JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - One Haribux Modi was adjudicated an insolvent on 13th March 1936 on his own application by the District Judge of Howrah. In his application for adjudication he mentioned the names of many of his creditors but did not state that the firm of Dwarka Das Kedar Bux was one of his creditors. The firm of Dwarka Das Kedar Bux, hereafter called, the firm, is the applicant for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. Before Haribux was actually adjudicated he made an application for amendment of the record of the insolvency proceedings by including the name of that firm as one of his creditors. After his adjudication, in pursuance of a notice issued under S. 64, Provincial Insolvency Act, the firm appeared before the Receiver in Insolvency and applied for its name to be included in the schedule of creditors. The Receiver reported in favour of the firm and the District Judge upheld that report. Its name was thus included in the schedule of creditors to whom Haribux owed Rs. 2,41,071 odd. The names of two other creditors were also included in the schedule of creditors, namely, Gajanan Jagannath and Balmukund Ruia. One of the creditors namely Gajanan Jagannath preferred an appeal (Appeal from Original Order No. 587 of 1936) against the order of the learned District Judge by which the firm had been included in the schedule of creditors. That appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court on 13th and 14th July 1939. The appellant in that appeal contended that the firm was not a creditor of the insolvent at all. After the hearing on those two dates the learned Judges asked the firm to produce some account books immediately preceding the year 1920-Sambat 1977. The learned advocate appearing for the firm took time to produce those books. At the further hearing those books were, however, not produced before the Judges and judgment was delivered allowing the appeal, that is to say, the name of the firm was ordered to be struck out from the schedule of creditors. That judgment of this Court was pronounced on 7th August 1941, and the decree in that appeal was signed on 22nd August 1941. On 28th August 1941, the firm made an application for review to this Court. That judgment of this Court was pronounced on 7th August 1941, and the decree in that appeal was signed on 22nd August 1941. On 28th August 1941, the firm made an application for review to this Court. On that application a rule was issued on the opposite party namely Gajanan Jagannath as to why the judgment and decree of this Court dated 7th August 1941 should not be set aside and the appeal re-heard. This rule which was issued on 16th January 1942 was heard on 10th March 1944 and was discharged on that date. The firm presented their application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council on 25th of July 1944. They propose to appeal against the judgment and decree of this Court dated 7th August 1941 by which the appeal to this Court filed by Gajanan Jagannath was allowed as also against the order refusing review dated 10th March 1944. The judgment is a judgment of reversal and the subject-matter of the proposed appeal to His Majesty in Council is much over Rs. 10,000. If there had not been other questions involved the firm would have been entitled to get a certificate from us as a matter of course. The other questions involved in the case are whether the order of this Court dated 10th March 1944 refusing review is an order which comes under cl. (a) of S. 109, Civil P. C. If it does there is no further question which would disentitle the firm to a certificate, but if it is not an order of the class mentioned in cl. (a) of S. 109, Civil P. C., the further question would be whether the application for leave had been filed within the period of limitation. The material portion of S. 109 (a) runs thus: An appeal shall lie to His Majesty in Council from any decree or final order passed on appeal by a High Court. The order refusing review is an order passed by this Court. It may be a final order or it may not be a final order. That is a point which we do not wish to discuss but the question is that assuming it to be a final order passed by this Court whether it is a final order passed on appeal. In our judgment it is not. It may be a final order or it may not be a final order. That is a point which we do not wish to discuss but the question is that assuming it to be a final order passed by this Court whether it is a final order passed on appeal. In our judgment it is not. The appeal which was pending in this Court namely appeal from original order No. 587 of 1936 was finally disposed of by the judgment and decree dated 7th August 1941. In our judgment proceedings by way of review are independent proceedings and an order refusing an application for review cannot be considered to be an order passed on appeal. In 6 W. R. (Misc.) 102 Soudamini Dassi v. Mahatab Chand Bahadur ('66) 6 W. R. Misc. 102, a Full Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether an order refusing an application for review made in this Court was an order against which an appeal could be preferred to His Majesty in Council. That question depended upon the construction of Part 1 of Cl. 39, Letters Patent, of this Court which runs thus: And we do further ordain that any person or persons may appeal to us, our heirs and successors in Our or Their Privy Council, in any matter not being of criminal jurisdiction from any final judgment, decree or order of the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal made on appeal. The Full Bench held that the order rejecting an application for review was not an order made on appeal. This interpretation of the Full Bench was adopted and followed in construing S. 595, Civil P. C. of 1882 by Maclean C. J. and Geidt J. in 30 Cal. 679 Sunder Koer v. Chandheshwar Prosad Singh ('03) 30 Cal. 679, where the question arose as to whether an order refusing to amend a decree passed by this Court on appeal was an order passed "on appeal." These are binding authorities on the interpretation of S. 109 (a), Civil P. C. of 1908, which is pari materia with Cl. 39 of our Letters Patent and cl. (1) of S. 595, Civil P. C. of 1882. We therefore cannot grant a certificate in regard to the proposed appeal against the order dated 10th March 1944 refusing review. 2. 39 of our Letters Patent and cl. (1) of S. 595, Civil P. C. of 1882. We therefore cannot grant a certificate in regard to the proposed appeal against the order dated 10th March 1944 refusing review. 2. The question that arises then is whether the application for leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of this Court in the aforesaid appeal F. M. A. No. 587 of 1936 passed on 7th August 1941 is in time. Under S. 12, Limitation Act, the petitioner before us is entitled to add to 90 days the time between the delivery of judgment and the date of the signing of the decree: 13 Cal. 104 Bani Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dassi ('86) 13 Cal. 104 (FB). It is also entitled to add to the said period under S. 12, Limitation Act, the time that was taken up in obtaining certified copies of the said judgment and decree. It applied for copies of the judgment and decree on 30th May 1944 and those copies were ready on 14th June 1944. In view of the decision of the Judicial Committee in 44 I. A. 218 Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram ('17) 4 A. I. R. 1917 P. C. 156 : 45 Cal. 94: 44 I. A. 218 : 104 P. R. 1917 : 42 I. C. 43 (P. C.), and having regard to the nature of the application for review we are inclined to hold that the firm is entitled to the time during which its application for review was pending, that is, from 28th August 1941, when the application for review was filed to 10th March 1944, when it was dismissed. Making all those allowances, the last date for filing the application for leave to appeal would be 18th June 1944 but the firm filed its application for leave on 25th July 1944. It made an application under S. 5, Limitation Act, to extend the period up till 25th July 1944. In that application it states that 44 days were spent in getting a certified copy of the order refusing review. The relevant dates are these: On 31st March 1944 the application for certified copy of that order was put in. The copy was ready for delivery on 13th May 1944. It covers 44 days. In that application it states that 44 days were spent in getting a certified copy of the order refusing review. The relevant dates are these: On 31st March 1944 the application for certified copy of that order was put in. The copy was ready for delivery on 13th May 1944. It covers 44 days. Under S. 12, Limitation Act, it is not entitled to this period because its appeal must be regarded, as an appeal against the judgment and decree of 7th August 1941 only and not an appeal against the order refusing review, for, we have already held that that order is not appealable to His Majesty in Council. The question is whether the facts justify an extension up to 25th July 1944. The application for review was rejected on 10th March 1944. The order is a very short order. The applicant had still about 84 days from that time to put in his application for leave, because as we have already pointed out that if the period during which the application for review was pending here was excluded in computing limitation, the last date of filing the appeal would have been 18th June 1944. If a copy of the order refusing review was thought to be necessary for the purposes of drawing up the petition for leave and the grounds of appeal a certified copy of that order on expedition fee could have been got in course of three days under the provisions of R. 15, Chap. XIII of the Appellate Side Rules of this Court. We are further of opinion that having regard to the contents of that order a copy of that order would not have been reasonably required for drawing up either the petition for leave or the grounds of appeal directed against the judgment and decree of 7th August 1941. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to extend the period of limitation under S. 5, Limitation Act, to 25th July 1944, when the application for leave was presented. 3. A further question has been raised as to whether we should certify the proposed appeal against the order refusing review to be a fit case under cl. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to extend the period of limitation under S. 5, Limitation Act, to 25th July 1944, when the application for leave was presented. 3. A further question has been raised as to whether we should certify the proposed appeal against the order refusing review to be a fit case under cl. (c) of S. 109, Civil P. C. In support of that contention the learned advocate for the petitioner says that we should do it because the application for review was rejected on a misapprehension, as the relevant account books were, in fact, lying in this Court but unfortunately were not put before the learned Judges as the fact that they were lying in the record room of this Court was not known to the officers of the petitioner. The Judicial Committee has laid down the test in 28. I. A. 11 Banarshi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain ('01) 23 All. 227 : 28 I. A. 11 : 7 Sar. 825 (P. C.). For a certificate under S. 109 (c) there must be a question of great public or private importance. There is in this case no question of public importance and we do not consider that the case involves questions of great private importance either. It is not enough for the purpose of exercising our discretion under cl. (c) of S. 109, Civil P. C., that there is only a substantial question either of fact or of law. We accordingly refuse to grant a certificate. The opposite party 1 would be entitled to costs of this application. The hearing-fee is assessed at five gold mohurs. Akram, J. 4. I agree.