JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Madeley, JJ. - This is an application for leave to appeal to their Lord- ships of the Privy Council in a case, the valuation of which is below Rs. 100.10. The case comes u/s 109 (e), C. P. C, and the point of law must be one of great public or private importance vide Raja Barkhandi Maliesh Pratap Narain Singh v. Mst. Sadluina, minor, under the guardianship of Mahadeo Prasad 1943 OA 4 (1943 O. A. 4). The mere existence of a substantial question of law does not give jurisdiction to give leave to appeal under clause (e) and the question involved in the case must be one of great public or private importance. 2. The decision against which petition to appeal is sought is reported in Ram Dulari v. Gaya Prasad 1944 OA (CC) 75 : AWR (C C) 75 : OWN 69. It relate:- to the construction of two sections of the Encumbered Estates Act when read together viz. 14 (4) (a) and Section 15. The question is whether in the matter of decretal debts the law of "damdupat" is to be applied by the Special Judge to future interest decreed by the regular Court. The Benches of this Court have held that it is nut, while a single judge of the Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad hold that it was. This is undoubtedly a substantial question of law, but is it of great public or private importance ? We think not. 3. We shall deal first with "public importance." The last date for applications u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act was the 29th October, 1936. The present applicant bled his application on the very last day legally possible. This means that the vast majority of Encumbered Estates Act cases in the Civil Courts are over, though liquidation proceedings may still be pending in the Collectors' Courts in many cases. By the time this appeal could be decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council it seems certain that all those cases, or practically all, would be completed in the Civil Courts. Since the interpretation relates .only to two sections of a temporary Act, we do not think that the question is any longer of any public importance. By the time this appeal could be decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council it seems certain that all those cases, or practically all, would be completed in the Civil Courts. Since the interpretation relates .only to two sections of a temporary Act, we do not think that the question is any longer of any public importance. During the K years since cases under the E. E. Act have been going on, it appears to have come up only three times in both, provinces. 4. We come next to "private importance". The decree would, if the law of "damdupat" were applied to future interest, be reduced by about 6,000. The decretal amount is now more than Rs. 71, MHO so that the amount is dispute is considerably less than 10 per cent of the ' whole. Moreover, since there are some other creditors, it is probable that proceedings would have to be held up in liquidation pending the decision of the appeal. This delay, which is we think what the applicant is striving after, would be most inconvenient to the opposite party. In Babu Govind Das and Another Vs. Mt. Indrawati and Others, AIR 1940 All 38 it was held that one of the matters which must in variably be taken into consideration in this connection is whether the permission to appeal is likely to delay the settlement of the substantive dispute between the parties unduly. This related to an interlocutory order. The present order is certainly not interlocutory nor can we altogether agree with the terminology of the learned Counsel for the opposite-party in calling it an interlocutory proceeding. But it is correct to say that the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act are divided into two sharply separated stages, one before the judicial and the other before the Collector, and that- ordinarily speaking the second cannot be started till the first is finished. This is therefore another reason for not granting this application. We dismiss this application with costs.