JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Madeley, JJ. - The suit out of which this first appeal arises was commenced on the 5th May, 1938, by the appellants against the respondents for possession of two annas one pie 12 krants share in Thok Ratan Sen, patti Suraj Baksh Singh in village Sarai Pande, pargana and tahsil Hydergarh, district Bara Banki. A short pedigree will explain the relationship of the parties: 2. It appears from the above pedigree that the plaintiffs are the sons of two brothers. The defendants to the suit are their fathers and the two vendees in whose favour they executed a sale-deed of the share in suit on the 4th August, 1926 (Ex. A-1). This sale-deed was challenged as being not binding on the plaintiffs on the ground that plaintiffs were joint with their fathers, that the deed was without consideration and had been executed without any legal necessity and that it was void on account of fraud having been practised in getting the deed registered in Lucknow district instead of at Hydergarh registration office. The plaintiff No. 1 attained majority on the 5th May, 1935, and the other plaintiffs were still minors. 3. The suit was contested by the vendees alone, the vendors namely the plaintiffs' fathers not having appeared in the suit at at all. The vendees filed separate written statements. Lachhman Prasad, defendant No. 1, admitted the pedigree. He, how- ever, denied the joint family and asserted that the property covered by the sale-deed in question was the personal property of the vendors. In any case he urged that even if the family was joint the vendors had been borrowing money from the vendees from time to time for paying the antecedent debts and for various legal necessities, and the sale deed was, there- fore, binding upon the plaintiffs. Lachhman Prasad claimed the exclusive ownership and possession of the property in question on the basis of a private partition with his brother Umrao Prasad, defendant No. 2. Lachhman Prasad claimed the exclusive ownership and possession of the property in question on the basis of a private partition with his brother Umrao Prasad, defendant No. 2. As regards the plea of fraud upon registration Lachhman Prasad alleged that at the time of the settlement of the terms of the sale deed it was agreed upon between the parties that a mango tree in plot No. 285 (old settlement) with one biswansi land covered by the said tree in village Bahrauli, tahsil Mohanlalganj, district Lucknow, would be sold' with the share in village Sarai Pande and in pursuance of this agreement both the properties were actually transferred in favour of the vendees, who came into possession thereof from the date of the sale deed. In the alternative it was pleaded that if the Court held registration to be invalid by reason of the fact that the tree was not intended to be, and was not actually, transferred in favour of the vendees, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief for possession without payment of Rs. 65,000 which was the consideration of the sale deed. Lastly he alleged that even if there was any defect in the registration of the sale deed it was cured by the vendors executing a deed of relinquishment in respect of the ex-proprietary rights and getting it registered at Hydergarh wherein they admitted the valid execution and completion of the deed. 4. Umrao Prasad, defendant No. 2 sup- ported his brother in all the allegations. He admitted that the property in suit had fallen to the share of Lachhman Prasad and, therefore, no relief could be claimed against him. 5. On the date of the oral pleadings the defendants' Counsel further stated that the Bahrauli property was purchased by the vendees to acquire the status of a co- sharer in that village and not for the purpose of having the sale deed registered in Lucknow district as alleged by the plaintiffs. He admitted that Bahrauli land had not been mutated in their names. The plaintiffs' Counsel at first stated that the vendors had merely grove-holders' rights in grove No. 285 and these rights were not transferable and even if they were, the transfer of one unspecified tree in the grove with unspecified land was fictitious and was simply made to get the sale deed registered in Lucknow district. The plaintiffs' Counsel at first stated that the vendors had merely grove-holders' rights in grove No. 285 and these rights were not transferable and even if they were, the transfer of one unspecified tree in the grove with unspecified land was fictitious and was simply made to get the sale deed registered in Lucknow district. He denied that the deed was for payment of antecedent debts or for legal necessity. He added, however, that he gave up the plea that the sale deed (Ex. A-1) was without consideration. 6. The following issues were framed by the trial Court: 1. Were defendants 3 and 4 separate and did not constitute a joint Hindu family at the time of the execution of the sale deed, Ex. A-l? 2. Was Satrohan Singh, plaintiff No. 2, in existence when Ex. A-l was executed? 3. Is the property in suit joint and ancestral property of the plaintiffs and defendants 3 and 4, as alleged? 4. Is the sale deed (Ex. A-l) void and ineffective on account of its having been registered in Mohanlalganj, as alleged? 5. Was the sale deed (Ex. A-l) executed by defendants 3 and 4 for legal necessity and payment of antecedent debts as alleged and as such is it binding on the plaintiffs? 6. Is defendant No. 2 not a necessary party to this suit as alleged? 7. Are plaintiffs not entitled to get decree for possession of the property in suit, even if the sale deed (Ex. A-l) be void as a sale deed on account of the alleged fraud on registration, without paying the purchase money Rs. 65,000 or any portion thereof by which they were benefited as alleged? 8. (a) Did defendants 3 and 4 relinquish their sir rights in the property sold by them under Ex. A-l to defendants 1 and 2, under a deed of relinquishment, Ex. A-2, which was registered in Bara Banki? (b) If so, does it cure the alleged defect in registration of Ex. A-l, as alleged? 9. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled and against which of the defendants? Issues Nos. 1 and 3 were found in favour of the plaintiffs. It was also found that Satrohan Singh, plaintiff No. 2, was in existence when the sale deed was executed. Under issue No. 6 it was held that the defendant No. 2 was a necessary party. Issues Nos. 1 and 3 were found in favour of the plaintiffs. It was also found that Satrohan Singh, plaintiff No. 2, was in existence when the sale deed was executed. Under issue No. 6 it was held that the defendant No. 2 was a necessary party. No finding was given on issue No. 7 and issue No. 8 was not pressed. The remaining two issues Nos. 4 and 5 were found against the plaintiffs. The result was that the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed with costs, to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. In arguments before us on behalf of the plaintiffs only these two issues (Nos. 4 and 5) have been argued. It is not denied that u/s 17 of the Indian Registration Act the sale deed in question is compulsorily registerable. u/s 28 of the same Act the sale deed must be presented for registration in the office of the Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property to which such document relates is situate. By Section 49 of the same Act no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall affect any immoveable property comprised therein, unless it has been registered. The present sale deed was executed for Rs. 65,000 which was almost entirely the value of the property in village Sarai Pande. The tree and the land in Bahrauli were not valued in the deed, nor has any evidence been given as to their value in the course of the trial. No estimate has even been given of the profits of the tree and the land. If this had not been included in the deed, the registration would inevitably have taken place in Hydergarh. The tree and the land being situate within the Lucknow district, its inclusion in the sale deed permitted the registration of the deed in the Lucknow district. The question raised on behalf of the plaintiffs was that this tree and the land were not intended to be transferred and consequently the registration of the deed in the Lucknow district was a fraud upon registration and rendered the deed inoperative in law. 7. It is now well settled by various decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that in determining whether the requirements of the law as to registration have been complied with, the intention of the parties is the criterion by which the matter must be decided. 7. It is now well settled by various decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that in determining whether the requirements of the law as to registration have been complied with, the intention of the parties is the criterion by which the matter must be decided. Where the parties never intended that a particular item of property which has been included in the sale deed should be transferred to the vendee, its inclusion would not validate the registration of the deed and the deed must in such a case be held ineffective in law u/s 49 of the Indian Registration Act. See the following: 1. Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhri v. Hari Dasi Debi (1914) 41 I A 110. ; 2. Biswanath Prashad v. Chandra Narayan Chowdhuri (1921)48 IA 127.; 3. Col- lector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal (1934) 61 I A 286 : (1934) 4 A W R 46.; 4. Raja Inuganti Venkatarama Rao v. Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur Garu (1936) 63 I A 169 : 1936 AWR 311. 8. In Harandra Lal Roy Chowdhuri's case the property included in the mortgage deed was described as No. 25 Garu Das Street Calcutta and it was also described in the deed by metes and bounds. There was no property in Calcutta known by that name and the mortgagor never had any title to the property described by metes and bounds. None of the other properties included in the mortgage was situate in Calcutta. The mortgage deed being registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Calcutta, its registration was held invalid. Their Lordships held that the parcel of land in Calcutta included in the deed was a fictitious entry and represented no property that the mortgagor possessed or intended to mortgage or that the mortgagee intended to form part of the security. Their Lordships observed: Such an entry intentionally made use of by the parties for the purpose of obtaining registration in a district where no part of the property actually charged and intended to be charged in fact exists is a fraud on the registration law, and no registration obtained by means thereof is valid. Their Lordships observed: Such an entry intentionally made use of by the parties for the purpose of obtaining registration in a district where no part of the property actually charged and intended to be charged in fact exists is a fraud on the registration law, and no registration obtained by means thereof is valid. To hold otherwise would amount to saying that mortgages relating solely to land in other parts of the Presidency could be validly registered by the sub-registrar at Calcutta if the parties merely took the precaution to add, as a last parcel, Government House, Calcutta, or any similar item. 9. In Bishwanath Prashad's case bulk of the property was situate in the Darbhanga district and the mortgage included one kauri share in Muzaffarpur district, which the mortgagor had purchased for Rs. 50 shortly before the execution of the mortgage with a view to obtaining registration in Muzaffarpur. There was no registered document in respect of this one kauri share nor delivery of possession as required by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act had taken place. Their Lordships found that none of the parties intended that the one kauri share should vest in the mortgagor or should pass under the mortgage and following the view taken in Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri's case hold the deed invalid. 10. The third case was decided on appeal from a decision of the Allahabad High Court, which was reversed on the question of registration. The facts were that a sale deed comprised four villages within Deoria sub-district for registration purposes and a one-third share in a garden-room within Gorakhpur sub-district. The deed gave to the purchaser no access to the garden-room. 11. The room was of no value and the vendor bad no title to it. The deed was registered in Gorakpur sub-district. Their Lordships held that the deed was not validly registered as the evidence showed that the parties did not intend that the share in the garden-room should really be sold, its inclusion in the deed being a mere device to evade the Act. Their Lordships explained that the word "fictitious" used in Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri's case is not confined to non-existing property ; it is satisfied if the deed does not relate to a specified property for any effective purpose of enjoyment or use. 12. Their Lordships explained that the word "fictitious" used in Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri's case is not confined to non-existing property ; it is satisfied if the deed does not relate to a specified property for any effective purpose of enjoyment or use. 12. Following the three previous decisions their Lordships held in the last case that in determining whether the requirements of the law as to registration have been complied with, the intention of the parties is the criterion by which the matter must be decided. In that case their Lordships held that there was no intention that one yard of land should pass under the deed and consequently there was no effective registration. 13. These cases were followed by this Court in Lala Par shot am Das v. Saiyed Yar Ali (1929) 4 Luck. 13 and Parshotam Das v. Ali Haider 1937 OWN 914. A similar view was taken in Godha Ram v. Sudh Singh (1929)10 Lah. 381, where it was held that the test for determining whether the inclusion of a small item of property situate at a place where the document was registered rendered the sale invalid was whether it was actually intended to be transferred. 14. In the light of these decisions we have now to determine whether the tree and the land were intended to be transferred by the vendors to the vendees. In paragraph 15 of the written statement Lachhman Prasad had clearly asserted that the tree and the land were intended to be sold and were actually sold. In oral pleadings to which we have already referred the defendants' Counsel definitely stated that the Bahrsuli property was purchased to acquire the status of a co-sharer in the village.. These pleas were supported by the evidence of Lachhman Prasad and Umrao Prasad. On the other hand the. vendors did not come forward to rebut this evidence. There is a good deal of force in the suggestion of the trial Court that the vendors are at the bottom of the present suit. Indeed this is not seriously denied on behalf of the plaintiffs. Under the circumstances it was incumbent upon them to produce their fathers to rebut this evidence. They arc the only persons who knew the real facts and their abstention from the witness box must, therefore, lead to the inference that the story put forward by the vendees is true. Indeed this is not seriously denied on behalf of the plaintiffs. Under the circumstances it was incumbent upon them to produce their fathers to rebut this evidence. They arc the only persons who knew the real facts and their abstention from the witness box must, therefore, lead to the inference that the story put forward by the vendees is true. On the date of the pleadings the plaintiffs' Counsel made the following statement: The plaintiffs do not know whether defendants Nos. 3 and 4 knew that they were party or not to this fraud on registration. It is difficult to extract any intelligible meaning out of this statement. The only interpretation favourable to the plaintiffs' case would be that the vendors knew that they did not intend to sell the tree but they did not know the legal position that by including it in the sale deed they were practising fraud on the Registration Law. If such be the position taken up by the plaintiffs, what was there to prevent the vendors from coming forward to the witness box and stating that they never intended to transfer the tree and, included it for the purpose of getting the deed registered in Lucknow district? The Court cannot allow itself to speculate on the possible intention of the vendors when they delibrately abstained from the witness- box while on the other hand there is the positive evidence of the vendees that no fraud was intended, that there was no question of facility of registration as far as they were concerned and there was every intention to transfer the tree which was actually transferred. The vendees have definitely stated that they intended to acquire property in Bahrauli in future and in order to guard themselves against a possible attack upon their title by a pre-emptive suit they intended to acquire the status of a co- sharer and in pursuance of that intention purchased the tree and the land. It was open to the vendors to contradict this evidence but they have not chosen to do so. It appears-that the deed was presented by Rabinath Bakhsh Singh at the office of the Sub- Registrar. Both the brothers were present at the time of the registration and were duly identified. The vendees were not personally present but their mukhtar Ajudhia Prasad was present. Ex. It appears-that the deed was presented by Rabinath Bakhsh Singh at the office of the Sub- Registrar. Both the brothers were present at the time of the registration and were duly identified. The vendees were not personally present but their mukhtar Ajudhia Prasad was present. Ex. A-2 is the deed of relinquishment executed on the 25th April, 1928, which was registered in Hydergarh district Bara Banki. It was presented by Rabinath Bakhsh Singh and both the brothers were identified before the Sub-Registrar. This relinquishment was in respect of the ex-proprietary rights in the property sold under Ex. A-1. These and the other circum- stances show that it was far more to the convenience of the vendors to have the deed registered in Luck- now district than for the vendees. The vendors resided is Rahmatnagar They had also their house in Lucknow. The road from Lucknow to Mohanlalganj where the deed was registered is pucca while the road from Rahmatnagar to Hydergarh is kachcha. It may, therefore, be taken that the proposal for convenience must have emanated from the vendors and not from the vendees. Here again, it was open to the plaintiffs to produce the vendors to show that it was the vendees who induced them to include this item of property in the deed merely with the object of facilitating registration in Mohanlalganj. The fact that they have not chosen to pro- duce their fathers may reasonably raise the inference that had they been produced they would not have supported the plaintiffs' case. The plaintiffs were fully aware of the case which they were called upon to meet. They had a clear indication of the defendants' position put forward in the pleadings and if they did not avail themselves of the opportunity to rebut the vendees' evidence by the positive evidence of the vendors, a legitimate presumption arises that the plaintiffs' story has no substance. The intention to transfer the tree and the land being established, it only remains to consider whether this property was actually transferred. It is true that the tree and the land are not specified in the sale deed but the boundaries are given. The vendees have come into the witness-box. Lachhman Prasad has property in Bhagalpur (Bihar) in addition to the property in Lucknow and Bara Banki districts, and he says as D. W. 14 that since the. It is true that the tree and the land are not specified in the sale deed but the boundaries are given. The vendees have come into the witness-box. Lachhman Prasad has property in Bhagalpur (Bihar) in addition to the property in Lucknow and Bara Banki districts, and he says as D. W. 14 that since the. death of his father 25 or 26 years ago he has been mostly living in Bhagalpur. He says that there was a partition between himself and his brother eight or nine years ago. Under this partition the property under the sale deed is to the north-west of the trees of Rabinath and Bhagwan Bakhsh, who own other trees in Bahrauli. He also says that he saw this tree after the sale deed had been taken. The vendors, he and Lotan Singh mukhtar since dead had gone to Bahrauli and the vendors had actually pointed out the tree to him. He says that he is in possession of this tree. He was cross-examined at great length on this point. He admitted that his brother Umrao Prasad had settled the transaction of sale as he was at that time in Bhagalpur. When he came back from Bhagalpur he came to know all about it. Umrao Prasad as D. W. 18 says that as he intended to acquire property in Bahrauli, he purchased the tree and the land in Bahrauli so that he should be able to resist a pre-emption suit against any property which he acquired later. He says that Rabinath Bakhsh Singh had told him that he had five or six trees near the bazar at Bahrauli and that he could take any one of the trees. He then sent Lotan Singh to select the tree and the land before the execution of the sale deed. The tree is a bit removed to the north-west of other trees of Rabinath Bakhsh Singh. He had directed Lotan Singh to get the khasra number of the grove in which this tree stands and' the boundaries. He definitely stated that the tree and the land were included in the sale not for the purpose of getting it registered at Mohanlalganj but for acquiring the right to purchase the land in the village. That the vendees were anxious to acquire other property in Bahrauli will also appear from a sale deed, (Ex. He definitely stated that the tree and the land were included in the sale not for the purpose of getting it registered at Mohanlalganj but for acquiring the right to purchase the land in the village. That the vendees were anxious to acquire other property in Bahrauli will also appear from a sale deed, (Ex. 2/D. W. 1) which they obtained on the 23rd July, 1927 from one Sarju Prasad. Umrao Prasad also proved possession over the tree and the land. He was cross-examined to great length but there is nothing in the cross-examination to discredit his testimoney. As regards the mutation not being effected in respect of this tree and the land, his explanation was that Ajodhia Prasad had been asked to do the needful but he neglected it. It appears that no mutation was applied for also in respect of the land which was purchased under the sale deed of 1927 (vide Ex. 2/D. W. 1) by Lachhman Prasad and Umrao Prasad from Sarju Prasad in Bahrauli. The absence of mutation in respect of both these properties was due to the negligence of the mukhtar, who was ultimately dismissed. In addition to this evidence the vendees produced D. \V. 11 Badlu of Bahrauli. This man's evidence is to the effect that he was entrusted by Lachhman Prasad to look after the tree. He says that he has three trees in the grove known as Garhapar Ki Bagh. To the north of this grove is the temple of Astik. To its north is a field. There is a tank to its south and a bazar to the east. Rabinath Bakhsh Singh has five trees in this grove. One Ram Ratan Singh has one tree and a Lala of Satrikh has three trees. He says that he used to protect the crop of Lachhman Prasad's tree and used to get one-third of the crop as wages. Badlu is the son of Khemai and it is admitted by Baqar All (P. W. 3) that Khemai has three trees on the border of this grove. A reference to the map (Ex. 1/D. W. 17) shows the three trees of Badlu. It also shows the five trees of Rabinath and the tree which was sold under the sale deed is to be identified with No. 4 shown on the map, which is below the words "New Way between Market". A reference to the map (Ex. 1/D. W. 17) shows the three trees of Badlu. It also shows the five trees of Rabinath and the tree which was sold under the sale deed is to be identified with No. 4 shown on the map, which is below the words "New Way between Market". The boundaries as given by the witnesses are also correct. Badlu says that he happened to meet Lachhman Prasad in Bahrauli bazar ten or 11 years ago. He was talking to Girau Kalwar since de- ceased about giving his tree to some one for protecting the crop. He (the witness) offered to protect the tree for Lachhman Prasad who accepted it. Since then he has been looking after the tree. Another person present at this conversation was Manau who is dead. There was considerable controversy about the period of the death of Manau. Lachhman Prasad, Umrao Prasad and Badlu have stated that Manau died about 8 or 9 years ago while on behalf of the plaintiffs it is alleged that he died about 18 or 20 years ago. The plaintiffs' suggestion is that the evidence of these witnesses is false inasmuch as Mannau died 18 or 20 years ago. Having considered the evidence of these witnesses against the evidence of Baqar Ali who attempted to prove that all the trees of Rabinath Bakhsh Singh were under his protection, including the one in dispute, we are inclined to accept the evidence of the vendees and not the evidence of Baqar Ali. A document Ex. 12 was allowed by the Court below to be produced in evidence u/s 153 of the Indian Evidence Act to contradict Umrao Prasad. Lachhman Prasad, without being shown any document, was asked in cross-examination that in the settlement papers six Bighas of tenancy land was entered in the possession of Antu, the son of Manau, from two years before 1333 Fasli = 1925-26 and if he still stuck to his statement that Manau died only 8 or 9 years ago, Lachhman Prasad adhered to his statement. We are of opinion that Section 153 of the Indian Evidence Act did not justify the production of this document. The two exceptions mentioned in that section do not apply to the case. Apart from this we have seen the document; the entry is far too ambiguous to permit of an inference that Manau was dead in 1925-26. We are of opinion that Section 153 of the Indian Evidence Act did not justify the production of this document. The two exceptions mentioned in that section do not apply to the case. Apart from this we have seen the document; the entry is far too ambiguous to permit of an inference that Manau was dead in 1925-26. All that the document says is that his son Antu is entered, in respect of certain land. The document is incomplete and there is nothing in it to suggest that this land was inherited by Antu on the death of Manau. The best evidence to prove the death of Manau, if it was intended to contradict the evidence of the vendees, was to produce an extract from the death register or some other reliable evidence. We are not prepared, therefore, to reject the evidence of the vendees and Badlu to the effect that the tree shown in the map referred to above was the tree which was actually transferred and that it was in the possession of the vendees who had engaged Badlu to look lifter it. We may add that it was open to the vendees to produce evidence to show which tree was intended to have been transferred under the sale deed. This course is fully warranted by the provisions of Section 96 of the Indian Evidence Act 15. Accordingly we hold, in agreement with the view taken by the trial Court, that the registration of the sale-deed (Ex. A-1) is not void and ineffective on account of its having been registered in Mohanlalganj. The next contention which has been advanced on behalf of the appellants is that Ex. A-7 dated the 10th December, 1919, Ex. A-8 dated the 20th February, 1925, and Ex. A-9 dated the 30th May, 1913, are not legally proved. It has also been argued that the consideration of these deeds was not for payment of antecedent debts or for legal necessity. Ex. A-7 is attested by two witnesses Asa Ram, who is admittedly dead, and another person whose name could not be deciphered. Lal Bahadur Singh, (D. W. 6), aged 70 years is mentioned in the registration endorsement as the person who identified the executants. He says that the executants signed the deed in the presence of the attesting witnesses who signed the same in the presence of the executants. Lal Bahadur Singh, (D. W. 6), aged 70 years is mentioned in the registration endorsement as the person who identified the executants. He says that the executants signed the deed in the presence of the attesting witnesses who signed the same in the presence of the executants. He also says that the deed was returned to the executants. The original deed being with the vendors no satisfactory explanation has been given why it should not have been produced. Neither any of them has come forward to depose who the other witness was and if he was still alive. Umrao Prasad in his evidence proved the death of a number of persons and, for aught we know, the attesting witness whose name is undecipherable may well have been one of the dead. We do not think that there is any flaw in the evidence and hold that Ex. A-7 is duly proved. Ex. A-8 is a bond and this is in our opinion duly proved by the evidence of P.W. 1) Bhagwati Prasad, who scribed the deed. He stated that the executants had signed the original in his presence. Ex. A-9 is a copy of the hypothecation bond dated the 30th May, 1913. Of the two attesting witnesses Jagannath Singh is admittedly dead. The deed is proved by Anugrah Narain, D. W. 3 and Ram Charan Lal D. W. 12. It may be here mentioned that the originals of these documents were summoned from defendants Nos. 3 and 4 by the vendees. Rabinath Bakhsh Singh, however, stated on the 3rd November; 1938, before the trial Court that the documents were with Asa Ram who was dead and he was unable to produce them. u/s 89 of the Indian Evidence Act, therefore, the Court is entitled to presume that every document, called for and not produced after notice to produce, was attested, stamped and executed in the manner required by law. We hold, therefore, that there is no substance in the contention of the appellants that these deeds are not proved. As regards the consideration of these deeds, we need only refer to the statement of the plaintiffs' Counsel on the 21st September, 1938, that he gave up the plea of the absence of consideration in Ex. A-1. In 1936 when the deed was executed plaintiff No. 1 was eight years old and the plaintiff No 2 was one year old. As regards the consideration of these deeds, we need only refer to the statement of the plaintiffs' Counsel on the 21st September, 1938, that he gave up the plea of the absence of consideration in Ex. A-1. In 1936 when the deed was executed plaintiff No. 1 was eight years old and the plaintiff No 2 was one year old. The deed recites that the money had been borrowed from time to time by the vendors from the vendees and the deeds executed by them in respect thereof are set out in detail in the body of the deed. It is further stated that the vendors were executing the sale deed in order to pay the demands under those deeds as well as to meet their personal needs, which apparently means the needs of the family. We have not the slightest doubt that excepting in respect of Rs 3,800 which was paid in cash the other debts are antecedent debts. As regards this latter sum. it was open to the vendors to come forward and state why this money was needed and how it was spent. The failure of the vendors to come into the witness box and to state the real facts raises a presumption against the plaintiffs that the money must have been needed for legal necessity. 16. In this connection we may refer to a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jagannath v. Shri Nath (1934) 61 I A 150, which reversed the decision of the Allahabad High Court in ILR. 52 All. 391. The deed was executed by the head of a Hindu joint family in 1910 and he died in 1919. A son and a grandson witnessed the deed. In 1922 several junior members of the family, mostly minors, sued to set aside the deed. In addition to the purchaser the two witnesses to the deed were made defendants and were charged with fraud. No evidence of fraud was given and no member of the family who knew anything about the sale or circumstances attending it was called in evidence. It was held by their Lordships that the suit was a collusive suit and the conduct of the defendants who had witnessed the deed in not giving evidence afforded ample corroboration of the fact that the sale was effected for family necessity and for payment of antecedent debts. It was held by their Lordships that the suit was a collusive suit and the conduct of the defendants who had witnessed the deed in not giving evidence afforded ample corroboration of the fact that the sale was effected for family necessity and for payment of antecedent debts. We are of opinion that the present case is stronger on the facts. Here the fathers of the plaintiffs themselves borrowed the money from time to time and it is they who, in order to satisfy all their previous liabilities, executed the sale deed in favour of the vendees. They were impleaded by the plaintiffs as defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and yet they did not come forward to give evidence whether all or any of the debts borrowed by them were not for legal necessity. The suit was undoubtedly a collusive suit filed at the instance of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and it is one of the usual type of suits which are filed by junior members of a joint Hindu family on attaining majority to set aside transactions by their fathers or grandfathers charging them with fraud and collusion. Although collusion was set up in the plaint yet no attempt was made to prove it. 17. We hold, therefore, that there is no force in the contention of the appellants that the consideration of Ex. A-l was not for payment of antecedent debt or for legal necessity. 18. This is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. We may, however, mention that it was argued on behalf of the vendees that if the decision of the aforesaid points had been against them, they would have been, in any event, entitled to a return of the consideration of Rs. 65,000 without which no decree for possession could be passed in favour of the plaintiffs. Reliance was placed on Ram Charan Lonia v. Bhagwan Das Maheshri (1926) 48 All. 443 (PC), Raja Inuganti Venkatarama Rao v. Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur Garu (1936) 68 I A 169 and Raja Mohan Manncha v. Manzoof Ahmad Khan 1943 AWR (P C) 52 : OA (P C) 52 : OWN 214.. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this point. 19. The result is that we dismiss this appeal with costs.