JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is by the decree-holders and it is against an order passed under sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The Respondents, Sheikh Aminuddin alias Nudi Mia and one Karim Bux borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,000 from the decree-holders on a mortgage in the year 1927. A suit upon this mortgage was instituted and on the 9th November, 1938, a preliminary decree for Rs. 9,000 was passed. On the 18th May, 1939, the final decree was passed. On the 15th February, 1941, one of the original mortgagors and the representative-in-interest of the original mortgagor instituted a suit under sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act for re-opening the decree and for the passing of a fresh decree in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. Objection was taken by the decree-holders on the ground that the loan was a commercial loan. The learned Judge held that the loan was not a commercial loan and he re-opened the mortgage decree and passed a fresh decree allowing the decree-holders the sum of Rs. 5,708-8-0 for principal and Rs. 1,065-13-0 as costs. The judgment-debtors were allowed to pay this decretal amount in 12 equal annual instalments, the first instalment being payable in December, 1942. This judgment was passed on the 27th February, 1942. The decree-holders have appealed and two grounds have been urged before us, viz., first, that the learned Judge has erred in holding that the loan was not a commercial loan and second, that the number of instalments are unduly numerous, there being no materials before the Judge upon which the order of instalments could be based. 2. Upon the evidence adduced we cannot but hold that the decree-holders have failed to prove that the loan was a commercial loan. A commercial loan, according to sec. 2 (4) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act means a loan advanced to any person to be used by such person solely for the purpose of any business or concern relating to trade, commerce, industry, etc. The evidence given on behalf of the judgment-debtors is that this sum was borrowed to pay off the debts of the original mortgagors owing to the Standard Oil Company of which they were Agents. They alleged that the money which they borrowed from the Standard Oil Company was for the purpose of faying off the marriage expense of their children. The evidence given on behalf of the judgment-debtors is that this sum was borrowed to pay off the debts of the original mortgagors owing to the Standard Oil Company of which they were Agents. They alleged that the money which they borrowed from the Standard Oil Company was for the purpose of faying off the marriage expense of their children. The evidence is that the original mortgagors, Karim Bux and Aminuddin, held an agency under the Standard Oil Company and in connection with that agency they has to execute a bond in favour of the Company for the sum of Rs. 2,500. The bond was a security for loans advanced and to be advanced by the Company to its Agents. Now, had the evidence stood thus, we would have been inclined to hold that the loan was a commercial loan. In an agency business advances made by a Company to its agents would, in the normal course of things, be advances made for purposes of the agency business, that is to say, advances for a commercial purpose. We do not think it at all likely that the Company would advance money to its agents on a bond of this description for the purpose of other than the agency business. We would not be inclined to believe that the money borrowed by the agents from the Company was for meeting the marriage expenses of their children; but there is other evidence which establishes that the loan was not a commercial loan and that evidence is the evidence of Panchu Gopal Ghose, an officer of the decree-holders. He says that Karim Bux and Aminuddin, when they borrowed the sum of Rs. 3,000 from the decree-holders, borrowed it for paying off their debts "to the Standard Oil Company, to the grocers' shop and to the other people." He said that the mortgagors told him that they were in need of money for paying off these debts. These statements are made in cross-examination and there is no re-examination on this point. The evidence thus establishes that the sum of Rs. 3,000 was not borrowed solely for commercial purposes. It was borrowed partly for commercial purposes and partly for paying off grocers' bills and other people. The definition of a commercial loan is quite dear. The loan must be solely for commercial purposes. The evidence thus establishes that the sum of Rs. 3,000 was not borrowed solely for commercial purposes. It was borrowed partly for commercial purposes and partly for paying off grocers' bills and other people. The definition of a commercial loan is quite dear. The loan must be solely for commercial purposes. We hold therefore that the decree-holders have failed to establish that the loan was a commercial loan. In this connection we would like to point out certain errors in the appreciation of the learned Subordinate Judge regarding the law as to what is meant by commercial loan. The learned Judge seems to think that it is incumbent upon a person alleging that a loan was a commercial loan to prove that the entire sum borrowed was actually spent for commercial purposes. That is not the law. If the money is borrowed solely for commercial purposes, the loan is a commercial loan. The borrower may thereafter spend the money for purposes other than commercial purposes but that would not in any way affect the nature of the loan. 3. Next the learned Judge seems to think that if money is borrowed by a person for paying off a commercial debt, the loan would not necessarily be a commercial loan. This is what he says: in the course of a business, one may incur debts and if any loan be taken for paying off those debts, that loan cannot be strictly called a commercial loan solely for commercial purposes. 4. Here again we are of opinion that the learned judge was entirely wrong. In a business one of the business purposes is the payment of the debts of the business. Indeed no business can be carried on unless its debts are paid. Payment of business debts is therefore a commercial purpose. If therefore a loan is taken by a person solely for paying off his business debts, such a loan would undoubtedly be a commercial loan. This point was decided in the case of Purna Chandra Adhikari v. Jay Chand Loll Banu 48 C.W.N. 236 (1942). 5. We now turn to the question of instalments. If therefore a loan is taken by a person solely for paying off his business debts, such a loan would undoubtedly be a commercial loan. This point was decided in the case of Purna Chandra Adhikari v. Jay Chand Loll Banu 48 C.W.N. 236 (1942). 5. We now turn to the question of instalments. We have noticed in a number of cases that no attempt is made by the judgment-debtors to place materials before the Court which would enable it to decide the question of instalments and the idea seems to be prevalent that instalments should be granted as a matter of charity or good-will towards the judgment-debtors. The present case is one of such cases. The judgment-debtors have placed hardly any materials before the Court upon which it could decide with any certainty the number of instalments which it would be fair to allow. We find that the loan was taken 18 years ago and that during these 18 years the only payment made amounts to Rs. 52-8-0. The decree was passed in February. 1942, and no payment has been made. We can see no reason why the decree-holders should be kept out of their money for such a long time. In our opinion the ends of justice would be satisfied if we direct that the decretal amount be paid in three equal annual instalments, the first instalment is to be paid by the 31st December, 1945 and the other two instalments by the 31st December, 1946, and the 31st December, 1947. Each party will bear their own costs in this appeal.