JUDGMENT Misra, J. - This is an application u/s 25, Small Cause Courts Act, against the dismissal of the applicant's objections to the execution of- a Small Cause Court decree. 2. The facts are that on 29th March, 1931, a loan of Rs. 200 was taken from Bhagwan Din on the basis of a promissory note executed by one Jagat Narain on behalf of his principal Mst. Baidehi Kuar for payment of arrears of revenue in respect of certain landed property. The property belonged to her husband B Rup Narain, a well-known resident of Sitapur district. There were some disputes between Mst. Baidehi Kuar and her husband's brother, B. Saroop Narain, regarding its devolution, but her possession was upheld by an award of arbitrators soon after B. Rup Narain's death. Baidehi Kuar died in 1932, and her husband's property was thereafter mutated in the name of Saroop Narain. Rup Narain, it appears, had a daughter, Mst. Bhagwan Dei, whose son, B. Suraj Mohan Dayal, instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Bareilly, for possession of the aforesaid property along with some other properties as a reversioner or as a stridhan heir of Mst. Baidehi Kuar. He obtained a decree on 25th September, 1934, and an appeal against it was finally dismissed by the High Court of Allahabad on 22ud December, 193V. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit in the Bareilly Court, Bhagwan Din obtained a decree for Rs. 300 and costs against Saroop Narain on the basis of his promissory notes from the Court of Sub-Judge Sitapur in the exercise of his Small Cause Court jurisdiction on 26th August, 1933. The decree was against "the assets of Mst. Baidehi Kuar" in his hands. 3. In August 1936 Sarup Narain applied u/s 4, Encumbered Estates Act, and since his appeal against the decree of the Bareilly Court was still pending decision in the High Court of Allahabad, he included in his written statement u/s 8 the property of his brother Rup Narain which after the death of Mst. Baidehi Kuar stood in the revenue records in his name. Bhagwan, Din apparently had no inkling about Suraj Mohan Dayal's decree and in the proceedings consequent upon the application of Saroop Narain he preferred along with other claims u/s 9 a claim in respect of his decretal debt. Baidehi Kuar stood in the revenue records in his name. Bhagwan, Din apparently had no inkling about Suraj Mohan Dayal's decree and in the proceedings consequent upon the application of Saroop Narain he preferred along with other claims u/s 9 a claim in respect of his decretal debt. He obtained a decree for Rs.- 2,421 from the Court of the Special Judge. Included in this amount was the sum of Rs. 406. found due to him in respect of his decree, dated 26th August, 1933. It was provided that this sum would be "recover- able from the assets of Mst. Baidehi Kuar, if any, in the hands of the applicant." After the dismissal of Sarup Narain's appeal from the High Court on 22nd December, 1939, Suraj Mohan Dayal preferred objections u/s 11 in proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, and the property, which constituted the assets of Rup Narain and which had come to Sarup Narain on the death of his sister-in-law, was released. 4. Bhagwan Din then applied on 21st April, 1941, for execution of his Small Cause Court's decree against Suraj Mohan Dayal and prayed -.that the latter's name be substituted in place of Sarup Narain as the legal representative of the judgment- debtor. On 21st May, 1941, Suraj Mohan Dayal raised a number of objections to the execution, pleading inter alia that he was not the legal representative of Sarup Narain, that the decree "against the assests of Mst. Baidehi Kuar" could not be executed against the assets of Rup Narain, that the execution was time-barred and that in any event the decree of 1933 no longer subsisted, as it had been converted on 5th May, 1939, into a decree under the En- cumbered Estates Act. All these pleas were repelled by the lower Court which held that the decretal amount was a charge upon the estate, and as that estate was no longer subject to the proceedings of Act XXV of 1934, the decree of 1933 could be realised by execution against Suraj Mohan Dayal who was substituted in place of Sarup Narain. It was also argued before the learned Civil Judge, though no issue had been raised in that behalf, that the: debt incurred by Mst. Baidehi Kuar was not supported by legal necessity and was, therefore, not binding on the reversionary estate. This contention also failed. It was also argued before the learned Civil Judge, though no issue had been raised in that behalf, that the: debt incurred by Mst. Baidehi Kuar was not supported by legal necessity and was, therefore, not binding on the reversionary estate. This contention also failed. Suraj Mohan Dayal has come up in revision u/s 25, Small Cause Courts Act, and the points urged before the lower Court on his behalf have been strenuously pressed by his learned Counsel in revision. 5. I am not disposed to accept the Appellant's contention regarding the want of legal necessity or the argument which relates to the bar of limitation. 6. It is clear to my mind that a necessity, even though brought about by the precedent mismanagement of the widow, cannot render the loan any-the-less binding on the reversionary heirs. It was found by the lower Court that the property was attached for arrears of Government revenue. It is clear, therefore, that there was sufficient and serious pressure upon the estate justifying the loan in order to prevent its sale The circumstances of the case would, in my opinion, also warrant the finding given by the Court below in favour of the exclusion of the period during which the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act were pending. * Further I am of opinion that the contention about the inexcusability of the decree on the ground that it was "against the asset of Mst. Baidehi Kuar" and, not against the assets of Rup Narain is on the interpretation of the decree futile. The discussion in the judgment which resulted in the decree under execution clearly indicates that no distinction was drawn by the learned Judge between the assets of Mst. Baidehi Kuar and those of her husband. 7. There are two matters, however, which deserves a more serious consideration and present some technical difficulties in the way of execution of the decree in the manner desired by Bhagwan Din. 8. The first of those matters results from the substitution of the decree of 1933 by a decree under the Encumbered Estates Act in May, 1939. 7. There are two matters, however, which deserves a more serious consideration and present some technical difficulties in the way of execution of the decree in the manner desired by Bhagwan Din. 8. The first of those matters results from the substitution of the decree of 1933 by a decree under the Encumbered Estates Act in May, 1939. Section 18 of the Encumbered Estates Act provides that Subject to the right of appeal or revision conferred in Chapter VI, the effect of a decree of the Special Judge under sub Section (7) of Section 14 shill be to extinguish the previously existing rights, if any, of the claimant, together with all rights, if any, of mortgage or lien by which the same are secured and, where any decree is given by the Special Judge to substitute for those rights a right to recover the amount of the decree in the m inner and to the extent hereinafter prescribed. 9. By reason of the fact than the assets against which the decree could be liquidated no longer constitute the attachable or sale- able property of the landlord, Bhagwan Din's decree under the Encumbered Estates Act becomes infructuous. The question to be determined is whether the circumstance can operate to resuscitate the decree of 1933 or the rights under it. The answer to this question is in my opinion, provided by Section 11, clause 3 which lays down that The Special Judge shall determine all claims made under this section before he proceeds to determine the amount due to any creditor u/s 14 and shall not pass any decree under that section until the expiry of a period of one month after the last day 0.1 which he determines a claim under this section. 10. This clause has existed in the Act from its inception. Its object obviously was to render impossible the eventuality which has occurred in the present case. 10. This clause has existed in the Act from its inception. Its object obviously was to render impossible the eventuality which has occurred in the present case. Complications have, however, arisen because of the amendment of clause 2 of Section 11 by the addition of a proviso to the effect that a claim u/s 11 can be presented at any time before such property is transferred to any person under Sections 24, 25, 28 or 31 or a bond is issued under sections 30 or 31 if the Special Judge is satisfied that the objector had sufficient cause for not preferring his application within a period of three months from the date of publication of notice in the gazette. In cases contemplated by the proviso it is, I think, reasonable on the principles enunciated in Har Charan Lal v. Sukha Nand 1942 O A 46 : A W R (CC) 68 : O W N 78 and Pt. Parbhoo Dayal v. Mst. Husina Bagam 1944 O A 128 : A W R (CC)128 : O W N 180 to hold that in the event of success of the claim the decrees, which have already been passed on the footing that the property belonged to a landlord, must be regarded as automatically wiped off In this view Section 18 would not operate to extinguish the decree previously passed by the Small Cause Court, and it would again be capable of execution if other circumstances do not stand in the way of its enforcement. 11. The second matter, which needs some consideration, is whether the decree, as it stands, cam be executed against Suraj Mohan Dayal by merely substituting him in place of the judgment-debtor. The decree framed must, 1 have no doubt, be regarded as merely a money decree and not one which creates a charge on the assets of the deceased. It is analogous to a decree which is known to the English lawyers as De Bonis Testatoris a decree which by its terms is to be satisfied out of the assets left by the deceased person. It has no other effect than as mere money decree, and it does not create a charge upon the property which can be availed of for its satisfaction. It has no other effect than as mere money decree, and it does not create a charge upon the property which can be availed of for its satisfaction. See in this connection Ram Dhun Dhur v. Mohesh Chunder Chowdhry (1882) 9 Cal 406, Ordinarily an execution Court has no jurisdiction to sell the property of a person who was not party to proceedings nor properly represented on the record. Against such persons the decretal sales would be a nullity. An exception to the above principle has, however, sometimes been recognised in cases where the creditor selects from amongst several rival claimants to the estate of his deceased debtor any one whom be bona fide believes to have the best prima facie title as legal representative and obtains a decree against him. In such cases the decree and the execution sale founded thereon against the judgment- debtor have been held to bind the true heir in the absence of fraud or collusion vide Sotish Chunder Lahiry v. Nil Cotnul Lahiry (1884) U Cal 45, Chaturbujadoss Kushal Doss v. Rajamanicka Musali (1931) 54 Mad 212, and Sanna Govappa Vs. Rodda Sanna Govappa and Others, AIR 1929 Mad 482 . We are not here concerned with this class of cases, and it is, therefore, un- necessary to refer to the divergence of judicial opinion in connection with the view mentioned above. 12. Where a true legal representative is sought to be substituted for purposes of execution and sale in place of the person who ostensibly represented the estate of the deceased debtor at the time of the decree the matters stand on a fundamentally different footing. In Ashi Bhushan Dasi v. Pelaratn Mandal AIR 1914 Cal 28, a decree had been obtained for mesne profits against an alleged adopted minor son as the representative of a person who bad been in wrongful possession of the property. The adoption was subsequently declared invalid, and the decree-holder then sought to proceed in execution against the real representative. It was held that the decree-holder could not proceed against the judgment-debtor on the record as he had not received any assets of the wrong doer nor could he ask the Court to substitute the name of the real representative in the decree, since the result Would be really a new decree in his favour against such representative. It was held that the decree-holder could not proceed against the judgment-debtor on the record as he had not received any assets of the wrong doer nor could he ask the Court to substitute the name of the real representative in the decree, since the result Would be really a new decree in his favour against such representative. The distinction between the class of cases represented by Kaliappan Servaikaran v. Varadarajulu (1910) 33 Mad 75, and the other group of cases represented by Sotish Chunder Lahiry v. Nil Comul Lahiry has been brought out in Gnanambal Ammal v. Veerasami Chetty (1915) 31 Ind-Cas. 920, by Sadasiva Aiyar, J. The case- with which the learned Judge was concerned fell into the second of these groups, and it was pointed out that the decisions like the one in Kaliappan Servaikaran v. Varadarajula , were distinguishable inasmuch as the legal representative was there sought to be brought on the-record for purposes of execution and that the deceased debtor s property in his hands could .not be attached and sold in the same suit The decision in Sattna Gwappa v. Rodda Sauna Govappaon which the lower Court has relied is inline with the cases of the other kind. 13. It is well known that in England the principle has been adopted that an action lies on judgment: which finally establishes a debt, if it cannot be enforced in any other way. In William v. Jones 14 LJ Exc 145 Baron Parke enunciated the principle thus where a Court, of competent juusdiction has adjudicated a certain sum of money to be due from One to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that judgments of origin and colonial Courts are supported and enforced and the same rule applies to inferior Courts in this country and applies equally whether they be Courts of Records or not. 14. The principle was recognised in civil law by ado judicata. This is no doubt hit in cases which fall outside the bar imposed by Section 47 C. P. C. and where events following the decree renert nexecutable, a suit on judgment would be imaginable in India. 14. The principle was recognised in civil law by ado judicata. This is no doubt hit in cases which fall outside the bar imposed by Section 47 C. P. C. and where events following the decree renert nexecutable, a suit on judgment would be imaginable in India. The language of Lotion 9 C. P. C. is wide enough to cove it and article 122, Limitation Act, in tact contemplates such a suit. An action therefore, is permissible where a judgment cannot be enforced in some other way. 15. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has invited my attention to a decision of Sir Lal Gopal Mukerji, J. which directly favours the view taken by the Tower Court and holds that in the circum- stances analogous to those ,n the present case, substitution for purposes of execution permissible. The case is very much anoint but unfortunately the discussion of the matter if I may take the liberty of saying so, is scanty The vast amount of case law which 5"exists on the question does not appeal to have been brought to the notice of that learned Judge. 16. The result of what has be6ri said above is that Bhagwan Din may on a proper view of law be perhaps constrained to bring a fresh suit on the judgment of 1933 and after he obtains a fresh decree against Suraj Mohan Dayal he may become entitled to execute it against the property of up Narain in his hands. 17. I have, however, to consider whether it is desirable in this case to compel him to do so and whether the order of the lower Court dismissing the objections should be set aside in revision u/s 25, Small Cause Courts Act. Bhagwan Din obtained his decree in 1933 believing in good faith that Sarup Narain was the real legal representative of his debtor. He cannot, I think, be saddled with the knowledge of the Bareilly litigation or with the latent title of Suraj Mohan Dayal which the latter succeeded., in establishing alter a prolonged litigation against Sarup Narain. There is thus perhaps a procedural irregularity in executing, the decree against him, but as substantial justice has been done by the order of the lower Court it is, in my opinion, not necessary to relegate Bhagwan Din to a fresh suit. There is thus perhaps a procedural irregularity in executing, the decree against him, but as substantial justice has been done by the order of the lower Court it is, in my opinion, not necessary to relegate Bhagwan Din to a fresh suit. The decree-holder advanced the money to save the property from sale, and the debt must come out of the estate. The decree of 1933 had to remain unexecuted till now on account of legislative injunctions and on account of the course of events over which Bhagwan Din could hardly have any control. It would, in no opinion, be unfair to postpone further the satisfaction of his dues for a possible technical defect and to subject to him to the ordeal of a fresh litigation. In C. P. Clarke v. Agha Aziz Khan 1936 O W N 330. Srivastava and Nanavutty, JJ. held that the High Court should not ordinarily exercise its discretionary powers in revision u/s 25, Small Cause Courts Act, if no injustice has been done. The question whether interference should he made or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no doubt tint the question raised on behalf of the applicant is one of law, and that the Court is not precluded from interfering with the lower Court's decision on tint around, but having given our careful consideration To the facts and circumstances of the case we are satisfied that far from furthering any ends of justice it would perpetrate and an injustice in interfering with the decree of the lower Court in the present case. 18. A similar view was expressed in Maya Prakash v. Tulshi Ram 1936 O W N 533 by Sir Carleton Moss King who observed that it was a settled policy of this Court not to interfere u/s 35 of the Small Cause Courts Act unless SOUK- error had been commuted resulting in justice. 19. He held that even if the Court below was wrong on the question whether an uncertified payment saved limitation, this Court would not necessarily interfere unless it felt that the error had resulted in some miscarriage of justice. See ako Sampat Shukul v. Sub Karan Tewari 1941 O A 827 : AWR (CC) 319 : OWN 1112, and Mangnoo Singh v. Bindeshri 1943 O A 194 : A W R (C C) 87 : O W N 313. 20. See ako Sampat Shukul v. Sub Karan Tewari 1941 O A 827 : AWR (CC) 319 : OWN 1112, and Mangnoo Singh v. Bindeshri 1943 O A 194 : A W R (C C) 87 : O W N 313. 20. As in my opinion substantial justice has been done, and interference with the order of the lower Court is likely to perpetrate an injustice, this application must fail. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.