JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. - These are two connected revision applications by the plaintiff and the defendant respectively-. They have arisen in the following circumstances: Mohammad Ayub Khan filed a suit in 1941 against Saiyed Raziuddin for recovery of Rs. 4,000 as the unpaid sale price of the four annas share which he had sold to him in 1929, and in the plaint, he added a prayer under Order XXXIII of the CPC for permission to sue in forma pauperis. This application was opposed by Raziuddin. The learned Civil Judge of Bahraich by his order, dated the 25th May, 1942, dismissed the application for pauperism holding that Mohammad Ay.i.5 Khan was not a pauper. On the 7th July, 1942, Mohammid Ayaz Khan filed an application for review on the ground that certain property which was held to have been owned and possessed by him did not belong to him and was not in his possession. He further prayed, in the alternative, that if the review was not granted ;he may be given some time to pay the requisite court-fee. The Civil Judge by his order, dated the 26th September dismissed the application for review but granted one month's time to pay the court-fee. On the 29th September, Mohammad Ayaz Khan filed a revision against the order, dated the 25th May dismissing for pauperism vide Section 115 Application No. 159 of 1942). Dt. the 23rd October he obtained further extension )f time to pay the court-fee till a week after the decision /of the revision by this Court. Saiyed Raziuddin being aggrieved by the order, dated the 26th September granting time for payment of court-fee to Mohammad Ayaz Khan filed a revision application (No. 1 of 1943). 2. Mohammad Ayaz Khan died on the 1st March, 1944, leaving a widow and a daughter and an application was made by them for being brought on the record as the legal representatives of the deceased. The prayer was that they may be allowed to continue the proceedings in forma pauperis or such other order aa to the payment of court-fee be passed as may be just and convenient. (Vide Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 465 of 1944). 3. We have heard both sides and are of opinion that the application for substitution should be granted. The prayer was that they may be allowed to continue the proceedings in forma pauperis or such other order aa to the payment of court-fee be passed as may be just and convenient. (Vide Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 465 of 1944). 3. We have heard both sides and are of opinion that the application for substitution should be granted. It is urged for the defendant on the authority of Lalit Mohan Mandal v. Satish Cliandra Das (1906) 33 Cal. 1163, Farsad Ali Khar. v. Mir Amir Haidar (1915) 18 O C 64 and Jatindra Nath Gliose v. Sourindra Nath Mitra3 that the right to mike an application in forma pauperis is a personal right and cannot survive in the legal representative and consequently the heirs have no right to be brought on the record with a view to continuing the application for pauperism filed by Mohammad Ayaz Khan. This proposition is not denied. It is, however, be mentioned that these cases also lay down that it is open to the heirs to rile a fresh application for pauperism, if the right, to sue survives in them. Counsel for the heirs of Mohammad Aiyiz Khan has not seriously pressed the prayer that they may be allowed to continue the application in forma pauperis. He has also not urged that the heirs should be allowed to sue as paupers in their own right and an enquiry should be ordered into their pauperism. He has, however, urged that the heirs should be allowed to continue the suit upon the payment of the requisite court-fee. This prayer is opposed on behalf of the defendant. On behalf of the heirs reliance is placed in Kazim Husain v. Pearey Lal 1939 OA 687 : AWR (CC) 149 : OWN 819 in support of the proposition that Order XXII of the CPC does not apply to revisions and it is necessary for the Court to have the legal representatives of the .'deceased on the record before any effective orders can be pissed in the revision application. The revisions have been admitted and the record of the lower Court is before us. We hold, therefore, (hit the heirs of Mohammad Ayaz Khan should be represented arid we accordingly allow them to do so. 4. We shall take up the plaintiff's revision first. The revisions have been admitted and the record of the lower Court is before us. We hold, therefore, (hit the heirs of Mohammad Ayaz Khan should be represented arid we accordingly allow them to do so. 4. We shall take up the plaintiff's revision first. The only question which now survives for consideration is whether the heirs should be allowed to continue the suit on payment of the court-fee. Having heard both parties at length, we are of opinion that they should be so allowed. In Kavuri Subbiah v. Yaburau Bala Tripura Sundtira Boyamma A I R 1928 Mad. 278, the learned Judge while holding that the petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis being a personal right could not survive in the legal representative of the deceased, nevertheless recognised that he would have been prepared to allow the legal representative to continue the proceedings of payment of necessary court-lee in respect of the petition allowing the same to be .treated as a plaint. 5. This case was followed in Duraipandiyan Vs. Solaimalai Pillai and Others, AIR 1934 Mad 467 . In that case a petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis was filed by the father but before final orders could be passed he died and the sons applied to go on with the suit on payment of the necessary court-fee. The learned Judge up- held the order passed by the lower Court allowing the sons to continue the suit on payment of the court-fee. 6. The view taken in the case of Kavuri Subbiah was followed in Mt. Bibi Marim Vs. Surajmal and Others, AIR 1936 Patna 591 . 7. In Stuart Skinner alias Nawab Mirga v. William Orde (1879) 6 I A 126, their Lordships of the Privy Council in a case arising out of pauperism proceedings after referring to the provisions of the old CPC observed that there are no negative words in (he Act requiring the rejection of the plaint under circumstances like the present, nor anything in its enactments which would oblige their Lordships to say that this petition, which contains all the requisites which the statute requires for a plaint, should not, when the money has been paid for the fees, be considered as a plaint from the date that it was filed. It is obvious that very great injustice might be dune if this were not to be the practice. It is obvious that very great injustice might be dune if this were not to be the practice. There could hardly be a stronger instance of the mischief which might arise Than what would have happened in this case......... 8. The decision in that case was that the petition to sue as a pauper became a plaint from the date on which it was filed and not from the date on which the stamps were paid. 9. In Bank of Bihar Limited v. Sri Thakur Ramchanderji Maharaj (1930) 9 Pat. 439 it was held that the document referred to in rule 2 of Order XXXIII is a complete document consisting of an application for permission to sue as a pauper and a plaint, and that, therefore, the Court has Jurisdiction u/s 149, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while refusing leave to sue in form a pauperis, to permit the requisite stamp to be paid on the plaint within a certain time and after it has been so done, the unstamped plaint will he deemed to have been validly presented on proper court-fee on the date on which it was originally tiled. The case of Stuart Skinner v. William Orde was relied upon in this case. 10. The Calcutta High Court in Jagadeashwaree Debae v. Tinkarhi Bibi (1935) 62 Cal 711 following the view taken in Stuart Skinner v. William Orde held that the document mentioned as an application for permission to sue as a pauper in Order XXXI11 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which contains all the particulars that the law requires to be given in a plaint, and in addition a prayer that the plaintiff might be allowed to sue as a pauper, is a plaint required to be filed in a suit, and the refusal by the Court to grant the prayer of the plaintiff to sue as a pauper and termination of the proceedings in the matter of granting or refusing leave to sue as a pauper does not amount to rejection of plaint. It further held that in such a case the plaint being before the Court on which a proper court-fee had not been paid by virtue of a refusal of the prayer of the plaintiff for leave to sue as a pauper, the Court has power to grant time for payment of court- fee u/s 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. Reference has been made on behalf of (he defendant to Chunna Mal Vs. Bhagwant Kishore, AIR 1936 All 584 , Gade Anasuyamma being minor by next friend Batchu Nagireddi Vs. Gade Subbareddi, AIR 1943 Mad 646 , and Vamanrao Lallubhai Vs. Pranlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1944 Bom 63 . 12. In the Allahabad case the facts were that the application to sue as a pauper was filed on the 17th August, 1934, and was rejected on the 29th September under rule 7. On the 1st October, the applicant filed an application for review of the previous order in which he further asked that the Court should give him time To deposit the necessary court-fee. The Munsif allowed the applicant to deposit the court-fee by the 30th November. The defendant went up in revision against this order. Two questions were referred to the Full Bench. (1) Whether while rejecting the application for permission to sue as a pauper the Court can u/s 149 CPC allow the applicant to pay the requisite court-fee and treat the application as a plaint? (2) Whether after rejecting the application for permission to sue as a pauper, can the Court by a separate and subsequent order also the applicant to pay the requisite court-fee u/s 149 CPC and treat the application as a plaint. 13. Two of the learned Judges, Sulaiman C. J. and Bennett J., answered both the questions in the negative. They held that if the Court while refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper under Order XXXIII rule 7 allows him to pay the requisite court-fee the Court has no jurisdiction to allow him time u/s 149, the reason being that the matter is then governed ] by the provision of rule 15 under which the plaintiff cannot without paying the costs of the proceedings be entitled to institute a suit. The learned Judges concluded the judgment with the following observation : Order XXXIII. The learned Judges concluded the judgment with the following observation : Order XXXIII. rule 7, may well be amended so as to empower the Court, while refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper, to grant him time to convert the application into a plaint and pay the necessary court-fee. 14. Allsop J. answered the first question in the affirmative. He held that a Court when it refuses to allow an applicant under Order XXXIII to sue as a pauper may at the same time give him per- mission to stamp his application, and treat it as a plaint. He answered the second question in the negative with the proviso that a Court having once passed an order refusing to allow an applicant to sue as a pauper may after the proceedings have been re-opened exercise jurisdiction u/s 149, Civil Procedure Code. It is noted in the judgment of Allsop J. that it was not contended that the decision in Stuart Skinner M. William Orde was no longer good law owing to subsequent modifications in the Civil Procedure Code. It was also admitted that the Court might allow court-fees to be paid upon the application so as to convert the application into a plaint provided such fees were paid before an order was passed refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper. We are inclined to prefer the minority opinion. This case is further distinguishable from the present case which is case of a legal representative brought on the .record in place of the deceased plaintiff and who asks to be allowed to continue the suit filed by the deceased plaintiff upon payment of court-fee. Rule 15 Order XXXIII. which is urged as a bar to the heirs being allowed to continue the suit, has in our opinion- no application. This rule says that an order refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper shall be a bar to any subsequent application of the like nature by him in respect of the same right to sue:: but the applicant shall be at liberty to institute a suit in the ordinary manner in respect of such right, provided that he first pays costs (if any) incurred by the Government and by the opposite party in opposing his application or leave to sue as a pauper." 15. This true obviously applies to the case of an original plaintiff, whose application to sue in forma pauperis has been dismissed and who, in consequence of that dismissal, is debarred from making a similar application in forma pauperis. It further prevents him from filing a suit without first paying the costs of the Government and the opposite-party. It cannot, however, affect the power of the Court u/s 149 to accept the offer of the plaintiff to convert the application into a plaint upon payment of court-fee when his application to sue as a pauper is refused, much less can it affect the power of the Court to allow the heirs of the deceased plaintiff to continue the suit instituted by him upon payment of the court-fee. 16. In the second case the learned single Judge held that as soon as the original applicant dies, the application abates and during the interval between the death of the original applicant and the appearance of the legal representative there would be no plaint before the Court and so, it would not be possible for the Court to overlook that break and to regard the plaint as having been presented by the legal represe dative on the day when the original applicant filed it. No reference is. made in the judgment to the earlier decision in Duraipandiyan v. Solaimaiai Pillai. Apart from this the reasoning of the decision would not apply to the present case. Here the plaintiff had filed a revision challenging the decision of the trial Court refusing to allow him to sue as a pauper, the record had been sent for and the question of the plaintiff's pauperism became the subject-matter of re-consideration and it was open to this Court to have set aside that order. Assuming that the plaintiff had not died and had expressed to Court that he would not go on with the revision application and had requested his application to be converted into a plaint on payment of proper court-fee, we have no doubt that u/s 149 such a request could have been granted.* If this were so, the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff could not be in a worse position and their right to continue the suit upon payment of court-fee could not be questioned. In the third case decided by a single Judge the question of a legal representative to continue the suit on payment of court-fee did not arise. The majority decision in Chunna Mal v. Bhagwant Kishore was followed and :it was held that when an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis is refused under Order XXXIII, rule 7 (t), the Court cannot u/s 149 allow the applicant to pay the requisite court-fee and treat the application as a plaint. To allow the applicant to do otherwise was to disregard the provisions of rule 15 of Order " XXXIII, which required the applicant to institute a fresh suit upon payment of costs and not to convert the application into a plaint on payment of court-fee. 17. We are unable to accept the view taken by the majority in the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court and the view of the single Judges in the Madras and Bombay Courts referred to above. We prefer to follow the view in the earlier decisions of the Madras and Patna High Courts. We hold that the present case is distinguishable upon its facts and the proceedings relating to pauperism not being defunct, it is open to the legal represent active to refuse to go on with those proceedings and to ask the Court to convert the application into a plaint on payment of proper court-fee. Accordingly we set aside the order of the Court below dated the 25th May, 1942, allow the appeal and direct that upon payment of the requisite court-fee within a month from to-day the legal representatives of Mohammad Ayaz Khan shall be allowed to proceed with the suit. No order as to costs. 18. In the view ' we have taken the question involved in the connected revision stands answered. We have already discussed the cases upon which the defendants learned Counsel relies in support of the contention that the lower Court f had no jurisdiction to grant time for payment of the court fee after it had refused to allow the plaintiff to sue as a pauper. In the events which have happened the order passed by the lower Court granting time to the deceased plaintiff has become in fructuous. Accordingly we dismiss the revision application No. 1 of 1943 but in the circumstances without costs.