JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This is an application u/s 491, Cr. P. C. praying that the petitioner Laxman Prasad Sharma, a detenu in Fyzabad District Jail, be ordered to be released from Jail custody. The applicant is a resident of Sikandarabad, district Bulandshahar. In 1941 Sharma was prosecuted at Bombay for the offence procuring a forged passport, but for some reason the prosecution was dropped on January 21, 1942. Meanwhile on January 3, 1942 an order under rule 26, sub/rule 1, clauses (d) and (e), Defence of India Rules,' framed u/s 2, Defence of India Act, was passed against him by the Government of India. Sharma was required by that order to proceed immediately to Sikandrabad, to report himself on arrival there to the Superintendent of Police Bulandshahar and thereafter to report himself at weekly internals at Sikandarabad police station. We seed not concern ourselves with what the applicant did after the service on him on the aforesaid order. It is sufficient to mention that he was eventually arrested by the police at Raksaul in the Province of Behar under rule 129, Defence of India Rules, on February 11, 1942. The relevant portion of the rule 129 provides (1) Any police officer or any other officer of Government empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the Central Government, (or of the Provincial Government) may arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects of having acted, of acting or. of being about to act (a) with intent :o assist any State at War with His Majesty, or in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to the efficient prosecution of war; 2. The arrest was apparently in consequence of some activity which brought him within the scope of the above clause. It seems that soon after the authorities in the province got the news of Sharma's arrest they ultimately succeeded in bringing him to Bulandshahar. There he was convicted under rule 26 (6), Defence of India Rules, after a regular trial, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. The conviction was upheld by the Sessions Judge of Bulaudshahar and later on by the High Court of Allahabad, though the sentence of fine was eventually remitted. 3. The period of imprisonment would in normal course have expired on June 2, 1944. 500. The conviction was upheld by the Sessions Judge of Bulaudshahar and later on by the High Court of Allahabad, though the sentence of fine was eventually remitted. 3. The period of imprisonment would in normal course have expired on June 2, 1944. The applicant, however, says that he was due to be released from Fyzabad jail, where he was then confined, on January 1, 194 4, because he had earned remission for good conduct. Whether this was so or not is of little consequence in view of the fact that on January 14, 1944, an order (No. 259-C. X) was passed by the Government of this Province under rule 26 (1) (b), Defence of India Rules, saying that the Government was satisfied regarding the necessity to detain Sharma in order to prevent his acting in a matter prejudicial to the prosecution of the war, to the defence of British India, or to the public order, and directing that the applicant be detained in custody of the Superintendent, District Jail Fyzabad, until further orders. It will be remembered that on account of some legal defect in the form in which rule 26 stood, and which the Federal Court held, rendered it ultra vires, a new law known as Resolution and Detention Ordinance (Ordinance No. Ill of 1944) was brought into force from January 15, 1944. By virtue of section 6, clause (2), thereof orders under rule 26 were deemed to have been made u/s 3 of the new ordinance and were to be given effect as such. Section 3 empowered the Central Government or the Provincial Government to pass an order directing among other things that a person may be detained, if the Government concerned was satisfied that it was necessary to do so with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, His Majesty's relations with foreign powers of Indian Estates, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal Areas or the efficient prosecution of the war. Section 7 rendered it obligatory on the authority which passed the order to communicate to the person affected thereby as soon as possible the grounds on which the order was made against him so far as this could be done without making disclosures which may be inconsistent with public interest. Section 7 rendered it obligatory on the authority which passed the order to communicate to the person affected thereby as soon as possible the grounds on which the order was made against him so far as this could be done without making disclosures which may be inconsistent with public interest. The object was to enable the detenu to make representation to the authorities who were invested with the power to review the order. By force of Section 9 of the Ordinance an order made or deemed under the provisions of Section 6 to have been made u/s 3 was operative for a period of six months only, and if it was desired* to continue the detention for a further period of six months an order in that behalf could be passed after a further consideration of all the circumstances of the case. 4. It appears that during the first period of his detention the applicant was not served with any notice as contemplated by Section 7. He nevertheless made a re- presentation to the Government on January 31, 1944. Evidently it failed to achieve its purpose, for His Excellency the Governor after a further consideration of all the circumstances of the case directed continuation of detention u/s 3(1) (b) on July 14, 1914. The applicant alleges that ever since his detention began, he made several attempts to approach this Court by applications u/s 491, Cr. P. C. The only petition, however, which reached this Court, and with which we are now concerned, is the one, dated November 24, 1944. 5. On behalf of the opposite-patty true copies of the orders, dated January 14, 1944 and July 14, 194 r duty authenticated by the Home Secretary have been produced in evidence. The first of these orders purports to have been made by the Provincial Government and the second by His Excellency the Governor. Both of them were signed by the Home Secretary a id purport to have been parsed after the authority concerned was satisfied in respect of the relevant matters. In view of section 16 (2) of the Government of India Act and Section 10 (3) of Ordinance III of 1944 it must be presumed that the orders were in fact passed by the appropriate authority. In view of section 16 (2) of the Government of India Act and Section 10 (3) of Ordinance III of 1944 it must be presumed that the orders were in fact passed by the appropriate authority. The only ground, upon which it is in our opinion, permissible to attack the aforesaid orders, is that they constitute a fraud upon the statute, in other words that though they say that the authority mentioned therein was satisfied, it did not in fact entertain the belief that it is said to have entertained. The burden of substantiating the plea as to the fraudulent nature of the order rests on the applicant. We recognise that it is a burden difficult to discharge. The difficulty, however, cannot be availed of for relaxation of the ordinary rules of proof. 6. In times of grave emergency and national danger it is natural and eminently expedient in the defence of the country that wide powers of executive discretion should be invested in some authority which can be trusted to use them as and when circumstances imperatively demand their use. The interests of public liberty have per force to be subordinated to the paramount consideration of public safety. The necessity of curtailing the fundamental rights of the subject is left to the judgment of some person or authority, who by his or its position has the information, which is often confidential, and who cm determine with due regard to the rights of the subject whether an action in a particular case is called for. In this country the satisfaction of such authority has been made by the statute the sole safeguard -against an unmerited or wanton infringement of the freedom of the people. The good faith of the authority being thus presumed, if a person comes to Court on the allegation that his detention under Order 26, Defence of India Rules, or u/s 3 of Ordinance III of 1944 is illegal or improper, it lies on term to establish that what purports ex facie to be an order under the aforesaid provisions was in fact not in accordance with them. On the principles enunciated in Liversidge v. Anderson1, and Greene v. The Secretary of State 1942 A C 206 for Home Affairs 1942 A C 384, it is clear that a Court of law empowered to exercise jurisdiction u/s 491, Cr. On the principles enunciated in Liversidge v. Anderson1, and Greene v. The Secretary of State 1942 A C 206 for Home Affairs 1942 A C 384, it is clear that a Court of law empowered to exercise jurisdiction u/s 491, Cr. P. C. cannot sit in judgment as a Court of appeal for scrutinising the correctness or otherwise of the exercise of discretion by the Provincial Government or the Governor. Since the Government of India Act and the Ordinance obviously intend that the reasons or the informations which ha e impelled the authority concerned to take action should not be subjected to a public judicial investigation, we cannot persuade ourselves to examine the sufficiency or the validity or the authenticity of the information. 7. We have, therefore, to confine ourselves as we have said above to the question whether the , applicant has succeeded in proving any fraud on the part of the authorities who passed the orders. His case, as presented to us at the bar, is that the Government of India became jealous of the privileges which the applicant as a joint managing director of a company acquired from the Government of Nepal by a lease in 1934. It is said that expression was given by Dr, Cyril Fox, Director of Geo- logical Survey of India, to the desire of the Central Government, for a sub-lease and on the proposal being turned down a threat was extended to Sharma that dire consequences would follow. The prosecution in Bombay, the subsequent order of restraint, arrest, imprisonment and detention and the Utter attitude of the Provincial Government and the jail Superintendent are all, it is urged, the result of jealousy on the part of the [Government of India and of the hostility conceived by Dr. Fox. The prosecution in Bombay, the subsequent order of restraint, arrest, imprisonment and detention and the Utter attitude of the Provincial Government and the jail Superintendent are all, it is urged, the result of jealousy on the part of the [Government of India and of the hostility conceived by Dr. Fox. The evidence produced by the applicant to proves these serious, and on the face of them somewhat fantastic, assertion is has only succeeded in showing (a) that there existed in Bombay a company known as the National Mining and Trading Company Limited and that Sharma was one of its joint Managing Directors (b) that a mining lense was obtained by the Company from Nepal Government in 1934, (c) that in 1940-41 the Company on the request of Dr Fox sent certain mineral specimen for his-examination and (d) that an officer of the Government of India was intending to proceed to Nepal for inspection of some mines. 8. We are unable to find in the documents produced on behalf of the detenue (and they, we may mention, include a number of letters written by the Director of Geo- logical Survey of India) any reference to a projected sub lease or to a threat. The correspondence between Sharing and Dr. Fox is couched in ordinary courteous language and ends with an expression of regret that it had not been possible for him to examine the mineral specimens submitted by the applicant till then. 9. In order to come to a conclusion in favour of the alleged hostility we are asked to accept as proof the facts narrated and the suspicions expressed in two affidavits sworn by the applicant and filed in this Court by his Counsel. It is urged that in the absence of any counter affidavit from the opposite-party they must be regarded as true representations of the circumstances which were responsible for the attitude of the Provincial authorities. In our opinion it was not incumbent on the opposite-party to controvert the correctness of events or to dispell the suspicions to which the detenu swore. It was, we think, no part of the duty of the Government Advocate to proceed to disprove that which had not been satisfactorily established. Sweeping affidavits of the kind before us do not inspire confidence. When in addition they proceeded from an interested person and remain otherwise uncorroborated, they cannot be given any evidentiary value. 10. It was, we think, no part of the duty of the Government Advocate to proceed to disprove that which had not been satisfactorily established. Sweeping affidavits of the kind before us do not inspire confidence. When in addition they proceeded from an interested person and remain otherwise uncorroborated, they cannot be given any evidentiary value. 10. In order to bring home the charge of fraud the learned Counsel for Sharma has further invited our attention to the communication sent to his client on 23rd December, 1944, by the Home Secretary in pursuance of Section 7 of the Ordinance. That section provides as follows : Where an order is made in respect of any person under clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 3, as soon as may be after the order is made, and where before the commencement of this Ordinance an order has been made in respect of any person under clause (b) of sub rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Ordinance, the authority making or which made the order shall communicate to the person affected thereby so far as such communication can be made without disclosing facts which the said authority considers it would be against the public interest to disclose, the grounds on which the order has been made against him and such other particulars as are in the opinion of such authority sufficient to enable him to make if he wishes a representation against the order aid such person may at any time thereafter make a representation in writing to such authority against the order and it shit be the duty of such authority to inform such person of his right of making such representation and to afford him the earliest practical opportunity of doing so. 11. The communication to which reference has been made by the learned Counsel for the detenu is as follows : In pursuance of Section 7 of the Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944 (No. Ill of 1944), you, Laxmin Prasad Sharma, son of Ghasi Ram, resident of Sikandarabad, District Bulandshahar are informed that the grounds for yours detention were that you were actively supporting and helping the under- ground organization of the mass movement sanctioned by Congress in the resolution of August 8, 1942, which was calculated to impede the successful prosecution of the war. 2. 2. You are informed that you have right to make a representation in writing against the order under which you are detained. If you wish to make such a representation, you should address it to the undersigned and forward it through the Superintendent of the jail as soon as possible. (Sd) C. M. Ker, Home Secretary to Government, United Provinces. 12. The argument which -is based upon this communication is that since the applicant has been constantly in custody after his arrest at Raksaul in February 1942, he could not have supported or helped the underground organization which was sanctioned by the Congress about six months later in August 1942, and as this constituted the sole ground for detention, it must be regarded as an afterthought designed merely to camouflage the real intention underlying the orders. The argument at first sight looks somewhat plausible, but having regard to the fact that the underground mass movement, though sanctioned by the Congress on 8th August, 1942, had existed long before that date, it is conceivable that during the period of his imprisonment or before it the applicant actively supported or helped it. It is not necessary for us to look for the evidence to prove that he did so. It is sufficient that the Provincial Government and His Excellency the Governor were satisfied that he did. 13. Finally it is contended that the delay in communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu and the attitude of the Jail Superintendent in refusing legal assistance and withholding his previous habeas corpus applications exhibit a malice which must have been inspired from interested sources namely the Government of India or Dr. Fox- There is no evidence whatsoever in support of this contention and the suggestion appears to us to be ridiculous. 14. There are some matters, however, Which have come to our notice in this case and which call for serious comment. We have mentioned above that the first order of detention was passed on 14th January, 1944, and that it expired on 14th July 1944, we have also stated that Section 7 of the Ordinance imperatively enjoins that the detenu must be supplied with the grounds of detention as soon as possible. We observe in this case that the provisions of Section 7 were altogether ignored throughout the period of the first detention. We observe in this case that the provisions of Section 7 were altogether ignored throughout the period of the first detention. During the second period which commenced on 14th July, 1944, the requisite notice was not issued by the officials concerned till over five months had elapsed, and the detenu had succeeded in getting his present application forwarded to- this Court. It is difficult to believe that till 23rd December 1944 it was against public interest to inform Sharma of the charge. In our opinion the inordinate delay in sending the notice displays, either negligence or indifference. The Ordinance prescribes no method by which the detenu can enforce the privilege which the statute confers on him with the avowed object of enabling him to obtain redress in the only way possible. Greater vigilance is therefore necessary and inappropriate circumstances we conceive that an omission to give effect to the intention of the statute may necessitate a finding that the detention though not illegal in its origin had become improper within the meaning of Section 491 Cr. P. C. Fortunately in this case no real prejudice has resulted by the inordinate delay. We say this, because the applicant 'did in fact make a representation on January 31, 1944, disclosing his whole case, and His Excellency :the Governor after a further consideration directed the detention to continue. There is also the further fact that Sharma, when served with the ground of his detention, did not choose to represent his case again. The obvious conclusion is that he did not feel any necessity for it. 15. We also consider it necessary to ex- press our disapproval of the conduct of the jail authorities in denying to the detenu all facility for obtaining legal assistance in order to move this Court by a habeas corpus application and in withholding his petition under S3ction 491 Cr. P. C. which was handed over to the Superintendent, District Jail Fyzabad, on February 17, 1944. We have no hesitation in saying that the allegations of the applicant in this behalf are substantially correct. It appears that on February 3, 1944, Sharma addressed a letter to Mr. R. F. Bahadurji, a senior Advocate of this Court, requesting him to move the Chief Court for his release. In this letter he enclosed a cheque for Rs. 20 for meeting the necessary expenses. It appears that on February 3, 1944, Sharma addressed a letter to Mr. R. F. Bahadurji, a senior Advocate of this Court, requesting him to move the Chief Court for his release. In this letter he enclosed a cheque for Rs. 20 for meeting the necessary expenses. The letter and the cheque were handed over to the Superintendent but were returned to the detenu. The latter then himself drafted a petition in the nature of habeas corpus and gave it to the Superintendent for transmission to this Court along with the same letter and the cheque. We have an affidavit sworn by the Superintendent which states that the letter and the cheque were forwarded by him to the Inspector General of Prisons on April 2, 1944. The delay in taking action is noticeable but what is more significant is that he does not deny the applicant's allegation regarding the handing over of the petition to him nor does he explain why it was not forwarded to this Court in the ordinary course. It appears that the detenu twice complained to the Deputy Commissioner, Fyzabad, regarding the attitude of the Jail Superintendent, once in the beginning of August and again in September, 1944. He handed over to these officers copies of the petition of 17th February, 1944 as well as a reminder dated 31-7-44 which he had addressed to this Court. The Deputy Commissioner wrote to the Government Advocate in August, 1944, enquiring about the fate of Sharma's application. The papers which Sharma delivered to the Deputy Commissioner in August are also now on the file. We further know that sometime in September or October the Deputy Commissioner communicated with the Home Secretary regarding the complaint and he was directed to inform the detenu that his application must be submitted to this Court in the manner prescribed therefor (vide Home Secretary letter No. 6208/C. X., dated October 12, 1944 a copy of which is on the record.) It was after this information was conveyed to Sharma that his application, dated 24th November, 1944 was eventually forwarded. Strong exception has been taken in other provinces to a similar conduct on the part of Jail authorities. Fortunately in this province this is the first case in which an irregularity of this kind has come to our notice. It has been observed in Baldev Mitter Bijli v. Emperor A I R 1914 Lah. Strong exception has been taken in other provinces to a similar conduct on the part of Jail authorities. Fortunately in this province this is the first case in which an irregularity of this kind has come to our notice. It has been observed in Baldev Mitter Bijli v. Emperor A I R 1914 Lah. 142, and it will bear repetition that petitions u/s 491, Cr. P. C. must be forwarded to the Court with utmost expedition. They demand urgency, and laxity in these matters can- not be countenanced. It may be that the officer concerned was under the impression that an application u/s 491, Cr. P. C. did not lie in view of section 10 (1) of the Ordinance but this is no ground for withholding it. It must be pointed out that the power to decide whether a petition addressed to this Court is or is not competent vests in this Court alone. We hope that our calling attention to this kind of behaviour on the part of those concerned ! will suffice and that in future scrupulous care will be exercised by those in charge of forwarding such applications from persons entrusted to their custody. 16. Before we close this judgment we think we ought to make a deference to another application received from the detenu on 6th April, 1945, complaining chat the Jail authorities had transferred him to Central Prison, Agra, on 19th March, 19*5 and had thus removed him from the jurisdiction of this Court. It: was prayed that the Inspector General of Prisons be ordered to transfer the petitioner to Lucknow Jail and that certain facilities for legal advice and filing of documents be granted to him. We are informed that the transfer was made under some mistake and that the applicant has since been brought back to Lucknow. His counsel have in due course filed the documents on which reliance was placed and have given him full assistance. It is, there- fore, not necessary to pass any orders on this application. 17. As we are of opinion that the orders of detention of Laxman Prasad were not passed fraudulently, we dismiss his application u/s 491 Cr. P. C. 18. It is, there- fore, not necessary to pass any orders on this application. 17. As we are of opinion that the orders of detention of Laxman Prasad were not passed fraudulently, we dismiss his application u/s 491 Cr. P. C. 18. The petitioner's learned Counsel has asked us to certify u/s 205 of the Government of India Act that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of that Act and is a fit one for appeal to the Federal Court. No such question has been argued or is, in our opinion, involved. 19. The certificate is accordingly refused.