JUDGMENT Misra, J. - This is Defendants' second appeal. It arises in the following circumstances:-- 2. In a partition suit which was started in Revenue Courts in 1938 the present Defendants-appellants filed objections on 21st January 1939 to the effect that there had already been a private partition between the parties and that the shares which were then allotted were no longer liable to a further partition. These objections were dismissed by the partition officer on 27th March 1939. On 2nd May 1939 the objectors appealed to the Court of the District Judge, but the memorandum of appeal was not accompained by any copy of the order. Obviously the appeal had been filed after the expiry of limitation, but there was no application made u/s 5, Indian Limitation Act A notice was issued to the Appellants, but as they did not present themselves in response to it the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter they again presented an appeal in the same Court and against the same order on 23rd April 1940 along with an application u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The circumstances which were pleaded in extenuation were that the objectors had appealed to the Court of the Deputy Commissioner on 26th April 1939 on the advice of counsel, and their appeal was allowed by that Court on 26th May 1939. I na further appeal by the Plaintiffs-respondents to the Court of the Commissioner it was held that the objections raised the question of proprietary title and the appeal lay to Civil Courts. The order of the Deputy Commissioner was therefore set aside and the decision of the Commissioner was upheld by the Board of Revenue by its Order dated 20th March 1940. A review against the decision of the Board of Revenue was also rejected on 14th September 1940. It is said that the proceedings in the Revenue Courts were being carried on legal advice and the Defendants Appellants were entitled to exclusion of time which those proceedings took. The learned District Judge had dismissed the application u/s 5, Indian Limitation Act, on a finding that there was no sufficient cause, and has therefore dismissed the appeal as barred by time. The Defendants-appellants have now come up in second appeal. 3. The learned District Judge had dismissed the application u/s 5, Indian Limitation Act, on a finding that there was no sufficient cause, and has therefore dismissed the appeal as barred by time. The Defendants-appellants have now come up in second appeal. 3. It is argued on their behalf that the delay in filing the appeal in proper Court was due to wrong advice of counsel and was such as was in the circumstances of the case excusable u/s 5. It is pointed out that the procedure adopted by the first two Revenue Courts disclosed that they did not consider the objection as being one which raised questions of proprietary title. I have already mentioned in an earlier part of this judgment the nature of the question raised, and there cannot be any doubt that an objection made to that application for partition on the ground that the property had already been divided and the shares of the objectors were no longer liable to be broken up by a fresh partition raises a question of proprietary title. The question which here falls to be considered u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act must be resolved on the principles laid down by Brett. L.J., in Highton v. Treherne (1878) 18 L.J. Ex. 167 at 168. "In cases where a suitor has suffered from the negligence or ignorance or, gross want of legal skill of his legal adviser, he has his remedy against that legal adviser, and meantime the suitor must suffer But, where there has been a bona fide mistake, not through misconduct nor through negligence nor through want of reasonable skill, but such as a skilled person might make, I very much dislike the idea that the rights of the client should be thereby forfeited." 4. Somewhat on the same lines is the observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in a case which went up to their Lordships' Board from Oudh, Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Rai Rajeshwar Bali 1937 O.W.N. 771 : 1937 A.W.R. 979. "Mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may in the circumstances of a particular case give rise to a sufficient cause within Section 5, Limitation Act, though there is certainly no general doctrine which saves parties from the results of wrong advice." 5. In a recent decision of this Court reported in The Municipal Board of Lucknow v. Mr. "Mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may in the circumstances of a particular case give rise to a sufficient cause within Section 5, Limitation Act, though there is certainly no general doctrine which saves parties from the results of wrong advice." 5. In a recent decision of this Court reported in The Municipal Board of Lucknow v. Mr. Kali Krishna Narain 1944 O.A. 92 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 92 : O.W.N. 119 a Bench of this Court remarked that: "It is easy to conceive of circumstances where counsel may be faced with two possible views. In such a case if he honestly takes one view rather than the other. his advice given on the strength of this view and acted upon by the litigant cannot be deemed to be advice given negligently. Each case must irrevitably depend upon its own special facts and circumstances." 6. The circumstances in the present case led the Court below to come to the conclusion, firstly, that in fact no legal advice was obtained and, secondly, that if such advice was in fact obtained it was not given with due care and caution. There was also a third ground upon which the learned lower Court refused to entertain the appeal and which was that the previous appeal having been dismissed by that Court on 2nd May, 1939, no further appeal to the same Court was competent. It is clear that an obvious mistake cannot be said to be a bonafide mistake which could have been avoided by due care and caution cannot be regarded as sufficient cause. If it was sought by the Appellants in the present case to attribute their wrong action of going to the Revenue Courts to a competent legal advice, it was for them to prove this fact either by an affidavit or otherwise in the lower Court. They not only refrained from doing so, but they did not even disclose the name of the counsel who was alleged to have been responsible for the advice. In any event in face of the provisions of Section 112 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act it is impossible to say that such advice, if given was otherwise than negligent. Upon the merits of the application therefore, I am of opinion that the decision of the Court below was correct. 7. In any event in face of the provisions of Section 112 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act it is impossible to say that such advice, if given was otherwise than negligent. Upon the merits of the application therefore, I am of opinion that the decision of the Court below was correct. 7. There is another principle which guides me also in the determination of this appeal. The appellate Court normally will not interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower Court in admitting or rejecting the application for condonation of delay u/s 5, Indian Limitation Act, unless it appears that the discretion has not been exercised at all or, if exercised, it violates judicial principles. Where the Court does apply its mind and considers in a judicial manner the explanations offered by the applicant for delay and comes to a conclusion against the applicant's submission, this Court will seldom interfere with such a discretion. 8. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to consider further whether the dismissal of the appeal previously filed in the Court of the District Judge on 2nd May 1939 operated as a bar to the entertainment of another appeal by the District Judge. 9. It is not necessary to interfere with the decision of the Court below. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.