JUDGMENT Misra and Kaul, JJ. - This application for revision of an order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Fyzabad, on the 28th of August, 1944, arises on the following facts : A suit was instituted by Jagdamba Prasad Singh, opposite party No, 1 against Sri Bhagwan Singh for possession of a half share in taluja Tigara in Fyzabad district. The property appears to have been claimed by Jagdamba Prasad Singh for himself and his brother Sarda Prasad Singh who was impleaded as defendant No- 2. The suit had reached a stage when evidence for plaintiff was being recorded; but as Sri Bhagwan Singh died on the 5th of April, 1944, Jagdamba Prasad Singh made an application purporting to be under Order 22 rule 4 of the CPC on the 24th of April, 1944, for bringing-Sri Bhagwan" Singh's widow and Mst. Sheel Kumari on record as his legal representatives. It was alleged in this application that Sri Baagwaa Singh died leaving his widow, Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar and a daughter that Dhanraji Kunwar succeeded to the taluqdari property under the Oudh Estates Act, but so far as the non- taluqdari property was concerned, the widow and daughter being excluded from succession to it, the applicant (Jagdamba Prasad Singh) and his brother Sarda Prasad Singh had inherited it. The application contained a further averment that one Ambika Prasad Singh alias Bansidhar of Tighra claimed to be the son and legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh and was supported by his widow Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar. It was suggested that a notice should be issued to the said Ambika Prasad Singh also and "the question of legal representation" be determined by the Court.' It was, however, clearly stated in the application that Ambika Prasad Singh was not the legitimate son of Sri Bhagwan Singh. Though notice of this application was served upon Ambika Prasad Singh, he did not care to put in an appearance. A fresh notice was at the plaintiff's request issued to Ambka Prasad Singh and the case was fixed for the 25th of May, 1944. Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar, however, appeared through a Counsel and informed the Court that she could not be the legal representative of Sri Baagwan Singh in presence of his son, Ambika Prasad Singh. The case appears to have been taking up again on the 30th May, 1944. Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar, however, appeared through a Counsel and informed the Court that she could not be the legal representative of Sri Baagwan Singh in presence of his son, Ambika Prasad Singh. The case appears to have been taking up again on the 30th May, 1944. On that date Jagdamba Prasad Singh presented another ;application alleging that a will which Ambika Prasad Singh claimed to have been executed in his. favour by Sri Bhagwan Singh was illegal and invalid. He denied both the execution and the validity of this will. Though Jagdamba Prasad Singh did not admit that Ambika Prasad Singh was the legitimate son of Sri Baagwan Singh, and further repudiated the will alleged to have been executed by Sri Baagwan Singh in favour of Ambika Prasad Singh, he insisted on impleading him as a party to the case because the latter claimed to be the legal heir of Sri Bhagwan Singh, and had put forward a will in respect of the disputed property in his favour. 2. Ambika Prasad Singh appeared through his Counsel after the expiry of 90 days from the date of death of Sri Bhagwan Singh and made his position clear. He claimed to be the legitimate son of Sri Bhagwan Singh and also a devisee of the entire property left by the deceased under the will dated the 10th of January, 1944, and as such his only legal representative. It was further contended on his behalf that inasmuch as the plaintiff had challenged his legitimacy and repudiated the will, and because the rightful legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh, deceased, was not brought on the re- cord within 90 days of his death, the suit abated. 3. On these facts it is clear that a question had arisen whether Ambika Prasad Singh or Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar was the legal representative of the deceased defendant, and under Order 22 rule 5 of the CPC it was the duty of the Court to determine it. The learned Civil Judge, however, was of opinion that under the "peculiar circumstances of the case" the suit could proceed without determination of that matter. The learned Civil Judge, however, was of opinion that under the "peculiar circumstances of the case" the suit could proceed without determination of that matter. Dealing with the question he observed as follows : Serious questions of law and fact affecting the merits of the case would arise and require decision during the trial of the suit and it would be quite premature and unnecessary to mike inquiries and record evidence under Order 22 rule 5 of the CPC for a limited purpose by almost same set of witnesses of the parties. Nay, I should say it would be most inopportune and inexpedient The rule is not to be followed too J strictly and to the very letter. 4. It appears that by his applications dated the 24th of April. 1944, and 30th of May, 1944, and oral pleadings the plaintiff suggested that in spite of the fact that Ambika Prasad Singh was pot the son of Sri Bhagwan Singh nor a devisee under a valid and properly executed will of Sri Bhagwan Singh, he might be impleaded as a legal representative of the deceased also with Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar. This suggestion was accepted by the learned trial Judge, and without any inquiry as required by Order 22 rule 5 of the CPC being made, it was ordered that the names of both, Ambika Prasad Singh and Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar, be brought on record as the legal representatives of defendant No. 1. He observed further that the question, who was the proper legal representative of the deceased, Sri Bhagwan Singh would be determined during the trial of the suit on the grounds of expediency and convenience. The names of Ambika Prasad Singh and Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar were accordingly substituted on the record. Both of them being, dissatisfied with the order have come up in revision. 5. Dhanraji Kunwar's case is that she is not the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh in presence of his son Ambika Prasad Singh. It is contended on behalf of Ambika Prasad Singh that he can be the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh only if the plaintiff accepts him as the legitimate son and devisee under the will of Sri Bhagwan Singh. In case the plaintiff did not admit these facts his name could not be brought on the record as the legal representative of the deceased. In case the plaintiff did not admit these facts his name could not be brought on the record as the legal representative of the deceased. In any case as the question had arisen it was the duty of the Court to determine it under Order 22 rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no warrant for the procedure adopted by the Court to bring his name on the record as the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh simultaneously with Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar without determining the question as required by law. 6. A preliminary objection was taken to the hearing of this revision application. It was contended that the proceedings which resulted in the names of Ambitca Prasad Singh and Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar being simultaneously brought on the record as the legal representatives of Sri Bhagwan Singh could not constitute a "decided case" within the meaning of that term as used in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was contended by Mr. Wasim, learned Counsel for the opposite party, that on a proper interpretation of the order passed by the trial Court the names of Ambika Prasad Singh and Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar were only provisionally brought on the record as the legal representatives of the deceased defendant N ). 1. No final order had been passed in the matter, and so it could not be called a "case decided". It will be seen that two questions arise for consideration in connection with the preliminary objection 1. Whether it was only a provisional order passed by the trial Judge, and 2. whether the proceedings in the Court below which culminated in the passing of this order constituted a case decided u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. We were taken through the elaborate order written by the learned Civil Judge and having considered the arguments of the earned Counsel for the opposite parties have no doubt in our mind that the order passed was not a provisional order : it is not so called by the trial Judge. It was an order passed without the inquiry which under Order 22 rule 5 of the CPC it was the duty of the Court to hold before passing this order. It was an order passed without the inquiry which under Order 22 rule 5 of the CPC it was the duty of the Court to hold before passing this order. The learned Judge was fully conscious of it, and his order can in no sense be called provisional: nor is there any warrant in the CPC for the passing of any pro- visional order of this character on the death , of a defendant. Ambika Prasad Singh's name has been substituted on the record as the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh. He has been called upon to defend the suit and it must be taken that he would be bound by the decision arrived at in the case. The true character of the order passed is this. Each of the two, Ambika Prasad Singh and Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar, is brought on the record as the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh : each of them is called upon to defend the suit; at the same time each of them is told that after the entire evidence of the case is recorded, and after each of them has incurred all the trouble and expense of de- fending such a suit, one of them would be held to be not the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh. This may perhaps be more appropriately called a conditional rather than a provisional order. We are unable to accept Mr. Wasim's contention. 8. Turning to the .other question which arises for consideration it was argued on the basis of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Paras Nath v. Ran Bahadur 1935 OWN 1158 that the order challenged by this revision petition was an interlocutory order and could not be regarded as a "case" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A decision of a Full Bench -of our own Court is binding upon us, and if it applies to the facts of the case before us mast be followed. We are of opinion, however, that the present case is not covered by the decision in Paras Nath's case. In that case the plaintiff sued for a declaration that certain decrees, passed upon the basis of certain debts incurred by his father and grandfather, were null and void and were not binding upon him. We are of opinion, however, that the present case is not covered by the decision in Paras Nath's case. In that case the plaintiff sued for a declaration that certain decrees, passed upon the basis of certain debts incurred by his father and grandfather, were null and void and were not binding upon him. He paid on his plaint a court- fee under paragraph 17 (iii) of the Second Schedule of the Court Fees Act on the ground that the suit was for a declaratory decree where no consequential relief was asked for The defendants pleaded inter alia, that the court-fee paid was insufficient and it should be paid ad valorem upon the aggregate value of all the decrees which the plaintiff sought to avoid. The trial Court decided this preliminary point and ordered the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court fee on the aggregate value of all the decrees in favour of the defendants and allowed two weeks for making good the deficiency, adding that in default the suit would stand dismissed. The plaintiff applied to this .Court for revision of that order. On these facts a preliminary objection was raised that the order challenged by the revision petition did not constitute a case within the meaning of Section 115. It is clear that the only question which arose for determination by the Full Bench in connection with the preliminary objection was whether the order passed by the trial Court on the objection raised by the defendant as regards the sufficiency of the court-fee paid on the plaint, upholding the objection, constituted a "case" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All the three learned Judges constituting the Full Bench answered the question in the negative. It is well to remember in this connection the well known dictum of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern LR 1901 AC 195 at 506 that a case is authority only for what it actually decides and not for what may logically seem to follow from it. The decision of the Full Bench went no further than this that an application for revision is not maintainable u/s 115 of the CPC against an order deciding that ' the plaintiff had paid an insufficient amount of court fee and ordering him to make good the deficiency. The decision of the Full Bench went no further than this that an application for revision is not maintainable u/s 115 of the CPC against an order deciding that ' the plaintiff had paid an insufficient amount of court fee and ordering him to make good the deficiency. King C.J., after an elaborate review of the authorities, observed as follows at page 1169 : This review of the authorities seems to indicate that the preponderance of judicial opinion supports the view that no revision of an interlocutory order lies, I am of tint opinion, firstly on the ground that no "case" has been decided within the meaning of Section 116 by the mere decision of a preliminary point regarding court fees, and secondly because no question of jurisdiction arises such as would justify interference u/s 116. 9. Srivastava J., however, went a little further and observed as follows at page 1174 : Thus having carefully examined the case-law on the subject, and given my anxious consideration to the matter, the conclusion reached by me is that on the correct legal interpretation of the terms of Section 116 all interlocutory orders passed during the trial of a pending suit must be excluded from the application of the Section. 10. This observation if taken literally is difficult to reconcile with the view ex- pressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Sheo Prasad Lal v. Mst. Prakash Rani (1938) 13 Luck.625 of which Srivastava, J. (then C. J.) was himself a member. That was an application for revision of an order passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge of Sultanpur dismissing the petitioner's application to be made a party to the suit brought by the opposite party, Mst. Prakash Rani. An objection was raised that no revision lay. It was observed by the Bench (page 626-27) as follow?: So far as the maintainability of the present application is concerned, we think that the order of the Court below, though in a sense interlocutory, did decide a case so far as it related to the prayer of the present applicant. 11. It is clear from this observation that though an order may in a sense be an interlocutory order passed during the pendency of a suit it may yet decide a case. 11. It is clear from this observation that though an order may in a sense be an interlocutory order passed during the pendency of a suit it may yet decide a case. Support for this view would be found in the opinion of Misra J. in the Full Bench case of Sardar Sahdeo Singh v. Sardarani Chanun Kuer (1928) 3 Luck 650 at 660: I am m full agreement with the view of law expressed in another case decided by the late Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh reported in Thakur Sital Singh v. Thakur Sitla Bakhsh Singh (6 O L J 96) to which the Hon'ble the Chief Judge was a party. It was observed in that case that orders passed u/s 10 of the CPC should be considered to stand on quite a different footing from those which are generally considered "interlocutory orders" passed under the Code of Civil Procedure. Such orders must be held to amount to a "case decided" which would be capable of being revised by the High Court. 12. We have indicated above the limited scope of the question which arose for decision before the Full Bench in Paras Nath's case The Full Bench was not called upon to decide whether all interlocutory orders passed during the trial of a pending suit, or-orders, to use the language of the Division Bench in Sheo Prasad Lai's case, which are in a sense interlocutory orders, should or should not be excluded from the application of Section 115. Ziaul Hasan J. who was the other member constituting the Division Bench with Srivastava J. in Sheo Prasad Lai's case, did not record a separate opinion in Paras Nath's case. He contented himself with expressing agreement with the opinion of King C. J. and Srivastava J. A perusal of the order of reference in Paras Nath's case shows that two questions were referred to the Full Bench by the Division Bench (King C. J. and Ziaul Hasan J.) ' The first point was thus stated : This is an application for revision of an order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Gonda deciding that the plaintiff had paid an insufficient amount of court-fee and ordering him to make goon the deficiency within a certain time. A preliminary objection has been taken tint this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision with such an order as the order in question does not amount to a decision of a case within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.................. As there is, therefore, a clear conflict of judicial opinion on this point and the matter has not been set at rest by any Full Bench decision of this Court we direct tint the case be referred to a Full Bench deciding the question whether this application for revision is maintainable u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Reference in the course of the referring order was made to the following cases : Gupta & Co. v. Kirpa Ram Brothers 1934 ALJ 381 : 3 A W R 677; Mathura Prasad v. Ram Lal (1934) 11 O W N 12923; Aieshwar Prasad alias E'achchu v. Mst. Badami Devi (1934) 11 OW N 617; and Lakshmi Narain v. Dip Narain Rai (1933) 55 All. 274. All these cases related to the same question (a decision whether the court-fee paid was sufficient or not) as arose in Paras Nath's case, and the Full Bench answered it in the negative. There was another question referred to the Full Banch, but it was not determined in view of the decision on the first point. Paras Nath's case, therefore is only authority for the proposition that a decision by a trial Court during the course of a suit that the court-fee paid on the plaint is insufficient and directing the plaintiff to make good the deficiency, did not constitute a case within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is not the question which we have to consider. 14. We do not mean to cast doubt on the proposition generally accepted in a large number of cases in this Court that interlocutory orders as such are not open to revision, but as appears from the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sheo Prasad Lal's case an order though in a sense interlocutory may yet amount to a case decided u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An interlocutory order is one made during the progress of an action but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. An interlocutory order is one made during the progress of an action but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. This would not necessarily include every order made during the period between the institution and the final decision of a suit. To illustrate the point reference may be made to a few of many such cases which may be found in our law reports. It was held by a Bench of the late Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh (Mr. Chamiar and Mr. Evans) in Riasat Ali v Rae Rajeshar Bali (1910) 13 OC 109 that where the lower Court rejected an application by a person to be made a party on the ground that the plaintiff was not willing to implead him as a defendant the proceedings amounted to a case decided within the meaning of Section 115. Sayid Qadir v. Abdul Khaliq 1943 OA 86 is another case on the same point. Similarly it was held in Thakur Sital Singh v. Thakur Sital Bahhsh (1919) 6 OLJ 96, that an order passed u/s 10 of the CPC is not such an interlocutory order as is not open to revision u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, The same view was taken in Sardar Sahdeo Singh v. Sardarani Chanun Kaur (1928) 3 Luck.650 to which reference has already been male. Whether an order does or does not constitute a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 depends more upon the nature and the character of the order rather than the time at which it is passed. It cannot be held as a universal rule that all orders passed during the pendency of a suit irrespective of their nature and their effect on the rights of the parties are not open to revision u/s 115 of the CPC merely because they can in a sense be called interlocutory inasmuch as they are passed during the pendency of a suit. 15. "Case" as observed by Sir Shadi Lal C J. in Lal Chand Mangal Sen v, Behari Lal Mehr Chand (1924) 5 Lah. 288 is not synonymous with "suit". While every suit is a case it cannot be said that every case is a suit. The word "case" is a more comprehensive expression as observed by Hasan J. in Sardar Sahdeo Singh v. Sardarani Chanun Kuer (1928) 3 Luck. 288 is not synonymous with "suit". While every suit is a case it cannot be said that every case is a suit. The word "case" is a more comprehensive expression as observed by Hasan J. in Sardar Sahdeo Singh v. Sardarani Chanun Kuer (1928) 3 Luck. 650 and includes not only a suit but other proceedings which cannot be described as a suit. The learned Judge proceeds to observe as follows : Certain proceedings may well be characterised as a case while other proceedings might not be so characterised though both any arise out of a suit. In this difficulty of reaching to any precise definition of the word "case" it is impossible to hold according to my judgment tint any branch of a suit' cannot be regarded as a 'case' as the learned Chief Justice in the case just now mentioned was inclined to hold. It appears to me that we should make no effort to create a definition where a definition is more likely to lead to confusion than to clarity of meaning. 16. It is interesting to note that in Sardar Sahdeo Singh's case Mr. Bisheshwar Nath Srivastava (subsequently Sir Bisheshwar Nath Srivastava C.J.) appeared for the applicant. We are of opinion that it would not be proper to rely on the Full Bench decision in Paras Nath's case for any other .proposition except what it actually decided. 17. It was held by Madeley J. in Sayid Qadir Ahmad v. Abdul Khaliq10 that a revision u/s 115 of the CPC lies against an order refusing to add a person is a party to the suit. Reliance was placed by the learned Judge in support of this view on Gopi Nath v. Mumtazadi alias Achhan (1929) 6 O W N 118 and Sheo Prasad Lal v. Prakash Rani 1937 OWN 1118. 18. It was held in AIR 1935 934 (Lahore) , that where the plaintiff dies during the pendency of a suit, and two parties apply to be brought on record as his legal representative, and the Court decides under O. 22 rule 5 of the CPC in favour of one party, the proceedings so far as the other party is concerned do not arise in the suit itself and are not subsidiary proceedings. They are collateral proceedings being final qua the party against whom the court decides. They are collateral proceedings being final qua the party against whom the court decides. They amount to a "case decided" within Section 115 of the CPC and an order passed therein is open to revision. 19. Krishnan and Odgers JJ. of the Madras High Court laid down in T. S. Nagappa Nadar v. T. S. Karuppiah Nadar AIR 1925 Mad. 456 , that under Order 22 rule 5, where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendants such question shall be deter- mined by the Court, and for that purpose, the Court must take evidence and then decide for itself, who has got the better claim. If the Court fails to follow this procedure the High Court will interfere in revision. 20. Without laying down any general pro- position or attempting to define what does or does not constitute a "cise decided" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are clear that the proceedings in the Court below which culminated in the order complained against constituted a case decided within the meaning of that section. The preliminary objection must, therefore, fail. 21. Turning to the merits of the case we find that the order passed by the Court below cannot be maintained. The provision in Order 22 rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff, or a deceased defendant, such question shall be determined" by the Court, is mandatory. That such a question arose in the present case is not disputed. The learned Judge was clearly in error in his opinion that "the rule (Order 22 rule 5) is not to be followed j too strictly and to the very letter". We f are further of opinion that the learned Judge could not properly postpone the decision of that matter till the delivery of judgment in the man case. la doing so he act in with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. The order passed by the learned Judge has given rise to a peculiar situation. According to the plaintiff Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar is the true legal representative of the deceased Sri Bhagwan Singh and Ambiki Prasad Singh is not his legal representative. la doing so he act in with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. The order passed by the learned Judge has given rise to a peculiar situation. According to the plaintiff Thakurain Dhanraji Kunwar is the true legal representative of the deceased Sri Bhagwan Singh and Ambiki Prasad Singh is not his legal representative. This is disputed by Dhanraji Kunwar. Yet without any determination of the question an order has b3en made that Ambika Prasad's name should be brought on record as Sri Biagwa 1 Singh's legal representative and he is forced to defend the suit; though it is possible that after recording the evidence in the whole case the learned Judge may come to the conclusion that Ambika Prasad Singh is not his legal representative. In our opinion the proper course for the learned Judge was .to have on receipt of the plaintiff's application 1 of the 24th of April, 1924, refused to issue notice to Ambika Prasad Singh. It was not open to the plaintiff to aver that Ambika Prasad Singh was not the legal representative and yet to ask the Court to issue a notice to him. There was no warrant for adopting this procedure. The difficulties which induced the learned Civil Judge in the Court below to postpone determination of the; question who is the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh, till the decision of the entire case, appear to us to be more imaginary than real. 22. We accordingly allow this revision application, set aside the order dated the 28th of August, 1944, passed by the Court below and remand the case to that Court with the direction that it shall first dermine the question, who is the legal representative of Sri Bhagwan Singh deceased, as contemplated by Order 22 rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the determination of this question the name of such legal representative shall be brought on the record and the case decided in accordance with the law. The applicants shall get their costs in this Court from Jagdamba Prasad Singh.