JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the plaintiff. He purchased the Touzi to which the disputed land appertains at a revenue sale on 25th March 1937. One Kali Charan Sinha the deceased husband of defendant 2, was the defaulting proprietor. He became a defaulter on 13th January 1937. He granted a lease of the disputed land to defendant 1 on a rental of Rs. 19-8-4 per annum on a selami of Rs. 250 on 19th March 1937. The principal prayer was for khas possession. There was an alternative prayer that, if the plaintiff is found to be not entitled to khas possession, he may be given a decree for rent against defendant 1 and for the recovery of Rs. 250, the amount of selami, from defendant 2. The prayer for khas possession was based on the allegation that the lease granted by Kali Charan is not binding on the plaintiff. The learned Munsif really considered the question from the point of view whether it was granted by a trespasser. He pointed out that there was nothing in the Act which would prohibit the defaulting proprietor from granting it. Indeed when pressed, Mr. Sarkar had to concede that at the material time there was nobody else in a position to grant it. It was most certainly not granted by a trespasser and, if the defaulting proprietor had saved the estate, there would never have been any difficulty in the way of the defendants. 2. The real point for determination is not whether the defaulting proprietor was in a position to grant the lease but whether the lease so granted is binding on the appellant. It is, therefore, necessary to consider to what date the appellant's title relates back. If it only relates back to the date of the sale, he is clearly not entitled to khas possession. Mr. Sarkar relied on the provisions of S. 28 of the Act, the relevant portions of which are as follows : Immediately upon a sale becoming final and conclusive, the Collector or other officer as aforesaid shall give to the purchaser a certificate of title in the form prescribed in Sch. A. annexed to this Act. Mr. Sarkar relied on the provisions of S. 28 of the Act, the relevant portions of which are as follows : Immediately upon a sale becoming final and conclusive, the Collector or other officer as aforesaid shall give to the purchaser a certificate of title in the form prescribed in Sch. A. annexed to this Act. And the said certificate shall be deemed in any Court of Justice sufficient evidence of the title to the estate or share of an estate sold being vested in the person or persons named from the date specified. 3. It is quite clear that the sale certificate may be deemed sufficient evidence that the estate vested in the appellant with effect from that date: but there is nothing to suggest that it is conclusive proof and I apprehend that it is open to the defendants to show that there is some blunder in it, or that as a matter of law the estate vested on some other date. The claim of the appellant is that the estate vested in him at a date anterior to the date of his purchase. I am clearly of opinion that it is for him to justify this claim as a proposition of law from some provisions of the Act. For this purpose Mr. Sarkar relies on para. 1 of S. 28 coupled with sch. A of the Act. Now that schedule specifically mentions the date after that fixed for the latest day of payment as the date from which the purchase took effect. This schedule forms part of the Act and must be read in conjunction with S. 28. When they are read together, the inference I draw is that under the provisions of the Act itself the estate vested in the auction-purchaser from the date of default. The result is that on account of the defaulter's failure to save the estate he had lost the title which he had on the date when he granted the lease. 4. Now it seems to be meaningless to say that, when the law ante-dates the appellant's title, he is bound by transfers made by somebody else at a subsequent date. The position is certainly anomalous. It may perhaps by analogy be compared with a transfer pendente lite. 4. Now it seems to be meaningless to say that, when the law ante-dates the appellant's title, he is bound by transfers made by somebody else at a subsequent date. The position is certainly anomalous. It may perhaps by analogy be compared with a transfer pendente lite. But however anomalous it may be, I have reached the conclusion that the lease does not bind the appellant and he need not rely upon S. 37 to get rid of it. It is easy to find out when an estate is in arrears and the effect of this provision of the law is that persons who deal with a defaulter do so at their own risk. 5. It is, therefore, necessary to consider another defence to the effect that defendant 1 is protected, because the lease was bona fide. On the view the learned Munsif took that the appellant is bound by the lease, this question does not arise and he did not deal with it. The learned District Judge deals with it at the end of para. 5 of his judgment but has really put the burden of proof on the wrong side. The principle of this doctrine has been explained in 21 C. W. N. 93 Krishna Nath v. Mahomed Wafiz ('16) 3 A. I. R. 1916 Cal. 598: 31 I. C. 789 : 21 C. W. N. 93. I should very much doubt whether the principle can apply in a case where the lessor had a good title when the lease was granted but a subsequent purchaser is allowed to ante date his title by the peculiar provisions of a statute. But be that as it may, defendant I would have to show good faith both in the lessor and the lessee. I have been through the scanty record and I am satisfied that there is no evidence upon which such a finding could be based. 6. Mr. Sarkar stated that his instructions are that the defaulter, having no intention of saving the estate, made hay while the the sum shone by realising Nazarana right and left. This of course would be very strong evidence to show that his action was not bona fide. No attempt, however, was made to prove it at the trial. 6. Mr. Sarkar stated that his instructions are that the defaulter, having no intention of saving the estate, made hay while the the sum shone by realising Nazarana right and left. This of course would be very strong evidence to show that his action was not bona fide. No attempt, however, was made to prove it at the trial. The plaintiff did, however, give some evidence to show that the conduct of the lessor was not bona fide by proving that the Nazarana demanded by the defaulter was abnormally low. There was no cross examination or rebutting evidence. The defendants gave no evidence to show that the conduct of the lessor was bona fide. The only witness examined on his behalf was his grandfather. Inasmuch as he told a story quite inconsistent with the written statement, it would be difficult to say even that he proved the bona fides of those acting on behalf of the lessee. 7. It remains to consider the alternative prayer for recovery of Nazarana from defendant 2. In S. 7 there is a provision for a proclamation to be served forbidding the raiyats to pay to the defaulter rent accruing to the defaulter after the latest date of payment, with the penalty that, if they do, they will not be able to claim credit for it against the purchaser. Now it is quite true that in the economic sense Nazarana may be described as capitalized rent. But in my opinion it is not rent within the meaning of S. 7. It is a condition for the granting of the lease and, at the time when it is paid, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. Hence the appellant would not be entitled to recover it from defendant 2. The decree of the Munsif, as modified by the District Judge, must be further modified. The plaintiff will be given a decree for khas possession. The decree for rent and damages will be altered to one of Rs. 58-9-0 as mesne profits for the years 1344 to 1346 B. S. The order for costs in the lower appellate Court will stand. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. Leave to appeal under Cl. 15, Letters Patent, is granted.