JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Kaul, J. - This is an application made by P. L. Jaitley, who is at present confined in the Fyzabad District Jail, within the jurisdiction of this Court. The application purports to be under Sections 491 and 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Of the six persons named as opposite parties in this application, the first four are the Hon'ble Sir Iqbal Ahmad, Chief Justice, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tej Narain Mulla, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. L. Yorke and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice A. H. de. B. Hamilton, puisne Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, opposite party No. 5 is Mr. W. V. Broome, Registrar of that Court and No. 6, Mr. Wajid Husain, a Police Inspector of Allahabad. It appears that the petitioner was convicted by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Hamil ton and Yorke, Judges on the 21st of November, 1944, for contempt of Court and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. He is serving out that sentence in a prison at Fyzabad within the jurisdiction of this Court. 2. It is contended that inasmuch as the petitionr's arrest and conviction and his subsequent confinement were illegal and improper an order for the petitioner's release be passed. We may mention that very scanty material was furnished to us for determination of this matter. It was only after the petitioner's learned counsel had addressed us for some time that he produced before us a copy of the order passed by the Bench of the Allahabad High Court sentencing him to six months simple imprisonment for contempt of Court. We, however, gather from his application that he was arrested under a warrant issued by the Allahabad High Court by the opposite party No. 6 Wajjid Husain at Delhi. He appears to have moved the Sessions Judge of Delhi that the order for his arrest was illegal and the Sessions Judge had on his application, ordered that P. L Jaitley be not removed from Delhi till an inquiry into the allegations made in the application had been made, This order was not served upon Wajid Husain, but it was stated before us that P. L. Jaitiey's counsel verbally informed Wajid Husain of the order passed by the Sessions Judge. Wajid Husain appears not to have taken any notice of the information thus received. Wajid Husain appears not to have taken any notice of the information thus received. P. L. Jaitley was accordingly brought before the High Court at Allahabad and after being given an opportunity to show cause was convicted and sentenced as already stated. 3. It was contended on his behalf that the Allahabad High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner while he was outside the jurisdiction of that Court and that his arrest was illegal. It was further argued that the contempt of High Court with which P. L. Jaitley was charged was not an offence, and inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, his conviction which followed such arrest was" without jurisdiction. 4. Before dealing with this matter further we may dispose of a contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that the contempt of a High Court is not an offence. Reliance in support of this contention was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Surendranath Benerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court' of Bengal (1883) 10 I A 171 : 10 Cal. 109, and our attention was invited to the observations of their Lordships at page 179 of the report which are as follows : Their Lordships are of opinion that a contempt of the High Court by a libel such as the present, published out of Court when the Court is not sitting, is not included in the words 'offences under the Indian Penal Code', although the contempt may include defamation". "Such an offence", their Lordships proceeded to observe, "is something more than mere defamation, and is of a different character. It is an offence which by the common law of England is punishable by the High Court in a summary manner by fine or imprisonment, or both. 5. Contempt of a High Court of the nature which was the subject matter for consideration by their Lordships in that case may not be an offence under the Indian Penal Code, but is certainly an offence. It is so described by their Lordships themselves, "ouch an offence", to use their Lordships words "is something more than mere defamation, and is of a different character". It is so described by their Lordships themselves, "ouch an offence", to use their Lordships words "is something more than mere defamation, and is of a different character". The High Court of Allahabad being a superior Court of Record is, as was held in the case of Kapildeva Malaviya v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court at Allahabad 1935 AW R 169 : A L J 810 authorised in its inherent jurisdiction to take proceedings for its contempt against the offender. These proceedings are of a criminal nature and there can be no doubt that contempt of a High Court is an offence. (See also Hadi Husain v. Nasiruddin Haidar (1926) 48 All. 711. 6. It was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Williams Rainy v. The Justices of Sierra Leone 8 Moor 47 at 54 as follows : In this country every Court of Record is the sole and exclusive Judge of what amounts to a contempt of Court. It is within the competency of the Court to impose files for contempt; and, unless there exists a difference in the constitution of the Recorder's Court at Sierra Leone, the same power must be conceded to be inherent in that Court we are of opinion that it is a Court of Record, and that the law must be considered the same there as in this country; and therefore, that the orders made by the Court in the exercise of its discretion imposing these fines for contempts, are conclusive, and cannot be questioned by another Court, and we do not consider that there is any remedy by petition to the Judicial Committee to review the propriety of such orders. All we can say is. that we have no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition impugning the propriety of such orders and praying the remission of the fines. 7. This case was quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Surendra Nath Benerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court at Fort William in Bengal We have referred to these observations of their Lordships just to show that every Court of Record and there can be no doubt that the High Court at Allahabad is a Court of record is the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt of Court. 8. 8. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the decision of a Bench of the Bombay High Court in In re Benjamin Guy Horniman A I R 1914 Bom. 127 where it was held that contempt of a High Court by a publication out of Court is not an offence which is dealt with by the Penal Code or Criminal Procedure Code. Nor is it an offence under any other law within Section 5(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Consequently no warrant of arrest can be issued under the Criminal Procedure Code for the arrest of a person charged with contempt of Court by the publication of an article out of Court. Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness of this dictum, we may point out that the matter before us is not the same which aro3e for consideration before the Bombay High Court in that case. There a journalist published in a newspaper in Bombay matter which was considered by the Judges of the Allahabad High Court to constitute contempt of that Court. The Allahabad High Court thereupon issued a bailable warrant over the signatures of two Judges of that Court, addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay in these terms : Whereas Mr. Benjamin Guy Horniman, Editor, Printer and Publisher of 'The Bombay Sentinel' Bombay, residing at the 'Bombay Chronicle Press, Red House, Parsi Bazar Street, "Fort, Bombay; stands charged with the offence of contempt of this Court, you are hereby directed to arrest the said Mr. Benjamin Guy Horniman and to produce him before this Court. He may, however, be released on bail if he enters into his own recognizance in Rs 1,000 with one surety in a like sum to appear before this Court on 18th September, 1943, at 10-30 a.m. as mentioned above. 10. The Assistant Registrar of the Allahabad High Court wrote to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, a letter stating that this warrant ' had been issued and requesting the Chief Presidency Magistrate to return the same duly endorsed after execution to the Court before a certain date. Thereupon the Chief Presidency Magistrate made an order that Mr. Horniman be enlarged on bail of Rs. 1,000 without deposit, with one surety in a like amount to appear before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on or before 18th September, 1943, at 10-30 a. m. 11. Mr. Thereupon the Chief Presidency Magistrate made an order that Mr. Horniman be enlarged on bail of Rs. 1,000 without deposit, with one surety in a like amount to appear before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on or before 18th September, 1943, at 10-30 a. m. 11. Mr. Horniman moved the High Court against the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate. The question considered by the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court was whether that order of the Presidency Magistrate was a valid order. The contention put forward on behalf of Mr. Horniman that it was not a valid order was upheld. In the case before us no such question arises. P. L. Jaitley was arrested in execution of a warrant issued by the Allahabad High Court in Delhi. He was brought to Allahabad, and after being given an opportunity to show cause he was convicted for contempt of Court and sentenced. Obviously, therefore the decision of the Bombay High Court on which reliance was placed has no application to the facts of the present case. 12. We may in this connection refer to the judgment of a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the same matter, Emperor v. Benjamin Guy Horniman 1945 A W R (H C) 97 : 1944 A L J 469, where it was held that the bailable warrant of arrest against Benjamin Guy Horniman to the Commissioner of Police at Bombay was legally issued and was executable at Bombay under Sections 83 and 86 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are not, however, called upon to pronounce an opinion on either of these cases. 13. The question before us is simple, whether assuming (without conceding) that the petitioner's arrest at Delhi in execution of a warrant issued by the Allahabad High Court was illegal, did it affect the jurisdiction of that Court to, try him for contempt of Court after be was brought to Allahabad. Our attention had not been invited to any authority to show that in such circumstances the Allahabad High Court had no jurisdiction. 14. On the other hand, there is definite authority, both Indian and English, which lays down that where a man is in the country and is charged with an offence it will not avail him to say that he was brought there illegally from a foreign country. 14. On the other hand, there is definite authority, both Indian and English, which lays down that where a man is in the country and is charged with an offence it will not avail him to say that he was brought there illegally from a foreign country. This was laid down in the case of Emperor v. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1911) 35 Bom 225. In that case the accused V. D. Savarkar was committed to the Bombay High Court (original criminal jurisdiction) by a Magistrate of the first class at Nasik for trial upon charges framed under Sections 121, 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that Savarkar was arrested in England and brought out to India under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881. He stated that he had escaped from police custody at Marseillies and had been recaptured. Relying on the fact of his having set foot in France, he claimed the asylum of that country and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over him, and indicated that he would take no part in the trial and asked for an adjournment and for facilities to make to the British and to the French Governments representations regarding what he contended was his illegal arrest in Marseillies after he had escaped from the custody of the police officer charged with the duty of bringing him from England to Bombay. Scott C. J. before whom the matter came for consideration, observed as follows : For the purposes of argument we will assume that Vinayak escaped from custody at Marseilles and was re-arrested there by the British Police under circumstances not authorised by the warrant which they held or by Section 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code or Section 28 of the Fugitive Offenders Act. The argument based by Mr. Biptista (Counsel for the accused) on these assumptions is one which has often been advanced before, but so far as we are aware always without success. Where a man is in the country and is charged before a Magistrate with an offence under the Penal Code it will not avail him to say that he was brought there illegally from a foreign country 15. Where a man is in the country and is charged before a Magistrate with an offence under the Penal Code it will not avail him to say that he was brought there illegally from a foreign country 15. Reference in support of this view was made to the charge to the Grand Jury by Lord -Justice Cockburn in The Queen v. Nelson and Brand (Charge to the Grand Jury, second Edition, in the case of Queen v. Nelson and Brand, page 118). We may with advantage quote a few passages from the charge of Lord Justice Cockburn: When Mr. Gordon was brought within the ambit or sphere of the jurisdiction or Martial Law- assuming always, on this part of the case, that there was such a jurisdiction it seems to me that it was not for the parties administering the Martial law to inquire how he had been brought there. I will illustrate the matter by a case which has happened before now. Suppose a man to commit a crime in this country, say murder, and that before he can be apprehended he escapes into some country with which we have not an Extradition Treaty, so that we could not get him delivered up to us by the authorities and suppose that an English Police Officer were to pursue the malefactor, and finding him in some place where he could lay hands upon him. and from which he could easily reach the sea, go him on board a ship and brought him to Eng land, and the man were to be taken in the first instance before a Magistrate, the Magistrate could not refuse to commit him. If he were brought here for trial, it would not be a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court that he had escaped from justice, and that by some illegal means he had been brought back. 16. Reference was further made in the Bombay decision to two other cases in this connection : 1. In re. Parisot (1889) 5 T L R B44, and 2. In Ex parte Scott (1829) 9 B and C 436 where the alleged illegality of an arrest in Brussels was held to be irrelevant. 17. The case of Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. Queen Empress (1897) 24 I A 137 which was relied on by Savarkar's Counsel was distinguished. 18. In re. Parisot (1889) 5 T L R B44, and 2. In Ex parte Scott (1829) 9 B and C 436 where the alleged illegality of an arrest in Brussels was held to be irrelevant. 17. The case of Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. Queen Empress (1897) 24 I A 137 which was relied on by Savarkar's Counsel was distinguished. 18. In the present case once Jaitley was brought to Allahabad within the jurisdiction of the High Court the question whether his arrest at Delhi was legal became irrelevant. For less could it be said to affect the jurisdiction of the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court to try him for contempt of Court. 19. We may further observe that this Court has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over a decision of the Allahabad High Court. In view of the decision of that Court in Emperor v. Benjamin Guy Horniman, to which reference has already been made, where a contempt has been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court in India, such Court is competent to issue process to secure the attendance of the offender wherever he may be residing in British India, as in the case of an offence under the Penal Code or under any other law for the time being in force. 20. Reference was in the petitioner's application also made to Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section, we are clear, has no application to the facts of this case. 21. There is in our opinion DO substance in this application and it will serve no useful purpose to issue notice. We summarily reject it. 22. After the hearting of the application was over an application purporting to be from P. L. Jaitley was received by post for permission to lay his case in person before this Court. There was an alternative prayer for grant of bail, or "suspension of his further confinement in jail for the proper conduct and prosecution of his case". His application had already been heard by us. He was represented by Counsel and all that could be said in support of the application was placed before us already. The application for bail is accordingly rejected.