JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit brought by the plaintiffs-respondents for possession of house property in Nakhas. The plaintiffs claim to have purchased this property at auction in execution of a decree on the foot of two mortgage deeds, dated the 20th November, 1920, and the 13th October, 1927. These deeds were executed by Mst. Alia Bandi in favour of Hyder Husain the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs brought a suit to enforce these two mortgages and obtained a decree. The property was sold in execution of this decree and the plaintiffs themselves purchased the property. When the plaintiffs, after obtaining the sale certificate, applied for a delivery of possession they were resisted by the appellants who made an objection under Order 21, rule 97. This objection was upheld by the execution court. The reason why the appellants resisted the delivery of possession is this. They say that this property belonged to Nawab Malka Begum and Ali Bahadur, the parents of defendants 1 to 3 jointly. On the 31st March, 1899, Nawab Malka Begam and Ali Bahadur executed a mortgage deed, Exhibit A-l, in favour of Sahib Mirza. It is a mortgage by conditional sale. After the death of Sahib Mirza, Hyder Mirza, one of his three sons and his executor under his will, sold the mortgagee rights to Baldeo Das and Lachman Das. The sale deed is Exhibit 11, dated the 14th November, 1901. Baldeo Das and Lachman Das sold the property to Alia Bandi by Exhibit A-5, dated the 16th October, 1903. The defendants-appellants say that Alia Bandi was no more than owner of mortgagee rights and that the two simple mortgages executed by her, and referred to .in the opening of the judgment, were sub- mortgages. 2. When the plaintiffs-respondents brought the suit on the foot of these mortgages they did not implead the appellants." Before the auction sale the appellants redeemed the property from Alia Bandi. This was during the pendency of that suit. The trial Court has held that this redemption is affected by the rule of "lis pendens" and the appellants' learned Counsel does not challenge this finding. This was during the pendency of that suit. The trial Court has held that this redemption is affected by the rule of "lis pendens" and the appellants' learned Counsel does not challenge this finding. Our note of his argument is The fact remains that when the suit was brought the defendants were in possession and when the plaintiffs tried to take delivery of possession defendants were in possession and resisted. 3. This is not correct. As is stated in the judgment of the learned lower Court (page 42 of the printed book, parts I and II), They (the plaintiffs) put the decree in execution. Their first application was made in 1933. The property was sold but the execution application was consigned to records before the sale was confirmed. There were the usual attempts by the judgment-debtor to checkmate the decree-holders and to deprive them of the fruits of their decree. The decree-holders put in a second application for execution on the 17th of February, 1936. This was the state of affairs when all of a sudden, after a lapse of about 45 years, the descendants of the original mortgagors decide upon redeeming the "Bai bil Wafa' mortgage of 1892. 4. The learned trial Judge then goes on to give his reasons for believing that the proceedings which followed were collusive as between Alia Bandi and the representatives-in-interest of Nawab Malka Begum and Ali Bahadur, and the reasons appear to us to be very good reasons. This part of the judgment has not been challenged at all in this appeal. The defendants- appellants say, however, that if the account of the mortgage of 1892 were taken, it would be found that the mortgage has been over-paid and that therefore they cannot be dispossessed. Furthermore appellants' learned Counsel argues that the point upon which the case turned in the lower Court was never pleaded by the plaintiffs in the suit and no issue was framed, la the arguments the point was raised that the sales purported to be sales not of mortgagee rights, but of absolute rights, and that therefore no suit for redemption lies but only a suit for possession under Art. 134, for which the period of limitation is only 12 years. Now it has been argued that in view of the pleadings and issues the plaintiffs were not entitled to raise this question at all. Now it has been argued that in view of the pleadings and issues the plaintiffs were not entitled to raise this question at all. It appears that when the evidence was over there was some discussion in Court about the points which were going to be argued in the case and this question was referred to as one of them. On the next , hearing the defendants made an application protesting against this and urging that it the matter was to be argued the defendants should be ordered to plead that case categorically and the Court should frame an issue upon it. This application was made on the 24th March, 1939. The Court, however, passed an order upon this application holding that it was not necessary to frame a specific issue on every point of law that is likely to be argued in the case and that paragraphs 13, 14 and 21 of the plaintiffs' 'replication covered the paint sufficiently as also issues 2, 3 and 4. We examined have the pleadings and the issues and we think that the point was sufficiently covered by these pleadings and issues as soon as by issue 5 (a), Are the defendants not entitled to show in this suit that the mortgage of 1892 has been satisfied in this manner. 5. The omission to mention Article 134 in the pleadings is immaterial. Every pleading must state facts and not law". (Orders on pleading and practice, 8th Edition, page 86.) 6. The appellants learned Counsel argues that on account of specific issue not having been raised about Article 134, he has been deprived of the chance of producing evidence on what is a mixed question of fact and law. We are unable to agree, with this contention. On the 26th April, 1939, some further documents were filed by the defendants and admitted in evidence. Since the facts necessary for the raising of the plea had already been pleaded and the plea was covered by the issues, these documents might have been filed before but it appears that to prevent any unfairness to the defendants the learned Judge gave them another opportunity of producing evidence on this issue. The plaintiffs also raised no objection. 7. The way in which the property came to the plaintiffs by a series of transactions has already bean described. The plaintiffs also raised no objection. 7. The way in which the property came to the plaintiffs by a series of transactions has already bean described. The pedigree of the defendants, which is given at page 7 of the paper book, will assist in the under- standing of the case. 8. Nausad Ali, defendant No. 7 and Razia Begum, defendant No. 6, are transferees, Razia Begum, who is the wife of S. Muhammad Naqi, Advocate, is also daughter of Nawab Suleman Bahadur. 9. The next part of learned Counsel's argument may be divided under three heads though the questions involved are not strictly separated from one another. (1) He argues that in none of the transfers after the mortgage of 1892 was there any intention to transfer more than mortgagee rights. The knowledge of the parties is relevant for the purpose of finding out what the intention of the parties was, and that knowledge can be inferred from the deeds of transfer themselves and also from other evidence, since the defendants were not parties to the diets of transfer and Section 92 of the Evidence Act does not apply. Since the parties to these deeds knew full well what were the rights held by the transferors, there will be a presumption against their having fraudulently transferred anything more than could actually be transferred. (2) The meaning of Article 134 by the removal of the words "in good faith" from the article it was intended merely to re- move the onus from the transferee of proving that he had not notice, that is, it related to constructive notice only and not to actual notice. If the transferor and the transferee can be proved to have known, that is, to have had actual notice of the nature of the right which could be legally transferred, Article 134 has no application. To hold otherwise would amount to holding that the legislature has given sanction to a transfer which is fraudulent on both sides. The legislature could never have intended that the period for bringing a suit could be cat down from 60 years to 12 years by means of fraud. (3) Article 134 does not apply to a transfer from a transferee from a mortgagee, though it applied to a transfer from a mortgagee. 10. The legislature could never have intended that the period for bringing a suit could be cat down from 60 years to 12 years by means of fraud. (3) Article 134 does not apply to a transfer from a transferee from a mortgagee, though it applied to a transfer from a mortgagee. 10. Section V of Act XIV of 1359 ran : In suits for the recovery from the purchaser or any person claiming under him of any property purchased 'bona fide' and for valuable consideration from a trustee, depositary, pawnee, or mortgagee, the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen at the date of the purchase. Provided that, in the case or purchase from a depositary, pawnee, of mortgagee, no such suit shall be maintained unless brought within the time limited by Clause 15 Section I. 11. Section I, Clause 15 provides 30 years for movable and 60 years for immovable property. Article 134 in the Limitation Act IX Of 1871 ran: To recover possession of immovable property conveyed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards purchased from the trustee or mortgagee in good faith and for value 12 years the date of purchaser. 12. In the Limitation Act XV of 1877 it ran : To recover possession of immoveable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards purchased from the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration 12 years the date of the purchase. 13. In the Limitation Act, Act IX of 1908, it ran : To recover possession of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration 12 years the date of the transfer. 14. In Act I of 1929 the words "when the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff," were substituted for the words 'The date of the transfer". The first case to which we are referred, Radhanath Doss v. Gisborne & Co. (1871) 14 M o I A 1, was under Act XIV of 1859. The discussion of the question of Limitation begins at page 14. The first case to which we are referred, Radhanath Doss v. Gisborne & Co. (1871) 14 M o I A 1, was under Act XIV of 1859. The discussion of the question of Limitation begins at page 14. At pages 15 and 16 their Lordships make the following re- marks : Their Lordships think, that in order to claim the benefit of this section a defendant must show three things : First, that he is a purchaser according to the proper meaning of that term ; second, that he is a 'bona fide' purchaser ; and third, that he is a purchaser for valuable consideration. Now what the meaning of the term 'purchaser' in this section ? It cannot be a person who purchases a mortgage as a mortgage, because that would be merely equivalent to an assignment of a mortgage: it would be the case of a person taking a mortgage with a clear and distinct understanding that it was nothing more than a mortgage. It, therefore must mean, in their Lordships' opinion, some person who purchases that which lde facto' is a mortgage upon a representation made to him, and in the full belief that it is not a mortgage, but an absolute title. 15. Their Lordships then go on to examine the pleadings, the deed itself and the evidence of the transaction and come to the conclusion that the defendant was not a purchaser within the meaning of the section at all. This they do before dealing with the question of 'bona fides1 at all and quite independently of it. Appellants' learned counsel argues that the substitution of the word 'transfer' for the word purchase makes no difference in principle, and that all these questions the pleadings, the deeds and the evidence about the negotiation for the transaction, are relevant for the decision whether a transfer has been made within the meaning of Article 134 or whether there has been merely an assignment of the mortgage. 16. The next case relied upon by the appellants is Saiyed Muhammad Abbas v. Mst. Nasiban (1918) 6 O L J 384, decided in 1918. 16. The next case relied upon by the appellants is Saiyed Muhammad Abbas v. Mst. Nasiban (1918) 6 O L J 384, decided in 1918. At page 387 the learned Judge remarked : There is no distinction in principle between a person purchasing a mortgage as a mortgage, that is, with a distinct understanding that it was nothing more than a mortgage, and another who acquires a mortgage, knowing that it was a mort. gage but giving it a false description in order to serve some ulterior end. 17. Higher up on the page he remarked that no secret compact between two persons can affect to alter the law of limitation to the prejudice of a third party. 18. A distinction is made between property mortgaged and trust property, because if a person purchases trust property in good faith and without any notice of the trust, he acquires an immediate right to the property u/s 64 of the Indian Trust Act, but if he has not acted in good faith and has paid valuable consideration, he acquires a good title only after the period of limitation provided by Article 134 has elapsed. On page 388 he said, Article 134 of Act IX of 1871 provided that a suit to recover possession of immovable property conveyed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards purchased by (sic) the trustee or mortgagee in good faith and for value could not be brought after the lapse of 12 years from the date of transfer; but as the reference to 'good faith' was strictly inapplicable to cases of transfers by trustees, it was omitted from the succeeding Limitation Acts. 19. The case was, therefore, sent back for the decision of the question of good faith and the other issues which had not been decided. 20. According to this decision, so far as mortgages are concerned, the removal of the words "in good faith" from the articles in 1877 and subsequent Acts made no difference whatsoever. Without reference to other rulings, however, we are, with great respect, inclined to doubt whether this interpretation of the Article can be accepted because in the Act of 187l the words qualified both kinds of transaction and in subsequent Acts it was removed and therefore apparently no longer qualifies either kind of transaction. 21. In Drigpal Singh v. Kallu (1915) 37 All. 21. In Drigpal Singh v. Kallu (1915) 37 All. 660, it was held 'that the removal of the words " good faith" from the article does not entitle a person, who purchases with full knowledge that his vendor's title is merely that of a mortgagee, to the benefit of the article. Their lord- ships of the Allahabad High Court say, It may have been that the words were considered not altogether appropriate and that their retention would throw the onus on the transferee of proving that he had no knowledge of his vendor's title. This would be in many cases a hardship upon the person in possession of the property he would have to prove a negative possibly after the lapse of many years. 22. This ruling is relevant for the contention which we have termed the second contention of the appellants' learned counsel. 23. Hanoman Singh v. Sardami Umrao Kuar A I R 1926 Oudh 492, is also cited, but we find nothing in it to support the case of the appellants. It is there held that mere constructive notice is not sufficient to deprive the transferee of the benefit of Article 134. It is for the persons who asserts that a transaction was something different from what, on the face of it, it purports to be, to substantiate that assertion. 24. T. K. Lakshmana Aiyar v. Sankarapandiam Pillai AIR 1926 Mad. 311, has been more or less given upon by the appellants' learned Counsel as he says that it applies to the peculiar facts of that case, but we think that with reference to contention No. 1 we should cite one sentence : The question whether a transferee from a mortgagee took an absolute interest or only a mortgagee interest is a question of intention. 25. Shivaji Sheshgir Kulkarni Vs. Channava Kom Basangavda, AIR 1930 Bom 292 , is a single Judge ruling. It was held, A suit for redemption by a purchaser of the interest of a mortgagor against the transferee of the rights of the mortgagee with notice of the right of the mortgagee is not governed by Article 134 since the article is designed for the protection of the transferee who hag been made to believe by the mortgagee that he was transferring the full proprietary title in the property. 26. 26. In Mehnga v. Zaman Ali Shah A I R 1931 Loh 464 it was held Only a transferee with a bona fide belief at the time of the conveyance can claim the protection of Article 134. 27. There is, however, a full Bench decision of this Court cited in Shri Ram v. Najibullah (1927) 1 Luck 423, in which it was held that the language of Art. 134 renders the question of notice wholly irrelevant. Under that article, as it stands at present, the transferee without notice and the transferee with notice are on the same footing. Before this passage in the judgment the Hon'ble Judges say that "transferred" in Article 134 means the transfer of an absolute title and that it was admitted in the case that such a transfer had taken place. 28. The question is how this decision is to be interpreted. In Our opinion it cannot mean that extraneous evidence, which, of course, includes the knowledge of the parties, cannot be taken into consideration in finding out what was the "intention"., of the parties to the deed, to use the word used in AIR. 1926 Mad 311. Section 92 of the Evidence Act does not apply to the case and we think that there is force in the argument of the appellants' learned counsel that, just as in a pre-emption suit it is legal for the plaintiff to show by extraneous evidence that what purports to be a deed of lease is in fact an out and out sale, so it is admissible for the mortgagor to show that what purports at first sight to be a transfer of an absolute title was in the intention of the parties to the deed only a transfer of mortgagee rights. This is also in accordance with 14 Moore's Ind. App. 1 where such extraneous matters were taken into consideration in determining whether there had been a "purchase" within the meaning of the article, before ever their Lordships of the Privy Council proceeded to inquire into the question of good faith. But one thing has been definitely laid down in this Full Bench decision of this Court, viz , that once the nature of (he transaction has been determined, whether it was a transfer of absolute title or only an assignment of mortgagee rights, the question of good ' faith is immaterial. But one thing has been definitely laid down in this Full Bench decision of this Court, viz , that once the nature of (he transaction has been determined, whether it was a transfer of absolute title or only an assignment of mortgagee rights, the question of good ' faith is immaterial. This decision is binding upon us and with great respect we may say that we agree with it. If the deed purports on the face of it to be a sale of absolute rights, the burden of proving that it is something different lies upon the person who asserts it. Knowledge of the nature of the title of the transferor is no doubt a material piece of evidence for this purpose. But if be fails in his attempt to prove that the transaction was not the transfer of absolute title, he cannot then succeed on the ground that that transfer of absolute title was not made or taken in good faith. 29. It follows from this that the appellants fail in their second contention. We shall now proceed to determine on the merits whether they have succeeded in their first contention. 30. The original mortgage deed of 1892 is Exhibit A 1. This is a mortgage deed by conditional sale in which it is provided that the mortgagors will repay the principal money in three years. The mortgagee was put in possession of the mortgaged property while the mortgagors executed a separate "sarkhat" agreeing to pay rent of Rs. 156-4-0 every month. They agreed to pay up the rent every six months with this condition that the tenants shall pay the rents of the houses, shops and rooms etc. to the Nawab Sahib and if-there should be any deficit, it should be paid every six months by the mortgagors out of their own pocket. If the mortgagors wanted to repay the principal sum within the stipulated period of three years, they should pay the aforesaid fixed rent lot the whole period and then should be entitled to redemption, If on the due date they failed to get the mortgaged property redeemed, then the mortgage deed should be deemed a sale deed 'and the mortgage money as sale consideration. 31. 31. According to the contract thus contained in "bai bil wafa" the mortgagors could not redeem after three years, but this contract could not operate to cut down the period of limitation provided in Article 148, 32. In Exhibit 5, which is an agreement executed between the same parties it was provided that the mortgagee should get 'sarkhats" from the tenants and realise the rents from them direct as well as from the mortgagors themselves. This agreement is dated the 22nd November 1892, this document has no particular bearing on the argument of the appellants. Exhibit A 20 dated the 18th December, 1896, is a simple mortgage deed of mortgagee rights in favour of Babu Khem Chand. In the deed it is expressly stated that the mortgage is a mortgage of mortgagee rights under the mortgage deed, Exhibit A-l. The appellants' learned counsel lays stress upon the fact that it was executed more in an three years after Exhibit A-l, aid be argues that since Nawab Sahib Mirza Bahadur speaks of himself in this deed as a mortgagee still, he cannot, as has been suggested in regard to the following document, have considered himself at this time to be full owner of the property on account of the expiry of three years. 33. The next document is A-19/D.W. I, another simple mortgage deed, executed by Nawab Sahib Mirza Bahadur in favour of Lala Baldeo Das and Lala Lachman Das in this it is recited : For further satisfaction of the said creditors, the houses with shops and room, together with land situate in Mohallas Nakhas, Patanala and Pul Kirangi Mahal, thana Chauk, bounded as below which the declarant purchased from Malka Begum and Haji Syed Ali Bahadur jointly under a mortgage deed of conditional sale for Rs. 20,100 dated and registered on the 31st March, 1892, and which is in ownership and proprietary possession of the declarant without any co-sharer therein and the said property is mortgaged to Lala Khem Chand jeweller, resident of Sondhi Tola, under a mortgage deed without possession for Rs. a,000 dated and registered on the 18th December, 1896, and except the charge of the said jeweller the property is free from .ill sorts of transfers, sale, gift etc. 34. a,000 dated and registered on the 18th December, 1896, and except the charge of the said jeweller the property is free from .ill sorts of transfers, sale, gift etc. 34. In our opinion there can be no doubt that this purports to be a mortgage of property which belongs in full ownership to the declarant, not of mortgagee rights in such property. 35. It is argued that subsequent entries in the deed show that this mortgage is only the mortgage of mortgagee rights. In the first place it is provided that the debt due to Lala Khem Chand, the prior mortgagee, is to be paid by Lala Baldeo Das a ad Lala Lachman Das. It is argued that the mention of the prior mortgagee shows that this must have been a mortgage of the property previously mortgaged and that Lala Baldeo Das and Lala Lachman Das must I have known that this property which was mortgaged was the same as that mortgaged to Lala Khem Chand. 36. The next deed, the sale deed, Exhibit 11, is to be examined along with Exhibit A-19/D.W.I. Exhibit 11 was executed by Nawab Hyder Mirza, son of Nawab Sahib Mirza Bahadur, as the executor under the will of Nawab Sahib Mirza. The executant first states that he is in proprietary possession and occupation as executor of the whole movable and immovable assets of his father. He then-goes on to state that "pucca" houses and shops and rooms together with land situate in Mohalla Nakhas and Pafanala and Pul Firangi Mahal stand mortgaged to Lala Baldeo Da1; and Lala Lachman Das on behalf of Nawab Sahib Mirza and that excepting the said mortgage the property is now free from all kinds of transfers and encumbrances, and out of the said mortgaged property he has, as executor of the estate of Nawab Sahib Mirza Bahadur, sold one "pucca" house with shops and rooms in the upper storey situate in Nakhas with materials and land, bricks and timber and fixtures pertaining thereto without the exception of anything, portion or right for the purpose of paying off the debt to the said money lenders and also other debts of Nawab Sahib Mirza Bahadur. This, he says is done under the order of the District Judge, dated the 4th May, 1901, and he puts the vendees into possession of the property like himself. 37. This, he says is done under the order of the District Judge, dated the 4th May, 1901, and he puts the vendees into possession of the property like himself. 37. Appellants' learned counsel argues that Exhibit 11 must be read in conjunction with Exhibit A-19/D. W. 1. The property is identified as the same property and the parties are the same. He argues that siDce Exhibit A-19/D. W. 1 refers to the mort- gage of the same property in favour of Lala Khem Chand, and since in Exhibit A-20 Nawab Sahib Mirza Bahadur slates that he is in possession of the property as mortgagee the knowledge of this fact must be imputed to Baldeo Das and Lachman Das, and in view of their knowledge of the real fact, it cannot be said that they intended to take a sale of property held in absolute ownership. They knew that by this deed Exhibit 11 their position in respect of the property sold was merely changed from that of sub mortgagees to mortgagees. 38. We are also referred in this connection to Exhibit A-21, which is a copy of the statement of account showing income and expenditure from August 1898 to July 1899 filed by Nawab Hyder Mirza in the Court of the District Judge. This account is of l/3rd share of the property sold by Nawab Sahib Mirza Bahadur for religious purposes. In the list of immovable property we find "share in the Nakhas property mortgaged Rs. 4,333/5/4" and below it a note. It may be noted that the Nakhas property and the house situated in Pul Firangi Mahal, Lucknow were mortgaged with the applicant's father in lieu of Rs. 20,000 and the house at Pul Firangi Mahal of the value of Rs. 7,000, was sold in the lifetime of the predecessor under the decree of Mathura Das from the Court of the Munsif South. The applicant has received one-third share under the will, only in the Nakhas property, and the Nakhas property was mortgaged by the predecessor with Baldeo Das for Rs. 8,000 which still subsists. 39. It is argued that since the sale-deed, Exhibit 11 was executed with the sanction of the District Judge Baldeo Das and Lachman Das must have had knowledge of the history of the property contained to this note. 40. 8,000 which still subsists. 39. It is argued that since the sale-deed, Exhibit 11 was executed with the sanction of the District Judge Baldeo Das and Lachman Das must have had knowledge of the history of the property contained to this note. 40. It appears to us, however, that the terms of Exhibit A-19/D. W. 1 import a mortgage of absolute ownership rights and not a sub-mortgage and that similarly the terms of Exh. 11 import a sale of absolute rights, already mortgaged to the vendees. This is what the learned lower Court has held we find that Sahib Mirza has used therein (Exhibit A-19/D. W. 1) language which would show that he regarded himself to be owner of the property and that what he intended to convey to his transferee was not an interest carved out of his rights as a mortgagee but an estate much larger than that, an interest carved out of full proprietary rights. 41. The learned lower Court takes the same view of Exhibit 11 and makes a further point total absence of any such reference to the previous deed, to the amount due thereunder or other similar terms, is very significant and leaves no doubt that the deed purported to transfer full proprietary rights as it does on the face of the instrument. 42. The learned trial Judge also lays special stress upon the warranty of title which he holds to be inconsistent with the deeds being merely an assignment of a mortgage, we agree with this view. 43. It is true that on a correct view of the law neither Sahib Mirza nor Hyder Mirza could have been on these dates full owners of the property, but it is not correct to say that they could not have supposed themselves so to be. In our opinion the principle that everyone must be supposed to know the law does not apply to the question before us. What we have to find out is what was the actual intention of the parties at the time of these transfers. This is best evidenced by the deeds themselves. As the lower Court says both these transfers seem on the lace of them to be transfers made by the absolute owner of the property, one being a mortgage and the other a sale of the mortgaged property. This is best evidenced by the deeds themselves. As the lower Court says both these transfers seem on the lace of them to be transfers made by the absolute owner of the property, one being a mortgage and the other a sale of the mortgaged property. The burden of proving that the intention of the parties was different from what from the terms of the deeds, it appears to have been lies upon the person interested to prove that fact. He cannot do so by falling back on the presumption that the parties knew the law. The mere fact that in the mortgage to Khem Chand Sahib Mirza described himself as a mortgagee though at that time the period of three years prescribed in the mortgage deed of 189J had expired, does not prove that at the time of executing Exhibit A-19/D. W. 1 he did not believe himself to be owner. These remarks apply with even greater force to Lachman Das and Baldeo Das the transferees, for they can only be said to have had constructive notice of the deed in favour of Khem Chand. It was their duty to pay off to Khem Chand the Rs. 3,500 mentioned in the deed Exhibit A-l j/D. W. 1. It was not necessary that they should examine his mortgage deed nor is it proved that they did so. 44. Again it has been argued that, because the order of the District Judge, dated 4th May, 1901, is mentioned in Exh. 11, and the transferees under that deed must be supposed to have satisfied themselves that that sanction had been duly given, therefore they must have known that only mortgagee rights were being transferred. But we do not know what the terms of the order of the District Judge were. The fact that a chart history of the Nakhas property was given in the accounts, Exhibit A-l?, tiled by Hyder Mirza, does not prove that it was incorporated in the order of the District Judge or that it was seen by the transferees. Moreover, the entry in Exhibit A-12 leaves the question open whether the rights in the Nakhas property were still mortgagee rights or had ripened into full ownership. 45. Moreover, the entry in Exhibit A-12 leaves the question open whether the rights in the Nakhas property were still mortgagee rights or had ripened into full ownership. 45. A perusal of the sale deed Exhibit A-5 executed by Lala Baldeo Das and Lala Lachhman Das in favour of Alia Bandi will show that the case with respect to this deed is, if possible, stronger than in the other two deeds. The order of the District Judge, dated the 4th May, 1901, with which we have already dealt, is mentioned, but there is not a word in the deed which would show either that the transferors thought themselves to be parting with any- thing less than the right of full ownership, or that the transferee could have believed herself to be getting anything less. The appellants' learned counsel lay stress on the sentence "all the papers relating to the property sold which we have with us have been handed over to the vendee." He argues that Alia Bandi must have been in possession of all the title deeds. Whether she was or was not given all the title deeds is, in our opinion, a matter of small moment. The question before us is, nor whether she had or had not constructive notice of the true nature of the vendor's title but what was the actual intention of the parties to Exhibit A-5. We have no doubt that she was taking a sale of the right of full ownership and that this is what she intended to do. We do not know whether she had the intelligence to under- stand the deeds handed over to her or whether she knew enough of the law to be able to trace the title through these deeds. There is in fact nothing to go upon so far except the deed itself. Afterwards it appears that she bought astrip of land from the Municipal Board and included it in this plot, for the purpose of building a "chabutra" in front of these shops and houses. In the subsequent mortgage deeds in favour of Hyder Husain she treated it as her absolute property. 46. The appellants' learned counsel argues, however, that Article 134 does not apply to this transfer because Baldeo Das and Lachhman Das were not mortgagees, but only transferees from the original mortgagee and that Article 134 is confined to transfers by the latter. 47. 46. The appellants' learned counsel argues, however, that Article 134 does not apply to this transfer because Baldeo Das and Lachhman Das were not mortgagees, but only transferees from the original mortgagee and that Article 134 is confined to transfers by the latter. 47. In our view this contention does not assist the appellants even if it is correct. In support of this contention he cites Munawar Ali Vs. Jagmilan Ram and Others, AIR 1927 All 177 and Chhoti Begam v. Ram Prasad (1917) 20 O C 164. He also refers to the change which has taken place in 1871. for in Section 5 of Act XIV of 1859 not only the purchaser from a mortgagee, but also any person claiming under him, was mentioned. On the other side, however, it is argued that an assignee from a mortgagee stands in exactly the same place as a mortgagee, and there is, therefore, no need to make any distinction between them. 48. In Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohammad Mustapha Marcayar (1923) 46 Mad 751, it was held that there is little difference in principle between a transfer under an adverse execution and sale by the trustee himself. This Privy Council decision has been relied upon by the Court below but we cannot see that it helps very much. If an adverse execution is taken pat against a trustee or mortgagee it purports to be his property which is sold. But in the case of a transfer by an assignee from a mortgagee the property transferred purports to be that of the assignee and not of the original mortgagee. Learned Counsel for the respondents cites also Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Char an Nand (1909) 36 Cal 1003 at p. 1014 for the purpose of showing that "Statutes of Limitation, like all others, ought to receive such a construction as the language, in its plain meaning, imports", that is, that we should hot be influenced by the possible hardship which the mortgagor might suffer by the period of limitation being cut down owing to a transfer by a transferee from the mortgagee, the argument being that though it is incumbent upon the mortgagor to be watchful of the conduct of his mortgagee, it may be very hard for him to be watchful of the conduct of the transferees where the mortgagee rights pass through many hands. 49. 49. He also cites James Richard Rennet Skinner v. Kunwar Naunial Singh AIR 1929 PC 158 . The facts (without complication) appears to be that T. Skinner executed a simple mort- gage of the property in favour of a money lender. T, Skinner died and his eldest son, T. B. Skinner, took a life interest in his property. He executed another mortgage in favour of the same money lender purporting to mortgage as absolute owner which he probably thought himself to be. In 1872 money decrees were obtained against him and his equity of redemption in the mortgaged property was sold up and bought by the same money lender Lachhman Das, who, thinking himself to be absolute owner, first mortgaged and then sold the property to the Nawab of Kampur who transferred these villages in 1904 to Naunihal Singh. When T. B. Skinner died other holders of life interests took the estate and a suit was filed against Naunihal Singh for recovery of possession. The litigation had many vicissitudes which are not necessary for the purpose of this analysis. At page 161 column 2 we find the passage, Their Lordships have little doubt that had T. B. Skinner had the absolute title to the equity of redemption at the time when Lachhman Das purported to transfer the absolute title to the Nawab the case would have been brought within Section 134. The appellant sought to put a limited construction on the article by contending that it only applied where the transfer took place while the mortgagee was mortgagee, or at any rate transferred possession which he had obtained as mortgagee. It did not apply, they said, where, as here, the mortgagee had apparently ceased to be mortgagee by getting in the equity of redemption and had obtained possession not under the mortgage but under the purchase of the equity in 1872. Their Lordships see no reason for accepting this view. It appears to them to be immaterial that the mortgagee should have thought he was absolute owner' if in fact he was mortgagee; and immaterial whether he got possession before, under or after the mort- gage if in fact he purported to transfer the property to the transferee. 50. We are quite unable to see what bearing this decision has upon the question now before us. 50. We are quite unable to see what bearing this decision has upon the question now before us. The appeal was allowed and it was held that limitation in the case was not governed by Article 134. 51. We do not think, however, that 20 O.C. 164 is of any more value for the decision of this question. Though the headnote is very wide, an examination of the judgment shows that the decision has no application to the facts before us. Mohammad Hasan who transferred the property had purchased the property in execution of a decree on the foot of a mortgage deed in favour of Mendi Lal and he did not be- come the mortgagee of the property for the simple reason that the mortgage had ceased to subsist. His transferee Chhoti Begam was not therefore entitled to the benefit of Article 134 in a suit brought for redemption by a puisne mortgagee who had not been impleaded by the prior mortgagee Mendi Lal in the previous suit. 52. We have also examined Munawar Ali Vs. Jagmilan Ram and Others, AIR 1927 All 177 , and we find that the question before the learned Judge who decided that case was very different from the present cise case. The relevant passage starts at page 173, column 2 and what we find is that the plaintiffs in the case was the original mortgagor. His mortgagee had sub-mortgaged the property and the sub- mortgagees executed what purported to be a '.mortgage of absolute rights on the 3rd August, 1888. Upon the basis of this mort-\ gage a decree for foreclosure of full proprietary rights was obtained. Defendant No. 4 who ultimately came into possession of the house in pursuance of transactions starting from this foreclosure decree, urged that limitation was governed by Article 134 but this contention was, we say with great respect, rightly rejected. The mortgagee, upon whom the mortgagor was supposed to keep a watch, made a perfectly honest transfer by way of sub mortgage and it does not appear to us that it was the duty of the mortgagor to keep a watch upon the sub-mortgagee. The mortgagee, upon whom the mortgagor was supposed to keep a watch, made a perfectly honest transfer by way of sub mortgage and it does not appear to us that it was the duty of the mortgagor to keep a watch upon the sub-mortgagee. In the present case, however, even if we were to accept the contention of the appellants learned counsel (which we do not accept) that the sale deed Exhibit 11 is only a sale of mortgagee rights, still Baldeo Das and Lachhman Das would stand exactly in the shoes of the original mortgagee Mawab Sahib Mirza, and there is no reason why the mortgagor should no! keep a watch upon them. We think that there is nothing in the article to show that it is intended to apply only to a transfer made by the original mortgagee and not to a person who is a transferee of the very rights held by the original mortgagee. 53. We now come to the question of "lis pendens". Respondents' Counsel has argued that this finding of the learned Judge, which is not disputed by the appellants' counsel to fact decides the whole case. Nawab Sahib Mirza was put in possession of the property. By the sale deed Exhibit 11 the possession of this property passed from Nawab Hyder Mirza to Baldeo Das and Lachhman Das who transferred their possession to Alia Bandi by Exhibit A-5. She was entitled to possession until her mortgagees obtained a decree against her and sold the property. The purchasers of Alia Bandi's rights in the property are certainly entitled to possession. The present appellants only claim to possession of the property is a collusive understanding with All Bandi and a transfer of possession made by her in pursuance thereof pendente lite, Any rights they might have therefore must be subject to the tights of the successful parties in the suit viz., the present respondents. 54. For these reasons we dismiss this appeal with costs.