JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the Raja of Mahmudabad for recovery of Rs. 20-12 as zar chaharrum in respect of auction sale of house No. 615 in execution of a decree of Sumeri Lal against Ram Bharosey, a riyaya of the respondent. The house was purchased on 18th March, 1938, by Binwari Lal and Mst. Sakunta for a sum of Rs. 83, and the sale consideration was deposited in the execution court and utilised for the satisfaction of Sumeri Lai's decree. The plaintiff based his claim on a local custom prevalent in Mahmudabad and prayed for a decree not only against Ram Bharosey Lal but also against the decree-holder Sumeri Lal and the auction purchasers Banwari Lal and Mst, Sakunta. Both the courts below were of opinion that the custom recorded in the wajibularz would include the right to recover Zar Chaharrum in respect of execution sales, but while the trial court held that the liability to pay the amount rested on Ram Bharosey Lal alone, the lower appellate court was of opinion that the decree-holder and the auction purchasers were equally liable. The result of the decision of the first appellate court, therefore, was that the plaintiff's suit was decreed against all the defendants jointly. Sumeri Lal, decree- holder and Banwari Lal and Mst. Sakunta, auction purchasers, appealed against the decision of the court below. The appeal was first heard by one of us sitting as a Single Judge and was then referred to Bench. 2. The first contention on behalf of the appellants is that wajibularz of Mahmudabad, Exhibit ?, recording the custom does not contemplate the payment of zar chaharrum in respect of execution seas. The relevant portion of paragraph 9 of that document is as follows : No one has any right to construct a house without the permission of the Taluqdar nor has the owner of a house any right to transfer or to remove its material. If any house owner settles down in another village his house conies into possession of the Talqdar. This custom prevails in all the villages of the taluqa, but in the town of Mahmudabad proper and in Musahibganj and Kitra which appertain to the town the owners of houses have the right to transfer their houses. If any house owner settles down in another village his house conies into possession of the Talqdar. This custom prevails in all the villages of the taluqa, but in the town of Mahmudabad proper and in Musahibganj and Kitra which appertain to the town the owners of houses have the right to transfer their houses. They will first be sold to the Taluqdar, but if the Taluqdar does not pay a reasonable price; they can be sold to another person. In either event the Taluqdar gets l/4th of the sale price from the vendor. Nothing is taken in case of mortgages. The owners have no right to mike a gift of their house................... 3. A riyaya who owns a house in Mahmudabad town has thus a transferable right in it. If he wants to sell, he must in the first instance offer it to the landlord. This is, of course, not possible if the sale is made in execution of a decree. In the event of the sale to another person the liability is cast upon the vendor to pay one- quarter out of the purchase money to the owner of the land. . The judgment-debtor in auction tale has no control over the sale price realised by court and cannot, therefore, divert any part of the sale price for payment to the Taluqdar. The provision in the wajib-ul-arz, therefore does not seem to have contemplated the eventuality of a court auction. If it did, one would expect to find some customary arrangement in it to ensure realisation of the zar chaharrum in cases where the transfer was by execution sale. The wajib-ul-arz was dictated in the year 1864 i.e. only two years after the CPC was enforced in the province of Oudh. It is impossible, therefore, to say that any usage having the sanctity of a local custom in respect of execution sales could have grown up within this short period. From the custom applicable to private sales, we are unable to deduce the further custom that zar chaharrum is realisable from the vendor in execution sales also. It is impossible, therefore, to say that any usage having the sanctity of a local custom in respect of execution sales could have grown up within this short period. From the custom applicable to private sales, we are unable to deduce the further custom that zar chaharrum is realisable from the vendor in execution sales also. This would at best be an inferential extension of the custom by application of a fiction that the court in Felling the property of a judgment-debtor in execution of a decree acts as his agent and the disposition of the purchase money received though at the disposal of the Court, can yet be shared by the Taluqdar. It will further have to be assumed that where the entire sale proceeds are utilised towards the discharge of the decree, an obligation rests upon the vendor to pay from his other assets. In our opinion, it is not permissible to read into the wajib-ul-arz of Mahmudabad all this without doing violence to its language or without resorting to an unwarranted process of deductive reasoning. In Saiduddin v. Ganga Prasad 1938 O A 410 : A W R (C C) 46 : O W N 500 a certain class of tenants was given the right to sell materials of the house and the additional right to substitute another person in his place in occupation. The question was whether a transference of the house for consideration was thereby permitted. It was held that where the wajib-ul-arz was to be interpreted for ascertainment of a custom, a Court was not entitled to put on its terms any inferential constructions, and the terms of the custom could not be considered in the ordinary way to extend beyond what was actually stated in the wajib-ul-arz. In Gulab Chand v. Munni Lal 1941 O A 43 : A W R (C C) 58 : O W N 214 it was pointed out that custom set up must be strictly proved and should not be extended by analogy. Unless, therefore, the wajib-ul-arz contains any reference to execution sales either expressly or by necessary implication, a liability to pay to the Taluqdar a share in the consideration money realised at auction sales cannot necessarily be taken to be included in it. In Mst. Unless, therefore, the wajib-ul-arz contains any reference to execution sales either expressly or by necessary implication, a liability to pay to the Taluqdar a share in the consideration money realised at auction sales cannot necessarily be taken to be included in it. In Mst. Bhagwanta v. Raja Muhammad Mumtaz Ali Khan 1898 I O C 2, the zamiadar claimed a fourth share of the sale price of a grove on the basis of a custom in Qasba Utraula. Spankie, A. J. C. ex- pressed the opinion that where a zamindar was entitled to haq chaharrum in the case of private sales, it did not follow (hat haq chaharrum in the case of execution sales was also payable. The same view was expressed in a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kalian Das v. Bhagirathi (1884) 6 All 41 and Basdnu Singh v. Sheo Shankar 1941 OA (Sup) 778 : A W R (Rev) 904 : ILR 1941 All 737. There is no evidence in the present case either oral or documentary in support of a custom entitling the plaintiff to haq chaharrttm in case of execution sales. In fact it was stated by the learned Counsel for the respondent when this appeal came before one of us in 1942 that there had been no claim to haq chaharrum in any Court auction sale before, and this was because there had been no auction sales through Court of houses in Mahmudabad town. In support of the view taken by the Court below the decisions in Utri Din v. Munshi Prag Din 1943 11 O C 64, Raghunandan v. Krishna Dutt (1943) 10 O W N 1145 and Manni Lal v. Gauri Shankar 1943 A W R (HC) 635 : A L J 931 ware relied on. These were cases where a mortgage by conditional sale had ripened ultimately into an absolute I transfer. Decisions of this kind, in our opinion, stand on a somewhat different footing and cannot be regarded as relevant in that they amount in reality to the enforcement of a condition of sale voluntarily stipulated for by the mortgagor. 4. These were cases where a mortgage by conditional sale had ripened ultimately into an absolute I transfer. Decisions of this kind, in our opinion, stand on a somewhat different footing and cannot be regarded as relevant in that they amount in reality to the enforcement of a condition of sale voluntarily stipulated for by the mortgagor. 4. In the .view that we take of the pro- visions of the wajib-ul-arz of Mahmudabad, it is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to consider the second argument whether any liability to discharge haq chaharrum reason the decree-holder or on the auction-purchasers As this question, however, formed the main reason for refer rug the appeal to this Beach, we might shortly indicate our view. We have in this connection considered amongst others the decision in Maharaja Jagatjit Singh v. Bairisal Oudh select Cases No 9 and the view of Justice Walsh in Parbhu Narain Singh v. Ramzan (1919) 41 All 417. In the former case haq chaharrum was payable to the landlord on sale of groves by the tenants and was claimed from the vendee on a transference thereof to him. It was found that the vendors had not an unfettered right of vale but a right to sell such rights as they possessed coupled with the liability to pay the landlord the price of one-fourth of the trees. It was held that the landlord's lien on the trees for his one-fourth of the purchase money was an incident impressed on the very nature of the property sold and which no arrangement between the vendor and the vendee could eliminate therefrom. 5. In the latter case the equitable rule in Tulk v. Moxhay 18 Law. Journal Chancery 83 regarding restrictive covenants was applied on the ground that equity would no'_ allow the assignee to lake the land in contra ention of the restriction. In our opinion, the rule XX relating to restrictive covenants enunciated in Tulk v. Moxhay does not apply to a liability of the kind imposed by the wailb-ul-arz on the vendor. In the first place the covenant here contained is an affirmative one, and in the second place the pecuniary liability which rests on the vendor by the terms of the custom cannot be regarded as a lien of the landlord on the property. The right to get one fourth of the purchase money accrues after the sale. In the first place the covenant here contained is an affirmative one, and in the second place the pecuniary liability which rests on the vendor by the terms of the custom cannot be regarded as a lien of the landlord on the property. The right to get one fourth of the purchase money accrues after the sale. It cannot, therefore, attach itself to. the property of the vendee or be regarded as an incident impressed on the very nature of the property sold or a covenant running with the land. With great respect to the learned Judges, who decided the aforesaid cases, we are unable to consider that the decree holder on the auction purchasers can in any way be bound in equity or in law to discharge the personal obligation of Ram Bharosry Lai. It is clear that the full purchase price was paid by Banwari Lal and Mst. Sakunta into Court. If the sale could give rise to any lien or charge against the property, the Taluqdar would have preferred objections to the attachment or sale of it without the payment to him of one-fourth of the purchase money. This was not done obviously because no lien or charge existed. Our attention was drawn to the case of Heera Ram v. Deo Narain Singh 1867 N. W. P. H. C. R. (F B) 63, where a bench of the six learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court 'considered that the zamindar's rights to the share of the purchase money- was not merely a right to claim that share from the vendor but that it was incumbent on the purchaser (if he wished to acquit himself of all liability) to see that the zamindar was satisfied in respect of his dues and that he could not discharge himself by payment of the full price to the vendor. The auction purchasers of course could not have insisted on seeing that the sale consideration was applied to the discharge of Ram Bharosey Lai's obligation to the Taluqdar, for under the CPC they had no hand in the application of the money which they paid into Court. The view in Heera Ram's case must be confined to private sales. It is singularly inappropriate to auction purchasers in execution. 6. As a result of what we have said above, this appeal must succeed. The view in Heera Ram's case must be confined to private sales. It is singularly inappropriate to auction purchasers in execution. 6. As a result of what we have said above, this appeal must succeed. It is accordingly allowed, and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs.