JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Defendants in a suit for ejectment. Both the Courts below decreed the suit. The first question that was raised before us on behalf of the Appellants was whether the hearing of the appeal should be stayed under sec. 3 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940. That Act came into force when the appeal was pending in this Court, and has since been extended from year to year and is still in operation. We do not think, however, that the Appellants are entitled to a stay under this Act. The appeal is a tenant's appeal against a decree allowing ejectment, and it has been held in a series of decisions of this Court that such an appeal does not come within the meaning of the expression "suit or proceeding in any Court for ejectment" in sec. 3. There is no reason, therefore, why the hearing of the appeal should be stayed. 2. As regards the merits of the appeal, the only question is whether the tenancy is governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act or by the Transfer of Property Act. If the Transfer of Property Act applies, it is not disputed that the decree for ejectment, which has been made by the Courts below, must stand. In order to bring the case under the Bengal Tenancy Act the Appellants argue that they are raiyats within the meaning of that Act, and that the tenancy was created for agricultural purposes. On this point the Appellants are confronted by the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below. It has been found that the Defendants were settled raiyats of the village, and it follows that they can make the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act applicable to the disputed lands, if they can bring the case under sec. 182; in other words, if they can show that these lands were used as homestead, though not as part of their agricultural holdings in the same or in an adjacent village. The findings of the Courts below, however, are that the lands were not taken for the purpose of a homestead, nor ever used by the Defendants for such purposes. They were taken for business purposes. The findings of the Courts below, however, are that the lands were not taken for the purpose of a homestead, nor ever used by the Defendants for such purposes. They were taken for business purposes. The learned Advocate sought to assail the finding by suggesting that it was based on a misconception of the case made by the Defendants in their written statement. An examination of paragraph 14 of the written statement, however, shows that there is no substance in this contention. There is nothing in the written statement which is inconsistent with the statement made by the learned Judge that there is no mention therein that the Defendants ever used the site for the residence of their families. The statement in the written statement on which the learned Advocate relies is made with reference to a number of plots of which the disputed plots are only two, but the learned Judge was referring only to the two plots in dispute, and he is quite right in saying that the Defendants never made the case that these two plots were ever used for residential purposes. The finding must accordingly stand; and it follows that the case will be governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.