Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1944 DIGILAW 96 (CAL)

Arun Bhusan Roy v. Sir Hari Sankar Paul

1944-05-01

body1944
JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This is an application to set aside the election of Sir Hari Sankar Paul as Councillor to the Corporation of Calcutta from the General Constituency of Ward No. 2. The Petitioner is Arun Bhusan Roy, an elector of the Consitutency. Sir Hari Sankar was elected unopposed, and his election was published in the Calcutta Gazette on March 9th, 1944. On April 6th, 1944, the names of the persons who were elected on contest were published also in the Calcutta Gazette. Sir Hari Sankar's name was not published in that list. On April 17th, 1944, the present petition was filed. It is necessary to bear in mind both the nature of these publications and the dates thereof as they will be important in considering the preliminary objections raised as to the maintainability of this petition by the Advocate-General appearing for Sir Hari Sankar Paul. 2. The ground on which the election is sought to be set aside, put shortly, is that Sir Hari Sankar Paul has a share of interest in a contract with the Calcutta Corporation and is disqualified from being a Councillor by sec. 22 (g) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 3. The petition consists of two parts. The first part claims relief under the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923, and the latter part claims an alternative relief by the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition. 4. I shall first deal with the petition so far as it claims relief under the Calcutta Municipal Act. The learned Advocate-General raises two preliminary objections which may be stated thus: (1) An application to set aside an election can be made only if the conditions set out in sec. 46 of the Calcutta Municipal Act are present. If a petition is made on the ground that a person is not qualified to be elected Councillor, it can be made only with respect to a person whose name has been published under sec. 29 (8) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. If the name has not been so published, an application under sec. 46 on this ground will not lie. In the present case Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name has not been published under sec. 29 (8). Therefore the petition fails. (2) If it be held that Sir Hari Sankar's name has been so published, then the publication was made on March 9th, 1944. Under sec. 46 on this ground will not lie. In the present case Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name has not been published under sec. 29 (8). Therefore the petition fails. (2) If it be held that Sir Hari Sankar's name has been so published, then the publication was made on March 9th, 1944. Under sec. 46 the petition must be made within eight days of the publication. The petition having been made on April 17th, 1944, more than eight days after the said publication, it is barred by limitation. 5. On behalf of the Petitioner the argument is: (a) an application under sec. 46 can be made on the ground that a person is not qualified to be a Councillor even though the name of that person has not been published under sec. 29 (8) of the Calcutta Municipal Act. In such a case the application must be made within eight days of any publication under sec. 29 (8) (even though such publication does not contain the name of the person whose election is being challenged). In the present case such a publication under sec. 29 (8) was made on April 6th, 1944. The Court was closed from April 5th, 1944, and re-opened on April 17th, 1944. This application was made on the re-opening date and is consequently within time. (b) In the alternative it is argued that the publication of Sir Hari Sankar's name on March 9th, 1944, is a publication under sec. 29 (8) and it should be deemed to have been made on April 6th, 1944, when the publication regarding the contested elections was made. The petition would in this view be within eight days of the publication, and therefore, would not be barred by the law of limitation. 6. The first matter for decision is, whether an application lies to set aside an election on the ground that the elected person is disqualified from being elected as Councillor when such person's name has not been published under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 7. It is quite clear and indeed it is not disputed that the only section of the Calcutta Municipal Act under which an application to set aside an election can be made in sec. 46. Let us see what that section says. (8) of sec. 29 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 7. It is quite clear and indeed it is not disputed that the only section of the Calcutta Municipal Act under which an application to set aside an election can be made in sec. 46. Let us see what that section says. It is as follows: Sec. 46 (1) "If there is any dispute as to whether any person whose name is published under sub sec. (8) of sec. 29 is qualified to be elected a Councillor, or if the validity of any election is questioned, whether by reason of the commissions of any corrupt practice by a candidate or his agent or by" any other person or by reason of the improper rejection of a nomination or of the improper reception or refusal of a vote, or for any other cause, any person enrolled in the electoral roll may at any tune within eight days after the said publication, apply to the High Court. 8. There is a proviso to this sub-section, and there are two other sub-sections, these are not germane to the matter under consideration so I refrain from reproducing them. Now, what are the several conditions which would entitle a voter to apply to the High Court to set aside an election under sec. 46 of the Calcutta Municipal Act? They are as follows: (1) There must be a dispute as to whether any person whose name is published under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 is qualified to be a Councillor or, (2) The validity of the election must be questioned by reason of any corrupt practice by a candidate or his agent, or, (3) The validity of the election must be questioned by reason of the improper rejection of a nomination, or, (4) The validity of the election must be questioned on the ground of the improper reception or refusal of a vote, or, (5) The validity of the election must be questioned for any other cause. 9. These are all the grounds on which an election petition may be filed. It is quite clear that nowhere in sec. 46 is it stated that an election petition may be filed on the ground that there is a dispute as to whether any person whose name is not published under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 is qualified to be elected a Councillor. It is quite clear that nowhere in sec. 46 is it stated that an election petition may be filed on the ground that there is a dispute as to whether any person whose name is not published under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 is qualified to be elected a Councillor. It is argued on behalf of the Petitioner that such a ground is included in the last general ground "for any other cause." I am unable to accept this contention. I realise that the words " for any other cause " should be given a liberal interpretation but their meaning cannot be extended to include something which is obviously excluded by the other parts of the section. "What can be the object of introducing the qualifying words " whose name is published under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 after the word " person " in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 46, if the qualification is to be rendered nugatory by adding the words "for any other cause"? If the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner be accepted, then one must hold that this qualifying phrase is of no effect. This would be violating one of the fundamental canons of interpreting a statute, namely, that effect must be given to the words of every portion of the section whenever that is possible. I hold, therefore, that if an election is challenged on the ground that a person is not qualified to be elected a Councillor, that person must be one whose name has been published under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 10. The next question for determination is whether Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name has been published under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29. That his name has been published is admitted, the question is whether the publication is one under the aforesaid section. This leads us to the consideration of two sections of the Act, namely, sec. 28 and sec. 29. Sec. 28 deals with uncontested elections and it consists of two sub-sections. Sub-sec. (2) is the relevant section and it is as follows: In any constituency not referred to in sub-sec. (1), if the number of candidate? who are duly nominated and have not withdrawn their candidature, is not more than the number of Councillors to be elected for that constituency, all such candidates shall be declared to be duly elected. 11. Sub-sec. (2) is the relevant section and it is as follows: In any constituency not referred to in sub-sec. (1), if the number of candidate? who are duly nominated and have not withdrawn their candidature, is not more than the number of Councillors to be elected for that constituency, all such candidates shall be declared to be duly elected. 11. In this case Sir Hari Sankar Paul was the only candidate standing for election for this Ward, the other candidates having withdrawn. He was accordingly declared to be duly elected. It will be noticed that sec. 28 does hot provide for any publication of the name of the person elected under this sub-section. 12. The next section is sec. 29. It is as lows: Sec. 29 (1)-In any case not provided for in sec. 28, a poll shall be taken. Procedure (2) Votes shall be given by ballot at election and in person. No vote shall be received by proxy. (3) No vote shall be given either by any Government or by the Corporation"; (4) In plural-Councillor constituencies every elector shall have as many votes as there are Councillor to be elected, but no elector shall give more than one vote to any one candidate. (5) Votes shall be counted by or under the super vision of the returning officer, and any candidate, or, in the absence of the candidate, a representative duly authorised by him in writing, shall have a right to be present at the time of counting. (6) When the counting of the votes has been completed, the returning officer shall forthwith declare the candidate or candidates, as the case may be, to whom the largest number of votes has been given to be elected. (7) Where an equality of votes is found to exist between any candidates and the addition of one vote will entitle any of the candidates to be declared elected, the determination of the person or persona to whom such one additional vote shall be deemed to have been given shall be made by lot to be drawn in the presence of the returning officer and the candidates and in such manner as he may determine. (8) The returning officer shall without delay report the result of the election to the Executive Officer, and the name or names of the candidate or candidates elected shall be published in the Official Gazette. 13. (8) The returning officer shall without delay report the result of the election to the Executive Officer, and the name or names of the candidate or candidates elected shall be published in the Official Gazette. 13. It should be remembered that sub-sec. (8) is the only provision in the Act regarding publication of the name or names of the candidate or candidates elected. The question is whether this sub-section applies both to contested and uncontested elections or whether its application is limited to contested elections only. The learned Advocate-General argued that sec. 28 dealt uncontested elections and sec. 29 with contested elections only and that therefore sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 cannot refer to any publication of the name of a candidate who succeeds at an uncontested election. For this argument he relies on sub-sec. (1) of sec. 29 which starts with the words " In any case not provided for in sec. 28." He contends that these words qualify or affect the whole section and that consequently the publication under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 29 had nothing to do with an uncontested election under sec. 28. A casual reading of sec. 29 may lead one to draw this conclusion but after considering the section carefully and taking into consideration certain other sections of the Act, I am of opinion that this is not a correct appreciation of sec. 29. The section is divided into eight sub-sections which are distinct and independent of each other. The words "In any case not provided for in sec. 28 " are to be found only in sub-sec. (1). This sub-section is separated from the subsequent sub-sections by a full stop. Adopting a grammatical construction the words " In any case not provided for in sec. 28 " can be made to apply only to sub-sec. (1), and a grammatical construction should be adopted whenever it is possible unless such construction would do violence to some obvious or expressed intention of the Act. The argument of the learned Advocate-General would have been quite correct if sec. 29 was in the following form: Sec. 29. "In any case not provided for in sec. 28: (1) A poll shall be taken; (2) Votes shall be given by ballot and in person. The argument of the learned Advocate-General would have been quite correct if sec. 29 was in the following form: Sec. 29. "In any case not provided for in sec. 28: (1) A poll shall be taken; (2) Votes shall be given by ballot and in person. No votes shall be received by proxy; (3) No Votes shall be given either by any Government or by the Corporation: (4) In plural Councillor constituencies every elector shall have as many votes as there are Councillors to be elected, but no elector shall give more than one vote to any one candidate (5) Votes shall be counted by or trader the supervision of the returning officer, and any candidate, or, in the absence of the candidate, a representative duly authorised by him in writing shall have a right to be present at the time of counting; (6) When the counting of the votes has been completed, the returning officer shall forthwith declare the candidate or candidates, as the case may be, to whom the largest number of votes has been given to be elected (7) Where an equality of votes is found to exist between any candidates and the addition of the vote will entitle any of the candidates to be declared elected, the determination of the person or persons to whom such one additional vote shall be deemed to have been given shall be made by lot to be drawn in the presence of the returning officer and the candidates and in such manner as he may determine; (8) The returning officer shall without delay report the result of the election to the Executive Officer, and the name or names of the candidate or candidates elected shall the published in the Official Gazette. 14. Then it could have, been said that the whole section was dependent on the words "In any case not provided for in sec. 28,'' but this is not the form of the section. Those words are not placed outside the sub-sections and made to govern the whole section but they are placed within sub-sec. (1) and not repeated in the other sub-sections. In my opinion sub-sec. (8) is distinct and independent of sub-sec. (1) and the other sub-sections of sec. 29. The view I have taken is supported by the marginal notes to secs. 28 and 29. (1) and not repeated in the other sub-sections. In my opinion sub-sec. (8) is distinct and independent of sub-sec. (1) and the other sub-sections of sec. 29. The view I have taken is supported by the marginal notes to secs. 28 and 29. I am not unmindful of the principle that marginal notes do not govern the section but they may be looked at as throwing some light on the meaning of the section if there is ambiguity or doubt regarding its meaning. The marginal note of sec. 28 " Uncontested elections," and that of sec. 29 is " Procedure at election." The marginal note of sec. 29 indicates that the section is prescribing for the procedure at both types of elections. If it were intended that sec. 29 was to prescribe for the procedure at contested elections only, then the words " contested" would have been used in the marginal note to sec. 29. That word has not been used, and this, in my opinion, supports the view which I have taken. That sec. 29 (8) provides for the publication of uncontested elections also is clearly indicated by the provisions of sec. 31 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. That section is as follows: Sec. 31 (1) " If any person is elected by more than one constituency, he shall, by notice in writing signed by him and delivered to the Executive Officer, within seven days from the date of the publication of the result of such election in the Official Gazette, choose for which of these constituencies he shall serve and the choice shall be conclusive. (2) When any such choice has been made, the Executive Officer shall call upon the constituency or constituencies for which such person has not chosen to serve to elect another person or persons. (3) If the candidate does not make the choice referred to in sub-sec. (1), the Executive Officer shall forthwith declare the constituency for which such person shall servo and shall call upon the other constituency or constituencies concerned to elect another person or persons. 15. The section provides that when a person has been elected by more than one constituency he must choose which constituency he proposes to represent. 16. Now, a person may be elected by more than one constituency both by a contested as well as an uncontested election. 15. The section provides that when a person has been elected by more than one constituency he must choose which constituency he proposes to represent. 16. Now, a person may be elected by more than one constituency both by a contested as well as an uncontested election. The provision as to make a choice must apply to persons elected after contest as well as to persons elected without contest: otherwise the provision in sec. 5 fixing the number of elected and nominated Councillors cannot be carried out. Now if the choice under sec. 31 has to be made by a Councillor elected without contest, he must make it in accordance with the provisions of sec. 31, that is to say, he must make it "within seven days from the date of the publication of the result of such election, in the Official Gazette." This pre-supposes a publication in the Official Gazette of the result of the uncontested election. Nowhere in the Act is there any provision directing a publication of the result of an election except in sec. 29 (8). The publication referred to in sec. 31 must therefore be the publication directed by sec. 29 (8); consequently, it must be held that sec. 29 (8) directs the publication of uncontested elections also. 17. The learned Advocate-General in meeting this argument drew my attention to sub-sec. (8) and he argued that there would be no difficulty experienced if it were held that the publication referred to in sec. 31 related only to contested elections. He conceded that if this interpretation were adopted, Councillors returned uncontested for more than one constituency would not be able to make a choice; but that difficulty he says would be met by the choice being made on behalf of the Executive Officer under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 31. He would have me hold, first, that though by the Act a person returned after contest is given the privilege of choosing his seat, a person returned unopposed is denied that right. Secondly, he would have me interpret the words "does not make the choice" as "cannot make the choice." I am not prepared to do either of those things unless there are clear words in the statute which would compel me to do so. Secondly, he would have me interpret the words "does not make the choice" as "cannot make the choice." I am not prepared to do either of those things unless there are clear words in the statute which would compel me to do so. I would certainly not hold that the Legislature intended anything so unreasonable as to give one set of Councillors the right of choice and arbitrarily refuse it to another. Secondly, I cannot possibly agree that the words "does not" have the same meaning as "cannot." The words "if the candidate does not make the choice" indicates that the candidate has the power to make the choice but refuses or fails to exercise it. The word "cannot" means that a person has not the power to do something. 18. Again, if the view of the learned Advocate-General be accepted, it must be held that in the case of uncontested elections, even if there has been fraud and corrupt practice of the worst type, no election petition would He. The learned Advocate-General expressly stated that this would be the result of his interpretation of sec. 29 (8). Unless the words of the sub-section compelled one to do so, one should not give the sub-section an interpretation which would lead to such unfortunate and unfair results, results which would encourage fraud and corruption. Fortunately, the sub-section does not contain any words which would compel such an interpretation. 19. The learned Advocate-General next referred to Rule 16 (2) of the Rules made by the Provincial Government under powers granted to it by sec. 30 of the Act. It is as follows: In the case of uncontested returns the returning officer shall report the name or names of the candidate or candidates 'whom ho declares to be elected to the Executive Officer and to the Election Officer, and thereupon the Election Officer shall after informing the candidate or candidates, cause the name or names of the candidate or candidates elected to be published in the Calcutta Gazette. 20. This rule he says now forms part of the statute and he asks me to hold that now that there is a distinct provision for the publication of the names of persons elected at uncontested elections, sec. 29 (8) should be interpreted as being confined to contested elections. 20. This rule he says now forms part of the statute and he asks me to hold that now that there is a distinct provision for the publication of the names of persons elected at uncontested elections, sec. 29 (8) should be interpreted as being confined to contested elections. It is quite true that a rule validly framed under the Act shall be treated as being part of the Act itself; but the Provincial Government cannot by the exercise of its rule-making power alter the meaning of any of the provisions of the Act itself. Under sec. 30 it has power to make rules "subject to the provisions of the Act." Now if I am right in the view that sec. 29 (8) of the Act provides for the publication of the names of persons elected at both contested and uncontested elections, the making of a rule by Government cannot alter the effect of the section by limiting its application to contested elections only. All that can be said is that the Provincial Government adopted a certain interpretation of sec. 29 (8) in framing this rule. Although every consideration must be given to the interpretation put upon the section by the Government, this Court is not bound by it. 21. I have already given my interpretation of sec. 29 (8) and if it be correct, then Rule 16, sub-r. (2) must be treated as mere surplusage which leaves unaffected the force of sec. 29 (8). 22. For the above reasons I hold that sec. 29 (8) relates to the publication of the names of candidates elected at both contested and uncontested elections. 23. The next point for consideration is whether Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name has been published under sec. 29 (8). His name has certainly been published on March 9th, 1944, but the publication is declared to have been made under rule 16. The learned Advocate-General argues that in such circumstances it must be held that there has been no publication under sec. 29 (8) and that therefore the application is incompetent. 24. On behalf of the Petitioner it is argued that this publication of March 9th, 1944, must be treated as one under sec. 29 (8) notwithstanding the statement that it was published under Rule 16. I am inclined to accept this view. 29 (8) and that therefore the application is incompetent. 24. On behalf of the Petitioner it is argued that this publication of March 9th, 1944, must be treated as one under sec. 29 (8) notwithstanding the statement that it was published under Rule 16. I am inclined to accept this view. Whatever may be the statement made as to the provisions under which the publication was made, it should be treated, so far as it is possible to do so, as having been made validly rather than as being an invalid publication. I would therefore treat the publication as having been made sec. 29 (8) and treat the statement that it was being made under Rule 16 as being erroneous and of no effect. I hold, therefore, that the publication of March 9th, 1944, is a publication under sec. 29 (8) and that Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name has been published under that section. 25. There remains the question of limitation. The application has been made more than eight days after the publication of March 9th, 1944. Prima facie, it would be barred by limitation. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner argues that the publication of Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name should be treated as having been made on April 6th, 1944, when the other publication regarding contested election was made although Sir Han Sankar Paul's name was not mentioned in that publication and was published only on March 9th, 1944. I am unable to accept this contention. The publication of April 6th, 1944, does not contain Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name at all. In those circumstances it is not possible to hold that his name was published on that date. The position therefore is this. Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name was published on March 9th, 1944, and at no other date. That publication is either one under sec. 29 (8) or it is not. If it is not, there has been no publication of Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name under sec. 29 (8), and the application will fail as I have already held that such a publication is prerequisite to an application like the present one. 26. If the publication of March 9th, 1944, be treated as a publication under sec. 29 (8) of Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name, then the petition must be made within eight days thereof, that is, within eight days of March 9th, 1944. 26. If the publication of March 9th, 1944, be treated as a publication under sec. 29 (8) of Sir Hari Sankar Paul's name, then the petition must be made within eight days thereof, that is, within eight days of March 9th, 1944. This petition not having been made within time it must fail. I hold therefore that the present application is barred by limitation. 27. There remains the claim for relief by the issue of Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition. This need not detain us long. The returning officer is not a party to this application. The writ is claimed against the Corporation. Now it has been held more than once that these writs can only be issued to persons or bodies in respect of some judicial or quasi-judicial act performed by them, or with respect to some judicial or quasi-judicial order passed by them. The writs have no application to executive acts. In this connection I would refer to Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition), Vol. 9 at page 833. The conditions under which writs of Prohibition may be issued is discussed. This is what is said in paragraph 1411: Although prohibition does not lie against a body which is not and does not claim to be a Court or judicial tribunal in any legal sense, the High Court will issue the Writ to a body exercising judicial functions, though that body cannot be described as being in any ordinary sense a Court. Prohibition will not issue against the ministerial or executive acts of the Government, but wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicialy, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in the Writ. 28. It is quite clear from this passage that a Writ of Prohibition can only be issued in respect of a judicial or quasi-judicia] act. In the same volume the condition regarding the issue of a Writ of Certiorari is discussed at page 855. In paragraph 1449 this is what the learned author writes: Certiorari lies only in respect of judicial, as distinguished from administrative acts. In the same volume the condition regarding the issue of a Writ of Certiorari is discussed at page 855. In paragraph 1449 this is what the learned author writes: Certiorari lies only in respect of judicial, as distinguished from administrative acts. Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's (Bench Division exercised in the Writ. 29. In this connection I would also refer to a recent decision of the Judicial Committee, namely, Ryots of Garabandhu and other Villages v. The Zemindar of Parlakimedi and another 48 C.W.N. 18 at 19 (1943). The Lord Chancellor in dealing with a Writ of Certiorari says this: This Writ does not issue to correct purely executive acts, but, on the other hand, its application is not narrowly limited to inferior '' Courts '' in the strictest sense. Broadly speaking, it may be said that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from being a ministerial act, certiorari will lie. 30. In the present case Learned Counsel for the Petitioner was not able to indicate what judicial or quasi-judicial act has been done or is about to be done by the Corporation. In these circumstances I cannot see how any application for the issue of these writs will lie against the Calcutta Corporation. The application for the issue of these Writs must therefore fail. In view of what I have held the entire application must be dismissed with costs both as against Sir Hari Sankar Paul and as against the Calcutta Corporation with certificate for two Counsel. The costs will be as of a Motion.