JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - The Defendant No. 1, Appellant in this first appeal is an Insurance Company incorporated in Great Britain. It has its Head Office in London, and carries on business in various countries including India. In 1928 Sheikh Mohammad Abid, husband of Nawab Raushan Jehan Begum, Plaintiff, took out a life insurance policy from the company for a sum of Rs. 5,000. On 24th September, 1932, the company again insured his life for a sum of Rs. 50,000. This policy was, however, later, converted in 1935 into a paid up policy for Rs. 6,491. On 31st August 1935 the assured submitted fresh proposals for twelve further life policies for Rs. 5,000 each and paid the initial premia in respect of them. The company accepted the proposals and in due course issued its receipts on 11th September, 1935. The usual policies were to follow after they had been received from England. Under the contract embodied in these policies, read with the second schedule thereof, in consideration of the premises and the payment of the premia therein specified the amounts covered by them were payable with profits to the life assured on a particular date and in the event of his earlier death of his executors, administrators or assigns. There was no 'special provision' contained in the relative contracts, and it is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to encumber it by stating the other terms and conditions contained in the policies except that there was a non-forfeiture clause in all of them. 2. On the night between the 12th and 13th September, 1935, Sheikh Mohammad Abid shot himself. At one time it was alleged by the company that the assured had done so deliberately with a view to bring about the maturity of the policies, but the al- legation was held by the Court below to be unfounded, the finding being that Abid committed suicide after shooting his second wife Mst. Rani, on account of some domestic troubles. That finding is no longer challenged in appeal. We do not definitely know whether he did so in a fit of temporary insanity or otherwise. He died two days later at King George's Medical College Hospital, Lucknow, on 15th September, 1935, the cause of death being suppurative meningo eucephaletes. Rani, on account of some domestic troubles. That finding is no longer challenged in appeal. We do not definitely know whether he did so in a fit of temporary insanity or otherwise. He died two days later at King George's Medical College Hospital, Lucknow, on 15th September, 1935, the cause of death being suppurative meningo eucephaletes. Soon afterwards the brother of the deceased approached the insurance Company with a view to prefer claims based upon the policies, but they wrote back on 28th February, 1936, repudiating their liability under the contracts and claiming that they had information in their possession which pointed to a deliberate suicide. We may mention that the first policy No. 206398, Ex. 34, was, along with certain policies from other companies, assigned on 17th July, 1929, by Sheikh Mohammad Abid in favour of Allahabad Bank, Limited, as security for an advance, and an intimation of the assignment was sent to the Calcutta Office of the Defendant company in due course in July, 1929. After the death of the assured the bank also submitted its claim on Policy No. 206398 at the end of 1935, but the company refused to pay the amount due on the policy except that they intimated that they were willing to pay off any sum that might be still due to the bank from Abid. The bank, however, ultimately succeeded in realizing the amount due to the estate of the deceased from another insurance company on a policy which had been similarly assigned, and out of the money so received its loan was satisfied and policy No. 206398 thus became free of the encumbrance. On 15th August, 1936, the Plaintiff, who is the widow, of Mohammad Abid, along with her minor sons and daughters, secured a succession certificate from the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow, in respect inter alia of the policies of 1928 and 1932 and she then raised in 1937 the action out of which the present appeal arises for the recovery of Rs. 8,652-3 from the Defendant No. 1, Scottish Union and National Insurance Company, through its General Manager for India, and she impleaded the other heirs of her late husband, namely, her own sons and daughters, as party Defendants. The amount involved in the suit represented the Plaintiff's share in the inheritance from her husband. 8,652-3 from the Defendant No. 1, Scottish Union and National Insurance Company, through its General Manager for India, and she impleaded the other heirs of her late husband, namely, her own sons and daughters, as party Defendants. The amount involved in the suit represented the Plaintiff's share in the inheritance from her husband. The suit was apparently filed as a test case probably in view of the company's repudiation of its liability. During its pendency she also obtained on 31st August, 1938 from the same Court latters of administration limited to the extent of one-eight share amounting to Rs. 8,661-6 that is her own share in the policies of 1928 and 1932 and in the assurances of 1935, the total sum due thereon being Rs. 69,291. 3. Obviously the interests of the sons and daughters of Raushan Jehan Begam were the same as those of the Plaintiff The real contest in the case was therefore put up by the Insurance Company Defendant No. 1, and the ground upon which the defence depended was a denial of the company's responsibility for payment in the events which had happened. There was a further plea challenging the competency of the Plaintiff to sue in respect of all the policy monies or at, any rate, in respect of the first policy which stood assigned to the Allahabad Bank, Limited. There were some other defences also raised, but with them we need not concern ourselves now in view of the fact that they were not recanvassed at the Bar. The learned lower Court by an elaborate and well-reasoned judgment overruled the aforesaid pleas in defence, and decreed the Plaintiff's claim with costs and future interest at 31/4 per cent per annum from the date of the decree till realization. The Insurance Company has challenged the decree on no less than thirty grounds, but in arguments as presented to us only three contentions have been advanced, two of which relate to the competency of the Plaintiff to sue. The third contention forms the main centre of controversy. The Insurance Company has challenged the decree on no less than thirty grounds, but in arguments as presented to us only three contentions have been advanced, two of which relate to the competency of the Plaintiff to sue. The third contention forms the main centre of controversy. The questions which arise for decision under this contention may be considered from two aspects: firstly, whether on a true construction of the terms of the policies and the assurances the risk of death by suicide was in fact covered by them and, secondly, if they covered such a risk, whether the contract to that extent is against public policy and therefore unenforceable. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have taken time to weigh the respective contentions raised at the Bar. Having given our careful consideration to the points at issue we have come to the conclusion that this appeal must fail. We now proceed to give our reasons. 4. The contracts embodied in the policies of 1928 and 1932, as already shortly stated in an earlier portion of this judgment, is that: in consideration of the premises and of the first of the premium mentioned in Schedule 1, following, having been paid to the Company, and so long as all subsequent premiums required are paid on the due dates mentioned in said Schedule, the Company will, in the event specified in Schedule II, following, pay to the Life Assured, or to the Life Assured's Executors, Administrators or Assigns, the sum assured named in last mentioned Schedule both of which Schedules form part of this Policy. 5. It is not necessary to give the particulars of the first schedule, because it is not disputed that the amounts shown therein were realized by Defendant No. 1 in the ordinary way. Schedule II in the policies of 1928 and 1932 mentions the sum assured and says that the said sum is payable with profits in the event of the life assured surviving a particular date or "at his death if that should happen earlier." As regards the insurance of 1955 the local agent of the company wrote a letter Ex. 20 to the assured on 8th September 1935 as follows: With reference to your life proposal for Rs. 20 to the assured on 8th September 1935 as follows: With reference to your life proposal for Rs. 60,000 I have the pleasure to advise that we have accepted your case, and your policy will mature at the age of 55 and not at 60. We have received the difference of Premium, and you may note that your life is covered from this moment and risk remains on the Company. 6. On 11th September 1935 the company issued 12 receipts in identical terms except that the numbers of the receipts and of the policies specified in each were different. We quote one of them only as it is typical of others: Received from Mohammad Abid, Proprietor, United Provinces Perfumery Company, 45, Aminabad Park, Lucknow the Sum of Rupees Twenty six and annas six only being Premium for first month from the 7th day of September, Nineteen Hundred and Thirty Five for the Assurance of Rupees Five thousand on the life of himself, with profits, pay- able at the end of 18 years or at death if earlier for which Assurance a Policy will be issued. 7. On the back of the receipts was printed the form of the policies which were to follow. These forms are in nowise different from those of 1928 and 1932 policies. 8. The point that falls to be considered is whether the word "death" includes in its scope self-inflicted death also. The language of the policy does not in terms contain anything indicative of a restricted meaning and the word in its ordinary connotation includes extinction of life in whatever way or by whatever means. It is said, however, that the payment being conditioned on the event of death the fulfilment of the condition upon which it was made contingent could not be brought about by a voluntary act of the life assured, and the word "death" therefore, though used in a general way was in reality meant to be used in a limited sense. We are unable to read any such limitation in the language of the contract. When the intention of the parties is embodied in a written instrument, the language of that instrument is obviously the final evidence of that intention. We are unable to read any such limitation in the language of the contract. When the intention of the parties is embodied in a written instrument, the language of that instrument is obviously the final evidence of that intention. The contracts, with which we are concerned, are the set policies adopted avowedly after hundred years of experience of an extensive business in Great Britain and other countries of the world, and the fraimers thereof must, in our opinion, be credited with full knowledge of the implications of the words used by them and with the capacity for accuracy of expression. One of the well- known cannons of interpretation is that the language of a deed must be understood in its ordinary and grammatical sense. It is more so, in our opinion, when the language employed is of the company's own deliberate choice and is contained in its formal set policies. It was said in PELLY V. ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE COMPANY (1757) 1 Burr. 341, that in construing such documents the "strictum jus, or apex juris, is not to be laid hold on, but they are to be construed largely, for the benefit of trade and for the insured." The policies being the handiwork of the company they must be interpreted more strictly against their author, vide in this connection the observations of Lord St. Leonards in Anderson v. Fitzgerald (1853) 4 H.L. 484. 9. Assuming, however, that the expression used in the policies is ambiguous, it becomes permissible to see how the company themselves construed it before the controversy arose "Contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege" and "optimus interpes rerum usus. For this purpose a letter of the company, Ex. 17, written by its assistant secretary to the local agent in 1932 is of consider- able importance. Before we give its contents it is necessary to narrate its history which can be gathered from the statement of P. W. 7 Har Saran Sharma. This man was the manager of the shop of Sheikh Mohammad Abid in Aminabad, Lucknow, from 1931 to 1934. During his time the deceased had taken out the second policy from Defendant No. 1 for Rs. 50,000 through Mr. P. Dutt one of the company's agents. This man was the manager of the shop of Sheikh Mohammad Abid in Aminabad, Lucknow, from 1931 to 1934. During his time the deceased had taken out the second policy from Defendant No. 1 for Rs. 50,000 through Mr. P. Dutt one of the company's agents. The witness speaks of some reluctance on the part of Abid to insure himself with Defendant No. 1 because of his view that the rates of premium of the Scottish Union were comparatively higher. Mr. Dutt thereupon said that he would satisfy him that the policies of his company were more advantageous. He came four or five days later and mentioned some special features of Defendant No. l's policies of assurance. Among them he said that in case of suicide, accidental death or death by hands of justice the heirs of the assured would be entitled to get the monies covered by the policies at once. As regards the other companies, he pointed out that they allowed payment only if suicide took place after a certain period, whereas under the Defendant's policies such restrictions were altogether absent. It appears that Mr. P. Dutt in the meantime had communicated with the Calcutta office and had received Ex. 17 from them which was in the following terms: Dear Sir, With reference to your enquiry through the undersigned we now have pleasure in advising as follows: 1. In the event of a life assured committing suicide, even after payment of the initial Premiums, the company would pay the sum assured. 2. Should a Life Assured die by the hands of justice, or was accidentally killed, the Company would pay the sum assured under the policy. 3. As regards the status of a Proposer, the Agent must of course satisfy himself that the Proposer is taking out a Policy commensurate with his income and station in life. As regards item 1, we think that we are the only company operating in India that issues a policy free of suicide restriction whatsoever. In the majority of Companies a condition is laid down that in the event of death by suicide within thirteen months the Policy shall be null and void. You will thus see that our claim to a straightforward Policy free of restriction is well merited and deserves serious consideration by the insuring public. Yours faithfully, (Sd.) Illegible, Assistant Secretary. 10. In the majority of Companies a condition is laid down that in the event of death by suicide within thirteen months the Policy shall be null and void. You will thus see that our claim to a straightforward Policy free of restriction is well merited and deserves serious consideration by the insuring public. Yours faithfully, (Sd.) Illegible, Assistant Secretary. 10. The company does not deny the responsibility for this letter, and it is clear from the statement of P. W. 7 as well as from the facts that a copy of it was sent by the deceased's brother to the company in 1935 and that the original was produced in Court in the present case by the Plaintiff, that it was handed over to Sheikh Mohammad Abid, and he thereupon agreed to take out the policy of 1932 upon its representations. The letter in clear and unequivocal terms interpreted the relevant terms of its own policy, and it claimed that the Scottish Union were the "only company opening in India that issues a policy free of suicide restriction whatsoever". The sense therefore in which we understand the policy in the sense also in which it was intended by Defendant No. 1, and the features stated in the document were offered as an inducement for canvassing business. Upon this letter the Plaintiff has founded an argument of estoppel which will be dealt with somewhat later. For the purpose of construing the intention underlying the policy we consider that the letter is relevant as contemporanea expositio and it clearly indicates that the word "death" used in the policies was intended to cover not only death by natural causes but also by suicide as well as death by accident or by hands of justice. It is significant in this connection to notice that the subsequent policies which the Defendant company issued during and after the year 1936 contained a proviso that in the event of the life assured dying by his own hand or act (whether at the time sane or insane) before the assurance had been in existence for two full years, all premiums paid under the policy shall be forfeited, and the assurance shall be null and void subject, however, to any bona fide interests acquired by the assignees for a valuable consideration and intimated to the company prior to the date of death not being prejudiced thereby. Vide Ex. Vide Ex. 41,, (page 20). 11. It is impossible to consider that prior to the introduction of this proviso the company was not liable to bear any risks in the event of suicide and that thereafter it became liable if the suicide took place two years after the policy was taken out. We are satisfied therefore that the Plaintiff's rights under the policy were fully covered by the language of the contract even though the assured happened to terminate his life by his own act. Mr. Pearey Lall Bannerji, however, seeks to found his argument for the Appellant on the basis of a decision of the House of Lords in BERESFORD V. ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. 1938 A C 586. it is said upon its strength that the word "death" when it occurs in an assurance policy can not be regarded as including suicide, and in any event even if the policies be taken to cover the risk of suicide it was against public policy and therefore unenforceable. As this case forms the main pivot of Mr. Bannerji's argument it is necessary to examine it in detail. 12. By a number of policies of insurance issued by the Royal Insurance Company, Limited, to one Major Charles William St. John Rowlandson in 1925 he became insured for 81,000 Pounds and the event when the sum assured was to be payable was the death of the life assured. The contract mentioned that unless it was otherwise provided in the schedule the policy was free from all restrictions as to residence, travel and occupation, but that if the life assured should die by his own hand, whether sane or insane within one year from the commencement of the assurance, the policy was to be void as against any person claiming the amount assured or any part thereof provided that it was to remain in force to the extent of a bona fide pecuniary consideration, or as a security for money possessed or acquired by a third party before the date of such death. The premiums were regularly paid from 1925 to 1930. In 1932, however, the assured found it impossible to continue paying premiums on 81,000 Pounds and by an agreement between him and the company the policy was reduced to 50,000. Pounds. Financially Major Rowlandson was hopelessly involved in 1934. The premiums were regularly paid from 1925 to 1930. In 1932, however, the assured found it impossible to continue paying premiums on 81,000 Pounds and by an agreement between him and the company the policy was reduced to 50,000. Pounds. Financially Major Rowlandson was hopelessly involved in 1934. The date of payment of premiums had been extended till July 16 and then again until July 31, and finally till 3 p. m. of August 3. He could not find the money and at 3 minutes to 3 he shot himself in a taxicab in St. James's Street. It was found by the Special Jury that at the time he committed suicide he was perfectly sane. The action for realizations of the money due on Rowland- sons policies was brought by his administratrix for the benefit of his creditors. The defending Insurance Company alleged that the assured having died by his own hand the policies became void inasmuch as suicide by the Law of England was a felonious act and therefore nobody claiming through a felo de se could derive any benefit under the contract and that it would be contrary to public policy for the Courts of Law to compel payment. Swift J. decided in Plaintiff's favour on the ground that whatever considerations of public policy might be urged against the company paying on a life policy where the assured had feloniously taken his own life, yet where there was no idea of that kind when the policy was effected and where felonious suicide was not expressly excepted but impliedly covered, the dominant public policy to be observed was that of the sanctity of contract. He accordingly held that the Appellants must fulfil their contract. (Vide 1936 All ER (2), 1052). The matter then went up to the Court of Appeal which in disagreeing with the view of Swift J. observed: However absolute in terms the policy might be the Court will not enforce it if it is illegal or contrary to public policy or if it is otherwise such an agreement as the Court in its inherent jurisdiction will refuse to enforce. To take an extreme instance, the Court would not enforce a promise to pay a sum of money in consideration of the Plaintiff having, according to contract, committed a murder, or if the assured, having an insurable interest in another's life, had murdered the life insured and was seeking to collect the policy moneys. 13. The question whether felonious suicide was a bar to the action was fully considered in the light of English Law, and it being found that the Plaintiff, as persona! representative, stood in the shoes of the assured who has committed, as it were, murder on himself, the claim was equivalent technically to a claim brought by the assured or his representatives or assigns on a policy effected by the murderer on the life of the murdered man. It was held, therefore, that the Court could not allow a claim in contract to be based on the contracting party's crime as a necessary constituent of the cause of action, even though an interval of time and circumstances separated the crime from the resulting death. Certain American cases were distinguished on the ground that United States' Law was different from the law in England. The following passage in the judgment is of special interest: Opinions may differ whether the suicide of a man while sane should be deemed to be a crime, but it is so regarded by our law. The old inquisition in the case of self-murder was felonice et voluntarie se ipsum inter fecit et murder avit Hale's Pleas of the Crown (Ch. 31, p. 412). It may be that both ecclesiastical and civil penalties have been mitigated or abolished, but the criminal law still remains. Only the Legislature in this country can change the law in this matter, if it should so will. While the law remains unchanged the Court must, we think, apply the general principle that it will not allow a criminal or his representative to reap by the judgment of the Court the fruits of his crime. (Vide 1937 (2) K. B. 197). (The italics are oars.) 14. In appeal Lord Atkin in discussing the effect of suicide on policies of life insurance considered it from two aspects. (Vide 1937 (2) K. B. 197). (The italics are oars.) 14. In appeal Lord Atkin in discussing the effect of suicide on policies of life insurance considered it from two aspects. In the first place, he said, it was necessary to determine as to what was the real contract between the parties, and in the second place as to how that contract was affected by public policy. The view which found favour with the noble Lord was that if there was no express reference to suicide in the policy, sane suicide would prevent the representative of the assured from recovering, because on ordinary principles of insurance law an assured could not by his own deliberate act bring about the event upon which the insurance money is payable. In cases where the contract dealt expressly with the event of suicide it was said that even though the insurance company had agreed to pay the executors or assigns on death the sum assured if he dies by his own hand the contract could not be enforced in a Court of law because of the well-established principle that the rights resulting to the person asserting them from the crime of that person could not have the sanction of law. The view in this behalf was based upon public policy of England, and it was pointed out that such policy must develop nationally and it will be unreasonable to expect identity of outlook in the Courts of all countries. Lord Russell agreed with the above view of Lord Atkin. Lord Macmillan on the other hand confessed that he found the question a difficult one and adverted to the dangers pointed out in FENDER v. ST. JOHN- MILDMAY (1938) A. C. 1 which attended the application of considerations of public policy to contracts deliberately under-taken by persons of full age. He thought that there was a conflict of principles of public policy for it was undeniably one o! its principles that persons who entered into contractual engagements should be required to fulfil them. JOHN- MILDMAY (1938) A. C. 1 which attended the application of considerations of public policy to contracts deliberately under-taken by persons of full age. He thought that there was a conflict of principles of public policy for it was undeniably one o! its principles that persons who entered into contractual engagements should be required to fulfil them. He felt, however, the force of the view that to increase the estate which a criminal leaves behind him is to benefit him, and the question therefore whether the Courts should enforce a contract to pay a sum of money to a person's representatives in the event of his committing the felony was answered in the negative both on principle and on authority. 15. In the present case we have already examined the language of the policies issued by the Scottish Union and National Insurance Company and other evidence on the record, and we have found that it was intended definitely to insure the risk of suicide. Whatever the usage or the custom in insurance business may be we cannot shut out an intention so clearly defined by the contemporaneous interpretations made by the company itself. Nor can we ignore the conclusions to which we are inevitably led by subsequent incorporation of suicide restrictions in the policies of 1936 onwards. 16. We will therefore pass on to deal with the question of public policy in India. In this connection it is to be remembered that the criminal law of England is mostly a result not of statutory codification and definition, but of evolution and development. A special feature of that law is that crime itself remains undefined and there is no statutory provision for ascertainment of the question as to what acts arc to be regarded as offences and what others are not. The crime of felonia de se is regarded in England as a branch of the law of felonious homicide, and the common law endeavoured to deter people from this offence by a threat of degradations to be inflicted upon the suicide's corpse. These degradations by a natural if, according to Kenny, an unreasoning association of ideas, were often a potent deterrent. The penalty of forfeiture of goods was a vicarious punishment which, though falling wholly upon his surviving family, was considered to be likely often to appeal strongly to his sense Of affection. These degradations by a natural if, according to Kenny, an unreasoning association of ideas, were often a potent deterrent. The penalty of forfeiture of goods was a vicarious punishment which, though falling wholly upon his surviving family, was considered to be likely often to appeal strongly to his sense Of affection. The man who feloniously committed what was considered to be self-murder was at one time punished by a burial in the highway, with a stake through his body; and his goods were forfeited. In 1824 this gruesome aspect of punishment was replaced by the practice of burial between the hours of 9 p. m. and midnight without any service. In 1870 the punishment of confiscation of the goods of suicides was abolished by Forfeitures Act (83 and 34 Vict. c. 23) and in 1882 the statute 45 and 46 Vict. c. 19 removed every penalty, except the purely ecclesiastical one that the interment must not be solemnised by a burial service in the full ordinary Anglican form. In spite, however, of the discontinuance of some of the old penalties and mitigation of others the intentional suicide by a sane person is still regarded by English Law as an act of crime, and it is to this aspect of the matter that reference is made in the passage in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Baresford's case which we have already quoted and which is to the effect that only the Legislature of England could change the law and say that suicide was not to be deemed a crime. 17. The question whether suicide is against public policy in countries other than England must depend upon their system of jurisprudence and upon the conceptions of public policy as embodied therein. Every act which is regarded by English Law as a crime is not necessarily so regarded in India or in other countries. It is, for example, in England a crime not to send a child to school, vide Mellor v. Denham L R 5 Q B D 467. It is inconceivable to regard such an act a crime in India. Again, the crime of champerty is well known to English Law. It is, for example, in England a crime not to send a child to school, vide Mellor v. Denham L R 5 Q B D 467. It is inconceivable to regard such an act a crime in India. Again, the crime of champerty is well known to English Law. In India, however, it is neither a crime nor is it against public policy, vide Kunwar Ram Lal v. Nil Kanth (1893)20 I A 112 and Lal Achat Ram v. Raja Kazim Husain Khan (1905) 32 I A 113. The determination of the question whether suicide amounts to a crime in India is dependent largely, in our opinion, upon a consideration of the definition of the word "offence" as contained in Section 40, I. P. C. "Offence" is defined in that section as a thing punishable under the Code, or by the various sections of special or local laws as therein specified. u/s 2, Indian Penal Code Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act of omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within British India. 18. By Section 4 (o), Cr. P. C. an offence is defined as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force". Suicide is not so punish- able and cannot therefore be regarded as an offence within the meaning of Section 40, and in the nature of the act it is idle to provide any punishment. The abetment of suicide or attempt to commit suicide are, it is true, made offences under the Indian Penal Code, but that in our judgment does not alter the situation. 19. It is contended, however, for the Appellant that the language in which culpable homicide is defined in Section 299, I. P. C. does not confine itself to murder of another person, but it is wide enough to cover the case of self-murder. The argument, though on the fact of it somewhat plausible, is, in our opinion, fallacious. We cannot understand the Code as providing the penalty of death or transportation of life for suicide. The provisions of Section 300, I. P. C, and the following sections maybe perused in this connection with advantage. The argument, though on the fact of it somewhat plausible, is, in our opinion, fallacious. We cannot understand the Code as providing the penalty of death or transportation of life for suicide. The provisions of Section 300, I. P. C, and the following sections maybe perused in this connection with advantage. Section 300 defines murder and says that culpable homicide is murder where the act is done with the intention of causing death, or of such bodily injury as the offender knows .to be likely to cause death, or is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or is so imminently dangerous that in all probability it must cause death. Sane suicide would, therefore, be murder, if it was culpable homicide at all, were it not for Exception 5, which lays down that culpable homicide is not murder when the per- son whose death is caused, being above the age of 18, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. It is clear, therefore, that in case of a person above 18 years of age, if an imaginary punishment be supposed to have been provided for the offence of suicide it could be only u/s 304, I P.C., that is to say, he would be punishable with transportation for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and would be also liable to fine. If the person in question was, however, a minor he must be regarded as having committed the more heinous offence of murder and except for the fact that he is already dead, would be liable to be hanged. Again, by the 84th Section of the Code. nothing is an offence which is done by a person at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. 20. A look at Section 305, I.P.C., would show that when any person under the age of 18 years or any insane person, commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide is punishable by death or transportation for life etc. 20. A look at Section 305, I.P.C., would show that when any person under the age of 18 years or any insane person, commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide is punishable by death or transportation for life etc. The reason for the provision is obvious, but if we were to regard suicide" as culpable homicide, a bird's eye review at these provisions would lead to results which the framers of the Code, we imagine, would vehemently repudiate, since the ordinary conception under- lying Section 109 that an abettor is liable to the same punishment as the criminal is revolutionized and the abettor of a non-criminal is punishable with death, while the abettor of a criminal is punished much more leniently. We think the interpretation which Mr. Bannerji seeks to place upon the definition of culpable homicide would lead to illogical and strange results. 21. A further argument is possible on behalf of the Appellant, though it has not in fact been advanced. The illustration appended to Exception 5 of Section 300, I. P.C., is as follows: A by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under 18 years of age, to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z's youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder. 22. The same offence is described u/s 305, I. P. C. and is called the abetment of suicide. Prima facie this might indicate that under the Code "suicide is murder. We think, however, that there can be no equation between the illustration and the provisions of Section 305. The purpose of an illustration is not to control the substantive-provisions of the Act but to exemplify the meaning of the provision to which it is attached. 23. In Bengal Nagpur Railway Company, Limited v. Ruttanji Kamji (1938) 65 I A 66, their Lordships of the Privy Council in dealing with an illustration appended to Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act observed that: An illustration cannot have the effect of modifying the language of the section which alone forms the enactment. 24. Upon a reading of the criminal law of this country we are convinced that suicide is not an offence in India and is not against public policy by reason of its being a crime. 25. 24. Upon a reading of the criminal law of this country we are convinced that suicide is not an offence in India and is not against public policy by reason of its being a crime. 25. We have next to consider whether suicide is against public policy on any ground other than that of its being a crime. For this purpose it is necessary to turn to the observations of their Lordships Board in The Advocate General of Bengal on Behalf of Her Majesty v. Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863) 9 Moo Ind App 391.. The case was decided in 1863 after the Criminal Law of India had been codified under the Indian Penal Code and before the penalties for the offence of felonia de se were abolished by the Forfeiture Act in England. The main question which fell to be decided in that case was whether or not the goods and chattels of a Hindu could be forfeited to the Crown by reason of his having committed suicide and having been found a felo de se by the Supreme Court at Calcutta. Their Lordships observed the question before them must depend upon whether the English law by which the goods and chattels of a felo de se are forfeited to the Crown, has ever been introduced into Calcutta and, if so, whether it applies to Hindus and Mahomedans, as well as to European British subjects. 26. Dealing with the Charter of King George I by which in the year 1726 the first introduction of English law was effected and the Mayor's Court was established in Calcutta, their Lordships observed as follows: We are, therefore, of opinion that the Charter of George I, did not intend to render the goods and chattels of a felo de se so liable to be forfeited to the Crown, even in the case of a British subject. But, even if it did so, it is wholly improbable that such a law should have been intended to apply to Mahomedans and Hindoos, even if the Crown had the power at that time to make a law binding upon them, which is disputed by Lord Brougham. At that tune there was no law in India by which property was forfeited by suicide. By the Mahomedan law suicide was not an offence, and did not cause any forfeiture of properly. At that tune there was no law in India by which property was forfeited by suicide. By the Mahomedan law suicide was not an offence, and did not cause any forfeiture of properly. Even wilful homicide was justified, if committed at the request of the person killed. Nor should it be forgotten that at that time/Suttee, though not enjoined by the religion of the Hindoos, had not been declared to be a crime; and that the ignorant and deluded votaries of Juggernauth were under the belief that eternal hapiness was obtained by self-sacrifice under the wheels of the Idol's car. 27. Again the author of the Indian Penal Code in giving the reasons for not punishing homicide by concent so severely as murder pointed out that: In the first place, the motives which prompt men to the commission of this offence are generally for more respectable than those which prompt men to the commission of murder. Sometimes it is the effect of a strong sense of religious duty, sometimes of a strong sense of honour, not unfrequently 'of humanity. The soldier, who, at the entreaty of a wounded comrade, puts that comrade out of pain, the friend who supplies laudanum to a person suffering the torment of lingering disease, the freedman who in ancient times held out the sword that his master might fall on it, the high born native of India who stabs the females of his family at their own en- treaty in order to save them from the licentiousness of a band of marauders, would, except in Christian societies, scarcely be thought culpable and even in Christian societies would not be regarded by the public, and ought not to be treated by the law as assassins. 28. Public policy in regard to suicide must, therefore, be determined by the sense in which the law and public opinion of the country in which it takes place understand it. Suicide in India under certain circumstances is approved, and we conceive that in a country like Japan, for example, suicide is considered to be highly meritorious in certain circum- stances. We remember that at one time the murder of a gallant combatant in a duel was by no means looked at with disfavour by the law of France. Suicide in India under certain circumstances is approved, and we conceive that in a country like Japan, for example, suicide is considered to be highly meritorious in certain circum- stances. We remember that at one time the murder of a gallant combatant in a duel was by no means looked at with disfavour by the law of France. In India we would unhesitatingly hold that suicide is not against public policy as exhibited by the normal conception of society or as conceived by its laws. We must, therefore, overrule the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant on this behalf. 29. We will now consider the Plaintiff-Respondent's argument in favour of estoppel based upon the re- presentation contained in the company's letter dated 23rd August, 1932, Ex. 17. The learned lower Court while dealing with this question under issues 4 and 5 held that though the representation was made to late Sheikh Mohammad Abid, yet, as Mr. Dutt the local agent of the company, was not authorised to make such a representation, the company was not bound by it. It appears to us that the representation was in fact in- tended by the company to be communicated to Abid, and Mr. Dutt was only the channel through which the communication took place. The responsibility for the letter is admitted by the company in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the written statement. The subsequent policies taken by the deceased, must, therefore, be regarded as having been assented to on the faith of that representation. Under such circum- stances the provisions of Section 115 I.E. A. are attracted, and we are of opinion that the Defendant company is estopped from taking up the position which it now does in respect of the policy of 1982 and the contemplated policies of 1935. 30. The minor matters remain to be dealt with. The first matter as presented by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the effect of the assignment of the first policy No. 206398 in favour of the Allahabad Bank in 1927 was to render incompetent the present claim in respect of it by the Plaintiff. 30. The minor matters remain to be dealt with. The first matter as presented by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the effect of the assignment of the first policy No. 206398 in favour of the Allahabad Bank in 1927 was to render incompetent the present claim in respect of it by the Plaintiff. The assignment was made on 17th July, 1929 by Sheikh Mohammad Abid in the following terms: I do hereby assign for valuable consideration all my right, titles, and interest in the within policy and the sum thereby assured to the Allahabad Bank, Ltd., and their assigns and declare that the receipt or precepts of the said Allahabad Bank Limited, or their assigns for any sum or sums of money to be received by them under or on' account of the said policy shall discharge the Scottish Union and National Insurance Company from all responsibility in respect of the application of such money as effectually and to all intents and purposes as if such receipt or receipts were signed by myself, my heirs, my executors or administrators. 31. By its terms the endorsement did not clearly deprive the assured, his heirs, executors or administrators of the rights under the policy for ever. The legal incidents of each assignment must depend upon the nature of the transaction and upon the intention of the parties thereto. The assignment with which we ,are concerned enabled the Bank to give receipts on account of the policy for dischargeing the liability of the Scottish Union and National Insurance Company in the same manner as the assured and his representatives could have done. u/s 38, Clause (5) of the Insurance Act, 1938, the insurer is to recognise the transferee or the assignee in the notice as the only person entitled to the benefits under the policy subject to the terms and conditions of the transfer or assignment. We are conscious that the Insurance Act was not in force at the time when the endorsement was made, or at the time when the present suit was filed. We think, however, that the rule of law even previously was similar. The evidence, we are satisfied, establishes that the Allahabad Bank held the policy merely by way of security for its advance, and the assignment in its favour was to terminate on the satisfaction of the bank's debts. This is proved by Ex. We think, however, that the rule of law even previously was similar. The evidence, we are satisfied, establishes that the Allahabad Bank held the policy merely by way of security for its advance, and the assignment in its favour was to terminate on the satisfaction of the bank's debts. This is proved by Ex. 39 which is a letter written by the Bank to the deceased soon after the assignment that the policy was being kept by them merely as security against his overdraft. There is also the testimony of P. W. 8, Mr. Chandra Kishore, to the effect that the policy was endorsed in favour of the bank for the purpose of an overdraft, and that subsequent to the borrower's death all his debts were paid off. The extract of Abid's bank account. Exs. P. W. 8/1 and P. W. 8/2, also prove that the overdraft was adjusted subsequent to the death of the borrower. The evidence also shows that the company was fully aware that the assignment was only by way of security for the bank's loan vide. Exs. A69 and A79. It follows that the policy having been redeemed, its benefits reverted back to the estate of the deceased, and its redemption entitled the Plaintiff to sue. On equitable considerations also we are satisfied that the present claim in respect of policy No. 206398 should not fail. The Defendant company, in our opinion, should not be allowed to have it both ways. They refused to pay the bank when a call was made upon them and now they repudiate their liability to pay Abid's representative on the plea that it is the bank alone which is entitled to collect. For the fore- going reasons we are not inclined to accept the contention advanced by the learned Counsel in respect of this policy. 32. The next point which was agitated at the Bar on behalf of the Appellant was that the contract contained in the policy rendered the amount pay- able only to the executors, administrators or assigns and not to the heirs of the assured. The letters of administration, Ex. 49, dated 2nd June, 1936, it is said, were obtained by the widow not in respect of the entire estate of her deceased husband but to the limited extent of her share amounting to Rs. 8,661-6-0. The letters of administration, Ex. 49, dated 2nd June, 1936, it is said, were obtained by the widow not in respect of the entire estate of her deceased husband but to the limited extent of her share amounting to Rs. 8,661-6-0. It is argued that the Court could not appoint her administrator when she was not administering anything but was wanting to take the entire benefit for herself. Ex. 49, it is contended, having violated the very law under which it purports to derive its sanction, cannot be regarded as valid and binding letters of administration. The argument, we think, admits of a very short answer. Section 273 of the Indian Succession Act ( Act XXXIX of 1925) declares that letters of administration are conclusive as to the representative title of the holder against all debtors of the deceased and all per- sons holding property which belongs to him, and they afford full indemnity to all debtors paying their debts. The action of a Court of competent 'jurisdiction when:.t makes a grant of letters of administration 'is in the nature of proceedings in rem and so long as the order remains in force it is conclusive not only against all parties who may be before the Court but also against all the persons whatsoever. We. therefore, consider that the Defendant company is not entitled to challenge the validity of the grant and to refuse to pay on that basis the amount found due from them. There is no doubt that partial grants are contemplated by the Indian Succession Act as is evident from Sections 247 to 257. We cannot, therefore, accede to the arguments of Mr. Bannerji on the basis of any alleged invalidity of the letter A of administration, Ex. 49. 33. The result of the above discussion is that this appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.