JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against a preliminary decree passed in a suit for partition of certain properties. The following genealogical table will explain the position of the parties. The Plaintiff's case is that the property in suit belonged to Pachuram De Sarkar, that after his death his descendants occupied different portions of the property by arrangement, and that there was no partition of the property. The Plaintiff accordingly prayed for partition. Among the several Defendants in the suit, the contesting Defendants were the Defendants Nos. 3 Ka, 3 Kha and the Defendants Nos. 7 and 8. They are the successors-in-interest of Rajkishore, one of the five sons of Pachuram De Sarkar. They claimed that the property did not belong to Pachuram De Sarkar but to Rajkishore, and that the Plaintiff and the other Defendants had no title thereto. In the alternative they claimed that they had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the property belonged to Pachuram De Sarkar; but he has held that the contesting Defendants have acquired title to that portion of the property in suit of which they were admittedly in possession by right of adverse possession. 2. The contesting Defendants' claim to title by adverse possession is based on the following facts: In the year 1927 the present Defendants Nos. 10 to 12 brought a partition suit in respect of the same property. In that suit the present contesting Defendants asserted their title to the property on the same grounds as those on which they base their present claim. They stated that the lands in that suit were the self-acquired property of Rajkishore, their predecessor, and that the other parties to the suit had no title thereto. 3. It is contended on their behalf that this declaration of hostile title made in the previous suit was known to the parties in the present suit at the time when it was made and that it having been made more than 12 years before the present suit, the title of the other parties to this suit has been extinguished in respect of the entire property in suit. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the contesting Defendants could not acquire title by adverse possession in respect of properties, which were not in their actual possession. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the contesting Defendants could not acquire title by adverse possession in respect of properties, which were not in their actual possession. He found, however, in favour of the contesting Defendants in respect of the property of which they were in possession. He was of opinion that the declaration in the written statement, filed in the suit of 1927, amounted to a hostile claim of title made to the knowledge of the other parties to this suit; and on this finding he holds that the contesting Defendants have acquired title by adverse possession to the properties of which they are in possession. The learned Advocate for the Appellants has failed to show that there is any error of law or of fact in this decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. He seemed to argue at one stage that as the parties were co-sharers, none of them could acquire title by adverse possession. This view is entirely untenable. A co-sharer may certainly acquire title by adverse possession as against another co-sharer in respect of joint property. If a co-sharer in possession of joint property declares openly that he is possessing it not as a co-sharer but in his own right by virtue of a title hostile to that of the other co-sharers, he must be taken to be in possession not as a co-sharer, but in possession adversely to his co-sharers. If such adverse possession continues for a period of twelve years to the knowledge of the other co-sharers without their taking any steps in the matter, their title in the property will be extinguished. The learned Advocate for the Appellants also argued that before the contesting Defendants could acquire title by adverse possession they would have to give up possession which they had got by the amicable arrangement, and thereafter get into possession again and assert an adverse title. He sought to place the contesting Defendants in the position of a tenant, or licensee who seeks to establish independent title by virtue of adverse possession. The position of a co-sharer is not analogous to that of a tenant or licensee. A tenant or licensee is estopped from challenging the title of the person who inducted him on the land. Before he can do this he must cease to be a tenant or licensee by giving up possession (vide sec. The position of a co-sharer is not analogous to that of a tenant or licensee. A tenant or licensee is estopped from challenging the title of the person who inducted him on the land. Before he can do this he must cease to be a tenant or licensee by giving up possession (vide sec. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act). There is no such estoppel in the way of a co-sharer. He does not come into possession by virtue of any contract or license whereby he has bound himself to restore possession on the termination of the contract or the withdrawal of the license. He possesses the property independently of any such obligation and therefore he is not estopped from asserting an independent title. There is thus no substance in the argument that a co-sharer, who is in possession of a specific portion of the joint property by an amicable arrangement, must first give up his possession before he can acquire title by adverse possession. 4. The learned Advocate for the Appellant next referred us to the case of Joy Narayan Ukil v. Srikantha Roy 26 C.W.N. 206 (1921). He referred us to certain passages at pages 209 and 210. We have been through the passages, and we are of opinion that they are of no help to the Appellants; on the contrary, they support the view which has been taken by us, vis., that one co-sharer may assert hostile title against another and thereby acquire title by adverse possession. 5. Next the learned Advocate drew our attention to the written statement in the suit of 1927, in which the contesting Defendants asserted their title; and he asks us to hold that there was no clear assertion of hostile title in that written statement. There is absolutely no substance in this argument. Paragraph 11 of the written statement contains in as clear language as possible an assertion of hostile title. There the contesting Defendants stated that the properties in suit belonged to Rajkishore De, their predecessor-in-interest, and asserted that the other parties had no title to these properties. He cannot conceive of any clearer assertion of hostile title than this. Paragraph 11 of the written statement contains in as clear language as possible an assertion of hostile title. There the contesting Defendants stated that the properties in suit belonged to Rajkishore De, their predecessor-in-interest, and asserted that the other parties had no title to these properties. He cannot conceive of any clearer assertion of hostile title than this. Next it was argued that as the partition suit of 1927 was dismissed for default, it may well be that the assertion in the written statement of the contesting Defendants in that suit was not brought to the notice of the other parties to the partition suit. We cannot accept this contention. All the parties to the present suit were parties in that suit, and they must be taken to have knowledge of the contents of the written statement in the former suit. In our opinion this is a clear case of adverse possession. We, therefore, uphold the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss this appeal with costs. The hearing-fee is assessed at two gold mohurs.