JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The only question involved in this appeal is the true construction of a will expressed in the Bengali language. It first came up for hearing before the Chief Justice and Lodge J. who considered that it ought to be heard by a Bench of Judges, conversant with Bangali, both written and spoken. Accordingly, it was placed before us and has since been heard. The facts are simple, and so far as they bear upon the question in controversy, not disputed. It appears that one Saraswati Dassi, a woman of the town, owned certain properties which included a house described as premises No. 5, Kalidas Dutt Lane. Saraswati had two children, a daughter named Radharani and a son named Gour Das. It is stated that the daughter was the elder of the two. By a will executed on 15th May 1917, Saraswati disposed of all her properties, moveable and immovable, and appointed one Anukul Chandra Ghose to be her executor and. the guardian of her minor children after her death. She died on 4th January 1920, leaving her surviving the daughter and the son abovenamed. It appears that Radharani attained majority in the year 1928, so that at the death of Saraswati both her children were minors, Radharani being about 18 years of age. 2. The dispute in this appeal concerns the effect of the disposition made by Saraswati Dassi of premises No. 5. Kalidas Dutt Lane, The vernacular words used in the will are the following: [Amar 5 number Kalidas Dutta Lane bari amar kanya sabalika hoile paibe ebong amar kanyar abartmane amar ochhir jyestha putra 5 number Kalidas Lane bati paibe.] 3. Stated broadly and in neutral terms they purport to create a bequest in favour of the daughter (Radharani) to be taken by her on attainment of majority and a bequest over to the eldest son of the executor which is made dependent on Radharani's death. The question to be decided in this appeal is whether under the terms of the clause above quoted, the bequest to Radharani was one as would become absolute and indefeasible on her attaining majority, or whether the bequest to the eldest son of the executor would take effect on Radharani's death, whenever that event might occur. Radharani lived to attain majority, which as stated above, she did in 1928. Radharani lived to attain majority, which as stated above, she did in 1928. Prior there to, on 2nd June 1920, probate of Saraswati's will had been granted to the executor, Anukul Chandra Ghose. By a conveyance dated 10th October 1939, Radharani purported to sell her absolute interest in the property to the defendant, Purna Chandra Dutt. She died shortly thereafter, in October or November 1940. It appears that Radharani married one Mobarak Hossain and adopted another or an additional name, viz., Firozi Begum, but nothing turns on that circumstance. On 12th April 1943, the present suit was commenced by the plaintiff, Sudhangshu Sekhar Ghose, who claimed to be the eldest son of the executor, Anukul. He prayed for a declaration that in the events which had happened, he had become absolutely entitled to premises No. 5, Kalidas Dutt Lane, for a construction of Saraswati's will, if necessary, for possession, mesne profits and other incidental reliefs. The sole defendant in the suit was Purna Chandra Dutt, the purchaser from Radharani. Gour Das, Saraswati's son, is stated to have died before the institution of the suit. In para.8 of the written statement, the defendant stated that he did not admit that the plaintiff was the eldest son of the executor. That objection, however, was not persisted in and the suit proceeded on the footing that the plaintiff was the eldest son of Anukul, as he claimed to be. The suit came to be heard by Sen J. Before him, the contention of the plaintiff was that as respects premises No. 5, Kalidas Dutt Lane, the will, on its true construction, created two successive interests, the first in favour of the daughter Radharani, to be taken by her on attainment of majority and limited to her life, and the second, an absolute interest, in favour of the eldest son of the executor, to be taken by him upon the death of Radharani, whenever it might occur. Radharani having died, the property, it was contended, had devolved upon the plaintiff in absolute right and the defendant had no present title or interest therein by virtue of his purchase from Radharani. The contention of the defendant was that the terms of the will attracted S. 124, Succession Act, and, by reason of the provisions of that section, the bequest to the plaintiff could not, in the circumstances of the case, take effect. The contention of the defendant was that the terms of the will attracted S. 124, Succession Act, and, by reason of the provisions of that section, the bequest to the plaintiff could not, in the circumstances of the case, take effect. It was contended that the will, on a fair construction, admitted of the meaning that the testatrix intended the eldest son of the executor to take only in the event of the daughter dying before attaining majority, and so much being possible, S. 124, as interpreted by the Judicial Committee in 59 I. A. 419 Indira Rani Ghose v. Akhoy Kumar Ghose ('32)19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 269 : 60 Cal. 554 : 59 I. A. 419 : 140 I. C. 433 (P. C.), required that that meaning should be adopted. The will, so construed, would mean that a legacy was given to the executor's eldest son if a specified uncertain event, viz., death of the daughter before attainment of majority, should happen, and no time was mentioned in the will for the occurrence of that event. The event did not happen before the period of distribution, i. e., the date of attainment of majority by the daughter, inasmuch she lived to attain majority. Accordingly, the argument proceeded, the legacy to the executor's son failed under the provisions of section 124. 4. Sen J. repelled the contentions of the defendant and accepted those of the plaintiff. He held that the correct translation of the words [ebong amar kanyar abartmane] would be 'and on the death of my daughter', as contended by the plaintiff, and not 'and in the event or in the case of the death of my daughter,' as contended by the defendant. That being so, the effect of the will, in his opinion, was that successive interests were thereby bequeathed, the first interest being a life estate to the daughter and the next interest being an absolute interest to the eldest son of the executor upon the daughter's death. He added that the words used in the will admitted of no doubt as to their meaning, but assuming they did, the doubt was removed by surrounding circumstances to some of which he referred. As regards S. 124, Succession Act, he held that it had no application, since the bequest to the executor's son was not contingent upon the happening of a specified uncertain event. As regards S. 124, Succession Act, he held that it had no application, since the bequest to the executor's son was not contingent upon the happening of a specified uncertain event. All that the will, in his view, said was that on the death of the testatrix's daughter, the executor's son would get the property, and death, he pointed out, was not an uncertain but the most certain of all events. He declined to apply the rule of construction laid down in 59 I. A. 419 Indira Rani Ghose v. Akhoy Kumar Ghose ('32)19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 269 : 60 Cal. 554 : 59 I. A. 419 : 140 I. C. 433 (P. C) on the ground that the observations of the Judicial Committee did not relate to a case of death simpliciter such as the present case. In the result, he passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff, declaring his title to the premises in suit and granting him immediate possession. It is stated in the judgment that the claim for mesne profits was not pressed. 5. Thereupon the defendant preferred the present appeal. At the hearing before us, the contentions respectively urged by the parties before Sen J. were repeated. It is obvious that the matters for consideration in the present appeal are, first, the correct construction of the will and secondly, when that construction has been determined, the rule of law applicable to the bequests as made. The paper-book contains two translations of the will. One was made at the time of the grant or probate and is said to be the translation copied in the register of grants under Ch. 35, R. 22, Original Side Rules. The other translation was apparently made for the purposes of the present suit. Each translation is by a Translator of the High Court, and both were filed on behalf of the plaintiff. In the first of the translations, the material clause of the will is thus rendered : 'My daughter on attaining majority shall get my house No. 5, Kali Das Dutt Lane, and in the absence of my daughter, my executor's eldest son shall get the said house No. 5, Kalidas Dutt Lane. The rendering in the other translation is as follows : My daughter on her attaining majority shall get my house No. 5, Kalidas Dutt Lane. The rendering in the other translation is as follows : My daughter on her attaining majority shall get my house No. 5, Kalidas Dutt Lane. On the demise of my daughter, the eldest son of my Achhi shall get the said house No. 5, Kalidas Dutta Lane. 6. It will be noticed that the second translation leaves out the conjunction between the clause containing the bequest to the daughter and that containing the bequest to the executor's son; and while the event contemplated by the vernacular word [abartmane] is rendered in the first translation as 'absence,' in the second it is rendered as 'demise.' On the subject of translations, Dr. Roy, appearing on behalf of the defendant, raised a preliminary contention which may be disposed of at once. He contended that in the case of vernacular wills, a Court of construction was not entitled to go upon any translation other than the one officially made at the time of the grant of probate, or even to look at the will itself. His argument was that when a grant of probate was made, probate was granted of the will as then translated, and the judgment of the probate Court being a judgment in rem, it was binding on all and held everyone to the particular translation. In support of his contention, Dr. Roy relied upon Rr. 22 and 23, Ch. 35, Original Side Rules, and the cases in (1838) 3 My. & Cr. 559 Bernal v. Bernal (1838) 3 My. & Cr. 559: 7 L. J. (N.S.) Ch. 115 and (1892) 2 Ch. 229 In re Cliff's Trusts (1892) 2 Ch. 229 : 61 L. J. Ch. 397 : 66 L. T. 483; 40 W. R. 439. 7. In our opinion, this contention is without substance. Under the Indian Succession Act, as under other systems of law, probate is granted, in the case of domestic wills, of the will itself and not of any translation. Indeed, it would be extraordinary if the law were that whatever the actual will left by a testator, if a translation came to be made during the probate proceedings and placed on the record, that translation would take the place of the will and prevail over the original text, although it might be incorrect and materially different in its provisions from what the testator had in fact willed and by his own language expressed. That, however, is not the law. Under S. 289, Indian Succession Act, probate is to be granted of the will; S. 294 requires that all original wills, of which probate has been granted, must be preserved; and when a will has been lost or mislaid or destroyed, probate of a limited duration only is granted under Ch. 2 of Part 9 of the Act on the basis of a copy or draft or of contents proved by parol testimony 'until the original or a properly authenticated copy of it is produced.' It is thus always the will itself to which the Court has regard in granting probate; and since the task of a Court of construction is to ascertain the intention of the testator as expressed in the language used by him, it is manifestly impossible that the Court should be bound to disregard that language and go upon the language of a translator, and thus act upon secondary in preference to primary evidence. The Rules of the Original Side, referred to by Dr. Roy, mainly follow Ss. 277 and 289 of the Act and require that in the case of wills, expressed in a language other than English, an English translation shall be made and placed on the record, presumably because the Court language is English; but they do not enact that the translation shall be deemed to be the will. Neither do the English cases referred to by Dr. Roy establish the proposition for which he contended. They deal with the peculiar rule of English law relating to foreign wills, concerning moveables and expressed in foreign language, which have to be construed according to the law of the testator's domicile and in respect of which probate had been granted of a translation; particularly, cases where the Court of domicile having itself granted probate of a translation, the English Court had granted probate of a translation of such translation and not of a translation of the original. It was in such circumstances that observations were made in certain cases to the effect that the original will could not be looked into. It was in such circumstances that observations were made in certain cases to the effect that the original will could not be looked into. But even with regard to cases where probate was granted of a translation, the general rule has been thus stated: Where a translation of a will has been admitted to probate and the original (or, where that is abroad, a duly certified copy) has been deposited therewith, the Court may refer to such original or copy for the purpose of deciding questions of construction; so also if the foreign will is admitted to probate and the English translation is registered therewith": see Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 6, pp. 254-55 and the cases in (1923) 1 Ch. 220 In re Manners; Manners v. Manners (1923) 1 Ch. 220 : 92 L. J. Ch. 249 : 128 L. T. 564 and (1885) 30 Ch. D. 390 In re Harrison; Turner v. Hellard (1885) 30 Ch. D. 390 : 55 L. J. Ch. 799 : 53 L. T. 799; 34 W. R. 420. There is an observation, it is true, in (1892) 2 Ch. 229 In re Cliff's Trusts (1892) 2 Ch. 229 : 61 L. J. Ch. 397 : 66 L. T. 483; 40 W. R. 439 by way of an obiter dictum that if an objection is raised, the translation may have first to be brought before the probate Court for correction. But that rule, even if correct, can have no application in the present case for as many as three reasons. In the first place, the will as far as the disputed property is concerned does not deal with moveables. In the second place, the will is not a foreign will, nor a will expressed in a foreign language, and under the law of the country probate was granted not of the translation but of the will itself. In the third place, instead of objecting to reference being made to the original will, the defendant himself stated in Para. 2 of his written statement that he craved leave to refer to the original will as well as the translation made at the time of granting the probate for the purpose of ascertaining the true intent, meaning and purport thereof. 8. 2 of his written statement that he craved leave to refer to the original will as well as the translation made at the time of granting the probate for the purpose of ascertaining the true intent, meaning and purport thereof. 8. We hold accordingly that for the purpose of construing the will, we are entitled to look at the original, and indeed bound to do so in the present case, inasmuch as there is no agreement between the parties as to the correct translation. On the question of the proper construction of the will, learned counsel for both the parties have referred us to a number of rulings. As has so often been pointed out, in construing a will, little or no assistance can be derived from decisions on other wills in which other testators used other language. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with merely mentioning the cases cited. They were, 22 Bom. 409 Lallu v. Jagmohan ('98) 22 Bom. 409; 22 C. W. N. 689 Harendra Chandra v. Basanta Kumar ('18) 5 A. I. R. 1918 Cal. 102 : 43 I. C. 991 : 22 C. W. N. 689; 43 I. A. 12 Bhupendra Krishna Ghose v. Amarendra Nath Dey ('15) 2 A. I. R. 1915 P. C. 101 : 43 Cal. 432 : 43 I. A. 12 : 34 I. C. 892 (P. C.) and (1852) 15 Beav. 357 Edwards v. Edwards (1852) 15 Beav. 357:21 L. J. Ch. 324 on the side of the plaintiff; and 23 I. A. 18 Narendra Nath Sirkar v. Kamal Bashini Dassi ('96) 23 Cal. 563 : 23 I. A. 18 : 6 Sar. 663 (P.C.); 16 I. A. 166 Tara Churn Chatterjee v. Suresh Chunder Mukherjee ('90) 17 Cal. 122 : 16 I. A. 166 : 5 Sar. 379 (P.C.); 26 C. L. J. 250 Kumud Krishna v. Jogendra Nath ('17) 4 A. I. R. 1917 Cal. 19 : 41 I. C. 511 : 26 C.L.J. 250; 12 C. W. N. 44 Gobinda Chandra Gupta v. Benode Chandra Dutt ('08) 12 C. W. N. 44; 33 Cal. 1306 Manikyamala Bose v. Nanda Kumar Bose ('06) 33 Cal. 1306; 17 C. L. J. 630 Mahendra Lal Nandi v. Rakhal Das ('12) 17 C. L. J. 630 : 16 I. C. 809 and 3 C.W.N. 478 Monohar Mukherjee v. Kasiswar Mukherji ('99) 3 C. W. N. 478 on the side of the defendant. 1306 Manikyamala Bose v. Nanda Kumar Bose ('06) 33 Cal. 1306; 17 C. L. J. 630 Mahendra Lal Nandi v. Rakhal Das ('12) 17 C. L. J. 630 : 16 I. C. 809 and 3 C.W.N. 478 Monohar Mukherjee v. Kasiswar Mukherji ('99) 3 C. W. N. 478 on the side of the defendant. In none of these cases did the word [abartmane] occur in the will construed. It did occur and was construed in 42 C. W. N. 1138 Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prosad ('38) 25 A. I. R. 1938 Cal. 709 : 177 I. C. 898 : 42 C.W.N. 1138 also cited, but the matter for consideration there was whether the word connoted only physical death or was wide enough to cover cesser of effective existence as by civil death or relinquishment of office. 9. Unless there be a case construing a will expressed in identical language, the only cases to which reference may legitimately and usefully be made are those in which some principle of construction is laid down. Of such cases only one was cited before us, viz., the case in 59 I. A. 419 Indira Rani Ghose v. Akhoy Kumar Ghose ('32)19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 269 : 60 Cal. 554 : 59 I. A. 419 : 140 I. C. 433 (P. C) to which reference has already been made. That case is the only one to be found in the books in which the Judicial Committee interpreted S. 124 of the present Succession Act or the corresponding S. 111 of the Act of 1865. Their Lordships did apply S. 111 in a number of other cases, but they did not interpret the section beyond stating that it laid down a hard and fast rule which must be applied, wherever it was applicable, without speculating on the intention of the testator. In 59 I.A. 419 Indira Rani Ghose v. Akhoy Kumar Ghose ('32)19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 269 : 60 Cal. 554 : 59 I. A. 419 : 140 I. C. 433 (P. C.) they interpreted S. 124, and, as we read that case, held it to embody both a rule of construction and a rule of law applicable to legacies contingent on the happening of a specified uncertain event. Two passages occurring in the judgment may in this connection be referred to. Two passages occurring in the judgment may in this connection be referred to. Their Lordships observed that the section only applies, if without doing violence to the terms of the will, it can be held, as a matter of words, that the occurrence of the uncertain event prior to 'the period when the fund bequeathed is payable or distributable' is alone within the contemplation of the testator. If the terms of the will make that construction of his words impossible, the section then does not apply. Dealing next with illust. (i) to the section, their Lordships observed that in the case illustrated it was possible without doing violence to the words to refer the specified death of A to his death in the life time of the testator, and "so much being possible, the section requires that A's death shall be so referred." Reading the two passages together, their effect seems to us to be that if the words of the will, on a fair and natural construction, are capable of bearing the meaning that the testator contemplated the happening of the contingency not at any time or after the period of distribution, but only before that period, then under S. 124 the will must be read in that sense, although another and a wider meaning might also be possible; and to the will, so read, the section will apply as regards the legacy taking effect, provided no time is expressly mentioned for the occurrence of the contingency. It appears that a distinction is made between 'mention' and 'contemplation,' for obviously the contemplation gatherable from the words of the will that the contingency must happen before the period of distribution does not amount to mentioning a time for its occurrence. If it did, the section could not be held to apply. The mention of the time must be express. The contemplation, on the other hand, need not be express but may be implied. In illust. (i) which the Judicial Committee interpret as contemplating the specified death of A in the life time of the testator, the language used is simply 'in case of his death.' Similarly, in 23 I. A. 18 Narendra Nath Sirkar v. Kamal Bashini Dassi ('96) 23 Cal. 563 : 23 I. A. 18 : 6 Sar. In illust. (i) which the Judicial Committee interpret as contemplating the specified death of A in the life time of the testator, the language used is simply 'in case of his death.' Similarly, in 23 I. A. 18 Narendra Nath Sirkar v. Kamal Bashini Dassi ('96) 23 Cal. 563 : 23 I. A. 18 : 6 Sar. 663 (P.C.), with regard to which the Judicial Committee observe in 59 I. A. 419 Indira Rani Ghose v. Akhoy Kumar Ghose ('32)19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 269 : 60 Cal. 554 : 59 I. A. 419 : 140 I. C. 433 (P. C) that death there "was clearly on the will confined to death in the testator's life time," the words used in the will were simply "any of the sons dying childless." 10. In the judgment under appeal Sen J., observed that the rule of construction laid down by the Judicial Committee would not apply in a case of death simpliciter and where death, without more, was treated as the contingency, there was no specified uncertain event, since of all events death is the most certain. If death simpliciter be really the contingency contemplated, the proposition is undoubtedly correct, but we must point out, with respect, that the mere fact that no express or specific words of contingency are attached to the reference to death is not conclusive that the case is one of death simpliciter and that no qualification is intended. The qualification may be implied in other words of the will, or the words, taken as a whole, may be such that the qualification is not excluded, as in the two instances above given. The rule of construction laid down by the Judicial Committee, as applied to cases of death, seems to be a mere re-statement of the general principle that where death, of all events the most certain and inevitable, is spoken of as a contingency, it will be construed, whenever possible, to mean death before the period of distribution, i. e., when the gift is immediate, death before the testator, or when the gift is in remainder, death before the expiration of the particular estate. The reason behind that principle has been stated to be that where a gift of an absolute interest in property to one person is followed by a gift of it to another in a particular event, the disposition of the Courts is to put such a construction on the gift over as will interfere as little as possible with the prior gift. The matter has nowhere been better put than in the following passage in Jarman on Wills, 7th Edn. pp. 2079-80. Where a bequest is made to a person, with a gift over in the case of his death, a question arises whether the testator uses the words 'in case of' in the sense of 'at' or 'from' and thereby as restrictive of the prior bequest to a life interest, i. e., as introducing a gift to take effect on the decease of the prior legatee in all circumstances, or with a view to create a bequest in defeasance of or in substitution for the prior one, in the event of the death of the legatee in some contingency. The difficulty in such cases arises from the testator having applied terms of contingency to an event, of all events the most certain and inevitable and to satisfy which terms it is necessary to connect with death some circumstances in association with which it is contingent; that circumstance naturally is the time of its happening; and such time, where the bequest is immediate (i. e., in possession) necessarily is the death of the testator, there being no other period to which the words can be referred. It has only to be added that when the bequest is not immediate but postponed to the occurrence of some event, the time which must be connected with death and before which death must occur in order that the gift over can take "effect, should be taken to be the date of occurrence of that event. The contention under S. 124, Succession Act, cannot, therefore, be disposed of merely on the ground that in the will no express words of contingency are coupled with the reference to the daughter's death. The contention under S. 124, Succession Act, cannot, therefore, be disposed of merely on the ground that in the will no express words of contingency are coupled with the reference to the daughter's death. A contingency may yet be implied; and in addressing ourselves to our first task of construing the will, we must apply the rule of construction laid down by the Judicial Committee and see whether the words can properly bear the meaning that the death of her daughter, on the occurrence of which the testatrix intended the executor's son to take the property, was only death before attainment of majority, although she might not have expressly said so. If that construction is a possible construction as a matter of language, it must be placed on the will. 11. On that question, it was contended by Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the plaintiff that the words of the will made such construction impossible. It was admitted by both parties that although the word [abartmane] in its literal meaning, meant 'non-existence,' in the context in which it had been used in the will, it referred only to death. But it was contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the word, as used in the will, did not speak of death as a contingency at all but as a certainty; and that its true meaning was not 'in the case of death' which alone might attract the rule of construction referred to above, but 'upon or after the death,' He pointed out the absence of any express words of contingency and quoted from a Bengali to English Dictionary the meaning of the words [abartmane] and [amar abartmane] as there given. The latter phrase has been rendered in the Dictionary as "when I am gone or dead," "after my demise." Mr. Chatterjee also referred us to a standard Bengali Dictionary Shabda-Kosha for various illustrations of the word [abartmane] as used by writers of repute. On the above grounds, his contention on the words of the will was that they did not contemplate the daughter's death as a contingency but as a certain event, dividing off the estate given to her from the estate given after her to the executor's son. On the above grounds, his contention on the words of the will was that they did not contemplate the daughter's death as a contingency but as a certain event, dividing off the estate given to her from the estate given after her to the executor's son. There were two successive interests conferred by two separate clauses connected by the conjunction [ebong] the second interest to be taken upon the termination of the first by death, whenever the death might occur. 12. It should be added that Mr. Chatterjee also referred to several passages from Jarman on Wills, but as those passages relate to legacies expressed to take place 'on,' 'after' or 'at' death, they do not require to be considered in detail. It is not disputed that the rule laid down in the passages cited will apply if the disposition is in the form there assumed. The primary question to be considered in the present case is whether the words of the will, taken in their proper and natural sense, contemplate a legacy to the executor's son 'in the event of the daughter's death or 'upon the death' of the daughter. If the former, then the rule of construction laid down in 59 I. A. 419 Indira Rani Ghose v. Akhoy Kumar Ghose ('32)19 A. I. R. 1932 P. C. 269 : 60 Cal. 554 : 59 I. A. 419 : 140 I. C. 433 (P. C) will apply. On behalf of the defendant, it was contended by Dr. Roy that the word [abartmane] meant 'in the event of death' and it might quite properly bear the construction that thereby the testatrix was only referring to death of the daughter before attainment of majority. He pointed out that in the vocabulary of the testatrix the word for 'after death' was [jibanante] which she had used twice with reference to her own death. If the testatrix intended the bequest to the executor's son to take effect 'after the death' of the daughter, it was unnatural that she should not have used that word, but another. Dr. If the testatrix intended the bequest to the executor's son to take effect 'after the death' of the daughter, it was unnatural that she should not have used that word, but another. Dr. Roy also relied on the word [paibe] used in connexion with the bequest to the daughter, and contended that having regard to the use of that word in connexion with other bequests which were unquestionably absolute, it meant that the daughter was to get the house absolutely as soon as she attained majority, or to put in another form, if she did not die before attaining majority. The fact that the bequest was postponed till the attainment of majority was said to lend strength to this contention as also the fact that the predicate [paibe] had been used twice with reference to the two bequests. On these grounds Dr. Roy's contention on the words of the will was that it was possible to construe them as contemplating the daughter's death, not simpliciter, but only before attainment of majority, and that, therefore, they must be so construed. We have examined the words of the original will for ourselves with care. We do not think that when the question is the construction of a document expressed in a particular language, it is correct or proper to go by the translation of individual or isolated words as given in a dictionary. As has been well observed, making a translation is not a mere question of trying to find out in a dictionary the words which are given as equivalents of the words of the document; a true translation is the putting into English that which is the exact effect of the language used under the circumstances. But having the advantage of knowing the language in which the will is expressed, we think we need not look for or consider any translations at all. It appears to us right that we should examine the vernacular words themselves. Taking those words as used in the will, we must say, first, that we do not attach to the word [paibe] the importance or significance which Dr. Roy would attribute to it. We also think that the repetition of the predicate is not a circumstance which supports Dr. Taking those words as used in the will, we must say, first, that we do not attach to the word [paibe] the importance or significance which Dr. Roy would attribute to it. We also think that the repetition of the predicate is not a circumstance which supports Dr. Roy's contention, but, on the other hand, if the predicate had been used only once at the end of the whole clause and not twice, as it has been, his contention would have been more tenable. The fact that the word [jibanante] has been used in other parts of the will to indicate 'after death' is of some importance, but we should not be prepared to base our decision on that circumstance. Nevertheless, taking all the words of the clause together and having regard to modes of expression natural to and familiar in the Bengali language, we are of opinion that the clause may quite fairly be construed, without any violence to its language, as meaning that the testatrix, in providing for a bequest to the executor's son, was making it dependent on a contingency, viz., the death of the daughter; and as regards that contingency, death before the daughter attained majority and was able to take the property was the only event she had in contemplation. It is true that no express words of contingency are used, nor any subjunctive; but in Bengali a contingency may also be imported by the seventh case-ending, as used in the present case in the word [abartmane]. Again it is true that no express words of qualification are attached to the expression [abartmane]. But the words [amar kanyar abartmane] mean, literally, "if my daughter is not there," and the whole phrase [amar kanya sabalika hoile paibe ebong amar kanyar abartmane amar ochhir jyestha putra paibe] (my daughter, on attaining majority shall get it, and if she be not there, the eldest son of my executor shall get) may well bear the construction that the second part relating to the executor's son is not a phrase of succession but indicates an alternative, and the testatrix is thinking of the non-existence of the daughter only with reference to the time indicated in the first part, i. e., when the daughter is due to attain majority. In other words, the language may quite fairly be taken to mean that the mind of the testatrix is dwelling on the destination of the property. She first gives it to the daughter, to be taken by her on attaining majority, but reminding herself immediately of a possible contingency that the daughter may not be alive at the relevant time, she provides for that contingency by laying down that in that event, the executor's son shall take the property. The two parts of the phrase constitute but one disposition, made to two persons in the alternative, the word [ebong] connecting them and carrying forward the mind of the testatrix from the one to the other in the course of the same act of disposition. On this construction, the word [abartmane] would be read as connected with the phrase [sabalika hoile] and the meaning of the clause would be : "my daughter, on the attaining majority shall get it, and if she be not there at the time, the eldest son of my executor shall get." It must be admitted that the word [abartmane] may also mean 'when she is not there' and the material clause of the will is equally susceptible of the meaning that the testatrix intended her daughter to take first and the executor's son to take after the death of the daughter. But the meaning first suggested is one which may properly be given to it without violence to the natural sense of any of the words used. Such meaning would not be inconsistent with any of the illustrations of the use of the word [abartmane] which Mr. Chatterjee cited from the Shabda-Kosha. A person intending to convey in Bengali the meaning that the daughter would take on attainment of majority and the executor's son would take only if the daughter died before attainment of majority might well use the language used in this will, and if he did so, his meaning would be appropriately conveyed. As we understand the matter, it is not necessary that the language of the will should only be capable of meaning that the testator intended the uncertain event to occur before the period of distribution. As we understand the matter, it is not necessary that the language of the will should only be capable of meaning that the testator intended the uncertain event to occur before the period of distribution. All that it is required is that the language should be such as, on a fair construction, admits of the meaning that occurrence of the uncertain event before the period of distribution was alone in the contemplation of the testator. If that meaning is possible but another meaning be equally possible, the first is not excluded or, to put it in the words of the Judicial Committee, the terms of the will do not make that construction of the words impossible. In such a case the words must, as a matter of law, be taken to bear that construction. 13. We must add that in our opinion the surrounding circumstances too do not exclude this construction. The first object of the testatrix's bounty is her daughter and the will shows that her first thoughts were of her. She may naturally have intended, as the language is capable of meaning that she did, that if the daughter lived to attain majority, then she should get the property absolutely and indefeasibly and that the executor's son, who was a stranger, would get it only if the legacy to the daughter did not effectuate by reason of her death during minority. Our conclusion on this part of the case, therefore, is that the meaning contended for by the defendant, though less wide than what the words might also bear, is yet one that may properly be given to it. Without doing violence to the terms of the will, it is possible to hold, as a matter of words, that death of the daughter before she attained majority was alone in the contemplation of the testatrix. If so, that construction must be adopted. On the above construction of the will, disposal of the remaining question is easy. There is a specified uncertain event, viz., death of the daughter before attainment of majority. A legacy of the house is given to the eldest son of the executor, if that uncertain event shall not happen. No time is mentioned in the will for the occurrence of that event. It follows that S. 124 applies. There is a specified uncertain event, viz., death of the daughter before attainment of majority. A legacy of the house is given to the eldest son of the executor, if that uncertain event shall not happen. No time is mentioned in the will for the occurrence of that event. It follows that S. 124 applies. In the next place, the period of distribution under the will is the date of attainment of majority by the daughter. She did not die before that date, but lived to attain majority. The specified uncertain event therefore, did not take place before the period of distribution. The result is that the case falls exactly within the third illustration to S. 124 and by reason of the provisions of that section, the legacy to the executor's son cannot take effect. In the above circumstances, the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the disputed property and is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed, the judgment and decree of Sen J. set aside and the plaintiff's suit dismissed. It is ordered and decreed accordingly. In the circumstances each party will bear his own costs in this Court as well as before Sen J. Biswas, J. 14. I agree.