JUDGMENT Ismail and Malik, JJ. - The Plaintiffs filed a suit for sale on the basis of two mortgages dated the 16th of January, 1918 and the 31st May, 1931 executed by the Defendant No. 1 in favour of the Plaintiffs. The suit was contested by Defendants 2 to 5 Defendants second party, who raised the plea that the said mortgages had been merged in a sale deed dated the 3rd of December 1926 and no suit could therefore be brought on the same Another plea taken on behalf of the Defendants second party was that the suit was barred by limitation. Both the Courts below have decided on both the points against the plantiff and have dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit. The Plaintiffs have filed this second appeal. 2. On the 3rd of December 1926 the Defendant No. 1 had sold the mortgaged property and some more property in favour of the Plaintiffs for Rs. 4,500. The property was sold free from encumbrance and the mortgages dated the 16th of January, 1918, and the 31st May, 1921, executed by the Defendant No. 1 in favour of the Plaintiffs were deemed to have been satisfied. 3. It appears that before the sale deed dated the 3rd of December, 1926 Defendants second party had obtained a simple money decree against the Defendant No. 1 and had in execution of that decree attached a portion of the mortgaged property. Defendants second party filed a suit No. 62 of 1927 for a declaration that the sale deed dated the 3rd of December 1926 did not affect their rights under the attachment and the sale must be deemed to be subject to the attachment in their favour. The suit was decreed on the 7th of September, 1929. 4. The Plaintiffs now allege that by reason of the decree dated the 7th of September 1929 it must be deemed that the sale deed dated the 3rd of December 1926 was cancelled and the Plaintiffs' right under the mortgages dated the 16th of January, 1918, and the 31st May 1921 revived so that they can now bring a suit for sale on the basis of the said mortgages. 5. We have looked into the decree in suit No. 62 of 1927. The Court in that case never purported to cancel the sale deed nor, as a matter of fact, could the sale deed have been cancelled. 5. We have looked into the decree in suit No. 62 of 1927. The Court in that case never purported to cancel the sale deed nor, as a matter of fact, could the sale deed have been cancelled. All that the Court held was that the rights of the Defendants second party under the attachment were not affected by the said sale dated the 3rd of December 1926. 6. After the decree dated the 7th September 1929 the Defendants second set executed their decree as against Defendant No. 1 and purchased a portion of the property that had been included in the sale deed. 7. The Plaintiffs now allege that by reason of the sale deed having been held to be invalid and by reason of a portion of the property having passed out from their possession to the possession of the Defendants second party the Plaintiffs are entitled to bring a suit for sale on the mortgages. 8. It appears from the judgment of the lower appellate Court that the Plaintiffs are in possession of that portion of the property which was sold to them on the 3rd of December, 1926 and which had not been sold in auction later on to the Defendants 2 to 5. In this case therefore the Plaintiffs never repudiated the sale deed dated the 3rd of December, 1926 after the decree in suit No. 62 of 1927 but elected to remain in possession of the rest of the property. It cannot therefore be said that the whole of the sale deed dated the 3rd of December, 1926 was set aside or the entire consideration failed with the effect that the previous mortgages revived. The case is fully covered by the decision of a Bench of this Court in Lachman Prasad v. Lachmeshwar Prasad (1922)20 ALJ 151. 9. The position now is that by reason of the saledated 3rd December 1926 the Plaintiffs have become the owners of a portion of the property which was mortgaged to them under the mortgage deeds now in suit and the rest of the properties had been purchased by Defendants Nos. 2 to 5 Defendants second set as against whom the sale deed dated the 19th of December 1926 was held to be ineffective. 2 to 5 Defendants second set as against whom the sale deed dated the 19th of December 1926 was held to be ineffective. We asked the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs how his clients were entitled to claim the entire sum due under the mortgages when they had become owners of a part of the mortgaged property. Learned Counsel had to admit that his clients were not entitled to claim the entire sum. And in case we were of the opinion that the mortgages had been revived we would have had to hold that the integrity of the mortgages was broken and the Plaintiffs could only claim a rateable portion of the mortgage money. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has urged that his clients agreed that the mortgages would be deemed to be satisfied in case the entire property was transferred to them and inasmuch as a portion of the property transferred to them has gone out of their possession they can no longer be bound by their undertaking. It may be that after the decree and the sale in favour of Defendants 2 to 5 the Plaintiffs may have had the right to repudiate the sale and fall back on the mortgage. But they could have also accepted the sale of whatever was left and claim damages for the balance in case they accepted the sale deed, they could not claim that the mortgages were again revived. The mere fact that they did not claim damages could not put them in a better position. In this case, the Plaintiffs never repudiated the sale and as we have already said above, they are still in possession of the rest of the property sold to them. We, therefore, do not see how the Plaintiffs can ignore the sale and can claim that they are entitled to sue on the mortgages Learned Counsel for the Appellants has, however, relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Kanhaiya Prasad v, Hamidan 1938 A W R (HC) 408. He urges that even if one property out of many conveyed under the sale deed has passed out of the possession of the vendee the vendee can urge that all mortgages are revived and he can bring a suit on the basis of the said mortgages. We do not think the Full Bench case laid down any such proposition. He urges that even if one property out of many conveyed under the sale deed has passed out of the possession of the vendee the vendee can urge that all mortgages are revived and he can bring a suit on the basis of the said mortgages. We do not think the Full Bench case laid down any such proposition. In the Full Bench it is made perfectly clear that the later deed did not provide that the earlier deed was replaced by the later deed. All that had happened was that there was a previous mortgage and in a subsequent mortgage the amount due under the previous mortgage had been included but as the Court held that the subsequent mortgage was not valid as regards part of the property it held that the mortgagee could fall back upon the earlier mortgage and enforce the same. In that case no question had arisen of the mortgagee having accepted the subsequent mortgage even though one house given as security under the later mortgage was held to be no longer a part of the security. To our mind, the decision in that case is entirely distinguishable from the facts of this case. 11. The effect of the transaction in this case, to our mind is that the Plaintiffs when they purchased the property on the 3rd of December, 1926 must be deemed to have paid themselves off and the two prior mortgages of 1918 and 1921, therefore were satisfied. The sale deed has never been held to be invalid. All that was held was that as regards some portion of the property included in the sale deed the rights of the Plaintiffs were subject to certain prior attachment. 12. The view we have taken as regards the first point makes it unnecessary for us to consider the question of limitation. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.