JUDGMENT Blank, J. - This application arises from the following facts: On the 11th of June, 1939, the Petitioner purchased a two annas share in a certain occupancy holding. On the 9th of April, 1942, the holder of another two annas share in the same holding sold it to Opposite Party No. 1 and another person since deceased, no notice of transfer being served on any of the co-sharer tenants. On the 25th of June, 1942, the Petitioner heard of the latter transfer and on the 8th of July, 1942, filed an application for pre-emption under sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act, impleading the transferee and all the co-sharer tenants; notices of this application were served on the Opposite Parties on the 22nd of August, 1942. On the 5th of September, 1942, the Opposite Parties applied under sec. 26F (4) to be joined as co-applicants on the averment that they came to know of the transfer and the application by the. Petitioner on the 3rd or 4th of September. The Petitioner opposed the application on the ground that it was not filed within the time provided in sec. 26F (4) of the Act. The Courts below have arrived at concurrent findings on the question of fact. The application of the Opposite Parties Nos. 3 to 8, was allowed and the Petitioner was granted pre-emption to the extent of one-sixth share and the Opposite Parties to the extent of five-sixths share. 2. The learned Munsif referred to the contention of the original applicant, as against the joined co-applicants, that the application of the latter is barred, inasmuch as they did not come within four months of the transfer or within one month of the present application. He held that there was no substance in the contention, on the ground that as no notice was served of the transfer, the joined co-applicants were entitled to apply under sec. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act within a reasonable time from the date when they first knew of the transfer. The Court of Appeal below endorses the view and appears, with respect, to take it for granted that the co-sharers concerned "are entitled to come within a reasonable time from the date of their knowledge of the transfer"; indeed the learned Additional District Judge observed that in his opinion sub-sec. (4) (a) "does not at all apply to them." 3. The Court of Appeal below endorses the view and appears, with respect, to take it for granted that the co-sharers concerned "are entitled to come within a reasonable time from the date of their knowledge of the transfer"; indeed the learned Additional District Judge observed that in his opinion sub-sec. (4) (a) "does not at all apply to them." 3. The results arrived at by the Courts below are no doubt reasonable but I confess that I find difficulty in appreciating the reasoning on which they are based. There is considerable force in the submission of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner that on the plain wording of the sub-section the starting point in this case is the date of the application by the original applicant, namely, the 8th of July, 1942, and that the Courts below have read something into the section which is not there. It is common ground that the point is not covered by authority. 4. On behalf of the Opposite Parties it was argued that the sections dealing with the topic of pre-emption are to be read together. The learned Advocate pointed out that under sec. 26C, on the transfer taking place, a notice with particulars in the prescribed form was mandatory under sub-sec. (4) of the section and that the date of the service of this notice was one of the starting points for limitation under sec. 26F (4). He pointed out that under sec. 26F the position was distinguishable, inasmuch as the notice under sub-sec. (3) was to the transferee only to appear for a specific and restricted purpose and that there is no provision in this section for a notice to the co-sharer tenants. He argued that the period of one month referred to in sub-sec. (4) (a) of sec. 26F must imply that the co-sharer tenants have knowledge of the transactions by which they are affected; that as the notice under sec. 26C, sub-sec. (4) on the co-sharer tenants is mandatory, the legislature provided notice to the co-sharers thereby and no question arose of providing by legislation that the co-sharer tenant should have notice of the application for pre-emption by one of their body, they themselves having equal rights with the co-sharer tenants applying for pre-emption. 26C, sub-sec. (4) on the co-sharer tenants is mandatory, the legislature provided notice to the co-sharers thereby and no question arose of providing by legislation that the co-sharer tenant should have notice of the application for pre-emption by one of their body, they themselves having equal rights with the co-sharer tenants applying for pre-emption. As the learned Advocate put it, the statutory right of a co-sharer tenant to obtain pre-emption cannot be defeated by non-service of the related statutory notice, which has been found as a fact in the present proceedings. It is frequently difficult to base a judicial decision on considerations of what may or may not have been the intention of the legislature." In the present case however the difficulty does not, in my opinion, arise as the words of the sub-section are, in my opinion, clear, in so far as they are required to be construed for the purposes of the present application. The sub-section runs as follows: (4) (a). When an application has been made under sub-sec. (1), any of the remaining co-sharer tenants, including the transferee, if one of them, may within the period referred to, in that sub-section or within one month of the date of the application, which ever is later, apply to join in the said application; any co-sharer tenant who has not applied under either sub-sec. (1) or this sub-section shall not have any further power of purchase under this section. 5. In my view the controlling words are "whichever is later." This necessarily implies that two dates are to be taken into consideration and limitation is to expire on the later of the two dates. These two dates, the later of which is to be selected, must start from two fixed points. The first fixed point is the date of the service of the notice under sec. 26C. A date four months after this date is the former of the two dates, the later of which is to be selected. The second fixed point is the date of the application. One month after this date is the latter of the two dates which are to be selected. Limitation expires on the later of those two dates. In the present case no notice under sec. 26C has been served on the co-sharer tenants. The second fixed point is the date of the application. One month after this date is the latter of the two dates which are to be selected. Limitation expires on the later of those two dates. In the present case no notice under sec. 26C has been served on the co-sharer tenants. Therefore the first fixed point does not exist and consequently the first of the two dates, namely, four months after the service of notice under sec. 26C, does not exist. It is therefore impossible to say which is the later of the two dates referred to in sec. 26F (4) (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. On this view the Courts below were right in the decision at which they arrived. 6. The Rule is discharged. I make no order as to costs.