JUDGMENT B. K. Mukherjea, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff and it arises out of a suit commenced by him in the Court of the First Munsif of Khulna for a declaration that an award made by the Kailasganj Debt Settlement Board on an application for settlement of debts presented to it by the defendant as well as the order of the appellate officer made on appeal from the same are null and void and without jurisdiction. The material facts are not in controversy and may be stated as follows. The defendant Haran Chandra Chakravarty was owner to the extent of four annas share in the raiyati holding recorded in C. S. Khatian No. 139 of Mouza Bajua in the district of Khulna. On 5th March 1927, he sold a quantity of land measuring about 533 acres out of his share in the holding by a deed of sale to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1500. On the same day, the plaintiff executed an ekrarnama in favour of the defendant stipulating inter alia that in case the latter returned the entire consideration money to the plaintiff within 16 years from the date of the kobala, the property would be reconveyed to the defendant. In 1937, the defendant filed an application before the Debt Settlement Board at Kailasgunj for the settlement of his debt and it was stated in the application that the kobala executed by him in favour of the plaintiff together with the ekrarnama given by the latter constituted a mortgage transaction, and the sum of Rs. 1500 was in reality an advance by way of loan. The Debt Settlement Board accepted this contention of the defendant and made an award settling the so-called mortgage debt at Rs. 1500 which was made payable in 20 instalments. This award was made in the year 1938. There was an appeal taken against it to the appellate officer who affirmed the decision of the Debt Settlement Board. 2. In 1939, the present suit was filed by the plaintiff, and his contention, in substance, was that it was not within the competence of the Debt Settlement Board to decide whether the deed of sale along with the ekrarnama created a mortgage-debt, and consequently, the award made by it was null and void for want of jurisdiction. 2. In 1939, the present suit was filed by the plaintiff, and his contention, in substance, was that it was not within the competence of the Debt Settlement Board to decide whether the deed of sale along with the ekrarnama created a mortgage-debt, and consequently, the award made by it was null and void for want of jurisdiction. The trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit being of opinion that the transaction between the parties was a sale out and out and not a mortgage, and the Debt Settlement Board had no jurisdiction to decide whether the documents created a debt within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. On appeal, this judgment was reversed and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The learned District Judge of Khulna who heard the appeal agreed with the trial Court in holding that the transaction was a sale and not a mortgage, but he held nevertheless that under S. 20, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, as it stands after the amendment of 1940, it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Debt Settlement Board to decide whether a liability amounted to a debt or not, and any decision which it might arrive at on this point could not be questioned in a Civil Court. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us in this second appeal. 3. We think that the general proposition of law is well settled that a Debt Settlement Board being a tribunal of special jurisdiction, its powers are limited by the statute by which it is created. The tribunal must act within the limits of its powers as laid down in the Act, and if it does so, its orders- right or wrong-cannot be challenged except in the manner and to the extent provided by the Act itself. Ordinarily, when a tribunal exercises a subordinate or special jurisdiction, the question whether the condition essential to give it jurisdiction is present or not is left to be decided by the ordinary civil Courts of the land: vide 44 C.W.N. 709 Secy. of State v. Mask & Co. ('40) 27 A. I. R. 1940 P. C. 105 : ILR (1940) Mad. 599 : ILR (1940) Kar. P.C. 194 : 67 I.A. 222 : 188 I. C. 231 : 44 C.W.N. 709 (P.C.). of State v. Mask & Co. ('40) 27 A. I. R. 1940 P. C. 105 : ILR (1940) Mad. 599 : ILR (1940) Kar. P.C. 194 : 67 I.A. 222 : 188 I. C. 231 : 44 C.W.N. 709 (P.C.). But the Legislature may invest a special tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction to determine its authority in certain matters, and when it does so, the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts must be deemed to have been taken away to that extent. In 43 C.W.N. 322 Nur Mia and Another Vs. Noakhali Nath Bank Ltd., AIR 1939 Cal 298 , it was held, that the assumption of jurisdiction by a Debt Settlement Board depends upon the fact that there is a debt and although the Board could decide any question relating to the extent or amount of the debt, the Legislature did not invest it with powers to determine exclusively whether a particular liability amounted to a debt at all. If, therefore, a civil Court came to the conclusion that there was no liability amounting to a debt within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, it could treat any order made by the Debt Settlement Board in regard to such matter as void for want of jurisdiction. 4. The law has since been changed, and under S. 20 of the amended Act, it is for the Debt Settlement Board to decide whether the liability amounts to a debt within the meaning of the Act, and the civil Court, therefore, is not competent to question the decision of the Debt Settlement Board in this respect. Section 20, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, however, was amended in 1940, and even if we hold that the amended section would be applicable to proceedings before the Debt Settlement Board which were actually pending at the time when the amendment came into force, it could not have any application in the present case where the proceedings before the Debt Settlement Board and before the Appellate Officer had terminated long before that date. In our opinion, therefore, the lower appellate Court was wrong in holding that the provisions of the amended S. 20, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, could be attracted to the facts of the present case; and as in the opinion of the District Judge, there was no debt created at all by the instrument of transfer, it must be held that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Debt Settlement Board was entirely unwarranted, and the award it made was a nullity. It is not necessary in the view we have taken to consider further whether S. 20, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, as it stands at present, authorises a Debt Settlement Board to (determine whether a transaction by way of a sale could create a liability at all. The point certainly is not free from doubt, and although a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that such matters would be within the exclusive competence of the Debt Settlement Board to decide, the matter may require further consideration. The result is that this appeal is allowed. "We set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restore those of the Munsif. We make no order as to costs in this Court. The plaintiff will have the costs of the Courts below. Akram, J. 5. I agree.