JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the decree-holder. The substantial question in dispute between the parties is whether the decree obtained by the Appellant is either wholly or in part a nullity. A further question remains as to the procedure by which the Respondent should enforce his claim. The possibilities are: (1) by a suit, (2) by an application under sec. 47, (3) by an application under sec. 144. (4) by an application under sec. 151. The Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal has dealt with it as an application under sec. 144. Although the Munsif does not say so definitely, it appears to be his opinion that the proper remedy is by way of suit. At any rate, he rejected the application. The Respondent executed a mortgage by way of conditional sale in favour of the Appellant on the 10th July, 1937. The Respondent made an application before a Debt Settlement Board which included this debt on the 29th March, 1939. The Appellant instituted his suit for foreclosure on the 28th February, 1939, and obtained a preliminary decree on the 21st June, 1939. The final decree was passed on the 25th July, 1939. Information was received from the Board on the 24th November, 1939; the Court informed the Board that inasmuch as the execution case was for delivery of possession in execution of a foreclosure decree there was nothing to stay. A writ for delivery of possession was issued, and possession delivered. The Respondent then instituted Miscellaneous case No. 240 of 1939 under sec. 47. This was disposed of in peculiar way to which I shall have to refer later. The Board made an award on the 12th June, 1940, and the Respondent then made the present application for recovery of possession and mesne profits. It was rejected by the Munsif. On appeal by the Respondent the Subordinate Judge disallowed the application for mesne profits but restored possession. The decree-holder then filed this appeal. 2. The first question for consideration whether the decree is a nullity. I had to consider this matter very recently in S. M. 237 of 1942 [Kishoregunj Co-operative Bank v. Rukmini 48 C. W. N. 359 (1944)]. My own view is that if this decree was passed in contravention of the provisions of sec. 33 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, then it was undoubtedly a nullity. I had to consider this matter very recently in S. M. 237 of 1942 [Kishoregunj Co-operative Bank v. Rukmini 48 C. W. N. 359 (1944)]. My own view is that if this decree was passed in contravention of the provisions of sec. 33 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, then it was undoubtedly a nullity. So far as the present decree is concerned, that will depend upon whether sec. 33 applies to pending suits. In the case of Sudhansu Kumar Pal v. Nur Muhammad Hazi 47 C. W. N. 725 (1943). I have expressed the opinion that it does not, but the other view may also be held. 3. Now, the question whether this decree was a nullity and whether it could be executed is certainly a matter within sec. 47 and was properly raised by the Respondent in Miscellaneous case No. 240 of 1939. When I was considering this matter recently, I expressed the opinion that the effect of the decisions in the cases of Chowdhury Mohammad Ibrahim v. Saburjan Bewa 47 C. W. N. 796 (1943) and Abinash Chandra Biswas v. Nakul Ruhidas 47 C. W. N. 891 (1943) is that when once this matter has been decided, it cannot be re-agitated. 4. On behalf of the Respondent Mr. Maitra contended that the question was not decided in that Miscellaneous case. It is true that the learned Munsif only made a direction that the Debt Settlement Board was competent to deal with the application before it notwithstanding the decree. He then went on to dismiss the application. This curious method of dealing with the application was due to the request of the Respondent's pleader; as the law was in rather a fluid state at the time, he was probably not anxious to have the question whether the decree was a nullity definitely decided. That, however, was the only ground of the application. It was abandoned and not pressed. It, therefore, comes within the principle of constructive res judicata and cannot be re-agitated. 5. This has really now become a matter of only academic interest, because the Respondent is relying upon the provisions of sec. 36 (a). The effect of that provision is that the decree is to be treated as a nullity in so far as it is inconsistent with an order made by a Board. The preliminary decree was for a sum of Rs. 218. 36 (a). The effect of that provision is that the decree is to be treated as a nullity in so far as it is inconsistent with an order made by a Board. The preliminary decree was for a sum of Rs. 218. The Respondent did not redeem and possession was delivered. Under the award of the Board the Respondent is liable to pay Rs. 108 in several instalments. As a result, the final decree is wholly inconsistent with the award and the preliminary decree is partly inconsistent. 6. The first question for consideration, therefore, is whether this is a fact which comes within sec. 47 of the Code. Now, the award was made on the 12th June, 1940, after the decree had been passed and executed when there was absolutely nothing left to do. There was nothing wrong with the decree and there was nothing wrong with the order for the delivery of possession. Thought the question arises between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor it is not really concerned with the execution of the decree. On this view the remedy of, the Respondent is by a suit not by an application under sec. 47. 7. This was apparently the view taken by the legal advisers of the Respondent as the actual application purported to be one under sec. 144. The learned Subordinate Judge found great difficulty in apply that section; he got over it by a remark that it has a wide application and complete justice could be done between the parties. 8. He certainly has not done complete justice between the parties because he has dismissed the application for mesne profits. Then on the other hand the Appellant may make out quite a strong case for recovering the money which was thrown away in obtaining this decree or may have some other defence to the delivery of possession. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to have thought that the failure of the Board to issue a notice under sec. 34 caused trouble to the Respondent. It appears to be the opposite. Trouble has been caused to the Appellant. 9. Now, before an order can be made under the principle underlying sec. 144, there must be some kind of resemblance to the matter with which that section deals. 34 caused trouble to the Respondent. It appears to be the opposite. Trouble has been caused to the Appellant. 9. Now, before an order can be made under the principle underlying sec. 144, there must be some kind of resemblance to the matter with which that section deals. Before there could be any sort of resemblance, the Board will have to be treated as though it were an Appellate Court sitting over the Court of the Munsif. I should certainly not be prepared to regard a Board in that light. Then, in the second place, sec. 144 is concerned with a variation or reversal of valid decrees. It has nothing to do with nullities. It seems to me to be quite wrong to distort sec. 144 and apply it to matters which are beyond its scope. 10. There remains sec. 151. Suffice it to say that as the Respondent has a remedy by way of a suit, there is no reason to apply the provisions of this section. In addition, the Respondent knew perfectly well that he had brought the case before the Board and it was primarily due to his negligence in not informing the Court and thereby obtaining a stay that the decree was passed. I shall certainly not be prepared to adopt a fancy procedure at the request of the party which is primarily to be blamed for the trouble. The plain remedy of the Respondent is by way of a suit and in my judgment the Munsif wisely rejected this misconceived application. 11. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and that of the Munsif restored. I make no order as to costs. Leave, to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.