JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - The question raised in this second appeal is whether the property in suit which was worth less than Rs. 100 vested in the first Defendant by an agreement for sale of the property followed by delivery of possession. It is admitted that an unregistered deed of sale was executed at the time and learned Counsel for the Appellants has urged that the Courts below were wrong in holding in favour of the first Defendant in view of the ruling in Kuppuswami Goundan v. Chinnaswami Goundan A I R 1928 Mad 546. The learned Judges of the Madras High Court held that there could be no transfer by delivery of possession when an unregistered document was executed at the same time. This was not the view taken by this Court in Habibur Rahman v. Rasul Bandi (1921) 19 A L 376. It does not appear that this Court has ever differed from that decision which was made in 1921. I may say that I agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge. Where the law allows property to be transferred either by means of a registered instrument or by delivery of possession it seems to me that either mode may be employed. The parties may in the first instance think that there ought to be a transfer by means of a registered instrument, but they are perfectly entitled to change their minds and effect a transfer by delivery of possession. There is no law requiring the registration of a deed of sale affecting property worth less than Rs. 100. The only effect of non-registrations is that the deed does not operate to transfer the property. The execution of the deed cannot in my judgment affect the unconnected process of transfer by delivery of possession. It does not seem to me that Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act affects the matter. There is a distinction between a deed evidencing a contract and an instrument which of itself operates to transfer title. If an unregistered instrument does not operate to (sic) title it does not (sic) to a grant for disposition of property and the transfer of property itself is not a term of a contract. I have recently taken the same view in second appeal No. 1102 of 1942 2. There is no force in the present appeal and I dismiss it with costs.