JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - This revision application u/s 115 of the CPC is filed against an order of the District Judge, Hardoi, rejecting the applicant's appeal as incompetent. 2. The plaintiffs-opposite-parties filed an application for redemption of a mortgage u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. Several pleas in defence were raised on behalf of the applicants. These were embodied in as many as nine issues. All these issues were disposed of by an order dated the 11th April, 1940, which were pronounced in presence of Counsel for parties, except issue No. 8 which related to the amount on payment of which the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem. As regards this, the Court appointed a Commissioner to prepare an account and to report what amount, if any, they were liable to pay for redemption. This report was filed on the 11th May. Objections were invited but no evidence was led in support of these objections. The plaintiff's Counsel made no claim for the excess amount and stated that his clients would be content with a decree for redemption without paying anything to the mortgagee. The Court thereupon allowed the redemption without payment. This order was passed on the 29th May, and the Court says that the judgment was pronounced, dated and signed on that date. The order of the 29th May is also headed as "Judgment''. The facts are stated in this judgment and a reference is made to the findings upon the issues recorded on the 11th April, The Court then considers the report of the Commissioner in the light of the objections and finally comes to the conclusion that the objections of the defendants mortgagees were without force and the accounts prepared by the Commissioner were correct. 3. The defendants filed an appeal before the District Judge on the 2nd August, 1940. The appeal was admitted on the 27th August and notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents for the f 18th October. On the 25th April, 1941, the defendants were ordered by the learned District Judge to file a copy of the order dated the 11th April, 1940, in respect of issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9. This was filed on the 17th May. On both these dates the Counsel for the other side was present and raised no objection to the filing of the order dated the 11th April. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 9. This was filed on the 17th May. On both these dates the Counsel for the other side was present and raised no objection to the filing of the order dated the 11th April. On the His May when the appeal came up for hearing, he raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was incompetent inasmuch as the copy of the order dated the 11th April, 1940, had not been filed along with the memorandum of appeal as, required by Order XLI rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. His objection was upheld and the appeal was rejected. Hence the revision application. The learned District Judge held that the order dated the 11th April, 1940, was the main judgment in the case and not having been filed with the copy of the decree at the time of the appeal, the appeal was not maintainable. He also held that the order admitting the appeal and directing, the copy of the order dated the 11th April to be filed did not amount to a "condonation of the failure of the appellants in his Court to comply with the mandatory provisions of law". 4. I am of opinion that the order of the lower appellate Court cannot be maintained. Order XLI rule 1 says :- ........................ The memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispenses there- with) of the judgment on which it is founded. 5. Two questions arise, firstly whether the order dated the 29th May was judgment within the meaning of rule 1 of Order XLI, and secondly if it was not and the order dated the 11th April was the judgment, whether the lower appellate Court had not in the circumstances of the case dispensed with the copy of that judgment by ordering the appellants in that Court to file the copy at a later date. The Full Bench decision in AIR 1929 481 (Lahore) .in my opinion; covers the present case. There one of the preliminary issues whether the plaintiffs were not in possession of the land in dispute was tried and found in favour of the plaintiffs. The suit was then tried on merits and decreed. The Full Bench decision in AIR 1929 481 (Lahore) .in my opinion; covers the present case. There one of the preliminary issues whether the plaintiffs were not in possession of the land in dispute was tried and found in favour of the plaintiffs. The suit was then tried on merits and decreed. The defendant who filed an appeal filed along with the copy of the decree the later order, and not the intermediate order upon the preliminary point, though this order was challenged in the memorandum of appeal. The learned Judges held that the appeal was competent as the later order was judgment, and not the intermediate order, and it was not necessary to file the intermediate order. I adopt the reasoning given in support of this view which in my opinion furnishes an effective answer to the opposite contention. According to the Full Bench. "the word "judgment" in Order XLI rule 1 means the statement of the final adjudication of the rights of the parties in the action, and does not include orders whereby some preliminary issue, point or plea was determined or some step taken or other question settled in the progress of the cause. 6. It has been argued that the real controversy between the parties was settled by the findings given on the various issues on the 11th April, which comprised also the right of the plaintiffs to redeem the property and the subsequent order dated the 29th May did no more than give effect to those findings. This order, according to the counsel for the opposite-party, was the main judgment. I do not agree. Section 2 (9) of the CPC defines judgment as the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. On the 11th April the question still for determination was whether the plaintiffs were liable to pay any amount to the defendants for redemption of the property. Unless this was determined the Court was not in a position to give a judgment awarding relief to the plaintiffs. It is this relief which constituted the foundation of the decree, which was ultimately passed by the Court. The order dated the 11th April, 1940, although a judicial pronouncement, could not constitute the basis of the decree to which the plaintiffs were ultimately held entitled and therefore could not be called judgment. 7. It is this relief which constituted the foundation of the decree, which was ultimately passed by the Court. The order dated the 11th April, 1940, although a judicial pronouncement, could not constitute the basis of the decree to which the plaintiffs were ultimately held entitled and therefore could not be called judgment. 7. I hold, therefore, that the appeal as presented satisfied' the requirements of Order XLI rule 1 of the CPC and it was not necessary for the appellants there to file a copy of the previous order. Assuming that if was necessary to file a copy of the order dated the 11th April, 1940, on the ground that the judgment dated the 29th May was in the absence of such an order in completive and therefore defective, the defect was cured by filing the order subsequently under the direction of the Court. The circumstances of the present case show that the action of the Court in admitting the appeal and ordering the notice to issue to the respondents and further directing the appellants to file a copy of the previous order, was tantamount to an order dispensing with, for the time being, of the previous order. Though the facts in Sarat Chandra Nag Vs. Rati Kanta Polley and Others, AIR 1939 Cal 711 , and G.J.P. Railway Co. v. Radhakisan Jaikisan A I R 1926 Nag. 57, were different, the presumption drawn to the effect that the lower appellate Court had dispensed with the copy of the judgment can equally apply to the present case. There was no written order dispensing with the tiling of the judgment. But this was held to be unnecessary. In the Calcutta case the appellant waited merely to exercise his right u/s 4 of' the Partition Act of purchasing the share acquired by a stranger to the family. This right was not asserted or refused in the Court of first instance and the judgment of the trial Court did not deal with this question. It was held that the judgment was wholly unnecessary and as the appeal was admitted, it must be taken that the Court had dispensed with the filing of the judgment, which was entirely unnecessary for the determination of the question raised by the appellant. It was held that the judgment was wholly unnecessary and as the appeal was admitted, it must be taken that the Court had dispensed with the filing of the judgment, which was entirely unnecessary for the determination of the question raised by the appellant. In the Nagpur case the memorandum of appeal stated that the copy of the judgment would be given afterwards and the appeal was admitted and notice was ordered to issue to the respondent. It was held that it must be taken that the Court dispensed with the copy of judgment. 8. I accordingly set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and remand the case. The learned District Judge will re-admit the appeal to its original number and dispose it of according to law. Costs here and in the lower appellate Court will abide the event.