JUDGMENT Das, J. - The present rule is concerned with certain questions that have arisen in connection with the preparation of the electoral roll for the ensuing municipal election for 1944, under the Calcutta Municipal Act. The facts leading up to these proceedings are shortly as follows :- One hundred and two persons, whose names and addresses are set out in annexure "A" to the affidavit of the applicant Mr. Stanley Kissen Sawday sworn on 1st February 1944 and who claim to be qualified as electors of the General Constituency ward No. 17 of the town of Calcutta, separately applied to the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation of Calcutta in Form A prescribed by R. 3 of the Rules made by the Provincial Government under S. 25 (2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act 1923 (Bengal Act 3 [III] of 1923) for entry in the register maintained under cl. (b) of sub-s. (1), of S. 20 of that Act. All particulars required by the Form were set out therein. There is no question that all these applications except those of Messrs. Piperno, Glover and Brown, had been received by the Chief Executive Officer. 2. Under Rule 3, the Executive Officer is authorised to make such enquiries as he considers necessary for satisfying himself about the correctness of the statements made in the application. Accordingly, two Mutation Inspectors, Probodh Kumar Sircar and Enamul Haque, were deputed to make enquiries in connection with the several applications of these 102 persons. It is alleged that these Inspectors called at the addresses of the several persons (out of these 102 persons) whose names and addresses are set out in their respective affidavits. They could find some of them at home and could not and some of them at home and could get no information or trace of the rest. Those they could find at home either refused to see them or refused or failed to produce any rent bill. Thereupon, post cards were sent out requesting these gentlemen to appear before the Electoral Roll Officer with such evidence as they desired to rely upon for proof of their occupation of the respective premises, but none of them responded thereto or appeared or produced any evidence before the Electoral Roll Officer. 3. Thereupon, post cards were sent out requesting these gentlemen to appear before the Electoral Roll Officer with such evidence as they desired to rely upon for proof of their occupation of the respective premises, but none of them responded thereto or appeared or produced any evidence before the Electoral Roll Officer. 3. The allegations in the respective affidavits of these two Mutation Inspectors as to the alleged enquiries and the sending out of the post cards have been categorically challenged and disputed by Mr. Sawday in his affidavit in reply upon information said to have been received by him from the gentlemen concerned. Mr. Sawday in his affidavit in reply states that in the short time available to him it has not been possible to get these gentlemen to swear affidavits and he offers to produce them for examination, if necessary. He points out several discrepancies in the affidavit of Enamul Haque as proof of the falsity of the allegations therein. He further states that most of the gentlemen are well known citizens of Calcutta and their names and addresses appear in the telephone directory and their whereabouts could be easily ascertained from Mr. Sawday who was their agent or from the European Association through whom their applications had been submitted. Mr. Sawday also states that Enamul Haque called on him and admitted that he had made no enquiries and had paid no visits and made false reports about would-be voters under instructions of his superior officers, one of whom he named as a Mr. Lahiry, and all of whom, he said, were acting on the instigation of Mr. Sudhansu Mitter the sitting Councillor. The position, according to Mr. Sawday, was that after these 102 gentlemen had made their respective applications in Form A to the Chief Executive Officer for entry in the Register maintained under S. 20 (1) (b) none of them heard anything further in the matter. 4. In the meantime under S. 25, Calcutta Municipal Act, read with Rules 5 and 12, the Registering Authority on or before 15th November 1943, prepared and published an electoral roll, called the preliminary roll, for General Constituency, Ward 17, containing the names of all persons who appeared to him to be entitled to be registered as electors for that constituency. In the meantime under S. 25, Calcutta Municipal Act, read with Rules 5 and 12, the Registering Authority on or before 15th November 1943, prepared and published an electoral roll, called the preliminary roll, for General Constituency, Ward 17, containing the names of all persons who appeared to him to be entitled to be registered as electors for that constituency. It is not the applicant's case that there has been any irregularity in the publication of the preliminary roll or that the provisions of S. 25 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and Rules 12 and 15 have not been complied with. The names of none of these 102 gentlemen, who had applied to the Chief Executive Officer in Form A, appeared in the preliminary roll of the constituency. The names of two of them, namely, those of Mr. Y. R. Patel and Mr. R. B. Whitehead, however, appeared in the preliminary roll for other constituencies, a fact which was not known to them until after the expiry of the date for making a claim to the Revising Authority, namely, 20th December 1943. 5. Each of these 102 persons finding that his name had not been included in the preliminary roll applied to the Revising Authority for inclusion of his name in the following terms: I have to inform you that I made an application in time for inclusion in the Voters' List of Ward 17, General Constituency, being qualified under S. 20 (1) (b). To my surprise I find that my name has been omitted and I hereby apply for it3 restoration. Mr. S. K. Sawday and/or Mr. P. J. Gomes will represent me. 6. These applications are, in truth, claims purported to have been preferred under S. 25, Calcutta Municipal Act, read with Rules 16 and 17. There is no question that these claims were preferred within the time prescribed by Rule 16. I gathered from learned counsel that upon the claims being preferred, the prescribed notices specifying the place where and the time when the claims would be heard were given to the claimants. There is no grievance that the provisions of Rules 20 and 21 have not been complied with. On the dates fixed for hearing Mr. Sawday appeared in support of the claims as agent of the claimants. There is no grievance that the provisions of Rules 20 and 21 have not been complied with. On the dates fixed for hearing Mr. Sawday appeared in support of the claims as agent of the claimants. A point was raised that the claims were not in proper form and were defective and that the requirements of Rule 17 had not been complied with in that the grounds on which the claims had been founded had not been stated therein. Mr. Sawday made his submissions on the point and produced precedents in support of his contentions. The Revising Authority had the point of law referred to the Law Officer of the Corporation for his opinion. Two opinions of learned counsel, one advising the Corporation and the other advising the claimants which had been placed before the Revising Authority, were also placed before the Law Officer for his consideration. In the opinion of the Law Officer, the claims were defective and the requirements of Rule 17 had not been complied with. Mr. Sawday has made a grievance that the arguments advanced by him and the precedents in support thereof which had been produced by him had not been placed before the Law Officer. The Electoral Roll Officer, Mr. Phalaram Mukherjee, avers in his affidavit that all contentions of the parties were placed before the Law Officer and he also points out that the opinion of learned counsel advising the claimants contained the gist of the arguments addressed by Mr. Sawday. On divers dates up to 26th January 1944, the Revising Authority rejected each of the claims in the following terms: According to the opinion of the Law Officer the application is not in order. I accept the opinion of the Law Officer. Disallow. 7. At this stage it will be useful to set out paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit of the Revising Authority, Mr. N. Singh Roy : 5. The statements contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said affidavit are substantially correct except that I rejected some of the claims on 27th day of January 1944. Disallow. 7. At this stage it will be useful to set out paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit of the Revising Authority, Mr. N. Singh Roy : 5. The statements contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said affidavit are substantially correct except that I rejected some of the claims on 27th day of January 1944. I state that at the hearing of the claims filed by the persons whose names appear in Statement 'A' an objection was taken that they are not in conformity with Rule 17 of the Rules for the preparation and publication of the Electoral Roll which requires 'that all claims and objections should be in writing and signed by the persons making them and shall state the grounds on which they are based.' I examined the claims and found that beyond making a general statement that the claimant is qualified tinder S. 20 (1) (b) and that also without reference to any premises, the claims filed by the said persons did not state any grounds on which the claims were based. They did not even specify the premises in respect of which they claimed to be qualified under the said section. I heard the parties or their representative and their respective contention and I came to the conclusion that in the absence of grounds on which the claims ware based they could not be entertained. The parties placed before me opinions of counsel supporting their respective contentions. I also had the matter referred to the Chief Law Officer. Thereafter, I exercised my judgment after hearing the parties and going through the opinions placed before me and I decided that the claims should be disallowed and I ordered accordingly. 6. With reference to paragraph 7 of the said affidavit I state that Mr. Sawday produced before me a copy of the opinion expressed by Mr. P. B. Mukherjee which contains a gist of the arguments and precedents placed before me. The said opinion and also the opinion of Mr. P. S. Bose were placed before and considered by the Chief Law Officer. Thereafter I again considered the matter and came to the decision above referred to. 7. P. B. Mukherjee which contains a gist of the arguments and precedents placed before me. The said opinion and also the opinion of Mr. P. S. Bose were placed before and considered by the Chief Law Officer. Thereafter I again considered the matter and came to the decision above referred to. 7. I deny the correctness of the allegations and submissions made in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said affidavit and state that the claims in question being not in conformity with the provisions contained in Rule 17 of the Government Rules, I was legally entitled to reject them and that in passing such order I acted in accordance with law and in proper exercise of the jurisdiction vested in me. I deny all allegations to the contrary. 8. On 2nd February 1944, Mr. Sawday applied for and obtained the present rule calling upon the Revising Authority (Mr. N. Singh Roy) and the Registering Authority (whose name has not been mentioned) to show cause: (1) Why the claims of the several persons named in Ex. A to the said affidavit and also named in the schedule hereunder as voters in the ensuing Municipal Election 1944 should not be allowed. (2) Why the names of the said persons should not be included in the Electoral Roll prepared for the purpose of said election by the said authorities and why the refusal orders passed by the revising authority on various dates up to 26th day of January last in the applications of the said persons should not be vacated and (3) Why a writ of certiorari should not be issued calling up the proceedings had before the said revising authority for quashing same. 9. An interim injunction was granted by me restraining the said Revising Authority and the Registering Authority from publishing the electoral roll without the claimants' names until the disposal of the rule. This rule, it will be noticed, was instituted, inter alia. In the matter of 8.45 of the Specific Relief Act, and in the matter of cl. 21 of Charter of 1774. The contention of Mr. This rule, it will be noticed, was instituted, inter alia. In the matter of 8.45 of the Specific Relief Act, and in the matter of cl. 21 of Charter of 1774. The contention of Mr. Sawday in his affidavit in support of the rule is that the order of the Revising Authority is illegal and ultra vires the Calcutta Municipal Act and in passing the said order the Revising authority acted is violation of the Calcutta Municipal Act and the Rules and the said order is in excess and is an abuse of the Jurisdiction conferred upon him and the exclusion of the names given in annexure "A" to his affidavit from the electoral roll is wrongful, illegal and ultra vires. It is also submitted that the ground of the aforesaid illegal and wrongful rejection of these claims, namely, that they did not conform to R. 17 in that the grounds were not sufficiently set forth therein, is illegal, untenable and ultra vires the Calcutta Municipal Act. In his affidavit in reply Mr. Sawday contends that the order disallowing the claims without going into the merits and evidence of such claims was illegal and ultra vires. Mr. Sawday complains that by the said order he has been unlawfully and illegally, deprived of the support of these persons at the forth, coming election in which he intends to stand as a candidate for election. There are also usual averments on lines indicated in S. 45, Specific Relief Act. The rule having been duly served the respondents have appeared by and through their learned counsel, Mr. S. N. Banerjee, to show cause. The points that have been canvassed before me by Mr. S. N. Banerjee, and most of which have been very ably controverted by Mr. P. B. Mukherjee, may be concisely summarised as follows: (1) That the Calcutta Municipal Act and the Rules framed thereunder by the Provincial Government constitute a self-contained Code, which has set up a special tribunal with a special jurisdiction for the determination of special rights created thereby and no other Court, including the High Court, has any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those rights or interfere with or control the exercise of the special jurisdiction of that special tribunal by any order made on any proceeding by way of suit, or application for mandamus or for a writ of certiorari. (2) That the jurisdiction of this Court, if it had any, has been taken away by the provision of S. 25 (3), Calcutta Municipal Act, which provides that the orders made by the revising authority shall be final. (3) That if this Court has jurisdiction and such jurisdiction has not been taken away, then the applicant has no locus standi to maintain this application, as his own property, franchise or personal right has not in any way been injured. (4) That if this Court has jurisdiction and such jurisdiction has not been taken away and the applicant is entitled to maintain this application then, (a) the decision of the revising authority is perfectly good and valid for reasons stated by him. (b) Even if the decision be wrong it is an error of judgment and not an illegal exercise of jurisdiction and this Court should not interfere. (5) (a) The decision of the revising authority is also maintainable on merits as none of the claimants possessed the requisite qualifications required by S. 20 (1) (b) in that none of them had on application made to the Executive Officer had his name entered in the Register maintained under that section. (b) That if this Court has jurisdiction and such jurisdiction has not been taken away and the applicant has the right to maintain this application and if the ground on which the revising authority disallowed the claims be misconceived or untenable, this Court, in exercise of its discretion, should not issue any mandatory injunction or a writ of certiorari, as such process will not constitute an effective remedy in this particular case, for the claim is bound to be dismissed as none of them has the requisite qualifications prescribed by Section 20(1)(b). 10. I now proceed to deal with the several points seriatim and give my decisions thereon: 11. Re. (1) & (2) In support of his arguments on this point Mr. Banerjee referred me to the case in 31 Bom. 604 Bhaishanker v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay ('07) 31 Bom. 604. Jenkins C. J. in that case observed as follows at page 607: The right claimed by the plaintiff is that he may be deemed to be re-elected by virtue of S. 34 (1) of the Act, and that claim rests on the theory that no Councillor was elected at the Justices' election. 604. Jenkins C. J. in that case observed as follows at page 607: The right claimed by the plaintiff is that he may be deemed to be re-elected by virtue of S. 34 (1) of the Act, and that claim rests on the theory that no Councillor was elected at the Justices' election. But this right is the creation of the Municipal Act, and the question is whether the Act has not indicated the tribunal, by which alone the facts on which the right depends can at this stage be determined. After quoting S. 33, City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, the learned Chief Justice at p. 608 stated: So, if the validity of any election is questioned, application may be made to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court. If the Chief Judge finds that the election was not a valid one, he shall set it aside, and his order shall be conclusive. Finally at pages 609-610, his Lordship concluded as follows: But under S. 33 the Chief Judge has jurisdiction to determine the validity of a contested election; and so he is the tribunal appointed by the Act for that purpose. But where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course, is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then, except so fat as otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. It is an essential condition of these rights that they should be determined in the manner prescribed by the Act to which they owe their existence. In such a case there is no ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts, for they never had any; there is no change of the old order of things; a new order is brought into being. Here not only is the Chief Judge appointed the tribunal, but it also is expressly provided that his order shall be conclusive, and that every election not called in question in accordance with the provisions of S. 33 shall be deemed to have been to all intents and purposes a good and valid election. But then it is argued that this is a suit of a civil nature, and S. 11, Civil P. C., provides that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature. But then it is argued that this is a suit of a civil nature, and S. 11, Civil P. C., provides that the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature. But from this rule are excepted suits of which their cognizance is barred by any enactment. The jurisdiction of the Courts can be excluded, not only by express words, but also by implication, and there certainly is enough in S. 33, Municipal Act, for this purpose; for there is no right which the plaintiff can at the stage assert as the subject of this suit, which is not subject to the condition that its essential basis must depend on the derision of the tribunal created for that purpose. 12. Mr. Banerjee also relied on the case in 12 Mad. 105 Rama Chandra v. Secy. of State ('89) 12 Mad. 105. The appellant in that case filed a claim before the Forest Officer under S. 10, Madras Forest Act (5[v]of 1882). His claim was allowed in part but disallowed as to the rest. He preferred an appeal under the Act to the District Court which dismissed his appeal. The appellant then filed a suit in the Munsif's Court for cancellation of the decision of the Forest Officer and the District Judge and for recovery of the land as to which his claim had been dismissed. The suit was decreed by the Munsif. An appeal was taken by the defendants to the District Judge who reversed the decision of the Munsif and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff then appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal holding that it is an established principle that when by an Act of the Legislature powers are given to any person for a public purpose from which an individual may receive injury, if the mode of redressing the injury is pointed out by the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts is ousted, and in case of injury, the party cannot proceed by action. The next case relied on by Mr. Banerjee was that in S. I. A. 90 Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu Rai ('81) 7 Cal. The next case relied on by Mr. Banerjee was that in S. I. A. 90 Raja Nilmoni Singh v. Ram Bandhu Rai ('81) 7 Cal. 388: 8 I. A. 90 (P. C.) where it was held that the decision of the Collector settling compensation under Act 10[x] of 1870, which had not been appealed from, was final and could not be re-opened or challenged in another suit The last case cited on this point by Mr. Banerjee is the case in 67 I. A. 222 Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. ('40) 87 A. I. R. 1940 P. C. 105 : I. L. R. (1940) Mad. 599: L. L. R., (1940) Kar. P. C.194: 67 I. A. 222 :188 L. C. 231 (P. C.). This case was concerned with the decision or order passed by customs authorities under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The Assistant Collector passed an order under that Act assessing the duty. The respondent appealed to the Collector under the Act but the appeal was dismissed. An application for revision to the Governor General under the Act was dismissed. The respondent then filed a suit in the civil Court. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit An appeal from that decree of dismissal was allowed by the High Court. The Secretary of State then appealed to the Judicial Committee. Their Lordships in allowing the appeal and restoring the decree of the Subordinate Judge observed, at pages 237-238 as follows: Their Lordships are of opinion that in this case the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is excluded by the order of the Collector of Customs on the appeal under S. 188, and it is unnecessary to consider whether, prior to taking such appeal under S. 188, the respondents would have been entitled to resort to the civil Courts, or whether they would have been confined to the right of appeal under S. 188. The determination of this question must rest on the terms of the particular statute which is under consideration, and decisions on other statutory provisions are not of material assistance except in so far as general principles of construction are laid down. The main principles to be observed in the present case are to be found in the well-known judgment of Willes J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. The main principles to be observed in the present case are to be found in the well-known judgment of Willes J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkes ford (1859) 6 C. B. (N. S.) 336 :28 L. J. C. P. 242 : 7 W. R. 464, which, was approved of in the House of Lords in Neville v. London 'Express' Newspaper Ltd. (1919) 1919 A. C. 368 : 88 L. J. K. B. 282 : 120 L. T. 299. The question is whether the present ease falls under the third class stated by Willes J., vis., 'Where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it.' With respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute. It has been held that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is excluded in three cases in which an appeal under S. 188 had been, taken-C. S. No. 747 of 1920, already referred to, Bhiwandiwala & Co. v. Secretary of State ('37) 24 A. I. R. 1937 Mad 536 : 172 I. C. 70, which is referred to by the High Court, and Thin Yien v. Secretary of State ('39) 26 A. I. R. 1939 Cal 763 : I. L. R. (1939) 1 Cal. 257 : 187 I. C. 542. Each of these cases related to an appeal against an adjudication under S. 182. In the case referred to in 71 Mad L. J., Notes of Recent cases, p. 40, Varadachariar J. held that jurisdiction was not excluded in circumstances similar to the present case, except that there had been no appeal under S. 188, and, for the reasons already explained, their Lordships do not find it necessary to consider the question. Similarly, in the cases of Vacuum Oil Co. v. Secretary of State ('32) 19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 168; 56 Bom. 313 : 59 I. A. 258 : 137 I. C. 535 (P. C.) and Ford Motor Co. of India, Ltd. v. Secretary of State ('38) 25 A. I. R. 1938 P. C. 15 :I. L. R. (1938) Bom. v. Secretary of State ('32) 19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 168; 56 Bom. 313 : 59 I. A. 258 : 137 I. C. 535 (P. C.) and Ford Motor Co. of India, Ltd. v. Secretary of State ('38) 25 A. I. R. 1938 P. C. 15 :I. L. R. (1938) Bom. 249 : 32 S. L. R 264 : 65 I. A. 32 : 112 I. C. 771 (P. C.), no appeal had been taken under S. 188; the question of jurisdiction was not in issue, though in the former case an issue had been framed, but it was abandoned by the Advocate-General. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that an exclusion of the subject's right of resort to the civil Courts would be ultra vires of the Indian Legislature in view of the provisions of S. 32, Government of India Act, 1915, which re-enacted S. 65, Government of India Act of 1858, and reference was made to Secretary of State for India v. Moment ('13) 40 Cal 391 : 18 I. C. 22 : 40 I. A. 48 (P. C.), which was a case of tortious trespass on land. But, in their Lordships' opinion, neither S. 32 not the principle involved in the decision in Moment's case "affect the validity of an Act of the Indian Legislature which creates an obligation and provides an exclusive Code for its determination; such an obligation is not covered by sub-section (2) of Section 32. 13. It should be noticed that in all the cases cited by Mr. Banerjee a regular suit had been filed in the civil Court and it was held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court had been ousted by special enactment. The observations in the judgments to which I have referred must, therefore, be regarded as authority for the point it actually decided, namely, that a suit in a Civil Court was not maintainable to challenge the decision of the special tribunal set up by special legislation. None of those cases was concerned with an application for mandamus or a writ of certiorari filed in the High Court, nor was it considered whether a Provincial Legislature could, by any of its enactments oust the jurisdiction of the High Court derived from Acts of Parliament and Royal Charters. None of those cases was concerned with an application for mandamus or a writ of certiorari filed in the High Court, nor was it considered whether a Provincial Legislature could, by any of its enactments oust the jurisdiction of the High Court derived from Acts of Parliament and Royal Charters. The Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, was passed by the Provincial Legislature as constituted under the Government of India Acts, 1915-1919. It has been held by a Special Bench of this Court in I. L. R. (1939) 2 Cal. 93: 43 C. W. N. 613 Narsingdas Tansukdas v. Chogemull ('39) 26 A. I. R. 1939 Cal 435 : I. L. R. (1939) 2 Cal. 93 : 183 I. C. 113 : 43 C. W. N. 613 (S. B.) that an Act of the Bengal Legislature as constituted under the Government of India Acts 1915 and 1919, in so far as it affects the jurisdiction of the High Court derived from Parliament, will be ultra vires, although such Act may be enacted with the previous sanction of the Governor General under S. 80A of the Acts. Assuming that by reason of clause 44 Letters Patent, the provision of S. 9, Civil P. C., read with the Calcutta Municipal Act, can exclude the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of suits, as to which I express no opinion, I am clearly of opinion that the Provincial Legislature as constituted under the Government of India Acts, 1915-1919, could not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing the high prerogative writ of prohibition or certiorari which it has inherited from the Supreme Court under successive Acts of Parliament and Royal Charters issued thereunder. It is true that the writ of mandamus has been abolished as such but the same or similar jurisdiction has been conferred on the High Court by S. 45, Specific Relief Act. I am not prepared to hold that these special jurisdictions; which have been zealously guarded, insisted upon and exercised by this Court from ancient time, could be taken away by the Provincial Legislature as constituted at the time of the passing of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, and that by mere implication and not by express words of enactment. In connection with the question of ouster of Court's jurisdiction, I may also refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Edn. 2, Vol. In connection with the question of ouster of Court's jurisdiction, I may also refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Edn. 2, Vol. 9, Art. 1455 p. 861 cited by Mr. Mukherjee in support. of his contention that certiorari can only be taken away by express negative words and that it is not taken away by words which direct that certain matters shall be "finally determined" in the inferior Court nor by a proviso that "no other Court shall intermeddle" with regard to certain matters as to which jurisdiction is conferred on the inferior Court. The case in 11 Cal. 275 Nundolal Bose v. Corporation of Calcutta ('85) 11 Cal. 275 which has been followed by Chaudhuri J. in 46 Cal. 132 In Re. Amulyadhan Addy. ('19) 6 A. I. R. 1919 Cal 174 : 46 Cal. 132 : 50 I. C. 307 and by Panckridge J. in 38 C. W. N. 729 In re : National Carbon Co. Incorporated ('34) 21 A. I. R. 1934 Cal 725 : 61 Cal. 450 :152 I. C. 914 : 38 C. W. N. 729 is also relevant on the points under consideration. Mr. Mukherjee cited the case in 45 Cal. 950 In re: Surendra Chandra Ghose ('19) 6 A. I. R. 1919 Cal. 50 : 45 Cal. 950 : 49 I. C. 454 on the question of the powers of this Court under S. 45, Specific Relief Act. But in the Municipal Act then in force there was no provision that the decision of the municipal authorities would be final. 14. The case in 58 Cal. 87 Rathi Chandra v. Amulya Charan ('31) 18 A. I. R. 1931 Cal. 36 : 58 Cal. 87 : 129 I. C. 422 also cited by Mr. Mukherjee is not very helpful because the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, expressly preserved the jurisdiction of the Courts but the Rules made thereunder made the decision final. For reasons stated above, however, I hold against Mr. Banerjee on these two points in so far as they concern this application for a mandatory injunction in the nature of a writ of mandamus and for a writ of certiorari. Re. (3) : Mr. Banerjee strongly contended that Mr. Sawday has no locus standi to maintain this application. There has been no injury to his property. Banerjee on these two points in so far as they concern this application for a mandatory injunction in the nature of a writ of mandamus and for a writ of certiorari. Re. (3) : Mr. Banerjee strongly contended that Mr. Sawday has no locus standi to maintain this application. There has been no injury to his property. His name has been registered in the preliminary roll and therefore, there has been no injury to his franchise. If anybody has been injured at all, it is the claimant whose name has been omitted. Mr. Banerjee referred ma to S. 25, Calcutta Municipal Act and pointed out the distinction that has been made between a claim and an objection. In the case of an omission of the name of a person from the preliminary roll that person and that person alone can prefer a claim to have his name inserted therein but in the case of the inclusion of the name of any person, that person whose name is on the roll and who objects to the inclusion of his own name or of the name of any other person on the roll, may prefer an objection. Therefore, if Mr. Sawday, whose name is on the preliminary roll, objects to the inclusion of his own name or of the name of any person in the Roll, he may prefer an objection, for this section gives him the right to do so. This right may have entitled him to make an application for mandamus or certiorari. But the Act gives him no right to claim that the name of some other person not in the preliminary roll be inserted therein and, if the Act gives him no such right then he cannot maintain an application under S. 45, Specific Relief Act 15. Under the English law, the right to apply for a mandamus depends on the existence of some legal right in aid of which the mandamus is sought. A mere equitable right is not enough. There are observations In different cases as to the quantum of legal right necessary to support a right to apply for mandamus. In some cases it has been held that only a slight legal right is enough. But all cases agree that there must be/some legal right. A mere equitable right is not enough. There are observations In different cases as to the quantum of legal right necessary to support a right to apply for mandamus. In some cases it has been held that only a slight legal right is enough. But all cases agree that there must be/some legal right. Under S. 45, Specific Relief Act, the right is made dependent on the injury to the applicant's property, franchise or personal right. The Corporation is a creature of statute. Its constitution is defined by the statute. Apart from the statute nobody has any municipal franchise or right to vote. The statute prescribes the qualifications for electors. Persons who have not the requisite qualifications have no franchise of right to vote. That shows that there is no natural right, or any right, apart from what the statute gives, in this behalf. Therefore, if the statute does not give any right to Mr. Sawday to claim the inclusion of the name of a person other than himself, then Mr. Sawday cannot be heard to say that he has any natural right or common law right to make such a claim for there is no right apart from the statute. 16. Mr. Mukherjee did not claim any right in Mr. Sawday apart from the statute. He referred me to Ss. 23 and 26 and formulated his contentions, in this way. First of all, he said, the term "franchise" is a term of collective import or content. It includes not only the right to vote but everything that flows from such right to vote. Thus, if Mr. Sawday has the right to vote i. e., is an elector, he may be a candidate for election. If be can be a candidate he can have the right to expect the votes of his supporters. His supporters can cast their votes for him only if they are electors i. e., if their names are included in the electoral roll. Therefore, Mr. Sawday is interested in seeing that the names of his supporters are on the roll. The "consummation of Mr. Sawday's title" as an elector-an expression adapted by Mr. His supporters can cast their votes for him only if they are electors i. e., if their names are included in the electoral roll. Therefore, Mr. Sawday is interested in seeing that the names of his supporters are on the roll. The "consummation of Mr. Sawday's title" as an elector-an expression adapted by Mr. Mukherjee from the judgment of Lord Kenyon C. J. in (1801) 2 East 75 King v. Clarke (1801) 2 East 75 at p. 83-is his election as a Councillor and for that end he looks to the votes of his supporters and if his supporters are not on the roll, the natural evolution of his right, from the right to vote to the right to be elected, is hampered. This argument may have apparent ingenuity but, in my Opinion, lacks in substance or merit. An elector may, by virtue of his being an elector, be a candidate for election. He may have an assurance from any number of persons for their support, but I cannot see that be has the legal right to anybody's vote. Mr. Mukherjee ignores the distinction between expectation of support and the right of support. There is no legal right of support which the law recognises and which may support a claim for mandamus. I confess that I have found it difficult to appreciate Mr. Mukherjee's arguments which seek to build up a legal right out of a possibility on a possibility, namely, the possibility that Mr. Sawday will be a candidate and the possibility that if he does become a candidate these 102 gentlemen will cast their votes for him In my judgment, it is not a right at all within the meaning of S. 45, Specific Relief Act, and Mr. Sawday is not, in my opinion, entitled to maintain this application, in so far as it seeks a mandatory injunction in the nature of a mandamus. The case reported in 45 Cal. 950 King v. Clarke (1801) 2 East 75 was the case of an objector and does not help Mr. Mukherjee for the statute itself gives a right of objection to any person. Mr. Mukherjee then fell back on certiorari. He contended that if mandamus is not available to Mr. Sawday for want of a right, he can yet ask for a certiorari, Mr. Mukherjee for the statute itself gives a right of objection to any person. Mr. Mukherjee then fell back on certiorari. He contended that if mandamus is not available to Mr. Sawday for want of a right, he can yet ask for a certiorari, Mr. Banerjee replied that certiorari stood on the same footing as mandamus and this Court will not issue the high prerogative writ of certiorari at the instance of a mere stranger who has no interest in the proceedings complained of. Mr. Banerjee did not draw my attention to any judicial decision in support of his arguments but rested his arguments on general principles. On a consideration of the authorities cited by Mr. Mukherjee I find myself in agreement with him that certiorari prohibition does not require any personal right or interest to support a claim for these writs. The only distinction is that in the case of a man who is personally aggrieved, he can ask for the writ almost ex debito justitice and that in the case of a man who has not suffered any injury, the Court has a discretion to grant or refuse the application according to the circumstances of the case. See Short & Mellor's Practice of the Crown Office, 2nd Edn. 2, p. 48 and the case in (1870) 5 Q. B. 466 The Queen v. Justices of Surrey (1870) 5 Q. B 466 : 39 L. J. M. C. 145 followed in (1914) 1 K. B. 608 Rex v. Williams (1914) 1 K. B. 608 : 83 L. J. K. B. 528 : 110 L. T. 372 at pp. 613-614. In my opinion, therefore, Mr. Sawday is entitled to maintain this application, in so far as it is one for a writ of certiorari. 17. Re. 4 (a): The decision of the Revising Authority was based, as it appears from the order itself and also from paras. 5, 6 and 7 of his affidavit, on the sole reason that the grounds had not been sufficiently stated in the claim and as such the claim was not in conformity with the requirements of R. 17. Turning to the Act I find that the only provision as to claim or objection in the Act is to be found in S. 25. Rules 16 to 23 deal with claims or objections and the procedure to be followed. Turning to the Act I find that the only provision as to claim or objection in the Act is to be found in S. 25. Rules 16 to 23 deal with claims or objections and the procedure to be followed. It will be noticed that neither the Act nor the Rules prescribe any particular form in which the claim or the objection has to be preferred. Rule 16 provides that the claim or objection is to be preferred within 5-30 P. M. of the 20th December and if not so presented shall not be entertained. Rule 17 provides that it must be in writing and signed by the person making it and shall state the grounds on which it is based, and where it relates to any entry in the preliminary roll it shall give the reference to or the particulars of that entry. Rule 18 provides for issue of notice by the revising authority fixing a time and place of hearing of the claim or objection and allows the claimant or objector to adduce such evidence as he may wish to do. Rule 19 provides for issue of notice, in the case of objection, to the person objected to, stating the grounds of objection. This rule also indicates that grounds of objection must be stated in the objection. Rules 20 and 21 deal with the form and contents of special notice and the general notice and the mode of service or publication thereof. Rule 23 prescribes the procedure to be adopted and followed by the revising authority at the hearing of the claim or objection. It is clear from these rules that grounds must be stated in the claim or objection, that the grounds must be substantiated by production of evidence before the revising authority. Mr. Mukherjee does not contend that grounds have not to be stated but he claims that the grounds have in fact been stated. Therefore, the point is whether the statement of grounds in this particular case is sufficient. This is a question of fact The Law Officer in his opinion to which I have referred, has urged the utility and necessity of specifying the grounds in detail There can be no doubt that the suggestions made by him, if adopted, will contribute towards clarity and precision. That is of course hoping for the perfect. This is a question of fact The Law Officer in his opinion to which I have referred, has urged the utility and necessity of specifying the grounds in detail There can be no doubt that the suggestions made by him, if adopted, will contribute towards clarity and precision. That is of course hoping for the perfect. The question, however, is whether a particular claim has set out the grounds and not whether perfection has been reached in the manner or mode of the statement of the ground. The Law Officer has pointed out by way of illustration, that a reference to S. 20 (1) (a) will, in reality, amount to an ambiguity, for S. 20 (1) (a) has several alternatives and there is no knowing on which of them reliance is placed. The argument is certainly sound and logical. But it is no logic to say that because a statement of ground with reference to S. 20 (1) (a) is vague or ambiguous therefore a statement of ground by reference to S. 20 (1) (b) must also be so. Section 20 (1) (b) requires two things in the conjunctive. A person to be eligible under S. 20 (1) (b) must possess both qualifications. There are no material alternatives in S. 20 (1) (b), so as to lead to any ambiguity. Further, seeing that in the determination of a claim, no other party is interested besides the revising authority and the claimant and seeing that the claim has to be substantiated by production of evidence by the claimant alone and that under R. 25 all corporation documents and papers are available to the revising authority and in the absence of any prescribed form, I am not satisfied that in this particular case the grounds of the claim had not been stated in conformity with R. 17. If such stringent observance of form was in contemplation of the Legislature it would have prescribed a particular form. The particulars of claim, be it remembered, had already been submitted in Form A. In the claim there was a pointed reference to that application. That was available to the revising authority for the mere asking under R. 25. If such stringent observance of form was in contemplation of the Legislature it would have prescribed a particular form. The particulars of claim, be it remembered, had already been submitted in Form A. In the claim there was a pointed reference to that application. That was available to the revising authority for the mere asking under R. 25. In my opinion, in this case by reason of the reference to S. 20 (1) (b) and of the reference to the application for registration in Form A, the grounds of claim had been sufficiently stated and the decision of the revising authority was erroneous. 18. Re. 4 (b): Mr. Banerjee argued that if the decision of the revising authority was wrong, it was an error of judgment in exercise of jurisdiction and not an illegal exercise of jurisdiction and this Court should not interfere. He relies on 55 Mad. 942 Kumaraswami Mudali, minor, by next friend Ganapathi Mudali Vs. Muniratna Mudali and The Board of Revenue and Another, AIR 1932 Mad 529 Abdulla Rowther Vs. Kesava Pillai and Others, AIR 1935 Mad 47 . The Act is silent as to what the revising authority will do when the claim or objection is preferred, except that in sub-s. (3) it is stated that the order made by him shall be final. The rules, to which I have referred, however, provide the procedure. Rules 18 and 23 require the revising authority to hear and determine the claim on the evidence adduced by the claimant, although he is to hold the enquiry in a summary manner. But he must hear and determine the claim. In this case be threw out the claim in limine on the ground of form without going into the merits of the claim. If the claim was not in form why did he issue a notice fixing a time and place for the hearing of the claim? If he issued a notice, did he not accept the position that a claim had been preferred which had got to be heard and determined? If he issued the notice, why should he not hear evidence in support of the claim which will clarify the ground? In my opinion, the rejection of the claim was erroneous and in declining to hear the evidence and to enquire into the claim on its merits the revising authority acted outside and in derogation of his jurisdiction. If he issued the notice, why should he not hear evidence in support of the claim which will clarify the ground? In my opinion, the rejection of the claim was erroneous and in declining to hear the evidence and to enquire into the claim on its merits the revising authority acted outside and in derogation of his jurisdiction. In my opinion, it was not merely an erroneous judgment but a failure to exercise jurisdiction conferred on him by the statute. The case in (1870) 5 Q. B. 251 The Queen v. Major & Assessors of Monmouth (1870) 5 Q. B. 251 appears to me to be in point. The same reasonings which were adopted by our Court on appeal in 11 Cal. 275 Nundolal Bose v. Corporation of Calcutta ('85) 11 Cal. 275 also appear to me to be applicable to the present case. That decision is binding on me. 19. Re. 5 (a) & (b): Mr. Banerjee has argued that even on the merits the decision of the revising authority may well be supported. He contended that under S. 24, Calcutta Municipal Act, every person was entitled to have his name registered on the electoral roll of a constituency who had the qualifications specified in S. 20 for an elector of that constituency and who was not subject to certain specified disqualifications. In this case each of the 102 persons claimed to be qualified under S. 20 (1) (b). The ingredients of the qualifications required under S. 20 (1) (b) are that he (a) as an occupier of any premises or part thereof paid rent for such occupancy for a specified period at a rate not less than Rupees 25 per mensem; and (b) has on application made to the Executive Officer had his name entered in a register to be maintained for the purpose. Therefore, having his name entered in that register is one of the two necessary ingredients of the qualifications under S. 20 (1) (b). Therefore, having his name entered in that register is one of the two necessary ingredients of the qualifications under S. 20 (1) (b). The importance of this part of the qualification is emphasised by Rules which says that no person should be included in the electoral roll by virtue of the qualifications specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 20 of the Act unless his name be entered in the register maintained under the said clause on an application made by him in that behalf under the clause to the Executive Officer. The name of none of these persons is on that register. The respondents say that enquiries were caused to be made by the Executive Officer through the two Mutation Inspectors and post cards were sent out to each of them requiring them to produce proof of the statements in Form A but none of them responded. These allegations of enquiries and sending out post cards have been characterised as false. If it were necessary for me to enquire into these allegations, I would have had to take evidence in the matter but in my view it is not necessary to do so. The propriety of the act or conduct of the Executive Officer or the Mutation Inspectors are not the subject, matter of this application. Assuming that no enquiries had been made and that, the names of these persons were wrongly omitted from that Register, this application is not concerned with rectifying that particular wrong. The fact, therefore, remains that these names are not on that Register and, it that be so, they have not one of the two necessary ingredients of the requisite qualifications under S. 20 (1) and (b) and, therefore, under S. 24 of the Act read with Rule 3 their names cannot be included in the electoral roll. Mr. Mukherjee has urged, with some warmth and vehemence perhaps justified on the facts of this case that this point was not taken at any stage of the proceedings, that those persons had never been informed of this non-inclusion of their names in that Register and the respondents should not be allowed at this stage to rely on it. Mr. Mukherjee has urged, with some warmth and vehemence perhaps justified on the facts of this case that this point was not taken at any stage of the proceedings, that those persons had never been informed of this non-inclusion of their names in that Register and the respondents should not be allowed at this stage to rely on it. But it is not a question of the respondents not being allowed to raise this point but it is a question of the applicant satisfying this Court that a wrong has been done for the redress of which he has come to this Court. In other words, he must succeed on the strength of the title of those persons whose cause he is championing. If he or they has or have any grievance regarding this non-inclusion he or they may have some remedies but that is not the subject-matter of this application nor are the necessary parties before me. Further, I do not for a moment countenance the view that the duty of the claimants was fully discharged by the mere filing of the application in Form A, 20. It is their business and duty to see that their application is given effect to by inserting their names in the register and, if necessary, to take appropriate action to bring about that result. That is how I read S. 20 (1) (b), for it is the claimant who has to have his name entered in the register. So far as the Registering Authority is concerned, he will prima facie take the names from that register and insert them in the preliminary roll and so far as the Revising Authority is concerned he has to see whether the name of the particular claimant is on the register kept under S. 20 (1) (b) so as to qualify him under that section. On my reading of the Act and the Rules, it is no part of the duty or function of the Revising Authority to enquire why a person's name is not on that register. The Revising Authority has no jurisdiction whatever in the matter of that register. His only duty is to enquire whether a person's name not included in the preliminary roll should be included therein and in the final roll, that is to say, whether the person has the requisite qualifications of an elector of a particular constituency. The Revising Authority has no jurisdiction whatever in the matter of that register. His only duty is to enquire whether a person's name not included in the preliminary roll should be included therein and in the final roll, that is to say, whether the person has the requisite qualifications of an elector of a particular constituency. One of the necessary qualifications under S. 20 (1) (b) is that his name must be in the register maintained under that section. If it is, he is qualified, if he has the other qualifications and if it is not, he is not qualified. The Revising Authority cannot, in my opinion, go behind that register. My attention has been drawn to what has been called "extract from Government order, dated 3rd October 1923" printed at p. 74 of the Yellow Handbook. It is there suggested that S. 20 (1) (b) must be construed in conjunction with S. 25 and that the Revising Authority is entitled to consider the objection made under S. 25 by a person whose application has been rejected by the Executive Officer under sub-cls. (b) and (c). I find no warrant for this suggestion in any of the sections of the Act or in the rules. On the contrary, the Act and the rules make it clear, to my mind, that it is entirely beyond the jurisdiction conferred on the Revising Authority thereunder. I am unable to accept the extract from the Government order as a correct interpretation of the Act. 21. The position, however, is that the Revising Authority has not disallowed the claims on merits basing himself on this ground. Ordinarily, I would have by mandamus, if mandamus lay, directed him to do his duty, namely, to consider the claim on merits or by certiorari brought up the proceedings and corrected the error. But, if my reading of the sections and the rules be correct, the result in either case would be that the claims must necessarily be disallowed, for the claimants have not the requisite qualifications in that their names are not entered in that register maintained under S. 20 (1) (b). No order that I can or may make on this application will correct that error and until that error is corrected the claims of these persons are bound to be disallowed. No order that I can or may make on this application will correct that error and until that error is corrected the claims of these persons are bound to be disallowed. In these circumstances, it is quite clear to me that the granting of a mandatory injunction or a writ of certiorari will not be an effective remedy and if that be so, this Court should not issue its process in vain. That was the view taken by Lort-Williams J. in 39 C. W. N. 573 Dorman Long & Co. v. Jagadish Chandra ('35) 62 Cal. 596 : 39 C. W. N. 573 at p. 576 which was an appeal from the Original Side and binding on me. On a consideration of the several questions argued before me and for reasons stated above, I have no other alternative but to discharge this rule with costs and vacate the interim order. Certified for two counsel.