JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This is a decree holder's appeal against the dismissal of his execution application by the Civil Judge of Malihabad at Lucknow on the ground that it was barred by time. 2. A simple money decree for Rs. 2,46,203- 11-0 was obtained on 6th May, 1931 against Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ali Khan by Raja Bahadur Bishnath Saran Singh of Tiloi whose estate has since been taken under the Court of Wards and is now represented by the appellant, namely the Deputy Commissioner Rae Bareli as Manager Court of Wards in charge of Tiloi estate. The decree-holder's first attempt to execute his decree in ;1932 proved to be abortive. In 1932 a payment of Rs. 44,129-7-3 was made by the judgment-debtor. Khan Bahadur Mohammad Ali Khan died on 3rd February, 1935, and on 10th October, 1936 the decree-holder applied for substitution of Nawab Ali Raza Khan and Sardar Newazish Ali Khan as the legal representatives of the original judgment-debtor and for a transfer certificate after substitution to the Court of Civil Judge Bahraich u/s 39, C. P. C. On 6th April, 1937, the proposed legal representatives, though apparently served, did not appear in the Court of the Civil Judge, Malihabad to raise any contest. The substitution was accordingly made on that date, and on 15th April, 1937, the decree was transferred for execution to the Court of Civil Judge Bahraich. The Deputy Commissioner, Rae Bareli. presented his execution application in the Bahraich Court on the 14-th January, 1938, but it was consigned to records on 17th February, 1938. It seems that the certificate of non- satisfaction was not sent by the Bahraich Court to the Civil Judge Malihabad at Lucknow for a long time, and we have been unable to ascertain from the record the reason for the delay. On 2nd June, 1938, Newazish Ali Khan, one of the legal representatives of the deceased judgment- debtor, presented a petition in the Court of the Civil Judge Malihabad for setting aside the substitution order of the 6th April, 1937 on the allegations that he was not in fact the legal representative and that there was sufficient cause for his absence on the date of hearing inasmuch as he was not served with any notice of the hearing of the decree-holder's application. The prayer was stoutly opposed by the Deputy Com- missioner, Rae Bareli, through a written reply filed by him on 19th November, 1938. Various steps were taken for controverting the allegations of Sardar Newazish Ali Khan, and finally the Civil Judge of Malihabad after considering the oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties came to the conclusion that the certificate was sufficient and that the applicant was in fact the legal representative of the de- ceased judgment-debtor. By his order, dated 17th December, 1938 therefore he rejected the previous order of the 6th April, 1937. 3. The transfer certificate was received back in Lucknow with a certificate of non-satisfaction from the Bahraich Court on 30th July, 1941, and the Lucknow Court thereupon ordered :that on that date the result should be noted and the. case be con- signed to records along with the file received. 4. The Deputy Commissioner, Rae Bareli, then filed his next execution application, out of which this appeal arises, on 31st May, 1941. Sardar Newazish Ali Khan objected to the execution on the ground of limitation, and his objections were upheld by the lower Court with the result . that the decree-holder's application was dismissed as time-barred. The Deputy Com- missioner, Rae Bareli, in his appeal against the aforesaid order challenges the decision of the Court below and after a careful consideration of the arguments in the case we are of opinion that his appeal must succeed. 5. Article 182 in the First Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act prescribes " period of three years for execution of a decree. One of the starting points of this period of limitation is laid down in clause (5) as follows (where the application next hereinafter mentioned his been made) the date of (the final order passed on an application made) in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order; 6. Explanation II appended to Article 182 says that "proper Court*' means the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree or order. 7. What is material under this clause is the date of the final order. Explanation II appended to Article 182 says that "proper Court*' means the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree or order. 7. What is material under this clause is the date of the final order. It is clear that the order must be of a Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, and it must be in respect of either an application for execution or an application to take some step in aid of execution. 8. There can be no doubt that the application of the decree holder dated 10th October, 1936 for substitution of the names of Sardar Newazish AH Khan was a step in aid of execution vide Adhar Chandra Das v. Lal Mohan Das (1897) 1 Cal W.N. 676 and Babu Rudra Pratab Singh v. Sheo Prasad Upadhiya (1924) 11 O L J 604. In Ram Bharose v. Rccmman Lal (1932) 7 Luck 590 a Full Bench of this Court was of opinion that if the facts of a particular case showed that the proceeding in question had the effect of facilitating or advancing the execution to any extent or removing some obstacle: from the way of execution, it might well be regarded as a step in aid. To a similar effect are the decisions cited by the learned Government Advocate on behalf of the appellant Sheo Sahay v. Jamuna Prasad Singh (1925) 4 Pat 302, and Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Rani Bhubaneshwari Kuer (1928) 7 Pat 708 9. The first order on the application of 10th October, 1936, was passed on 6th April, 1937. This was in order to enable the execution to proceed. That order was questioned by Sardar Newazish Ali Khan, and thus ad obstacle was thrown in the way, of the , decree-holder. The subsequent order was passed by the Civil Judge, Malihabad, on 7th: December, 1938. That order purports to reopen the previous order and to decide on merits that Sardar Newazish Ali Khan was in fact the legal representative of the deceased. The final order for the purposes of clause 5 must be the order which terminates the proceedings so far as the Court which passed it is concerned, and the steps taken by the decree-holder to frustrate the attempt of Sardar Newazish' Ali Khan must themselves be regarded on the principles of the Full Bench decision as being in aid of execution. On this ground the Order fulfils the requirements of clause 5. Apart from this consideration, it is, in our opinion, possible also to hold that the order of the 7th December was a final order in the proceedings for substitution which commenced with the decree-holder's application of 10th October, 1936. 10. The ground, upon which the lower Court refused to accept 7th December, 1938 as the starting point of limitation for a fresh execution application', was that the subsequent proceedings initiated by Sardar Newazish Ali Khan in the Court of the Civil Judge, Malihabad, were not in ."proper Court". This is also the argument addressed before us on behalf of the respondent on the strength of the case of Maharaja of Bobbili v. Narasaraju Peda Srinhulue (1916) 43 I A 238. We are unable to bold that the "proper Court" for the purposes of substitution or for setting aside the substitution could be a Court other than that of the Civil Judge, Malihabad, vide Section 50 C. P. C, Manjulabai Kashinath Mantri Vs. Pandurang Jayaram Mantri, AIR 1934 Bom 215 , Official Trustee of Bengal and Another Vs. Basdeo Bhagat and Others, AIR 1937 Patna 239 and Muthuveeraswami Nayudu v. V. T. A. L. Annantalai Chettiar A I R 1926 Mad 411. The Court of the Civil Judge, Malihabad, was, in fact, the only Court which could entertain the application. It was also, in our judgment, the execution Court as contemplated by explanation II. In Maharaja Bobbudas case the circum- stances with which their Lordships of the Privy Council had to deal were that in execution of a money decree the Munsif of Parvatipur to whom the decree had been transferred attached certain properties of the judgment-debtor and before the decree was returned to the transferring Court with the requisite certificate of non-satisfaction, an application was made to the latter Court for the sale of the attached property which lay within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid Munsif. Their Lordships on these facts held that the proper Court to which the application for sale should have been made was the Court whose duty, it then was, to execute the decree so far as it could be executed by that Court. It is obvious that the sale could not be affected by the transferring Court as the property was not within its jurisdiction. It is obvious that the sale could not be affected by the transferring Court as the property was not within its jurisdiction. In our view the ruling does not operate to disqualify all the steps in aid of execution in the present Court during the pendency of the proceedings in another Court on a certificate of transfer. It is said that the Judicial Committee laid down in this case the broad proposition that the Court which passed the decree has no jurisdiction Whatsoever to entertain any application on the execution side till the return of it and the decree with a certificate of non-satisfaction by the transferee Court, It is in our opinion not necessary to enter into the conflicting judicial opinion oh the interpretation of the pronouncement of their Lordships, because on the assumption that the view contended for is correct, it must follow that the execution which was taken out in Bahraich did not terminate till the return of the certificate to Lucknow in 1941. In other words the certificate of non-satisfaction constitutes the "final order on the execution application. In any view of the matter therefore the application of the Deputy Commissioner, Rae Bareli, for the execution is within time. The decision of the lower Court to the contrary is wrong. 11. We accordingly set aside the order and allow the appeal with costs.