JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This Rule has been obtained by the decree-holder. The original decree was reopened on an application made by the Opposite Parties under sec. 36 (6) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. As the decree was not passed in a suit to which the Act applies within the definition of sec. 2 (22), the Opposite Parties were fortunate in obtaining an order in their favour. A new decree for Rs. 47-12-9 pies with proportionate costs was passed. It was made payable in annual instalments of Rs. 10. The judgment-debtors were restored to possession of a certain property which had been purchased on 22-4-32 for Rs. 75. There was a further direction that in default of payment of an instalment the decree-holder would be put in possession and the purchase money set off against the new decree. The first instalment was due on 12th February, 1943. The Munsif made an order extending the time for a period of five months. The Petitioner then obtained this Rule. The learned Munsif purported to grant the extension of time under the provisions of sec. 34 (2). The order for restoration of the property to the Petitioner was made under the provisions of sec. 36 (2) (e). It was an order which the Court was bound to make. The question for consideration now is whether the Munsif had any jurisdiction to extend the time. 2. In opposing the Rule Mr. Roy contended that sec. 34 (2) applies to the case. He argued that the Petitioner was only entitled to recover possession of the property on a default by the Opposite Parties; the result is that, provided that time has been extended, no default has arisen. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this proposition. 3. Sec. 34 (1) (b) deals with unsecured loans. The judgment-debtor is entitled to apply for instalments. The implication is that the decree makes no such provision. Under the proviso to sub-sec. (2) the Court may grant an extension of time for a period not less than one year for the payment of any instalment. 4. When a decree is re-opened under sec. 36, the judgment-debtor has obtained a very valuable privilege. But there must be some finality in these matters and I should be reluctant to say that the process can go on indefinitely. The matter is, however, in my judgment made clear by the language employed. 4. When a decree is re-opened under sec. 36, the judgment-debtor has obtained a very valuable privilege. But there must be some finality in these matters and I should be reluctant to say that the process can go on indefinitely. The matter is, however, in my judgment made clear by the language employed. Sec. 34 (2) deals with default in payment of any instalment referred to in sub-sec. (1) (b). That is an order for instalments made on an application by a judgment-debtor against whom a decree has been passed. Under sub-sec. (3) such an order is deemed to have been made under sec. 47 of the CPC and is appealable as such. The present order for instalments was not made under sec. 47 on an application by the judgment-debtor after the decree had been made. It is a part of the new decree itself and was appealable as such. The Opposite Parties are in effect asking the executing Court to go behind the new decree. I am satisfied that sec. 34 (2) has no application. 5. In addition to asking for an extension of time, the petition of the Opposite Parties also contains averments which amount to a case that no default had taken place. This is a matter which can only be determined on evidence. It will have to be investigated unless in the meantime there has been a default in paying the second instalment. I shall not make a final order until the learned Advocates have had time to obtain instructions in the matter. 6. It has been ascertained by Mr. Roy that the second instalment was paid in time. It will, therefore, be necessary to have the disputed question of fact investigated. The order of the Munsif is set aside. He is directed to determine whether there was a default in the payment of the first instalment. Both parties will be at liberty to adduce evidence. Costs in this Rule will be costs in the case-hearing fee one gold mohur.