khewat and the pedigree of the first settlement (Exs. 2 and 5 respectively) in the year 1871. The pedigree shows that Patte Lal and Doodh Nath were uncle and nephew. Both of them were entered in the khewat as owning 10 pies and 13 1/4 krants. There is nothing to show how long before 1871 Ram Adhin Singh the brother of Patte Lal, died and whether, upon his death, Patte Lal and Doodh Nath were joint or separate. If they were joint it is obvious that both Patte Lal and Doodh Nath would succeed equally as members of a joint Hindu family and it is by no means remarkable that in the khewat their shares should be defined. It is clear, therefore, that these documents do not establish the custom that the uncles and nephews succeed together. 13. We hold that the decision arrived at by the two Courts below is correct and dismiss this appeal with costs.