JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. - This is a revision application u/s 115 of the CPC against an order dated the 21st March, 1945, passed by the Civil and Sessions Judge of Lucknow, dismissing the application for appointment of guardian ad litem under Order XXXII, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The material facts leading to the present application for revision may be shortly Stated : 3. The applicant is the widow of the late Raja Harnam Singh, who was the taluqdar of the Ram Nagar estate in Bara Banki district, and the opposite-party is the present Raja of Ram Nagar, who succeeded on the death of Raja Harnam Singh. He filed a suit for possession of certain property alleging inter alia that the compromise entered into by his mother as his guardian during his minority and the applicant, the widow of Raja Harnam Singh, was not binding upon him. He also claim, ed a considerable amount of gold valued as several lakh which he alleged Raja Harnam Singh had received from his father Raja Udit Narain Singh. The suit was defended and while the plaintiff was leading evidence both in Court and on commission an application was filed on the 4th November, 1944, by the three counsel appearing for the defendant under Order XXXII, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating that the defendant was in- capable of protecting her interest by reason of mental infirmity caused by continuous illness for about two months. It was requested that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the defendant. The allegation was contested by the plaintiff, who characterised it as mala fide and made by the defendant with the object of avoiding appearance In the witness box. The Civil Judge framed the issue : Whether the defendant is of unsound mind or mentally infirm so as to be incapable of protecting her interest in the suits pending in this Court ? 4. After recording evidence at great length and discussing it in detail the Civil Judge found the issue against the defendant and dismissed the application for appointment of guardian ad litem. Against this order the present revision application has been preferred. 5. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the plaintiff that no revision lies as the order in question is an interlocutory order passed in the course of a pending suit. Against this order the present revision application has been preferred. 5. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the plaintiff that no revision lies as the order in question is an interlocutory order passed in the course of a pending suit. A large number of cases have been referred to on both sides. As the question was not altogether free from difficulty we heard the parties on the merits of the application as well. Having given the matter our anxious consideration, we are of opinion that the revision application is liable to be dismissed on the preliminary ground. 6. There are two Full Bench Decisions of this Court, which, in our opinion, conclude the matter and render detailed reference to decisions of the other High Courts un- necessary. These are : 1. Sardar Sctdho Singh v. Sardarni Chanun Kuar (1928) 3 Luck 651 and 2. Paras Nath v. Raj Bahadur (1936) 11 Luck 529. 7. In the first case the two questions referred to the Full Bench were as follows: (1). Is an order by which proceedings are resumed in a suit which had been stayed u/s 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a 'case decided,' within the meaning of Section 115 of the CPC ? (2). Is an order the effect of which is to refuse exercise a jurisdiction vested in the Court, u/s 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, open to revision u/s 116 of the CPC ? 8. They were answered in the affirmative. Stuart C. J. held that the proceedings amounted to a 'case decided', and followed his own decision in Thakur Sital Singh v. Thakur Sitla Bakhsh Singh (1919) 6 O L J 96. Hasan J. after referring to the opinion of Sir Shadi Lal, C. J., in Lal Chand Mangal Sen v. Behari Lal Mehr Chand (1924) 6 Lah 288 that 'case' is not synonymous with 'suit' observed : Certain proceedings may well be characterised as a case while other proceedings might not be so characterised though both may arise out of a suit. In this difficulty of reaching to any precise definition of the word 'case' it is impossible to hold according to my judgment that any 'branch of a suit' cannot be regarded as a 'case', as the learned-Chief Justice in the case just now mentioned was inclined to hold. 9. In this difficulty of reaching to any precise definition of the word 'case' it is impossible to hold according to my judgment that any 'branch of a suit' cannot be regarded as a 'case', as the learned-Chief Justice in the case just now mentioned was inclined to hold. 9. He further held that the .meaning to be given to the word 'case' in Section 115 must depend upon the particular nature of the proceedings and having regard to the proceedings before him he expressed the view that it was a decided case within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Misra J. agreed with the view taken in Riasat Ali v. Rae Rajeshwar Bali (1910) 13 0 C 109 and Thahur Sital Singh's case above referred to, and held that the High Court had power of revision u/s 115 of the CPC in regard to independent proceedings arising out on suit. It may be mentioned that in Riasat Ali's case third persons had applied to be impleaded as defendants and their application was refused on the ground that the plaintiff was not willing to implead them. In Sital Singh's case the revision was filed against the order of the lower Court staying the suit u/s 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. In the second Full Bench case the plaintiff had filed a revision against, an order of the lower Court directing him to make good the deficiency in court-fee with- in a-.certain time and the Bench before whom the preliminary objection against the maintainability of the revision was raised referred it to the Full Bench for decision. King C. J. and Srivastava J. delivered separate concurrent judgments and Ziaul 'Hasan J. agreed. It was held by the Full Bench that no revision lay against the interlocutory order as no case had been decided within the meaning of Section .115, by the mere decision of a preliminary point regarding court-fee. The case of Sardar Sahdeo Singh was not referred to for the obvious reason that the nature of the proceedings in that case was wholly different from the case before them. The learned Judges, however, noted at great length the divergence of opinion prevailing in the difference High Courts upon the meaning of the words 'case decided'. We do not think it would serve any useful purpose 'to refer to those cases. The learned Judges, however, noted at great length the divergence of opinion prevailing in the difference High Courts upon the meaning of the words 'case decided'. We do not think it would serve any useful purpose 'to refer to those cases. The decision of the Full Bench authoritatively laid down the limits of the revisional powers of this Court u/s 115 of the CPC and this decision must be held binding upon us. King C. J. was of opinion that there was no separate record of the order relating to court-fee apart from the record of the pending suit and it was not possible to artificially construct a record of the decided case as distinct from the record of a pending suit. The only record that could be sent for he continued was the record of the pending suit and this the High Court was not authorised to send for u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He did not consider that interference u/s 115 was called for merely because the applicant might otherwise suffer hard- ship and might not have any other remedy open to him. He referred to the interlocutory orders appealable u/s 104 and Order XLIII rule I and observed that the High Court could expressly provide for an appeal against other interlocutory orders by adding to the' list of appealable orders in Order XLIII, rule 1. Accordingly he construed Section 115 to mean that the High Court could not interfere in revision unless the case had been decided and unless there was a record of a decided case which could be called for. 12. Srivastava J. referred to the' view taken by the High Courts that the word 'suit' includes a branch of a suit if the order in question constitutes a complete adjudication so far as that Court is concerned of the controversy at that particular stage of the suit. He agreed with King C. J. that in the case of a branch of a pending suit it was impossible to say that there was any record of that branch of the suit, as distinguished from the record of the suit itself, which the High Court could call for under that section. He agreed with King C. J. that in the case of a branch of a pending suit it was impossible to say that there was any record of that branch of the suit, as distinguished from the record of the suit itself, which the High Court could call for under that section. He accordingly held that the words used in Section 115 do not contemplate the invoking of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in the case of interlocutory orders passed during the trial of a pending suit. 13. The Full Bench decision in Baba Suttdar Bharthi v Trust Mandir Nageshar Nath Ji Mahadeo 1940 O A 239 : A W R (CC) 133 : OWN 259 has no material bearing upon the present case. In that case the question referred to the Full Bench was whether an order on an application for per- mission to sue in forma pauperis was revisable by the Court and whether a distinction should be made between orders allowing applications, under Order XXXIII, rule 2 of the CPC and those rejecting such applications. The reference was necessitated on account of a conflict of decision between the three previous decisions of this Court, viz., 1. Asa Ram v Genda1 2. Durga Prasad v. Gur Dularey 1938 O A 487 : 561 C W N 3. Badri Hath v. Ram Chandra 1939 O A 331 : O W N 193. The answer returned by the Full Bench was that an order on application for permission to sue in forma pauperis was not revisable by the Chief Court unless there had been an exercise of jurisdiction not vested by law or failure to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or an exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity by the lower Court. 14. This Bench in Deputy Commissioner, Rae Bareli v. Bhda Nath 1942 O A 260 : A W R (C C) 239 ; OWN 384" following the view in Paras Nath's case observed : A strict compliance with the conditions laid down in Section 115 is in our opinion the sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction under that .section. Considerations of possible irreparable injury or failure of ([justice cannot be invoked to give jurisdiction to this Court to interfere with any interlocutory order. Considerations of possible irreparable injury or failure of ([justice cannot be invoked to give jurisdiction to this Court to interfere with any interlocutory order. If interference with orders of the lower Courts in interlocutory matters were allowed on some such grounds the trial of suits in the lower Courts will lie unduly hampered and protracted. 15. The case in Sheo Prasad v. Musatnmat Prakash Rani (1938) 13 Luck 635 does not refer to Paras Nath's case. It may be further distinguished on the ground that the revision was filed by a third person whose application to be impleaded as a defendant was refused by the lower Court. The learned Judges (Bisheshwar Nath Srivastava, C. J. and Ziaul Hasan J.) remarked that the order of the Court below, the ugh in a sense interlocutory, did decide a case so far. as it related to the prayer of the applicant in that revision. 16. The decision in M. Mohammad Ihtisham Ali v. Lachhman Prasad (1940) 15 Luck 641 followed the Full Bench case in Sardar Sahdeo Singh v. Sardarni Chanun Kuar. The case stood on its peculiar facts. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to proceed with the trial of, a suit was clearly ousted by the provisions of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, but nevertheless the Court elected to proceed with the hearing of the suit. It was held that when the Court passes such an order, it is nonetheless a case decided though the decision was not with reference to Section 10 but with reference to the provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act. The learned Judges referred to Paras Nath's case and said that although certain remarks in the judgment of Srivastava J. in that case would lead to a contrary conclusion, those remarks would not suffice to justify them in taking a different view and they must act upon the view that an application in revision was competent. 17. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the applicant on (1) Bibi Gurdevi v. Chaudhri Mohammad Bakhsh A I R 1943 Lah 652. Sadaqat Ali Khan v Mohammad Sajjad Ali Khan A I R 1929 Lah 237 and 3. P. P. Ar. Rm. Sp. Ramanathan Chettiar v. A. R R. M. Somasundaram Chettiar A I R 1941 Mad 505. 17. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the applicant on (1) Bibi Gurdevi v. Chaudhri Mohammad Bakhsh A I R 1943 Lah 652. Sadaqat Ali Khan v Mohammad Sajjad Ali Khan A I R 1929 Lah 237 and 3. P. P. Ar. Rm. Sp. Ramanathan Chettiar v. A. R R. M. Somasundaram Chettiar A I R 1941 Mad 505. The first is a decision by seven learned Judges of the Lahore High Court reveising the previous Full Bench decision of 5 Judges in Lal Chand Mongol Sen v. Behari Lal Mehr Chand (1924) 5 Lah 288. It was held that the "case" in Section 115 of the CPC is wide enough to include interlocutory orders passed in a suit. This decision is in direct antithesis to Paras Nath's case and it is sufficient to say that we prefer to follow the Full Bench decision of our own Court. It may, however, be mentioned that in this case the order was by the Court staying a suit before it on receipt of a rocker from the Debt Conciliation Board u/s 25 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act and it was held that it was a case decided within the meaning of Section 115. In the second case an application had been made by the maternal grandmother of the minor charging the next friend with various acts of remissness and praying for his removal. A revision was filed against the order rejecting the application. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the revision was sought to be supported by the Full Bench decision in Lal Chand Mangal Sen v. Behari Lal Mehr Chand, but the learned ' Judge does not appear to have discussed that case. He remarked that the question as to whether a particular person should or should not be the next friend is ancillary to the suit itself and it is a case finally decided qua that particular proceeding. It stands on the same footing as giving or refusing leave to sue and therefore u/s 115 that Court has power to interfere 18. We are not prepared to follow this view as against the view enunciated in Paras Nath's case. 19. It stands on the same footing as giving or refusing leave to sue and therefore u/s 115 that Court has power to interfere 18. We are not prepared to follow this view as against the view enunciated in Paras Nath's case. 19. In the third case an application was made by the defendant's mother after the disposal of the suit for her appointment as guardian ad litem on the ground of his mental infirmity and for applying the pro- visions of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act to the appellate decree. The Court refused the application without even holding an enquiry. No question about the maintainability of the revision application was raised in the case. 20. Applying the test laid down in the Full Bench decision of this Court referred to above, we are of opinion that the present case must be held to be excluded from the purview of Section H5 of the Cede of Civil Procedure. It is true that rule 16 of Order XXXII requires that if a person is not adjudged to be of unsound mind, an enquiry should be made by the Court to find out whether the person, by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity, is incapable of protecting his interest, but this enquiry must be an enquiry in the suit itself and not apart from it. It is necessary to make such an enquiry with a view to the further progress of the suit", and though the enquiry is initiated upon an application made for the purpose, evidence is taken for or against the application, and an order follows upon it, it does not follow that the enquiry Is made as it were in a collateral or independent proceeding. It is not a case or an independent proceeding in the sense in which a proceeding under the Guardian and Wards Act, the Provincial Insolvency Act or the Indian Trusts Act is, nor is it analogous in any sense to the proceeding to restore a case dismissed in default or to set aside an ex parte decree for which the legislature has provided an independent remedy or a different procedure (vide Hevanchal Kunwar v. Kanhai Lal (1909) 12 O C 405, The enquiry into the question whether a party by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity is incapable of protecting his interest is one which is essential to the further progress of the suit and it is not open to the Court to proceed with the suit unless, as a result of the enquiry, the party is either found to be of unsound mind or mentally infirm in which case the Court appoints a next friend or guardian ad litem for such person as the case may be. Such a proceeding cannot, in our opinion, be dissociated from the suit and regarded as a proceeding independent of it. 21. Accordingly we uphold the preliminary objection and hold that no revision lies. In this view it is unnecessary to go into the further question whether the Court below committed any material irregularity in arriving at the finding against the applicant. 22. The result is that this application fails and is dismissed with 6osts. 23. Mr. Raghuraj Bahadur who was seized of this case has been transferred as Civil and Sessions Judge of Unao and Mr. Har Charao Dayal has temporarily taken his place. 1 he parties will appear before Mr. Har Charan Dayal on the 28th April, 1945, when the Judge will fix a date for evidence. He will now be seized of this case even after his reversion as Civil Judge.