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1945 DIGILAW 118 (CAL)

Jashoprokash Mitter v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Motor Vehicles Department

1945-05-28

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JUDGMENT Derbyshire, C.J. - This is an application referred to the Chief Justice under the provisions of Ch. V, R. 3, of the Original Side Rules by Das J. before whom the matter came originally. The applicant asks under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, for the cancellation of an order requisitioning his motor car. The applicant is a Barrister practising in this Court and other Courts in Calcutta and places adjacent thereto, and for the purpose of getting to and from his work with his books and briefs had and used a 1938 Packard motor car No. BLB 4811. He was allowed extra petrol and permitted to purchase tyres for the car. On 6th September 1944, the first respondent who is the Deputy Commissioner of police, Public Vehicles Department, Calcutta, made a requisitioning order in respect of the said car as follows: Whereas, in my opinion, it is necessary and expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of war, for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community to requisition the movable property described in the Schedule hereto annexed and to make the following order in connection therewith: Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rr. (1) and (5) of R. 75A, of the Defence of India Rules, which have been directed under sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, (35 [XXXV] of 1939) to be exercised by me I hereby make the following order namely : Mr. J. P. Mitter of 209, Lower Circular Road, Calcutta, in whose possession, control or keeping as the case may be, the said movable property is for the time being: (a) shall deliver the said property to the Civil Transport Officer, 38/2 Beltola Road, on 8-9-44 at 9-45 A. M. (b) shall furnish to the said officer such information in his (their) possession relating to the said property as the said officer may by order in writing specify; and (c) Shall not without any written permission dispose of the said property as long as this order remains in force : (d) the Provincial Transport Controller will be present at the office of the Civil Transport Officer on that date and will hear on that date only, any representation which the owner may desire to make. Motor Car No. BLB 4811 Sd. Dy. Commissioner of Police, Dated 6-9-44 Public Vehicles Dept. Calcutta. 2. The applicant appeared before the then Provincial Transport Controller, Mr. A. D. Khan, respondent 4, pursuant to cl. (d) of the requisitioning order and showed cause why the motor car should not be requisitioned. On 22nd September 1914, however, the applicant was served with a notice of acquisition in respect of the said car set out in Annexure "B" and he subsequently handed over the car to the requisitioning authorities. On 31st October 1944, Col. Mackay, Area Rationing Authority, Calcutta, assessed compensation for the said car at Rupees 5804. The car in question was required for the use of the Senior Royal Naval Officer at Calcutta, respondent 8, as a staff car. 3. On September 18, the applicant saw respondent 3 who said that he did not specially want that particular car, but that any suitable car would serve his purpose. The applicant offered to lend respondent 3 the car during the long vacation; but the car was requisitioned. The car when new cost somewhere about Rs. 8000 and the compensation fixed for it was assessed according to a price schedule dated 22nd April 1944 annexed to the used Motor Vehicles Control Order 1944. The said Order and schedule were issued by the Government of India pursuant to sub. r. (2) of R. 81 of the Defence of India Rules. 4. The applicant was deprived of the car and its use and asks for the setting aside of the order on the ground that it was made by Mr. Khan mala fides and further that the requisitioning order itself was invalid and ultra vires in that the Government of India had no authority to legislate for the requisitioning of movable property under the Government of India Act, 1935. Khan mala fides and further that the requisitioning order itself was invalid and ultra vires in that the Government of India had no authority to legislate for the requisitioning of movable property under the Government of India Act, 1935. As regards the question of ultra vires, the requisition order was made under sub-r. (1) of R. 75A of the Rules made under the Defence of India Act, which provides: If in the opinion of the Central Government or the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the defence of British India, public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of the War, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, that Government may by order in writing requisition any property, movable or immovable, and may make such further orders as appear to that Government to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning. 5. That rule was made under the provisions of S. 2 (2) (xxiv) of the Defence of India Act. It is not disputed that respondent 1 had vested in him the powers under R. 75A. The applicant has argued that the Central Legislature which passed the Defence of India Act can only legislate on such subjects as are set Out in Lists 1, 2, and 3 of sch. VII of the Government of India Act. The Defence of India Act was passed on 29th September 1939 after a proclamation of emergency, pursuant to S. 102 of the Government of India Act, had been made by the Governor General on 3rd September 1939. By reason of that proclamation, the Central Legislature had power to legislate on any of the matters set out in any of the Lists in Sch. VII. The applicant, however, says that there is nothing in any of the lists empowering the Legislature to requisition or authorise the requisition of movable property. It has been pointed out on his behalf that under List II, item 9, the Provincial Government are given powers to acquire land compulsorily. There is no similar specific provision permitting any Legislature, whether Central or Provincial, to acquire movable property compulsorily. It has been pointed out on his behalf that under List II, item 9, the Provincial Government are given powers to acquire land compulsorily. There is no similar specific provision permitting any Legislature, whether Central or Provincial, to acquire movable property compulsorily. It was also pointed out that the purpose of the Defence of India Act is stated to be to provide special measures for public safety and interest and defence of British India and that the defence of British India is not mentioned in any of the lists, and it was suggested that the Act itself is ultra vires of the powers of the Central Government. 6. It is noteworthy that the defence of British India is not one of the matters mentioned in any of the lists. The defence of a country is naturally one of the matters to which any Government must give its legislative attention. It may be that there is power implied to legislate for the Defence of India notwithstanding its omission from the lists. It is, however, pointed out on behalf of the respondents that the first item in the Provincial list, is "Public Order," that "Public order" has a very wide meaning and covers legislation in respect of all matters to ensure public order and that the Defence of India is a matter designed to insure public order in India. It is striking that this question has never been raised previously since requisitioning has been in operation under the Defence of India Act for the last five and a half years. Whether there is any implied power in the Legislature to legislate in respect of all matters necessary to ensure the defence and safety of British India or not, I am of the opinion that the words " Public order" cover the matter. It has only been too obvious during the last five years that if a country is not properly defended, public disorder will soon result. In my view, the words "Public order" have a wide meaning and they authorise the Legislature to do such acts as are necessary for the public safety and defence of the country. The requisition of movable property for this purpose is one of the oldest practices in war, as for instance the requisitioning of horses and fodder. In my view, the words "Public order" have a wide meaning and they authorise the Legislature to do such acts as are necessary for the public safety and defence of the country. The requisition of movable property for this purpose is one of the oldest practices in war, as for instance the requisitioning of horses and fodder. Now-a-days because of the necessity for employing the whole resources of the community to keep the enemy at bay, a much wider range of things must be included. In my opinion, therefore, the provisions of the Defence of India Act relating to the requisitioning of movable property contained in S. 2 (2) (xxiv) of the Defence of India Act are within the powers of the Legislature under the heading "Public order." 7. As regards the special facts of this case, the applicant complains that respondent 4 forwarded to respondent 1 a list of three motor cars, the applicant's and two other smaller cars, and at the same time respondent 1 was informed, presumably by respondent 4, that a high-powered American car was necessary for the use of respondent 3. The only high-powered car in the list was the applicant's car. The applicant says that there were many other high-powered American cars in Calcutta, some of them in the ownership of persons who had other cars as well; that the effect of respondent 4's intimation and the sending of the list was virtually to direct respondent 1 to requisition the applicant's car and not consider the other suitable cars. The applicant says that this is evidence of mala fides. I am not satisfied that there was mala fides in this case. It is admitted that neither respondent 1 nor respondent 4 was personally acquainted with the applicant and it is not suggested that either of them had any personal feeling against the applicant or any intention to do him any harm. Respondent 3 obviously was only concerned with getting a motor car suitable for his purpose. It is clear that it was necessary for purpose of respondent 3 that he should have a high powered car in order to perform his duties which were important in connection with the defence of India. It is admitted that the car when requisitioned was sent to respondent 3 and there is no suggestion that it has been used for any other purpose than that of his duties. It is admitted that the car when requisitioned was sent to respondent 3 and there is no suggestion that it has been used for any other purpose than that of his duties. It is probably a hardship upon the applicant that his one car should be taken if, as is alleged, there were other similar cars in the possession of persons who had other cars as well. We do not know why these other persons, if there were such, were allowed to keep their cars. It may be that there were good reasons, possibly connected with the defence of the country. 8. Mr. Baker who was respondent 2 and succeeded respondent 4 made an offer to the applicant to allow him to purchase a secondhand car of similar horse power for his work. The applicant says that no such cars were available. There is of course a duty upon those who administer the provisions of the Defence of India Act under S. 15, to act so as to interfere with the ordinary advocations of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest and the defence or British India. That is a direction which the Legislature has made for the protection of the subject. I am not able to say that in this case that provision has been disregarded, although I cannot help feeling that the authorities might have brought some evidence before the Court that they had regard to it. The only ground on which we can interfere is that there has been mala fide exercise of powers in requisitioning. In regard to that I am not satisfied that there has been mala fides. In my view, therefore, the application asking for an order annulling the requisition must be refused. The applicant must pay the respondents the taxed costs of the matter. Certificate under S. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is granted. Gentle, J. 9. I agree.