JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This court fee report arises out of an appeal in a partition suit involving three sets of properties, namely certain zamindari shares forming one group, groves and houses forming a second group and certain sir lands forming a third group. The office reports that, as the plaintiffs have been found to. be out of possession of the properties, of which they seek partition and as their claim to ownership is denied, they are liable to pay the court fee on an advalorem scale on the full value of the property. Section 7 (VI-A) says that in partition suits the court fee is to be according to one quarter of the value of the plaintiff's share of the property, and according to the full value of such share if on the date of presenting the plaint the plaintiff is out of possession of the property of which he claims to be a co-parcener or co-owner, and his claim to be a co- parcener or co-owner on such date is denied. According to the office the deficiency in respect of the memorandum of appeal filed in this Court amounts to Ks. 577-14-0 and that there is a deficiency of Ks. 610-14-0 in respect of the court-fee pay- able in the lower Court. The finding of the learned Civil Judge regarding the absence of the plaintiffs' possession is challenged in the grounds of appeal and for that reason the appellants' learned Counsel argues that court-fee should be charged from him according to his averment in the plaint irrespective of the decision of the Court below. In support of his contention he has strongly relied on Parmeshur Din v. Hargobind Prasad 1939 OA 85 : 1938 AWR (CC) 139 : O W N 1865 and a decision of the Full Bench of Lahore High Court in AIR 1941 123 (Lahore) , In none of these case clause (VI-A) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, as it stands after 1939 in this province, was considered. In Safdar, Husain v. Achchan Begam 1948 OA 226 : A W R (CC) 94 : OWN 356 which is another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, our learned brother; Ghulam Hasan J. held that the meaning of the word "possession" in Section 7 (VI-A) is not restricted to actual possession. In Safdar, Husain v. Achchan Begam 1948 OA 226 : A W R (CC) 94 : OWN 356 which is another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, our learned brother; Ghulam Hasan J. held that the meaning of the word "possession" in Section 7 (VI-A) is not restricted to actual possession. If in a case of joint property a ed-owner brings a suit for partition of a share and is able to show that he is in actual possession of portion of the joint' property, a presumption of constructive possession in respect of the property of which he is not in actual possession can reasonably arise, so that his case falls not under the second portion of Clause VI-A of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act but under the first part of the section and court-fee is payable according to l/4th of the value of the plaintiffs share of the property. In order to bring his case in line with the aforesaid decision the learned Counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to paragraphs 5, 13,15 and 19 of the written statement and he infers there from that joint possession of the parties in respect of two groves was admitted by the defendants. The judgment of the learned lower Court shows the real construction which Is to be placed upon the so-called admission contained in the written statement. The conclusion reached by the Civil Judge on the question of possession of the properties in suit was against the plaintiffs-appellants. 2. In view of the fact their learned Counsel has challenged the adverse finding in the grounds of appeal we asked him to convince us from the evidence on the re- cord that the finding in this behalf was erroneous. He has expressed his inability to do so and he desires that the matter should be taken up at the time of hearing. We consider this course to be inadvisable. Indeed Section 6 clause (4) enjoins that whenever a question of the proper amount of court-fee payable is raised otherwise than under sub-Section (3) the Court shall decide such question before proceeding with any other issue. We consider this course to be inadvisable. Indeed Section 6 clause (4) enjoins that whenever a question of the proper amount of court-fee payable is raised otherwise than under sub-Section (3) the Court shall decide such question before proceeding with any other issue. Clause (2) of the same section prescribes that no memorandum of appeal shall be acted upon unless the appellant make & good the deficiency in court-fee within such time as may from time to time be fixed by the Court. 3. The decision of the lower Court on the question of possession for the purpose of court-fee under the circumstances must be regarded as prima facie correct and the appellants must pay the deficiency according to the full value of the share which they claim on partition. The learned Counsel for the appellants has, however, said that he does not want to include in the appeal item No. 7 of list B of which the value is Rs. 305. The total valuation of the appeal for payment of court-fee regarding the half share of the plaintiffs- appellants therefore will come to Rs. 7,071-10-0 on which the deficiency in court-fee for this Court has to be calculated. 4. The office report .with respect to the deficiency in court-fee of the Court below, namely Rs. 610-14-0 is correct. The appellants must therefore make up the deficiency of the court-fee of the lower Court and of this Court within three months of this date. 5. The learned Government Advocate would be entitled to his- costs amounting to Rs. 120.