JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an application in revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against an order of the learned Small Cause Court Judge of Gorakhpur whereby he rejected the applicants application for certification of payment under Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The opposite-party obtained a decree and on the 25th of August, 1941, the applicants made an application for certification of the payment alleged to have been made by them in full satisfaction of the decree of the 22nd of June, 1941. This application came up for hearing on the 9th of March, 1942 but was dismissed for default. The judgment-debtors made another application on the 17th of March, 1942 which has given rise to the present application in revision. The learned Small Cause Court Judge has rejected it as being barred by Article 174 of the Limitation Act. 3. The learned Counsel for the Appellant argues before me that the present application of the 17th of March might be treated as an application in continuation of the previous applicition of the 25th of August, 1941. This argument was also addressed to the learned Judge of the Court below but he declined to accede to it. 4. In the view which I have taken of this case it is not necessary for me to express an opinion I would prefer to rest my decision on another principle. 5. It is true that the applicition of the 17th of March 1942 wound up with a prayer for the certification of the payment, but read carefully the contents amount really to a prayer for restoration of the previous applicition which was dismissed for default on the 9th of March, 1942. 6. The applicants had assigned their reasons for absenting themselves on the 9th of March, 1942. There was no occasion for setting forth any reason for their absence, if they had not treated this application as a continuation of the privious one. It obviously conveyed a request, though by implication for the restoration of the previous application. 7. The next question which demamds consideration is whether it is permissible to treat this as an application for restoration of the previous applicition dismissed for default on the 9th of March 1942. It obviously conveyed a request, though by implication for the restoration of the previous application. 7. The next question which demamds consideration is whether it is permissible to treat this as an application for restoration of the previous applicition dismissed for default on the 9th of March 1942. It is true that Order 9, R. 9 of Order 9 r. 13 will not apply to the preset proceedings which are not proceedings in suit; but are proceedings, in execution; but this Court has held that, on sufficient cause being shown, an execution Court can restore an application for execution dismissed for default, under its inherent power, vide Mohammad Hanif v. Ali Raza (1936) 2 A W R 549 (F B). 8. I have come to this conclusion not without some reluctance, inasmuch as I am satisfied that, if the order complained of stands, and if it is a fact that the judgment-debtor has discharged the decree in full, he will suffer considerable hardship. 9. On a consideration of all the facts I allow this application in revision and send the case back to the Court below with the direction that it will rehear the application of the 17th March, 1942, along with the application of the 25th of August, 1941. 10. As the Respondent has not appeared I do not pass any order as to costs.