JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the judgment-debtor and is directed against an order allowing an application filed by the Respondent under sec. 47 of the CPC to the effect that his execution case should proceed inspite of a notice sent under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act by a Debt Settlement Board. The debt in question is a decree for mesne profits passed on the 14th November, 1941. The contention of the Respondent was that it is a debt within the meaning of the Act as it was incurred after the 1st January, 1940. This contention has been accepted by both the Courts below. 2. All the decisions of this Court dealing with the question in what cases, if any, the Civil Court may ignore a notice sent by a Debt Settlement Board have been placed before me. 3. The first question that arises is, therefore, the general question whether a Civil Court jurisdiction to ignore the notice. The Appellant is certainly supported by the decision in Jadu Mondalani v. Sm. Sarajini Chowdhurani 47 C. W. N. 888 (1943) but decisions to the contrary are to be found in the cases of Chowdhury Mohammed Ibrahim v. Saburjan Bewa 47 C. W. N. 796 (1943), Abinash Chandra Biswas v. Nakul Ruhidas 47 C. W. N. 891 (1943), Dinanand Singha Jha v. Sm. Nazimannessa 48 C. W. N. 712 (1944), Srikanta Kamar v. Atul Krishna Biswas 49 C. W. N. 143 (1944) and Bibhuti Bhusan Roy v. Bholanath Sinha Roy 49 C. W. N. 101 (1944). In this state of the authorities, it could hardly be contended any longer that the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter and, if I may say so with respect, I welcome those decisions. 4. On the merits of the question whether the Board has jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant's application, I am clearly of opinion that the decision of the Courts below is correct. Before the amendment of sec. 20 there would have been no difficulty in giving effect to the legal position. Whatever the Board might the Courts would ignore any award made and treat it as a nullity. 5. As a result, however, of the amendment of the section the Boards have now been given exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a liability is a debt or not. 6. Whatever the Board might the Courts would ignore any award made and treat it as a nullity. 5. As a result, however, of the amendment of the section the Boards have now been given exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a liability is a debt or not. 6. This of course may involve disputed quest both of fact and of law. But as a result of this exclusive jurisdiction it is not always easy to draw the exact line between a case of no jurisdiction and a case of a wrong decision. If it is merely the latter, a Civil Court cannot call it in question. 7. Turning to the present case it appears to be undisputed that the decree was passed after the 1st January, 1940. But in similar cases there might well be a dispute on a question of fact. Obviously the Court could not interfere with the decision of the Board on a matter of that kind. Then in the second place there is a question of law, whether the debt is a debt within the meaning of the definition under sec. 2, sub-sec. (8). In the present case the actual acts of trespass on which the liability is founded were admittedly committed prior to the 1st January, 1940. Apart from the provisions of sub-sec. (8) (i), which excludes any amount the liability for the payment of which is only contingent, it would be very difficult to say that the Board had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. If the Board forms the opinion that this sub-section has no application here, it cannot be said that they have done more than decide a point of law wrongly. 8. It is true that the decision in the case in Abinash Chandra Biswas v. Nakul Ruhidas 47 C. W. N. 891 (1943) suggests that the Court may treat a wrong decision on a point of law as a nullity. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided the case, I should find it impossible to draw such a distinction. If Boards have jurisdiction to give wrong decisions on questions of fact, they must also have similar jurisdiction to give wrong decisions on questions of law. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided the case, I should find it impossible to draw such a distinction. If Boards have jurisdiction to give wrong decisions on questions of fact, they must also have similar jurisdiction to give wrong decisions on questions of law. This is the effect of the decisions in Manager, Nator Raj Wards' Estate v. Geda Bewa 46 C. W. N. 12 (1941), Sitaram Bhattacharjee v. Pancha Muchi 48 C. W. N. 14 (1941) and Mahadeblal Agarwalla v. Inder Chand Kezriwal 49 C. W. N. 237 (1944). 9. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the question now in dispute is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board and that the present execution proceedings must be stayed on receipt of the notice. 10. It would be quite wrong to assume that the Board and the Appellate Officer will not give a right decision in this matter. Mr. Guha complains that he is being kept at bay indefinitely because of the dilatoriness of the proceedings before the Board. The present application was made as long ago as June, 1942, and there is another still earlier application by the Appellant. It is certainly alarming to find that the case is still undisposed of and I direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Collector of the District. 11. The result is that the orders of the Courts below are set aside and I direct that the execution case be kept pending until the application before the Board is disposed of. The costs in this Court and in the lower Appellate Court will be costs in the execution case--hearing-fee, one gold mohur. 12. Let the amount paid into Court remain in Court. Leave to appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent is granted.