JUDGMENT Das, J. - This is an application on a Tabular Statement for leave to execute the decree passed in this suit against one C. M. Sahani as one of the partners of the Defendant firm, the National Theatres. The suit was filed on August 21, 1936 against the Defendant firm and two persons of the names of P. N. Banerjee and G. T. Bulchandani who are two of the partners of the Defendant firm. The two last named persons were individually impleaded as Defendants as guarantors. The suit was for recovery of Rs. 11,394/5/- due for the balance of price of goods sold and delivered by the Plaintiff company to the Defendant firm. P. N. Banerjee, who was a partner of the Defendant firm and was also impleaded as a Defendant individually entered appearance as a partner of the Defendant firm through Messrs. A. P. Roy & Co. It appears that on the very day the suit was filed the Plaintiff company obtained an interim injunction restraining the Defendant firm from receiving the hire of certain films and from disposing of or otherwise dealing with those films. 2. On August 25, 1936 being the returnable date of the application in which the interim injunction had been granted a decree was passed in accordance with certain terms of settlement. By these terms of settlement the Defendant firm consented to a decree for the amount claimed in the plaint with costs and interest on judgment at 6 per cent. The decretal amount was to be paid in certain installments covering a period ending with December 31, 1936. Certain films were charged for the due repayment of the decretal amount and the Defendant firm undertook to pay certain percentage of their income from the films towards the decretal amount. Clause 6 of the terms of settlement provided that in default of any payment stipulated above the Plaintiff Company will have liberty to apply in this suit for the appointment of a receiver of those films. Finally the interim injunction was dissolved. The Defendant firm paid Rs. 2,500 but failed to pay the balance of the decretal amount. Thereupon the decree was transferred to Muslimabad Court for execution against P. N. Banerjee and in the execution proceedings the Plaintiff Company realized between August 11, 1938 and June 14, 1942 the total sum of Rs. 2853/1/6. Finally the interim injunction was dissolved. The Defendant firm paid Rs. 2,500 but failed to pay the balance of the decretal amount. Thereupon the decree was transferred to Muslimabad Court for execution against P. N. Banerjee and in the execution proceedings the Plaintiff Company realized between August 11, 1938 and June 14, 1942 the total sum of Rs. 2853/1/6. There is still due to the Plaintiff Company a sum of Rs. 9,203/8/6 inclusive of interest up to February 28, 1943 as shown in column 7 of the Tabular Statement. 3. On March 2, 1943, the Plaintiff Company by the Deputy Custodian of Enemy Properties filed a Tabular Statement for leave to execute the decree against C. M. Sahani as one of the partners of the Defendant firm by attachment of a proportionate share of his salary as an employee in the Department of Supply at Calcutta. A notice was issued under Order 21, rule 5O and served on C. M. Sahani whereby he was called upon to show cause why the prayer of the Plaintiff firm should not be granted. C. M. Sahani has filed an affidavit showing cause and has appeared by the learned Advocate who opposed this application. In his affidavit he does not deny that he was a partner of the Defendant firm or that the Defendant firm was in existence at all material times. He, however, has taken several objections which I shall presently slate in detail. 4. Learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted that these objections cannot be entertained at this stage and that as partnership is not disputed the order for execution should go. He contends that the only issue that can be investigated into in the proceedings under or. 21, r. 5O sub-rule 2 is that of partnership. Apart from this contention of law he has also assailed the objections put forth by the Respondent on facts. 5. The first objection of the Respondent is that there was no contract between the Plaintiff Company and the Defendant firm. This, however, is not averred as a statement of fact but is put forward as presumptions or inferences to be drawn from certain facts alleged. It does not appear to me that the inferences sought to be drawn from the alleged facts necessarily follow from the allegations on which the Respondent relies. This, however, is not averred as a statement of fact but is put forward as presumptions or inferences to be drawn from certain facts alleged. It does not appear to me that the inferences sought to be drawn from the alleged facts necessarily follow from the allegations on which the Respondent relies. This objection and particularly the way it has been formulated does not impress me at all and I accept the statement made in the affidavit in reply. I do not think that there is any substance in this objection. 6. The second objection urged is that although the decree purports to be a consent decree, all the Defendants did not consent and that in fact two of the Defendants did not appear in their personal capacity as guarantors. I do not think that there is any substance in this objection either. Assuming that the other two Defendants did not appear that fact does not make the decree any the less a decree against the Defendant firm because one of its partners had in fact been served and had appeared in the proceedings. 7. The third objection is that by these terms certain properties were charged for the payment of the decretal amount and the only mode for the realization of the decretal amount reserved under these terms of settlement was the appointment of a receiver of the goods charged. Therefore the only mode of execution open to the Plaintiff was to have a receiver appointed of those goods and the Plaintiff Company cannot take any of the other usual modes of execution. In my opinion this objection is wholly untenable. Special mention was made of this particular mode of realization of the decretal amount obviously to avoid any possible contention that the charge could not be realized in execution but that a separate suit would have to be filed. This does not mean that the other usual modes of execution had been given up. In my opinion the appointment of a receiver was to be a mode of execution available to the Plaintiff Company in addition to other modes of execution open to a decree-holder. 8. This does not mean that the other usual modes of execution had been given up. In my opinion the appointment of a receiver was to be a mode of execution available to the Plaintiff Company in addition to other modes of execution open to a decree-holder. 8. The last objection taken by the Respondent has been formulated as a submission, namely, he submits that under the law any one partner has no authority to compromise a suit against a partnership firm and that in this view of the matter the compromise decree is not binding against him or the partnership firm and that he is not liable to pay anything due under the decree. 9. The learned Advocate for the Respondent has referred me to sec. 19 of the Indian Partnership Act in support of this contention. This is to be noted, however, that the Respondent in this affidavit does not aver as a fact that P. N. Banerjee had no authority to enter into the compromise or that he did so without the knowledge or consent of the Respondent or that the terms were prejudicial to his real interest or that there was any collusion between the Plaintiff Company and P. N. Banerjee or that any fraud had been perpetrated by either of them. The Respondent has contented himself with a proposition of law namely, the absence of implied authority of a partner under sec. 19 and is careful not to make any specific averment as to want of actual authority Learned Counsel appearing, in support of this application has refuted this point both in fact and in law as in the case of the other objections. He contends that the Plaintiff Company filed a suit and obtained an interim injunction and a state of emergency arose and P. N. Banerjee had authority to do what was reasonably necessary to be done to meet that emergency. It was imperative, he says, that the interim injunction should be dissolved and to secure that end P. N. Banerjee as partner had authority under sec. 21 of the Indian Partnership Act to consent to the decree and particularly so when there was no real defense to the claim of the Plaintiff. Learned Counsel also referred me to the Deed of Partnership under which the Defendant firm was constituted as a firm. 21 of the Indian Partnership Act to consent to the decree and particularly so when there was no real defense to the claim of the Plaintiff. Learned Counsel also referred me to the Deed of Partnership under which the Defendant firm was constituted as a firm. He pointed out that very extensive powers had been granted by this Deed to P. N. Banerjee. By cl. 6 P. N. Banerjee was appointed the general manager of the business for managing the firm to the best of his ability and he was authorized to supervise ail office works, to draw or endorse any Bill of Exchange or give security in the name of the firm, to make necessary purchases, to enter into agreement with other firms, to negotiate with all persons and companies in furtherance of and for the purpose of the business and he was further authorized to institute suits or to be sued in his name, to take all legal proceedings, both civil and criminal, in the name of the firm and for the firm and to represent the firm in all suits and proceedings either as Plaintiff or as Defendant and to do all necessary things in them for the firm including subscription of name to plaint and written statement and so forth. In view of these wide powers given to P. N. Banerjee by the Deed of Partnership and the circumstances in which the compromise was effected I am inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for the applicant that P. N. Banerjee had actual authority to enter into the compromise which he did on behalf of the Defendant firm so as to bind the Defendant firm. I am strengthened in this view of the facts particularly by reason of the way the point of want of authority has been formulated in the affidavit in opposition, namely, as submission and not as an averment of fact. 10. I now come to deal with the question or law which has been argued with great ability on both sides. The suit was against a firm and was therefore governed by Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under r. 3 of that Order the writ of summons has to be served either on a partner or on a person having the management and control of the business of the Defendant firm as the Court may direct. The suit was against a firm and was therefore governed by Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under r. 3 of that Order the writ of summons has to be served either on a partner or on a person having the management and control of the business of the Defendant firm as the Court may direct. In this case the writ of summons was served on one of the partners with the direction of the Court. Therefore this service was a good service upon the Defendant firm. There is no suggestion that the Defendant firm had been dissolved at the date of the institution of the suit to the knowledge of the Plaintiff Company so as to attract the operation of the proviso to or. 50, r. 3. There being thus good service of the writ of summons, rule 6 provides for appearance of partners and directs that ail subsequent proceedings should continue in the name of the firm. In this case P. N. Banerjee entered appearance as a partner of the Defendant firm. The net result is that in a suit against a firm once there has been a proper service of writ of summons in accordance with the provisions of Or. 30 the proceedings should continue in the firm's name and any decree passed in the suit is binding on the firm and certainly so far as partnership properties are concerned against all partners whoever they may be. It may be said that this may work hardship on a partner who is not served and therefore is unable to defend the suit and in such a case if the partner or the manager on whom service is effected is negligent or fraudulent he may allow a decree to be passed when a firm has a really good defense to the claim. It is apparently this consideration of possible hardship which has induced some learned Judges to construe or. 21 r. 5O sub-rule 2, in the way they did and to which I shall presently refer. To my mind however, there is really no hardship in the ultimate analysis. A partner should take an interest in the affairs of the firm and should be diligent and keep himself informed of the affairs of the partnership business. 11. 21 r. 5O sub-rule 2, in the way they did and to which I shall presently refer. To my mind however, there is really no hardship in the ultimate analysis. A partner should take an interest in the affairs of the firm and should be diligent and keep himself informed of the affairs of the partnership business. 11. If he is so diligent then there will be no difficulty in his knowing if any proceedings had been taken against his firm. If he is indifferent then it is his own negligence or indifference that prevents him from coming forward and entering appearance and defending the case. Further each partner is the agent of the other partners. If one partner leaves the affairs of the firm including the defense of a suit against the firm to his agent, the other partner, then he cannot complain if his other partner to whom he had left the matter was incompetent or negligent. If that partner who was his agent is negligent, or docs not inform him of the suit or is fraudulent, or does not defend the suit properly, the Plaintiff ought not to be penalized for such negligence or carelessness, or fraudulent conduct of that partner with whom the Plaintiff may have had nothing to do. A partner who suffers by the negligence or fraud of his own partner may have his remedy against his own partner in appropriate proceedings, but I do not see why the third party who is the Plaintiff should be penalized for no fault of his own. The responsibility, in my opinion, should be on the person who enters into the partnership. One should be careful in selecting one's own partner and take the risk of his choice. If, however, the Plaintiff colludes with that partner, or is a party to any fraud, then, of course, the aggrieved partner has his remedy in appropriate cases, for fraud will vitiate all proceedings in Court. One should be careful in selecting one's own partner and take the risk of his choice. If, however, the Plaintiff colludes with that partner, or is a party to any fraud, then, of course, the aggrieved partner has his remedy in appropriate cases, for fraud will vitiate all proceedings in Court. In the absence of fraud or collusion to which the Plaintiff is a party, every partner, whether individually served or not, gets an opportunity to defend the suit by himself or through his partner who has been served, and there is nothing to prevent any partner from appearing and defending the suit on any ground, and consequently a decree passed against the Defendant firm after a proper service of summons is a complete adjudication of all questions between the Plaintiff and the Defendant firm and all partners therein whosoever they may be. To hold otherwise would be to nullify the provisions of Or. 30, of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. The execution of such a decree is governed by or. 21 r. 5O. Under sub-r 1 (a) execution can be issued straightway against any property of the partnership. This follows from the very principle that a decree against a firm after proper service of summons is binding on the firm and on all partners thereto, because all partners whosoever they may be have had an opportunity through the partner who has been served to defend the suit, and the merits must be taken to have been once for all adjudicated upon by the decree. Further under r. 5O sub-r. (1) cls. (b) and (c) execution may go without any further proceedings against those persons who fall within those clauses because they have had an opportunity to dispute the claim of the Plaintiff and also the fact of their interest in the firm if they disputed the same. It is only when the Plaintiff decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-r. (1) clauses (b) and (c) that he has to obtain the leave of the Court under sub-r. (2). Why? It is only when the Plaintiff decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-r. (1) clauses (b) and (c) that he has to obtain the leave of the Court under sub-r. (2). Why? Not because the decree is not binding on all persons who are partners, but because the Court has to be satisfied that the person against whom the decree is sought to be executed was in fact a partner of the Defendant firm. So far this fact has not been established as regards persons who do not fall under cls. (b) and (c) of sub-r. (1), and therefore it is necessary to give that person an opportunity to deny that fact, if that be his case. There is no reason, in my opinion, to give such a person a fresh opportunity to dispute the Plaintiff's claim altogether, for, if he is a partner he already has had an opportunity to dispute the claim through his partner, and if he is not a partner he is not concerned with the Plaintiff's claim. Therefore the law requires that the Plaintiff has to obtain the leave of the Court under sub-r. (2) when he seeks to execute the decree against persons who do not come within cls. (b) and (c) of sub-r. (1). To allow execution to go against such a person in the first instance without any enquiry may result in inflicting a very serious injury on such a person if it ultimately turns out that he was not a partner. Therefore the Court has to be satisfied that the person is really a partner and liable as a partner in the Defendant firm. The words " as being a partner in the firm" in sub-r. (2) are important and to my mind indicate the issue before the Court. This is the only ground on which sub-r. (2) can be invoked. It is only when this ground is disputed that the Court has to decide the issue. The words " as being a partner in the firm" in sub-r. (2) are important and to my mind indicate the issue before the Court. This is the only ground on which sub-r. (2) can be invoked. It is only when this ground is disputed that the Court has to decide the issue. The words " liability" and "such liability " in the latter part of this sub-rule, in my opinion, are to be read along with the words " as being a partner in the firm", and it is only the liability "as being a partner in the firm " that is the subject-matter of the enquiry under sub-r. (2). With great respect I do not agree with the learned Judges who have decided that the word " liability " has left the matter at large and includes liability on any ground whatever. In my view, on a true construction of sub-r (2) the liability is limited to liability as a partner; and as I have explained, such a construction involves no real hardship on a person who is actually a partner. To hold otherwise will be, as I have said, to nullify the very object of or. 30 and to give an unnecessary latitude to a person who has already had an opportunity through his partner contest the liability on the other grounds. The fact that under our new Rules, a person may appear under protest and file a written statement denying his partnership and at the same time disputing the claim on merits, does not, in my opinion, make any difference in the position we are considering. 13. I now turn to the authorities which have been cited before me. In Jagat Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Gunney Hajee Ahmed I. L. R. (1925) CaL 214 which was on appeal from the Original Side of this Court there are very useful observations as to the meaning and effect of Or. 21, r. 5O. At page 224 Sanderson, C. J., observed as follows: It was argued by the learned Advocate for the Appellant that this should not be the meaning for it might be that the person sought to be made liable as a partner might desire to contest the validity of the decree, and if he had not been served with the writ of summons he would not have an opportunity of doing so. In my opinion there is no substance in that argument. If on the trial of the issue contemplated by Or. XXI r. 60 (Z) it is decided that the person alleged by the decree-holder to be a partner was a partner in the Defendant firm, then it seems to me he has no cause of complaint. Or. XXX r. 3 provides for the service of summons in a case when persons are sued as partners in the name of the firm. Assuming that the summons has been served in one of the ways specified in Or. XXX r. 3 and that the person sought to be made liable as a partner was found in fact to be a partner he would have had an opportunity to defend the suit either by himself or through his other partners who were his agents. 14. I humbly agree with the above observations of the learned Chief Justice and if I may say so with respect, the principles underlying the provisions of or. 30, and of Or. 21, r 5O are very clearly and concisely summarised in those observations. The observations of Buckland, J., at pp. 234-235 also indicate the same thing. 15. Reference has been made by learned Advocate for the Respondent to the case of Chatto Lall Misser v. Naraindas Baijnath Prasad I. L. R. (1980) cal. 704 , the decision of Remfry, J. With great respect to Remfry, J., I do not think that his Lordship's appreciation of the observations of Sanderson, C. J., and of Buckiand, J., to which I have referred is accurate. Nor do I think that the case of Davis v. Hyman L. R. [1903] 1 K. B. 854 militates against the view I have expressed above. The last mentioned case was concerned with the form of the issue that is to be tried under or. 48, r. 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court which corresponds to our or. 21, r. 5O. It was held that the proper issue should be whether a person against whom execution is sought was, or held himself out, as a partner of the Defendant firm. I respectfully agree that that is the correct form of the issue: for a person becomes liable as a partner if he is in fact a partner, or if he holds himself out as such. I respectfully agree that that is the correct form of the issue: for a person becomes liable as a partner if he is in fact a partner, or if he holds himself out as such. Neither Vaughan William, L. nor Mathew, L. J., goes any further than this. Even Starling, L. J, says that the question to be determined was a general question of liability as a member of the firm. The rest of the concluding portion of his Lordship's judgment was not necessary for the decision of the case, as by the last sentence he himself said so, and those observations I have referred to above were entirely obiter. The observations and reasonings of Bankes, L. J., in Weir & Co. v. McVicar & Co. L. R. [1925] 2 K. B. 127 at p. 133 and the observations of Scrutton, L. J., at 134 with which Atkins, L. J., agreed at pp. 135-136 seem to me to decisive of the present question. The possibility of two contradictory decision in the same case adverted to by Scrutton, L. J., appears to me to be a weighty objection to allowing a further trial on the merits of the case. 16. The case of Chattoo Lall Misser I. L. R. 1930 Cal. 704 decided by Remfry, J., is clearly distinguishable. There on an application for leave under or. 21, r. 5O the Defendant took two objections, namely, (1) that under the U. P. Court of Wards Act no decree could be passed against him except in conformity with the Act, I. L. R. [I 1930] Cal. 704 and that he was not a partner. It will be noticed that the first objection was not an objection available to any of the other partners. It was entirely a personal objection of that particular partner. Remfry, J., allowed both the objections to be taken. In so far as he did so on the basis that under or. 21, r. 5O (2) all kinds of defenses were open to the person sought to be made liable as a partner. I respectfully disagree with him for reasons and on the authority of the cases I have mentioned above. The fallacy, if I may say so, is that he took it for granted that there had been no decree against the Respondent in that case. I respectfully disagree with him for reasons and on the authority of the cases I have mentioned above. The fallacy, if I may say so, is that he took it for granted that there had been no decree against the Respondent in that case. The fact however is that if the Respondent was a partner in fact then there was in fact a decree even against him because there was a decree against the firm. 17. The next case is that of Re Malabar Forest and Rubber Co., Ltd. A. I. R. [1982] Bom 334; 34 Bom. L. R. 617 which entirely supports the contention of learned Counsel for the applicant, and, if I may say so with respect, accords with my view of Or. 30 and Or. 21 r. 5O. In the same volume there is another case, namely, the case of Bhagvan Manaji Marwadi Vs. Hiraji Premaji Marwadi, AIR 1932 Bom 516 which is relied upon by the learned Advocate for the Respondent. 1 find myself unable to accept this decision as correct. Patkar, J., only refers to the case of Davis v. Hyman L. R. [1903] 1 K. B. 854 and relies upon the observations of Sterling, L. J., in that ease for coming to the conclusion that all grounds of objections were open to the Respondent on such an application. As I have shown those observations of Sterling, L. were mere obiter. Further the attention of Patkar, J., was not drawn to the case of Weir & Go. v. McVicar & Co. L. R. [1925] 2 K. B. 127 at y. 133 or the case of Jagal Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Gunny Hajce Ahmed I. L. R. (1925) Cal. 214 on the general consideration I have endeavored to formulate above. Murphy, J., simply dismissed this point with the short observation that a view contrary to the one expressed by him would be a very narrow interpretation. No reason is given in either of the judgments, and as I have said, with the utmost respect, I feel myself unable to agree with the views expressed in this decision. 18. There is a case namely that of F. 0. Dhanapatmal v. F. 0. D. B. C. Chand Dowlat-ram A. I. R. [1934] Sind 135 which also supports the applicant and the view I have expressed above. The earlier cases however were not cited in this case. 18. There is a case namely that of F. 0. Dhanapatmal v. F. 0. D. B. C. Chand Dowlat-ram A. I. R. [1934] Sind 135 which also supports the applicant and the view I have expressed above. The earlier cases however were not cited in this case. The last case I may refer to on the point is a case of our Court namely a decision of Panckridge. J. It is reported under the heading Tdolaram Nathmull v. Mahomed Valli Patel I.L. R. [1939] Cal. 312 It was a case of an execution of an award which was filed in Court and became executable as a decree. It was not really a decree passed by the Court in a suit against a firm. There was no service of summons under or 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was no opportunity for the Respondent to appear individually as there would have been if a suit had been filed, because under or. 30, r. 6, he would have been entitled to appear separately if he so chose to do. I would not however rest my criticism on this case on the apparently distinguishing features I have mentioned. It is no good my trying to disguise my respectful disagreement with this decision. For the reasons stated above, and on the authority of the cases I have mentioned already I cannot accept this decision as correct. This decision contains within itself its own contradiction. With great respect to Panckridge, J., it appears to me to be wholly illogical to allow the Respondent to raise some defenses on merits but to preclude him from raising others. If his reasoning were correct all the defenses should have been left open to the Respondent. 19. In my opinion a Respondent cannot, for reasons stated above, be allowed to raise any of the objections he has sought to raise on this application. The partnership being admitted execution is to be allowed. Apart from this I am further of opinion, as I have already indicated, that the grounds of objections sought to be set up have no substance in fact. 20. The result is that 1 allow this application with costs. Certified for Counsel. 21. This appeal is from a judgment and decree of this Court dated the 26th May. 1943. Apart from this I am further of opinion, as I have already indicated, that the grounds of objections sought to be set up have no substance in fact. 20. The result is that 1 allow this application with costs. Certified for Counsel. 21. This appeal is from a judgment and decree of this Court dated the 26th May. 1943. In August, 1936, the Haver Trading Co., Ltd. filed a suit against the firm "National Theatres" The suit was for recovery of over Rs. 11,000, the balance of the price of goods sold and delivered by the Plaintiff company to the Defendant firm. Mr. Banerjee, who was a partner in the Defendant firm entered appearance as a partner On the day on which the suit was filed the Plaintiff Company obtained an interim injunction restraining the Defendant firm from receiving the rent of certain films and from disposing of or otherwise dealing with those films. The returnable date of the application for an injunction was August 25, 1936. The parties had by then arrived at terms of settlement and a consent decree was passed pursuant to the terms of settlement which had been signed by counsel for the Plaintiff and for the Defendant. The terms of settlement, so far as matrial, provided for the payment by installments of the amount claimed and created a second charge upon the negatives of the films which had been the subject-matter of the injunction. There was a further provision that the Plaintiff Company should have liberty to apply for appointment of a receiver of the films on default in any payment under the decree. The Defendant firm defaulted and the decree-holders applied on tabular statement for leave to execute the decree against the present Appellant, Mr. Sahani, as one of the partners of the Defendant firm, by attachment of his salary as an employee in Government Department. Mr. Sahani docs not deny that he is a partner in the Defendant firm. He opposed the application for execution on the ground amongst others that the decree-holder should have applied for appointment of a receiver. He also submitted that Mr. Banerjee had no authority to agree to the terms of settlement, and that the compromise decree was therefore not binding against him, Mr. Sahani, nor against the firm, and that he had incurred no liability under the decree. 22. He also submitted that Mr. Banerjee had no authority to agree to the terms of settlement, and that the compromise decree was therefore not binding against him, Mr. Sahani, nor against the firm, and that he had incurred no liability under the decree. 22. The matter came before Das, J., who decided against Mr. Sahani and he now appeals from Das, J.'s judgment. His Counsel contends that the decree was passed against the firm and that it cannot be executed against the Appellant personally by attachment of his salary, as is sought by the tabular statement, on the ground that it was a consent decree consented to by a partner other than the Appellant. In support of his argument he relies on sec. 19 sub-sec (2) (c) of the Indian Partnership Act. Sec. 19 provides: Subject to the provisions of sec. 22 the act of a partner 'which is done to carry on in the usual way business of the kind 'carried on by the firm binds the firm', The authority of a partner to bind the firm by this section is called his 'implied authority' " and sub-sec. (2) (e) provides, In the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to admit any liability in a suit or proceeding against the firm, 23. In my view this section does not assist the appellant because when we turn to the provisions of the deed of partnership it appears that cl. 6 contains a definite authority empowering Mr. Banerjee who was the consenting partner, to act as he has done on behalf of the firm. Cl. 6 provide: The third party, (that is. Mr. Banerjee). shall be the General Manager of the business for managing the firm to the best of his ability and in the best interest of the business;" it empowers Mr. Banerjee to draw or indorse any bill of exchange or give security in the name of the firm, to enter into agreements with other firms, and to negotiate with all parsons and companies in further, ance of and for the purpose of the business. Mr. Banerjee to draw or indorse any bill of exchange or give security in the name of the firm, to enter into agreements with other firms, and to negotiate with all parsons and companies in further, ance of and for the purpose of the business. Mr. Banerjee was further authorized "to institute suite or to be sued in his name, to make all legal proceedings, both civil and criminal, in the name of and for the firm and to represent the firm in all suits and proceedings either as Plaintiff or Defendant and to do all necessary things in them for the firm including subscription of name to plaint and written statement and to make verification there of......... 24. The clause also provides that Mr. Banerjee " will, be held responsible to the firm for all his acts and conducts in the matter of the management of the business as General Manager...." Those final words must refer to the responsibility of Mr. Banerjee to the other partners and cannot refer to the responsibility to any firm or person with whom his firm was dealing. The provisions of the clause which empower Mr. Banerjee to negotiate with all persons and companies in furtherance of and for the purpose of the business appear to me clearly to give him power to negotiate a settlement of the suit in which this application arises. 25. A further question has been raised, whether, in an application in execution under Or. 21, r. 5O of the Code of Civil Procedure, a partner who has admitted that he is a partner can question his own liability and incidentally, the liability of his firm under the decree which has already been passed. 26. This matter has been dealt with in great detail by the learned Judge from whose judgment this appeal is brought. He has considered all the relevant authorities and has held that the words of sub-r. (2) of Or. 21, r. 5O do not entitle a person who is admittedly a partner in the firm to dispute his liability under the decree. Or. He has considered all the relevant authorities and has held that the words of sub-r. (2) of Or. 21, r. 5O do not entitle a person who is admittedly a partner in the firm to dispute his liability under the decree. Or. 21, r. 5O provides that where a decree has been passed against a firm execution may be granted (a) against any property of the partnership; (b) against any person who has appeared in his own name or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner; and (c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear. The rule provides for execution against the property of the partnership and against a person who is a partner Sub-r. (2) of r. 5O provides that where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-r. (1), cls. (b) and (c) as being a partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such Court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. 27. I am clearly of opinion that what is intended by sub-r. (2) of r. 5O is that the liability of a person as a partner may be put in issue, but that once his liability as a partner has been decided or, as in the present case, where it is admitted, sub-r. (2) of r. 5O enables the decree-holder to execute the decree against all partners, and the partner against whom execution is sought is not entitled to contest the validity of the decree or his own liability there under. 28. I do not propose to deal with the cases in detail as they have been dealt with carefully and thoroughly by the learned Judge of first instance, and the matter has already been decided by this Court on appeal from an order of a Judge on the Original Side in the case of Jagat Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Gam Hajee Ahmed I. L. R. (1925) Cal. 244 At page 223 Sir Lancelot Sanderson, C. J., says: In my judgment the intention of the rule is that when an application under the rule is made it should be on notice to the person who is alleged to be liable as a partner; be is to be served with a summons and called upon to answer the application. Then if the Court finds that the liability is not disputed, the Court may grant leave to execute the decree against the partner who does not dispute the liability. 29. In the present case the Appellant has not disputed his liability as a partner but he contends that the method of execution which it is sought to adopt, namely, by attaching some portion of his salary, cannot be justified. 30. There is no substance in his contention that the decree-holder is bound to apply for the appointment of a receiver, that is merely, as the learned trial Judge points out, one method which is provided by the decree for executing the decree. It does not prevent the decree-holder from executing his decree in any other method provided by the law. 31. With respect, I agree fully with the reasons which Mr. Justice Das has given in his judgment for holding that the partnership having been admitted, execution must be allowed as prayed. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. Gentle, J. 32. I agree and desire to say a few words with reference to the provisions of or. 21, r. 5O of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Or. 30, r. 1 (1)- Any two or more per"one claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in British India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm. 33. This provision presupposes that there will be a decree against the firm. Or. 21 r. 5O sub-r. 1 provides that- where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted-{b) against any person who has been adjudged to be a painter. 34. 33. This provision presupposes that there will be a decree against the firm. Or. 21 r. 5O sub-r. 1 provides that- where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted-{b) against any person who has been adjudged to be a painter. 34. It is clear from the provisions of the above sub-rule that when a person has been adjudged a partner of the firm against which there is a decree, execution against him can issue and no other question will arise regarding his liability to meet the decree which has been passed against the firm in its name as such, of which he is a partner. It is against sub-r. 2 in respect to which an argument has been mainly directed. This provides that, where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause a decree against the partnership to be executed against any person other than a person who has either appeared in his own name or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is or has been adjudged to be a partner or who has been individually served as a partner with the summons and has failed to appear, the decree-holder may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave and where the liability is not disputed such Court may grant such leave, or, where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and deterined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. In my view the only question which can be the subject of the enquiry within sub-r. 2 is whether or not a person is a partner of a firm and liability in the sub-rule means liability of such a person because he is a partner of the firm against which the decree has been obtained. Under sub-r. 1 r. 5O(1)(b) it is clear that upon ad judgment of a man as partner in a firm against which the decree is obtained execution may issue against that person and sub-r. 2 cannot, in my view, enlarge the right of any partner against whom execution is sought as a partner to raise any contention or issues beyond what in my opinion is manifest from the wording of sub-r. 1 whether he is a partner of the firm or whether he is not.