JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the Plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 is the liquidator of the Society of which the Plaintiff is a member. Defendant No. 2 is the arbitrator appointed by the Registrar. The dispute between the parties is whether the reference by Defendant No. 1 to the Registrar and the consequent appointment of Defendant No. 2 as arbitrator by the Registrar are ultra vires. The facts are admitted. The Society was registered under Act II of 1912. The registration was cancelled by the Registrar on the 17th January, 1939. The Defendant No. 1 was appointed liquidator. During the pendency of these proceedings, Bengal Act XXI of 1940 came into force on the 2nd July, 1942, and Act II of 1912 with the exception of certain portions of sec. 28 was repeated. It appears that a formal order appointing Defendant No. 1 liquidator was made under sec. 40 of the new Act. As the original appointment was saved under sec. 4 (2), in my opinion, this order was wholly redundant, and has no legal effect of any sort. Defendant No. 1 referred the dispute between him and the Plaintiff to the Registrar under sec. 86, who in his turn referred it to Defendant No. 2 under sec. 87 (1) (c) 2. The Plaintiff then instituted the present suit. Briefly, his case is that the liquidator must follow the old procedure and not that laid down in the new Act. If this contention is correct, it follows that this reference to arbitration was ultra vires. 3. Although they differed in opinion, both the learned Munsif and the learned District Judge delivered well-reasoned and careful judgments. 4. Both sides have relied upon sec. 4 (1) and placed upon it an extreme interpretation which, in my opinion, is not sustainable. 5. In view of the provisions of sec. 41 of the old Act, the Society had already ceased to exist as a corporate body. 6. According to the Appellant, the result is that it is not an existing Society within the meaning of sec. 4 (1). But although it had ceased to exist as a corporate body, it continued to exist as a Society, apart from anything else. This is clear, from the wording of sec. 42. The view of the learned District Judge on this point seems to be clearly right. The effect of sec. 4 (1). But although it had ceased to exist as a corporate body, it continued to exist as a Society, apart from anything else. This is clear, from the wording of sec. 42. The view of the learned District Judge on this point seems to be clearly right. The effect of sec. 4 (1) is merely that the Society is deemed to have been registered under the new Act. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Das on behalf of the Defendant went so far as to argue that as a result of the enactment of the sub-section the previous order of cancellation by the Registrar must be deemed to have been wiped out. The section of course does not say so; nor does it even suggest such a curious result. It would indeed be strange if a saving clause enacted to preserve what was done in the past, should really have a precisely opposite effect and wipe something out. It is impossible to read any such meaning into the section and it must be interpreted as I have already indicated in the preceding paragraph. 8. The question that has now to be determined is therefore, whether Defendant No. 1 is to follow the old or the new procedure. As this is a matter of procedure, the provision of the new Act will have retrospective effect unless it can be held that by implication the old procedure is to be retained for the completion of pending liquidation. 9. The procedure under the two Acts is totally different. Under the old Act, the liquidator is appointed after registration has been cancelled. Under the new Act it is exactly the opposite. Nor is that all. Under the old Act, the Society as a corporate foody is dead. Under the new Act it is merely undergoing an operation from which it may recover [vide sec. 74 (1)]. 10. In there circumstances, I should be quite prepared to infer that it was not the intention of the Legislature that a liquidation started under the old procedure should be completed under the new and inconsistent procedure. But in my judgment, this matter is concluded by the provisions of sec. 4 (2) by which the order of cancellation made by the Registrar shall be deemed to have been made under the present Act, that is to say, under sec. 94 (2). But in my judgment, this matter is concluded by the provisions of sec. 4 (2) by which the order of cancellation made by the Registrar shall be deemed to have been made under the present Act, that is to say, under sec. 94 (2). The proceedings which are now being taken are previous to an order of cancellation under sec. 94 (2). The proper conclusion, therefore, is that that procedure has no application and Defendant No. 1 must follow the old procedure. 11. The learned District Judge also referred to sec. 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act upon which the Appellant relies. In my judgment this gives the Appellant a second line of attack. His right to have this dispute tried in the ordinary Courts instead of being forced into arbitration against his will had undoubtedly accrued; it is accordingly preserved. The result is that even if the liquidator has to follow the new procedure, the right of the Appellant to have this matter decided in the ordinary Courts remains intact. 12. Finally, Mr. Das contended that this is not a case in which an injunction should be granted : it is clear that a mere declaration without an injunction would serve no useful purpose. 13. I may say at once that if it were to appear that the Plaintiff deliberately stood by until a suit was barred by limitation and then instituted the present suit, nothing would induce me to give him an injunction which might have the effect of allowing him to build his house at the expense of somebody else. That, however, is not the case here. He was given notice of the arbitration on the 4th June, 1943; and filed the present suit on the 15th June, 1943. 14. Whether he should be put on terms depends upon what took place in connection with the suit which I am told was filed by Defendant No. 1 before the new Act came into force. 11th June, 1945. 15. It has now been ascertained that no actual suit was filed by the liquidator. I am, however, satisfied that in view of the correspondence which passed between the parties, the Appellant must certainly be put on terms that he pays Rs. 3,000. 11th June, 1945. 15. It has now been ascertained that no actual suit was filed by the liquidator. I am, however, satisfied that in view of the correspondence which passed between the parties, the Appellant must certainly be put on terms that he pays Rs. 3,000. It has now been ascertained by the Rai Bahadur that the liquidator and the directors of the Society will accept this in full satisfaction of their claim. The Appellant is also willing to accept these terms. The appeal will accordingly be disposed of as follows: The Appellant must pay Rs. 500 into this Court within a fortnight and the balance of Rs. 2,500 within six months. Defendant No. 1 will then give him a full receipt for the claim. The decree of the lower Appellate Court will then be set aside and that of the Munsif restored, subject to this modification that both the parties will bear their own costs. Defendant No. 1 will be entitled to withdraw the money so deposited. If these terms are not complied with, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.