JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the judgment-debtor. There is nothing whatever to be said in his favour except that he is trying to evade paying his debt by the law of limitation and that he is helped in so doing not by any negligence or omission of the decree-holder but by a mistake made by the Court. The law point involved in the appeal is whether sec. 48 of the CPC is controlled by sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. 2. The Respondent having been baffled for years applied in the Court of the Fourth Munsif, the Court which passed the decree, for a certificate for execution of the decree at Dacca. The certificate was eventually signed by the Munsif in the third Court. Simply reading the judgment it appears to be a perfect mystery how this was done. However the Appellant filed an objection under sec. 47 to the effect that the Munsif of the third Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He succeeded in the Appellate Court, the learned Judge holding that the certificate ought to have been granted not in the third Court but in the fourth Court. A certificate has now been granted in the fourth Court and an appeal by the judgment-debtor was dismissed. 3. Now if the Munsif in the fourth Court wrongly holding that he had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter, instead of returning the petition to the Respondent for presentation in the proper Court, had himself sent it to the third Court with the result that the Respondent was baffled by proceedings in the wrong Court, for which he was in no way responsible. I should have had no hesitation whatever in setting aside that order in revision. It is quite obvious that the mistake of the Court would have given the Respondent a very serious grievance. 4. The question whether sec. 48 of the Code is controlled by sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act ultimately depends upon whether the period referred to in the former can be described as a period of limitation prescribed for any proceeding. The Appellant relies upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Minor Subbarayan, by Guardian Visalakshi Achi v. Minor Natarajan, by Guardian Gouri Achi I. L. R. 45 Mad. 785 (1922). The Appellant relies upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Minor Subbarayan, by Guardian Visalakshi Achi v. Minor Natarajan, by Guardian Gouri Achi I. L. R. 45 Mad. 785 (1922). The Respondent relies upon a contrail decision in the case of Duragpal Singh v. Pancham Singh I. L. R. [1939] All. 647 (F. B.). 5. My own view is that the former decision is correct. In the latter decision the learned Judges could not go so far as to say that Art. 182 does not apply to execution cases. So far from prescribing a period of limitation, sec. 48, C. P. C., lays down that, even though an application is made within the time prescribed by Art. 182, it must still be dismissed, if it comes within the mischief of the section. 6. I have already referred to the mystery in connection with the order originally passed. The learned Munsif who is now dealing the matter sitting in the fourth Court was sitting in the third Court, He has himself explained that as Sub-Divisional Munsif he signed the certificate but he does not explain how the certificate was put up before him. There is nothing to suggest that the Munsif presiding in the fourth Court sent the case to the third Court. The Munsif in the fourth Court actually made no order of any kind until he granted the present certificate on the 6th of April, 1943. As he had neither allowed nor dismissed the application nor returned it for presentation in the proper Court, when the Respondent asked for an extension of time on the 2nd of January, 1943, the original case filed before the period of 12 years had elapsed was still pending in his Court and no question of extending time really arose. On any view of this law point the Munsif was really merely dealing with a case which was filed in his Court within time and which was still pending there. The appeal is dismissed with costs--hearing-fee, two gold mohurs.