JUDGMENT McNair, J. - I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment in this appeal which is about to be delivered by Gentle, J. and with which I am in complete agreement; but inasmuch as the matter is of considerable importance I have set out my own views shortly. 2. The Appellant obtained a decree in May, 1931, against the firm of Kaniram Bangsidhar and the questions for determination arise in an attempt to execute that decree. 3. The CPC provides in Or. 30 the procedure to be adopted when a firm is sued. Or. 30, r. 1, enables the partners to be sued in the firm name. Or. 30, r. 3 provides so far as is material that the summons shall be served upon any one or more of the partners. In the present instance the summons was served on one partner alone, namely Bangsidhar. 4. The effect however was that all persons who were in fact at the time partners became Defendants to the suit. When a firm's name is used it is only a convenient method for denoting those persons who compose the firm at the time when the name is used, and a Plaintiff who sues partners in the name of their firm in truth sues them individually just as much as if he had set out all their names. [per Lindley, L. J., Western National Bank of City of New York v. Perez Triana & Co. [1891] 1 Q. B. 304 at p. 314]. 5. It follows that the moment a decree is passed against a firm it is a decree against the individual members of the firm. In order to ascertain how that decree is to be executed it is necessary to refer to other provisions of the Code. Sec. 51 provides, that the Court may on the application of the decree-holder order execution of the decree in a number of ways including (b) by attachment and sale... of any property and the property liable to attachment and sale is specified in sec. 60. Order 21 deals with the procedure. R. 10 of that Order, in conformity with sec. Sec. 51 provides, that the Court may on the application of the decree-holder order execution of the decree in a number of ways including (b) by attachment and sale... of any property and the property liable to attachment and sale is specified in sec. 60. Order 21 deals with the procedure. R. 10 of that Order, in conformity with sec. 51, provides that the machinery for execution must be set in motion by an application; Rule 11 (1) provides that the Court may on an oral application in certain cases order immediate execution by arrest of the judgment debtor and R. 11 (2) provides that in all other cases there must be a written application in the form of a tabular statement giving certain prescribed particulars. 6. In the present instance application was made by Tabular Statement for realisation of the decretal amount and costs by attachment of shares standing in the names of persons who were alleged to be partners of the Defendant firm. 7. This was an application for execution and the Court is bound under Or. 21, r. 17 to see if the requirements of the rules have been complied with. If so, the application is admitted and execution is ordered to issue as prayed, subject to the provisions thereinafter contained. 8. Among these provisions are the provisions of Or. 21, r. 50, which relate to a decree against a firm. Execution may be granted- (a) against any property of the partnership and (b) against any person who has appeared, or admitted, or been adjudged to be a partner. Or. 21 r. 50 (2) provides: Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub rule (1), clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such Court may grant such leave, or where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. 9. 9. In the present case Bangsidhar alone came into the category of persons who had been served as, or had admitted, or had been adjudged to be, a partner, and against him execution issued. With regard to the others their liability as partners was undecided and leave to issue execution had to be obtained. 10. In conformity with the practice observed in this Court the Tabular Statement was presented to the Master who ordered notice to issue under Or. 21, r. 50 and 22 (1) (a) of the Civil Procedure Code. 11. The reference to R. 22 (1) (a) is not now material. 12. On receipt of the notice an objection was raised that there was no application under Or. 21, r. 50 of the Code. Das, J., held that the decree could not be executed against the Respondents for 2 reasons (1) that an application for leave to execute the decree under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) is a substantive application, separate and distinct from an application for execution under Or. 21, r. 11 and that no such application had been made nor leave obtained and (2) assuming that the application before him could be regarded as a combined application for leave under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) and an application under Or. 21, r. 11, the application for leave was barred under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act and the application for execution was therefore not maintainable for want of previous leave. 13. I am unable to accept the view that the application for leave under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) is essentially a separate and distinct application from an application for execution. 14. The decree-holder is entitled to execute the decree within a year against any judgment-debtor, and, if the decree is against a firm, against any partner in the firm who has had an opportunity to deny his liability; after one year he must apply under Or. 21, r. 22 for leave to execute against any judgment-debtor whether the decree is against the firm or against an individual. If an application has to be made for leave to execute in any event, it is not unreasonable that that application should be made in the first instance in accordance with Or. 21, r. 22 for leave to execute against any judgment-debtor whether the decree is against the firm or against an individual. If an application has to be made for leave to execute in any event, it is not unreasonable that that application should be made in the first instance in accordance with Or. 21, r. 22 and that the Court should, while considering under R. 17 whether there has been compliance with the rules, consider further whether in the case of a decree against a firm the persons alleged to be partners have had an opportunity of contesting their liability as such. If not, the application for execution must be stayed until that opportunity has been given them, and the issue referred to in Or. 21, r. 50 (2) has been tried. That issue however only arises when the application for execution is made. It arises out of and is subsidiary to the application for execution. 15. The practice adopted in the present case is of long standing and was approved by this Court in appeal from the Original side in Jagat Chandra Bhattachrjee v. Gunny Haji Ahmed, I. L. R. 53 Cal. 214 (1925) where Buckland, J., said at p. 234: Applications for execution are ordinarily made exparte on Tabular Statement In cases to which Order 21 Rule 22 applies it appears to be the practice to file the tabular statement and at the same time to take out a summons under that rule This practice appears to be convenient and it might well be followed where Order XXI R. 50 (2) applies whether in conjunction with O. 21 R. 22 or not but the summons should be served before any order is made against the persons to be held liable. 16. A similar view has been taken in the Bombay and Lahore High Courts and I cannot agree that the procedure which has been prevalent for so long should now be altered. 17. The two applications under Or. 21, r. and Or. 21, r. 50 are complementary and may well be combined in a single application. There is no obligation to apply in the first instance for leave under Or. 21, r. 50. 18. In fact it is only when the decree-holder applies for execution that the court has to consider whether there is any impediment against the issue of process. 19. 21, r. 50 are complementary and may well be combined in a single application. There is no obligation to apply in the first instance for leave under Or. 21, r. 50. 18. In fact it is only when the decree-holder applies for execution that the court has to consider whether there is any impediment against the issue of process. 19. In the case of an individual where liability as a partner is not yet determined the Court does not dismiss the application but directs an intermediate enquiry. During that enquiry the substantive application is in abeyance and it is eventually decided according to the result of the enquiry. 20. The determination of the question of limitation depends to some extent on the manner in which Or. 21, r. 50 (2) is construed. The learned Judge has held that the application for leave is a separate and special application, that it is not an application for execution of, nor an application to enforce, a decree of this Court and is there fore not governed by Art. 183 of the Limitation Act which gives the decree-holder 12 years in which to pursue his remedy, that no other Article is applicable and recourse must therefore be had to the residuary Art. 181 which limits the decree-holder to 3 years. 21. In my view the application for leave is not an independent application and I am further of opinion that it is an application to enforce a decree. The words to " enforce a decree" in Art. 183 are applicable to a decree of this Court and not the more restricted words " for execution of a decree " in Art. 182 which applies only to the decree of a mofussil court. 22. Undoubtedly the object of the application is to enable the decree-holder to obtain satisfaction of the decree. It is an application which is made in pursuance of the object, and since, as I have already stated it is combined with an application which is admittedly made in the course of execution and for the purpose of enforcing the decree, it appears to me that the application for leave must equally be an application to enforce a decree. 23. 23. According to the practice of this Court a combined application is made for execution, in the course of that application an issue is tried and if the decree-holder is successful execution issues as a matter of course. 24. Rule 50 (2) is confined to an enquiry to ascertain who are in fact the partners in the firm. The decree has been passed against all the persons who are at the time partners, and if, as the result of the enquiry, an individual is found to have been a partner at the date of the decree, the decree must operate as a valid decree against him from its date. 25. The words in R. 50 (2) are "Where a decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed...." The use of the word " claims " indicates that the decree-holder is asserting a right, and since that right has not been established in the presence of those persons who are not included in r. 50 sub-r. 1 (b) and (c) they are given an opportunity of contesting the claim. 26. It has been argued that the procedure is analogous to the procedure in a mortgage suit and reliance has been placed on the reasons given by the Court for their decision in Pell v. Gregory I. L. R. 52 Cal. 828 (1925) that an application for a personal decree against the mortgagor under Or. 34, r. 6 of the Code is an application to which Art. 181 applies. 27. The basis of the decision, as I read it, was that the application for a personal decree was an application for a new decree in the suit and not an application for enforcing a decree. 28. The analogy does not seem to me applicable to a decree against a firm where the liability of the partners upon the subject-matter of the suit has been decided but the question who the partners may be is outstanding. The decree-holder has the right to enforce the decree against the individuals who are partners; under R. 50 (2) he is not seeking any new right, as is the mortgagee under Or. 34, r. 6; he is merely seeking an order of the Court that the person against whom he claims to enforce the decree is a judgment-debtor against whom the decree has already been passed. 34, r. 6; he is merely seeking an order of the Court that the person against whom he claims to enforce the decree is a judgment-debtor against whom the decree has already been passed. Again it has been argued that limitation would not begin to run against a partner who does not come under r. 50 (1) (b) and (c) until the enquiry under R. 50 (2) is completed and reliance is placed on the Maharaja of Darbhanga's case L. R. 48 I. A. 17 (1820) for this proposition, on the ground that no "present right to enforce the judgment decree or order accrues " until the Respondent to the application is adjudged a partner. 29. Such a construction appears to me to confuse the right to enforce, with the procedure of enforcement. The moment the decree is passed it can be executed, but, as a matter of procedure, the persons against whom execution should issue may remain to be determined. 30. If that contention were to prevail there would be in effect 2 periods of limitation with regard to the same person. Suppose for instance a person were found on enquiry to be a partner. The decree-holder would have 3 years in which to apply for an enquiry, and a further 12 years in which to apply for execution against his private property, whereas had the partner's interest been admitted the period applicable would be only 12 years. 31. In my view the decree is in existence and capable of enforcement against the individual members of the firm so soon as it is passed, and one method of enforcing the decree is by an application to adjudge as a partner an individual who has not yet had an opportunity of contesting his liability as such. 32. It follows that the application is an application to enforce a decree to which Art. 183 applies. 33. The appeal must be allowed with costs. Certified for 2 Counsel and the application remanded to the trial court for disposal when the costs of the hearing before Das, J., will be in the discretion of the Judge by whom the application is heard. Gentle, J. 34. The Plaintiff is the Appellant. On 15th May, 1931, he obtained an ex parte decree against a firm named Kaniram Bangsidhar for Rs. 45,091-2-0 and interest at 6 per cent, per annum together with the costs of suit. Gentle, J. 34. The Plaintiff is the Appellant. On 15th May, 1931, he obtained an ex parte decree against a firm named Kaniram Bangsidhar for Rs. 45,091-2-0 and interest at 6 per cent, per annum together with the costs of suit. The firm was sued pursuant to Or. 30, r. 1, Civil Procedure Code. Service of the writ of summons was effected upon the 6th Respondent under r. 3 of the order, no other person being served. 35. On 5th May, 1943, within 12 years from the date of the decree, the Appellant made an application for execution under Or. 21, r. 10 of the Code. R. 11 (2) requires an application for execution made subsequent to the passing of the decree to contain in a tabular form the particulars prescribed. The Appellant's tabular statement gave, in Column 9, the names of the six Respondents as the partners in the firm and against whom execution was sought and, in column 10, as the mode of execution, attachment and sale of certain shares belonging to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Respondents and also attachment and sale of the respective shares of the same Respondents in a partnership alleged to be carried on by them with some other unnamed persons. 36. Since the 6th Respondent was served with the writ of summons in the suit, it is not disputed that execution should issue against him and reference to this Respondent is not further required. Further mention of the mode of execution and the property against which execution is sought is unnecessary. It is convenient hereafter to refer to the 1st to 5th Respondents as " the Respondents" who alone oppose the appeal. 37. On presentation of the tabular statement before the Master on 5th May, 1943, he endorsed it; Let notice issue under Or. 21 RR. 50 and 22 (1) (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure 38. Pursuant to this direction a notice, dated 5th May, 1943, over the signature of the Master was issued by the Court. This notice is headed " Notice under Or. 21, rr. 21 RR. 50 and 22 (1) (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure 38. Pursuant to this direction a notice, dated 5th May, 1943, over the signature of the Master was issued by the Court. This notice is headed " Notice under Or. 21, rr. 50 and 22 (1) (a) C. P. C." It is addressed to the Respondents and is to the effect that the Plaintiff had applied to the Court for leave to execute the decree against them as partners and they were thereby required to appear in person before the Judge in Chambers on 27th May, 1943, to show cause why the prayer of the Plaintiff should not be granted. R. 22 (1) requires notice to be given to the person against whom execution is sought when an application is made more than one year after the passing of the decree. Further mention of this Rule is not required as no point arises with regard to it. The matter was adjourned from time to time and eventually was heard by Das, J., on 28th January, 1944, who disposed of it by his order dated 8th February following. 39. The contentions before the learned Judge, so far as are material in this appeal, were: -Since the Respondents did not appear in the suit, have not admitted on the pleadings they were partners in the judgment-debtor firm and have not been so adjudged, and were not served with the writ of summons, the decree cannot be executed against them until they are so adjudged; application for such adjudgment must be made within 3 years from the date of the decree and since this was not done within that period an application for it is now barred by the provisions of Art. 181 of the Limitation Act; further, adjudgment as partners and execution of a decree must be sought by separate applications, the application before the Master was not for the Respondents to be adjudged as partners but for execution and no such application or order can be made in relation to the Respondents until they have been adjudged to be partners in the firm, which adjudgment cannot take place upon the application for execution. Das, J., accepted the above contentions and dismissed the applications. This appeal is preferred against the dismissal. 40. Das, J., accepted the above contentions and dismissed the applications. This appeal is preferred against the dismissal. 40. The provisions of the CPC which require to be set out at length are the following:- Order 21, rule 50 (1). 'Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted (a) against any property of the partnership (b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner. (c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and bus failed to appear : Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the provision of Section 247 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (2) Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any persona other than such a person as is referred to in sub-rule (1) clauses (b) and (c), as being a partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such Court may grant such leave or, where such liability is disputed may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. (3) Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub rule (2), the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. (4) Save as against any property of the partnership, a decree against a firm shall not release, render liable or otherwise affect any partner therein unless be has been served with a summons to appear and answer. 41. The decree in the suit was obtained against the firm, eo nomine and since none of the Respondents either appeared, or admitted being or has been adjudged to be, a partner or has been served with the writ of summons, it is necessary that he should be adjudged to be a partner before the decree can be executed against him. The decree in the suit was obtained against the firm, eo nomine and since none of the Respondents either appeared, or admitted being or has been adjudged to be, a partner or has been served with the writ of summons, it is necessary that he should be adjudged to be a partner before the decree can be executed against him. The provision in r. 50 (1) (b) " who has been adjudged to be a partner " applies to an adjudgment in the course of the trial of the suit and also to an adjudgment under sub-r. (2). When a person, who has not been adjudged a partner at the trial, but who, subsequently, is so adjudged under sub-r. (2), he then becomes a person adjudged under sub-r. (1) (b) and thereupon execution against him may be granted. The main points for consideration are the following:- (a) Whether the adjudgment under sub-r. (2) must be effected before application for execution is made, or (b) Whether the application for execution can include an application for adjudgment; and (c) Whether Art. 181 or Art. 183 applies to a application under R. 50 (2). Reference can now be made to the relevant articles of the Limitation Act, which are:- Description of Application. Period of Limitation. TIME from which period begins to Run. Article 181 Application for which no period of Limitation is provided elsewhere. Three years When the right to apply accrues. Article 182 For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by Article 183. Three years The date of the decree or order. Article 183 To enforce a judgment, decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary orginal civil jurisdiction. Twelve years. When the present right to enforce the judgment, decree or order accrues to some person capable of releasing the right. Art. 181 is the residual Article. It applies only when no other Article is applicable; when any other article is in point it must be applied. It is not disputed that art.183 is the relevant article which applies to the decree out of which the application for execution arose and that an application, simpliciter, for execution of the decree would not be barred until the expiration of twelve years after it was passed. It is not disputed that art.183 is the relevant article which applies to the decree out of which the application for execution arose and that an application, simpliciter, for execution of the decree would not be barred until the expiration of twelve years after it was passed. It is, however, contended that an application to adjudge a person as a partner in a firm, against which there is a decree, is not an application to which Art. 183 applies; since there is no article which specifically governs such an application, Art. 181 applies and the application cannot be made after the expiration of three years from the time when the right to apply accrues, namely, the date of the decree; the decree in the suit was passed on 15th May. 1931, and, therefore, the application to adjudge the Respondents as partners should have been made by the 14th May, 1934; if the application made on 5th May, 1943, is such an application, it was made after the expiration of three years and is barred by Art. 181. 42. Before dealing with the main points it is convenient to consider the effect of two short extracts from other provisions of the Code. Or. 30, r. 1 (1) provives that " any two or more parsons being liable as partners may be sued in the name of the firm "and r. 3 that "where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm" 43. With regard to these provisions I cannot do better than quote the observations of Lindley, L. J., in Western National Bank of City of New York v. Perez Triana & Co., [1891] 1 Q. B. 304 at p. 314 which are very much in point. At p. 314 he said when a firm's name is used it is only a convenient method for denoting those persons who compose the firm at the time when that name is used and a Plaintiff Who sues partners in the name of their firm in truth sues them individually just as much as if he had set out all their names. 44. In Ram Prosad Chimonlal v. Anundji & Co. I. L. R. 49 Cal. 44. In Ram Prosad Chimonlal v. Anundji & Co. I. L. R. 49 Cal. 524 (1921), Ghose, J., at 527 referred to the above decision of the Court in England and observed It is settled law that; the effect of the provisions (Order 30 of the Code) with regard to suing partners in their firm name is merely to give a compendious mode of describing in the writ the partners who compose the firm and that the Plaintiff who sues partners in the name of their firm in truth sues them individually just as much as if he had set out all their names. 45. It must follow that when a firm is sued the decree against the firm is a decree against the individual partners of the firm. 46. If a partner appears in the suit, he must, under Or. 30, r. 6 do so in his own name. His position as a partner is then known and execution may be granted against him pursuant to Or. 21, r. 50 (1) (b) in the event of a decree being passed against the firm, nothing further being required to enable this to be done. 47. If a person who is a partner does not appear in the suit and, it would follow, his position as such is not admitted in a pleading and if he has not at the trial been adjudged a partner and has not been served with the writ of summons, whilst execution cannot be granted against him unless he is subsequently adjudged to be a partner under r. 50 (2). Nevertheless, the decree against his firm is a decree against him. The investigation under r. 50 (2) is limited to making an enquiry whether a person is a partner in a firm against which a decree has been passed, such person cannot do anything more than dispute he is a partner; the merits of the subject-matter of the suit and the validity of the decree are matters outside the ken of the enquiry (vide Cooverji Verjang v. Cooverbhai A. I. R. [1940] Bom. 562. If he shows he is not a partner in the firm, then there was never a decree against him but if he is adjudged to be a partner, then there Was a decree against him from the time when it was passed. 562. If he shows he is not a partner in the firm, then there was never a decree against him but if he is adjudged to be a partner, then there Was a decree against him from the time when it was passed. The object of the enquiry is to ascertain whether he is a person against whom the decree has been passed in the name of the firm. It is always the obligation of a decree-holder to satisfy the Court that the person against whom execution is sought is the person against whom a decree is passed. Usually there is no dispute but tit is not unknown for a person against whom execution is issued to dispute that he is the judgment-debtor. In respect of a decree against a firm, the obligation of a decree-holder to show that a person, who is not covered by Or. 21, r. 50 (1) (b) and (c), is a partner and therefore is a judgment-debtor, may be more onerous than in a decree against named person but it is the same obligation as that which falls upon all decree-holders. 48. On behalf of the Respondents, the Advocate-General contended that since a decree against a firm is incapable of execution against a partner personally who is not included in Or. 21 r. 50 (1) (b) and (c), until he has been adjudged a partner under r. 50 (2), limitation begins to run from the date of such adjudication and not from the date of the decree since, he argues, the present right to enforce the judgment decree does not arise until adjudgment. 49. In support of this contention Maharaja of Dharbhanga v. Homeshyar Singh L. R. 48 I. A. 17 (1920) and Navivahoo v. Turner L. R. 16 I. A. 156 (1889) were cited. In the first of these cases a decree was passed in 1906; it did not provide that the judgment-debtor was personally liable but ordered the decretal sum to be realised by the sale of property belonging to his deceased brother in his possession. The judgment-debtor did not obtain the property until 1914 in which year application was made for execution. Art. 182 of the Limitation Act applied which requires an application for execution to be issued within 3 years from the date of the decree. The judgment-debtor did not obtain the property until 1914 in which year application was made for execution. Art. 182 of the Limitation Act applied which requires an application for execution to be issued within 3 years from the date of the decree. It was held that since application for execution could not be made until the the judgment-debtor came into possession of the property against which execution could issue, the period of limitation was three years from that time i.e., 1914. In Navivahoo's case L. R. 16 I. A. 156 (1889) the Insolvency Court ordered judgment against an insolvent in 1868 which was entered up in the High Court. In 1886, the Insolvency Court ordered execution for part of the judgment-debt, being satisfied the insolvent was then of ability or had left assets to pay. By sec. 86 of the Indian Insolvency Act (which was in force at the time) a Court might order execution if it appeared to its satisfaction the insolvent could pay. Therefore, no present right accrued in 1868 to move for execution and not until after the order was passed in 1886 and an application for execution more than 18 years after the decree was held not to be barred by limitation. 50. In each of the above authorities execution could not issue save upon the happening of certain events which, incidentally, were outside the control of the judgment-creditor. Before either of those decrees could be executed, the decree-holder had to wait until, in the case of the Maharaja of Darbhanga L. R. 48 I. A. 17 (1920) the judgment-debtor was in possession of the property against which, alone, the decree could be executed and, in Navivahoo's case L. R. 16 I. A. 156 (1889) until the Court was satisfied the judgment-debtor could pay or had left assets to pay the debts. In such circumstances, the decrees were incapable of execution until the events had occurred. In the Maharaja of Darbhanga's case L. R. 48 I. A. 17 (1920) their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, at p. 22, observed that In order to make the provisions of the Limitation Act apply the decree sought to be enforced must have been in such a form as to render it capable, in the circumstances, of being enforced. 51. In the Maharaja of Darbhanga's case L. R. 48 I. A. 17 (1920) their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, at p. 22, observed that In order to make the provisions of the Limitation Act apply the decree sought to be enforced must have been in such a form as to render it capable, in the circumstances, of being enforced. 51. The decree in the present suit is in a form which rendered it capable of execution from the date when it was passed, and at all times it was executable in contra-distiction to the decrees in the two cases before the Judicial Committee. An enquiry under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) could have taken place immediately in the present case, to ascertain the persons against whom it was passed and against whom it could be executed. The delay in invoking the provisions of the above rule cannot have the effect of postponing the date from which limitation commences and extending the period during which the decree can be enforced or executed. 52. The wording is different in Arts. 182 and 183. The former applies to decrees in Courts not established by Royal Charter and relates to an application for " the execution of a decree " whereas the later applies to Courts established by Royal Charter and relates to applications " to enforce a decree." In providing separate articles for different Courts and in adopting different language the legislature must have intended the effect of each article to be different. In Brij Lal v. Damodar Das I. L. R. 44 All. 555 (1922) Ryves, J., expressed the opinion, at p. 564, that "to enforce" is wider than "to execute" a decree and should be interpreted as equivalent "to give full effect to," with which view I respectfully agree. Pell v. Gregory I. L. R. 52 Cal. 828 (1925) was a mortgage suit. A preliminary decree was followed by a final decree for sale being passed and the proceeds, being insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, a balance remained unpaid. The mortgagee applied for a personal decree under Or. 34 r. 6 for the amount unsatisfied. The question for decision was whether Art. 181 or Art. 183 applied to such application, and, in that case, it was held it was the former. At p. 857 Mookerji, J., observed that the real question was whether an application for a decree under Or. 34 r. 6 for the amount unsatisfied. The question for decision was whether Art. 181 or Art. 183 applied to such application, and, in that case, it was held it was the former. At p. 857 Mookerji, J., observed that the real question was whether an application for a decree under Or. 34, r. 6 is for enforcing the preliminary decree passed under r. 4 of the same order. The preliminary decree reserved to the mortgagee liberty to apply for a personal decree for the amount of any balance remaining after sale of the mortgaged property. At p. 860 the same learned Judge pointed out that, in an application under r. 6, though the mortgagee comes under the decree to avail of a liberty, ho seeks to obtain something which the previous decree did not give him. He comes to enforce a right or seek a relief which be had independently of the previous decree. He comes under the previous decree only in the sense that the right or relief has been put off by it until the happening of certain events. Seeking to avail of a liberty for applying for a relief is different from enforcing a judgment or decree, the judgment or decree not bavins; granted the relief but only the liberty to apply for it. 53. In my view the circumstance and the effect of the decree are different in the present case. It is a decree against the partners of the firm although not identified by name in the decree. Upon it being passed the (Appellant was entitled, and had the right, to enforce it against all the partners personally. In respect of those partners to whom Or. 21, r. 50, sub-r. (1), (b) and (c) did not apply, ascertainment or adjudgment was required of the persons against whom the decree could be executed, the decree being executable against them from the date it was passed. An application by a decree-holder under R. 50 (2) is not for any right which was not given to him by the decree but for a determination that the person against whom the application is made is a person against whom the decree was passed and who has been liable upon it from its inception. 54. It is now convenient to examine the provision of rule 50 (2). 54. It is now convenient to examine the provision of rule 50 (2). The sub-rule can only be invoked when the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than one referred to in sub-r. (1) (b) and (c). " Claims " means that, at the time when the provisions of the sub-rule are invoked, the decree-holder asserts a right to execute the decree against the particular person and he seeks to have his existing right to execute the decree recognised; he does not seek to obtain a further right which he has not already obtained by the decree. If the particular person admits his liability to have the decree executed against him, the Court may thereupon grant the decree-holder leave to execute. " Liability " in the sub-rule does not mean liability in the suit but that he is one of the persons against whom the decree was passed and, consequently, his liability under the decree which has already been passed against all partners. When a person denies liability, i.e., his liability as a partner in the judgment-debtor firm, such liability is that which is tried and determined. The sub-rule relates only to a person who is not covered by r. 50 (1) (b) and (c) and therefore is not one who has had the opportunity of being heard; the reason for affording such person an opportunity to dispute his liability as a partner is that he should not be condemned without an opportunity being given to him to be heard and hence the provision in r. 50 (4), which does not relate to the suit itself but to the enquiry under sub-r. (2). Since the person affected by sub-r. (2) may not have had an opportunity of contesting his alleged position as a partner, execution cannot issue against him without leave of the Court and after (?) it has been satisfied he is a partner. Although, after the passing of the decree against a firm and, it follows, against the partners in the firm, the decree-holder execute the decree against every partner, this cannot be done unless and until a person alleged to be a partner has had an opportunity to contest the allegation of his personal liability as a partner and after the Court is satisfied he is a person against whom the decree has been passed. 55. 55. In my opinion, the wording of r. 50 supports the view that the period of limitation commences, not from the date of adjudication of a person as partner but from the date of the decree. 56. The next matter which requires consideration is whether an application under r. 50 (2) is one which is made to enforce a decree. If it is, then Art. 183 applies and the period during which such application can be made is 12 years from the time when the present right to enforce the decree accrues, i.e., the date of the decree. If Art. 183 does not apply then, it is common ground. Art. 181 is the only article which is applicable and which prescribes a period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues, again, the date of the decree. If Art. 181 applies then the Appellant's application is barred by limitation. 57. In Bhagwan Mansji Marwadi v. Hiraji Premaji Marwadi 34 Bom. L. R. 142 (1932), a decision by a Division Bench, it was held that an application under r. 50 (2) is an application for execution of the decree against the partnership and, at p. 1118, Patkar, J., observed an application for leave to execute under the above sub-rule is not barred so long as the decree against the firm is alive. This decision was followed in A.H.S. Kuppuswami Ayyar Vs. Rathilal Somabhai and Co. and Others, AIR 1935 Mad 926 . On the other hand Dhavle and Chatterjee, JJ., in Harnarain v. Dayabhi Hira Chand I. L. R. 19 Fat. 909 (1940) observed at p. 913 that the proceeding for obtaining leave under Or. 21, r. 50 (2) is not an application for execution, does the leave granted amount to any on for execution. No reason appears to be given to support this opinion. But in Bombay Company, Ltd. v. Kuban Singh I. L. R. 13 Lah. 327 (1931), Addison, J., with whom Coldstream, J., agreed, said at p. 334. I have no hesitation in holding that such an application is an application in execution and that it can bo made at any time during which the decree remains capable of being executed, and at p. 325, The application under, sub-r. (2) of r. 50, is ancillary to the application for execution against the partner as an individual. 58. I have no hesitation in holding that such an application is an application in execution and that it can bo made at any time during which the decree remains capable of being executed, and at p. 325, The application under, sub-r. (2) of r. 50, is ancillary to the application for execution against the partner as an individual. 58. In Cooverji Verjang v. Cooverbhai A. I. R. [1940] Bom. 562, the actual decision was that an application under r. 50 (2) can be made without any previous application for execution under r. 10. There are, however, some interesting observations in the course of the judgments. At p. 574, Sir John Beaumont, C. J., said, that while the late Sir Dinshah Mulla was the Chamber Judge in the Bombay High Court he held that no application for execution could be made until leave was first obtained by the executing creditor and he directed that that should be done by means of a Chamber summons and not by an application for execution. The learned Chief Justice adds We are not prepared to go so far as Sir Dinshah Mulla is said to have gone in saying that an application for execution cannot be made unless leave has first been obtained under r. 50 (2), and later We do not wish to commit ourselves to the view, which seems to have appealed to the late Sir Dinshah Mulla, that an application under r. 59 (2) is not an application in execution. 59. On behalf of the Respondents it was argued that the position is analogous to the proceedings in a mortgage suit in which a preliminary decree for sale is passed, followed by a final decree for sale. In Sisir Kumar Ghosh v. Srish Chandra Sinha C. W. N. 537 (1939), it was held that Art. 181 applies to an application for a final decree for sale, which gives a limitation period of three years. A preliminary mortgage decree quantifies the amount due but, whilst it directs the mortgagor to pay this sum into Court within a specified time, the mortgagee cannot obtain execution if the payment is not made. His sole remedy is to avail himself of another provision in the decree enabling him to apply to the Court for a final decree for sale. His sole remedy is to avail himself of another provision in the decree enabling him to apply to the Court for a final decree for sale. Such application is to obtain a decree which is capable of being enforced and is not an application to enforce a decree. 60. I have come to the conclusion that an application under r. 50 (2) is one to enforce a decree and I prefer to follow the line of cases which have held that such an application is an application in execution. Since it is an application in execution it must be one to enforce a decree. My reasons shortly are that a decree against a firm is a decree against each partner in the firm, the decree-holder is entitled to execute the decree against each individual partner from the time it is passed; execution may be granted at the outset against a person who has appeared in the suit or who has admitted in a pleading he is a partner or has been so adjudged or who has been served with the writ and has not appeared; whilst the decree can be executed against each individual partner, in case of a person not coming within the above categories, the decree-holder must satisfy the Court that such person is a partner and is a person against whom the decree has been passed; the object of r. 50 (2) is to enable a decree-holder to shew that a particular person is a judgment-debtor; even when a person admits he is a partner, leave to execute must be obtained under the sub-rule and if denied, the enquiry thereunder is held; sub-r. (2) enables execution to issue against a partner who is not covered by the provisions of sub-r. (1); the purpose of an application under sub-r. (2) is to execute a decree against a partner of a firm, and such an application is a step in the course of execution. It must follow that an application under sub-r. (2) is an application to enforce the decree. Art. 183 therefore applies to an application under r. 50 (2). 61. The remaining matter for decision is, whether an application under sub-r. (2) of r. 50 must be made before an application for execution is taken out or whether the two can be combined in one application or must be made by separate applications. Art. 183 therefore applies to an application under r. 50 (2). 61. The remaining matter for decision is, whether an application under sub-r. (2) of r. 50 must be made before an application for execution is taken out or whether the two can be combined in one application or must be made by separate applications. Jagat Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Gunny Hajee Ahmed I. L. R. 53 Cal. 214 (1925) was, unfortunately, not cited to Das, J., when he disposed of the application out of which this appeal arises. That was an appeal heard by Sanderson, C. J. and Buckland, J., from the Original Side of this Court, and concerned an application for execution against the personal representative of a deceased partner in a judgment-debtor firm. In the course of his judgment Buckland, J., at p. 234, observed that in cases to which Or. 21, r. 22, applied it appeared to be the practice to file the tabular statement and at the same time to take out a summons under that rule. This practice appears to be convenient and it might well be followed where Or. 21, r. 50 (2) applies whether in conjunction with Or. 21, r. 22, or not 62. That appeal was decided in 1925 and, ever since, the above suggested practice has been followed in this Court, and was adopted in the present instance. In Cooverji Verjang v. Cooverbhai A. I. R. [1940] Bom. 562, Wadia, J., against whose decision the appeal was preferred and was dismissed, observed at p. 568 that there is nothing in the Code to prevent an application under r. 11 (for execution) being filed along with the application for leave under r. 50, sub-r. 2. 63. In Bombay Company, Ltd. v. Kuban Singh I. L. R. 13 Lah. 327 (1931) it was decided that an application for execution of a decree against a partner of a judgment-debtor firm does not require a separate application for leave to execute as the application asking for execution against that particular person necessarily implies such a prayer; and both are applications to enforce the decree. 64. I am unable to accept the contention that obtaining leave to execute is a condition precedent to and must be obtained before an application for execution can be made. I agree with the decision of the Lahore High Court that the one is ancillary to the other. 64. I am unable to accept the contention that obtaining leave to execute is a condition precedent to and must be obtained before an application for execution can be made. I agree with the decision of the Lahore High Court that the one is ancillary to the other. I can see no objection to both being made at one and the same time; there is nothing in the Code which prevents it being done. It is the most convenient method by which all questions can be decided. This practice and procedure has been followed in this Court for nearly 20 years and there is no reason why it should not continue. The application by the Appellant under r. 50 (2) was made within the limitation period of 12 years and it is not barred by any article of the Limitation Act. In my opinion the appeal should be allowed, the dismissal of the application be set aside and it be remanded to a Judge sitting on the Original Side for disposal. The Appellant to have his costs of the appeal; certified for two Counsel. The costs of the hearing before Das, J., will be dealt with by the Judge before whom the application is heard on remand.