JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J., Ghulam Hasan and Kaul, JJ. - Owing to a difference of opinion between two learned Judges of this Court constituting the Division Bench before which this appeal first came up for bearing the case has been referred to a Full Bench. 2. The material facts are simple and lie within a short compass : The suit, which has given rise to this appeal, was instituted by the present appellant, Badlu, on the basis of a promissory note, executed on the 28th of November, 1935, by respondent No. 1 and Mst. Tej Kuer, mother of respondent No. 2, as guardian" of her minor son, for a sum of Rs. 4,050. This note was given in lieu of certain previous promissory notes. The rate of interest stipulated was 0 14-0 per cent per mensem. The suit was brought for recovery of Rs. 5,314 principal and interest due. The execution of the promissory note was admitted by the defendants. It was pleaded, however, on their behalf that Badlu. was a creditor within the meaning of that expression as. used in the Agriculturists' Relief Act and that the defendants were agriculturists. It was further averred that inasmuch as the creditor had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 39 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act, he could not gat any interest on the debt. The trial Court (Civil Judge of Sitapur) held on the evidence led before it that Badlu was not proved to be a creditor within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2 of the Act. The defendants were held to be agriculturists, and inasmuch as no copy of the promissory note was supplied by the creditor to the debtors as required by sub-Section (1) of Section 39, Bailu was not entitled to any interest on the loan. The claim was decreed for Rs. 4,0.59 only with future interest thereon from the date of the decree till realization at 3 1/4 per cent and proportionate costs. The appeal which was heard by the Division bench was preferred against this decision. 3. Two . points were argued before the Bench on behalf of the appellant: 1. That the respondents were not agriculturists of the class to which Section 39 applied, and 2. The appeal which was heard by the Division bench was preferred against this decision. 3. Two . points were argued before the Bench on behalf of the appellant: 1. That the respondents were not agriculturists of the class to which Section 39 applied, and 2. that inasmuch as the loan in respect of which the suit was brought was not initially advanced after the date on which the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act came into force the debtors could not claim the benefit of Section 30. 4. Both the learned judges constituting the Division Bench unanimously repelled the second contention. Relying on the decision of this Court in Lala Harakh Chand v. Lalta Prasad 1943 OA 63 : AWR (CC) 26 : OWN 104 and the Full Bench Decision of the Allahabad High Court in Partap Singh v. Babu Gulzari Lal 1942 WR(HC) 11 : OA(Sup)111 : AIR 1942 All 50 they held that the debt in question, though originally advanced before the U. P. Agriculturist*' Relief Art came into force, was in substance a loan, and accordingly the argument based on the opening words of Section 39, "every loan given after the date on which this Act comes into force etc. etc." could not be accepted. The same point was raised before us. Though the members of the Division Bench were agreed on this point, and ordinarily it should not have been a matter for consideration on reference to the Full Bench, as by the order of reference the whole appeal was referred to us u/s 13 (ii) (b) of the Oudh Courts Act, we have heard the learned Counsel on that point also. In view of the decisions to which reference has already been made, agreeing with the opinion of the Division Bench, we hold that the debt in question was "in substance a loan" and hence a transaction to which the provisions of Section 39 would a reply if they are not excluded on account of other considerations. 5. It was on the other point raised by the appellant that the members of the Division Bench differed in their opinion. It is based of the provisions of Section 2 (2) (a) of the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. Section 2 of the Act contains the inter predation clauses. It opens thus : In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context ; .............................................. It is based of the provisions of Section 2 (2) (a) of the U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. Section 2 of the Act contains the inter predation clauses. It opens thus : In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context ; .............................................. Then follows sub-Section (2) which runs as follows : (2). "Agriculturist" means, in all sections of the Act voliere the term is used, (a) a person who, in districts not subject to the Benares Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1795, pays land revenue not exceeding Rs. 1,000 per annum; or (b) a person who, in districts subject to the Benares Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1795, pays local rate u/s 109 of the District Boards Act, X of 1922, not exceeding Rs. 124 per annum; or (c) a person holding land free of revenue; who pays a local rate u/s M9 of the District Boards Act, X of 1421, not exceeding Rs. 120 per annum; or (d) in Oudh, an under-proprietor holding a sub- settlement of land the revenue of which does not exceed Rs. 1,000 per annum; or (e) a thekedar who holds a theka of land the revenue of which does not exceed Rs. 1000 per annum; or (f) a person, other than a thekadar or an under proprietor in Oudh holding a sub-settlement, who pays rent for agricultural land not exceeding Rs. 500 per annum; or (g) a person holding land free of rent, the area of which does not exceed 83 acres of or (h) a person ordinarily living outside the limits of any municipality who belongs to any of. the classes of persons mentioned in Schedule I: Provided that in Section 2 (10) (a), 3, 4, 6, 8 and Chapters IV and V an agriculturist means also a person who would belong to a class of persons mentioned in parts (a) to (g), of this sub-section, if the limits of laird revenue, local rates, rent and 'area mentioned in these parts were omitted: ................................................................. Explanation II. Explanation II. In the case of members of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or joint tenants, each member or owner or tenant shall be considered to be an agriculturist for the purposes of Chapters II (except Sections 3, 4, 5 and 8), III and VI, whose share or interest in revenue, local rate or rent or the rent-free land, as the case maybe, does not respectively exceed the aforesaid limits. ................................................................... Explanation VI When a person pays both rent and revenue, he shall not be deemed to be an agriculturist for the purposes of Chapters II (except sections 3, 4, 5 and 8j, III and VI, if the total of the rent and revenue annually payable by him exceeds Rs. 1,01*0, or if he is excluded from the definition of agriculturist under any of the clauses (a) to (g) ................................................................ 6. According to this definition of the term "agriculturist" as" mentioned in the first proviso there are two main classes of agriculturist (1) those who pay land revenue or rent or local rates or cultivate an area below certain prescribed limits; and (2) those who, though they belong to a class of persons mentioned in parts (a) to (g) of sub-Section (2), pay land revenue, local rates, rant or have a holding with an area exceeding such limits. 7. For facility of reference the former will be referred to in this judgment as agriculturists of the poor class and the other as agriculturist of the rich class. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that inasmuch as the respondents pay Rs. 4,50J annually as land revenue they could not, in view of omission of any reference to Chapter VI, in which Section 39 finds a place in the first proviso to sub-Section (2), claim the advantage of that section. On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the language of the proviso and to specific mention therein of Section 2 (10) which defines the term "loan". It was argued that Section 39 did not use the word "agriculturist"; on the other hand it used the word "loan" and accordingly in view of the provisions of Section 2 (10) that section will be applicable to a loan advanced to an agriculturist irrespective of whether he belongs to the rich or to the poor class. It was argued that Section 39 did not use the word "agriculturist"; on the other hand it used the word "loan" and accordingly in view of the provisions of Section 2 (10) that section will be applicable to a loan advanced to an agriculturist irrespective of whether he belongs to the rich or to the poor class. The appellant's contention found favour with Madeley J. but was not accepted by Misra J. The matter was accordingly referred to this Full Bench. 8. Thus the question for determination is whether the respondents, the share of land revenue paid by each of whom exceeds Rs. 1,000, can claim the benefit of the provisions of Section 39. Section 39 is as follows : 39 (1) Every loan given after the date on which this Act comes into force shall be evidenced by a written document, of which a copy shall be given to the debtor. (2) In the case of unsecured loans, an entry shall be made in every such document specifying the date by which repayment must be made in order to earn the benefit of Section 29 and the rate of interest which shall prevail if repayment is made by such date. (3) No interest shall accrue on any loan until a. copy of the written document prepared according to the provisions of sub-Sections (1) and (v) has been supplied to the debtor as required by sub- Section (1). (4) Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, no such written document as is referred to in sub-Section (I) shall require a stamp duty higher than that which would have been payable in respect thereof had it not contained the details mentioned in sub-Sections (1) and (2), and no copy supplied to the debtor as required by sub- Section (1) shall require any stamp duty. 9. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the first, proviso to sub Section (2) (a) of Section 2, though it makes reference to Chapters IV and V, omits to mention Chapter VI. Accordingly that proviso could be availed of for the purpose of determining which class of agriculturists could take advantage of Section 39 of the Act which occurs in Chapter VI. Accordingly that proviso could be availed of for the purpose of determining which class of agriculturists could take advantage of Section 39 of the Act which occurs in Chapter VI. It was pointed out that Explanations II and VI of the sub-section made special provision for members of a joint Hindu family or joint owners or joint tenants or persons who paid both rent and revenue and in them express reference was made to Chapter VI. The deliberate omission of any reference to Chapter VI in the first proviso, it was argued, made it clear that the benefits of Section 39 could not be claimed by an agriculturist of the rich class. Before considering these arguments in detail we should like to make a few preliminary observations. In applying the provisions of a statute it is the duty of the Court to administer the law in accordance with the intention of the Legislature. If the words of the statute are plain and unambiguous, no question of interpretation arises. As observed by Maxwell in his well-known treatise on the Interpretation of Statutes, 8th Edn. page 1. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature. 10. The necessity for "interpretation" arises only if the words of the statute are not clear. Acts of Indian and Provincial Legislatures usually consist of the following parts : (1) Preamble, (2) Date on which it received the assent of the Governor General or the Governor, as the case may be, (3) title, (4) marginal notes and punctuation, (5) headings, (5) the interpretation clauses, (7) the enacting clauses, and (8) the Schedules. 11. Each of these parts is interpreted according to certain known and will established canons of interpretation. It is only by reference to such rules of interpretation that the intention of the. Legislature is gathered. The Courts must content themselves with ascertaining the intention of the Legislature by examining the provisions of the statute in the light of these well established rules of interpretation. It is only by reference to such rules of interpretation that the intention of the. Legislature is gathered. The Courts must content themselves with ascertaining the intention of the Legislature by examining the provisions of the statute in the light of these well established rules of interpretation. It will be wrong if ignoring these rules the Court seeks to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considering what, having regard to the object the Legislature appears to have had in view, should be the meaning of any particular section 11 the enacting part of the statute. We may further observe that a clear distinction is to be drawn between the interpretation clauses and the enacting clauses of a a Act, The interpretation clauses, as observed by a writer, are "a little dictionary" whereof the only object is to help in understanding the meaning of certain expressions used in the Act; and it is a well recognised principle of Legislative drafting that an interpretation clause should never contain what is properly the subject matter for enacting clauses; or to use the language of Craies on Statute Law (page 193) "never to enact under the guise of definition." 12. We may now proceed to examine the arguments advanced in support of the two views relating to the applicability of Section 39 to which reference has already been made. A reference to Section 39 shows that it does not use the term "agriculturist". On the other hand it expressly uses the word "loan". Both these expressions are defined in the interpretation clauses found in Section 2 of the Act. It is further noteworthy that sub-Section (2) of Section 2 begins with these words : 'Agriculturist' means in all sections ,of the Act where the term is used": 13. This is followed by enumeration of several classes of persons in sub-clauses (a) to (h) who, if they fulfil certain requirements would be agriculturists for the purposes of the Act. Then follows the first proviso which runs thus : Provided that in Sections 2 (10) (a), 3, 4, 5, 8 and Chapters IV and V an agriculturist means also a person who would belong to a class of persons mentioned in parts (a) to (g) of this sub section, if the limits of land revenue, local rates, rent and area mentioned in these parts were omitted. 14. Section 2 (10) defines the expression "loan". 14. Section 2 (10) defines the expression "loan". The relevant portion of this sub- section is as follows : '(10) (a) 'Loan' means an advance to an agriculturist, whether of money or in kind, and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan, but shall not include............ 15. Thus it will be seen that unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context the expression "loan" wherever used in this Act will be understood to refer to an advance made to an agriculturist irrespective of whether he belongs to the rich or the poor class. It will thus appear that on a plain reading of the language of Section 39, every advance made to an agriculturist, whether of the rich or the poor class, should be evidenced by a writ- ten document of which a copy should be given to the debtor and no interest shall accrue on any such advance until a copy of the written document has been supplied to the debtor. In giving this meaning to the language of Section 39 we have used the interpretation clause only to ascertain the meaning of the word "loan" which is used in Section 39. It will further be noted, as already observed, that Section 39 does not use the word, "agriculturist". According to the opening words of Section 2 (2) reference can properly be made to that interpretation clause to ascertain the meaning of the word "agriculturist" only "where the term is used". The subsection expressly enjoins this. It will be wrong to ignore this very important portion of the sub-section. This was the view accepted by Mr. Justice Misra. 16. We may now proceed to consider the argument in favour of the opposite view which found favour with Madeley J. It was contended that inasmuch as Section 39 finds a place in Chapter VI, and no reference is made to that chapter in the proviso while express reference to it is made in Explanations II and VI appended to sub- Section (2), the Legislature has clearly indicated that it did not want to give the benefit of Section 39 to an agriculturist of the rich class. To begin with this is not a correct approach to the matter under consideration. To begin with this is not a correct approach to the matter under consideration. Whether the benefit of any particular enacting clause is to be given to any class of agriculturists is not to be as curtained by reference to the interpretation clauses. The argument that the Legislature, by omitting to mention Chapter VI in the first proviso, clearly indicated that the advantage of Section 39 could not be claimed by an agriculturist who belonged to the rich class would impute to the drafts- man the fault of having enacted under the guise of definition. There are no legitimate grounds for doing so. The report to this method of interpreting Section 39 would further ignore the very important words in the opening portion of sub-Section (2): 'Agriculturist' means, in all sections of this Act where the term is used. 17. We know that the term is not used in Section 39. Explanations II and VI .to which reference is made should also in our opinion, be read as subject to what has thus been enjoined in the opening portion of the sub-section. The words in the opening portion control the whole of the sub-section, including the Explanations. 18. It was argued that there was no good reason why a parson paying revenue over Rd. 1,00J should be given the benefits of Sections 37, 38 and 39, while persons paying rent and revenue, totalling more than Rs. 1,000,'should be denied these benefits. So long as the language of any provision of law is clear and unambiguous, it is not for the Courts to coniders why the law on a particular point should have been framed in the special form found in a statute and not otherwise. Even a cursory examination of our Statute Book will show the existence of many apparent anomalies. The existence of such anomalies can, however, be no good ground for ignoring well established and sound canons of interpretation of statutes and attempting to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by reference to our notions of what the law should be. 19. Our attention was further invited to the following observation of Madeley J., and strong reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on what was said by that learned Judge. 19. Our attention was further invited to the following observation of Madeley J., and strong reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on what was said by that learned Judge. It may be noted also that by the first proviso agriculturist of the richer class do not get the benefits of Chapter III which relates to mortgages and their redemption but the interpretation put upon the proviso by respondent's learned Counsel would drag these benefits in also by the definition contained in Section 2 (10) (a); for according to that interpretation, since a "secured loan" (Section 8(10) (b)) is merely a species of loan as defined in Section 3 (10) (a) Chapter III, must, according to the same argument, be applicable to both kinds of agriculturists. 20. There is a short answer to this argument. The expression "lean" is nowhere used in Chapter III and the term "agriculturist" is used in more than one section in that Chapter. 21. The fallacy underlying the whole argument of Mr. Misra learned Counsel for the appellant consists in his attempt to use the interpretation clause as an enacting clause and to infer the intention of the Legislature by reference to the interpretation clause. 22. Having given the matter our most careful consideration we are, for the reasons given above, of opinion that the present respondents are entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. Agreeing, therefore, with the view taken by Misra J. we dismiss the appeal with costs.