JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the decree-holder. The real question in dispute between the parties is whether the judgment-debtor is entitled to any relief under paragraph 11 of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. The Munsif found that he was a defaulter and refund to give him any relief. The judgment-debtor appealed. The learned Judge purported to deal with it as a matter of execution under sec. 47 of the CPC and then proceeded to alter the decree. Obviously the decree could not be altered on an application under sec. 47. The learned Judge also found that, although the judgment-debtor was a defaulter, he was entitled to relief. Now that the case has been put before me, the matter has become clear. Under paragraph 11 the Respondent might ask for the variation of either an order made in execution or the decree. Here no order was ever made in execution and the only thing to vary was the decree. The application before the Munsif was actually one to vary the decree. 2. It is quite clear that this has nothing to do with sec. 47 and the appeal in the lower Appellate Court was incompetent. There has always been a difference of judicial opinion whether a second appeal is created by the exercise in the District Court of a non-existing jurisdiction. My own view is that in such a case the remedy is in revision and I shall deal with it on those lines. 3. Now it is not enough to show that the appeal was incompetent. I should certainly not in revision restore what was obviously a wrong order. If the judgment-debtor can show that he could have obtained relief in revision, I should certainly not interfere. 4. Now in order to succeed the judgment-debtor must show that the decree would not have been made if this order had been in existence on the 19th of August, 1942. On that date he was a defaulter and the decree certainly would have been made. 5. Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the judgment-debtors contends that if paragraph 9 (4) is applied, he could have paid up to the 26th September, 1943. It seems to me to be quite impossible to transfer this sub-paragraph back simpliciler. For example, it requires the tenant to pay to the full extent allowable under the Order. 5. Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the judgment-debtors contends that if paragraph 9 (4) is applied, he could have paid up to the 26th September, 1943. It seems to me to be quite impossible to transfer this sub-paragraph back simpliciler. For example, it requires the tenant to pay to the full extent allowable under the Order. On the date when the decree was passed no such question could arise and no tenant would be liable to pay 10 per cent, more than the actual rent. If the terms of sub-paragraph (4) are applied simpliciter, no tenant would ever get any relief at all. It must be done mutatis mutandis. I therefore, certainly agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the tenant is not required to show that he had paid a sum in excess of that for which he was really liable when the decree was passed. 6. The other matter refers to the period of grace in which the rent which has accrued before the Order come into force, can be paid. There is a period of grace of three months. It is quite senseless to apply the actual calendar period of three mouths to a point of time several months earlier which will have the effect of giving a period of grace of over a year. I am quite satisfied that there is no period of grace which would help the judgment-debtor in cases of this kind where he seeks to have the decree altered or rescinded. 7. Finally, there is the difficulty that, even if this period of grace did exist, the judgment-debtor has not availed himself of it. It is quite true that he paid the arrears into Court on the 23rd of September, 1943, which is within the period, but at the same time he filed an application saying that he was paying under protest and that he would object to the decree-bolder taking the money out of Court. Under no stretch of the imagination could a deposit made under such circumstances be called a payment. 8. The appeal is dismissed as incompetent. In revision, I set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge and restore that of the Munsif. I make no order as to costs. The cross-objection is not pressed and is dismissed without costs.