Dwarka Nath Sakhari v. Pramatha Nath Roy Chaudhury
1945-01-11
body1945
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This is a Rule calling upon the decree-holders auction-purchasers to show cause why their appeal in the District Court should not be re-heard on the merits. The decree-holders purchased the property in execution of a decree for rent. The Petitioner then filed an application under sec. 174 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Munsif thought that it ought to succeed. He made an order to that effect and directed the Petitioner to pay the decretal amount into Court by the 30th of June. The Petitioner failed to do so. He applied to the Munsif for an extension of time. This prayer was allowed by the Munsif and the sale was set aside. 2. The decree-holder Opposite Parties appealed. The learned Judge following the decisions of Edgley, J., in the cases of Syed Mohammed Asraf Ali v. Nabijan Bibi 43 C. W. N. 417 (1939) and Girish Chandra Das v. Sm. Annadamoni Dasi 43 C. W. N. 553, held that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to extend the time. His judgment on the merits consisting merely of the words "On the question of suppression of processes, fraud and limitation I do not find sufficient reason to differ from the finding arrived at by the learned Munsif" is so perfunctory that the Petitioner has only obtained a Rule for the re-hearing of the appeal. 3. In my opinion the decisions that were followed by the learned Judge were correct. The deposit of this decretal amount is a condition precedent to the setting aside of the sale; as no time is fixed it should be done within a reasonable time. The Petitioner therefore instead of applying for extension of time should have allowed his case to be dismissed and then appealed on the ground that reasonable time was not allowed. 4. In view of the petition which he filed and the order which the learned Munsif made upon it he became the Respondent in this appeal in the lower Appellate Court. I am unable to see why he cannot support the order of the Munsif allowing his application on other grounds. It is true that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to extend the time: but he had jurisdiction either to allow the application or to dismiss it and, when he allowed it, the Petitioner might support that order on other grounds. 5.
It is true that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to extend the time: but he had jurisdiction either to allow the application or to dismiss it and, when he allowed it, the Petitioner might support that order on other grounds. 5. I do not propose to remand the appeal for that matter. The very fact that the learned Munsif himself extended the time is the strongest possible argument to show that the original time fixed was not enough. It was indeed fixed without any reference to the Petitioner at all and was merely inserted in the judgment as a date of some kind. I have no doubt that if he had consulted the Petitioner, and the Petitioner had said that he would pay by the 3rd of July, the Munsif would have fixed that date. 6. The Rule is accordingly made absolute, the order of the lower Appellate Court dismissing the appeal is set aside and I direct that it be re-heard by some other Judge on the merits. The costs of this Rule will abide the result--hearing-fee, one gold mohur.